



2809076969

REFERENCE ONLY**UNIVERSITY OF LONDON THESIS**Degree PhD Year 2006 Name of Author KEMPJerome Edward**COPYRIGHT**

This is a thesis accepted for a Higher Degree of the University of London. It is an unpublished typescript and the copyright is held by the author. All persons consulting the thesis must read and abide by the Copyright Declaration below.

COPYRIGHT DECLARATION

I recognise that the copyright of the above-described thesis rests with the author and that no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author.

LOAN

Theses may not be lent to individuals, but the University Library may lend a copy to approved libraries within the United Kingdom, for consultation solely on the premises of those libraries. Application should be made to: The Theses Section, University of London Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.

REPRODUCTION

University of London theses may not be reproduced without explicit written permission from the University of London Library. Enquiries should be addressed to the Theses Section of the Library. Regulations concerning reproduction vary according to the date of acceptance of the thesis and are listed below as guidelines.

- A. Before 1962. Permission granted only upon the prior written consent of the author. (The University Library will provide addresses where possible).
- B. 1962 - 1974. In many cases the author has agreed to permit copying upon completion of a Copyright Declaration.
- C. 1975 - 1988. Most theses may be copied upon completion of a Copyright Declaration.
- D. 1989 onwards. Most theses may be copied.

This thesis comes within category D.

☐

This copy has been deposited in the Library of UCL

☐

This copy has been deposited in the University of London Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.

The Philosophical Background to Horace's
Satires

Jerome Edward Kemp

Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D.

University College London

2006

UMI Number: U593051

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI U593051

Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

I hereby declare that, except where explicit attribution is given, the work in
this thesis is entirely my own.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'J. M.' followed by a period.

Abstract

In this thesis I aim to elucidate the philosophical content in Horace's *Satires* and to assess its implications for our reading.

In Chapter 1 I briefly discuss past scholarship on the *Satires*, with particular reference to the awareness of the philosophical content. I discuss the nature of ancient ethics, arguing that topics involving the practical side of behaviour were seen in a moral context. In this light I compare Horace with Seneca and Lucretius. I discuss Cynicism and the 'diatribe' in the context of what constitutes philosophy, and give an outline of the intellectual scene in 1st Century B.C. Rome.

Chapters 2 and 3 concern moderation. I argue for an interpretation in a combination of Epicurean and Aristotelian terms, pointing out the interrelation of ideas through a view of moderation as quantitative/ qualitative – as discussed in modern scholarship on Aristotle. In Chapter 4 I argue that Horace promotes an Epicurean position on Friendship, in opposition to Stoic inflexibility, though he has a unique take on Ambition. In Chapter 5 I show that Horace's discussions of Conduct are examples of ancient ethics in a practical context. Chapter 6 concerns Horace's showcasing and criticism of the Stoic paradoxes - in particular his use of Ciceronian material. In Chapter 7, on literary theory, Philodemian and Aristotelian theory are seen to be important, but, in response to recent scholarship, I find Horace's position deliberately evasive. On Religion (Chapter 8), I argue for an Epicurean position, making comparisons between the *Satires* and *Odes*. In Chapter 9 I discuss Horace's use of specific philosophical sources.

The philosophical aspects have considerable, sometimes unexpected, implications for our understanding of the *Satires*. The *Satires* are not philosophical treatises, but a proper awareness of the philosophical material is important in coming to a rounded interpretation of Horace's work.

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	5
Chapter 2: Moderation	41
Chapter 3: Moderation 2	80
Chapter 4: Friendship and Ambition	109
Chapter 5: Good Conduct	147
Chapter 6: Stoic Paradoxes	178
Chapter 7: Literary Theory	214
Chapter 8: Religion and Superstition	247
Chapter 9: Horace's Use of his Philosophical Sources	276
Conclusion	289
Abbreviations	293
Bibliography	295

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1

The prominence of the Hellenistic schools of philosophy in the intellectual activity of Rome in the 1st century B.C. is well known, but the significance of its influence on the contemporary literature has still not been fully realised. While the philosophical content in the poetry of Virgil and Horace, for example, has been noted, its implications have been left open to further exploration and analysis. In the case of Horace, in particular, a certain amount has been said about the philosophical material in the *Epistles*,¹ but the *Satires* have generally received less attention. The commentaries of Wickham and Palmer² note instances where Horace appears to be drawing from philosophical sources, and even more so Lejay's commentary of 1911³ - much of which was later subsumed by Fiske in his substantial study on the correlations between Lucilius and Horace.⁴ And a few decades after that, Fraenkel's and Rudd's analyses⁵ of Horace's *Satires* also address philosophical matters – to an extent - as do the recent commentaries of Brown and Muecke.⁶

However, these studies, although invaluable in terms of indicating philosophical themes and influences, have sometimes fallen short in realising

¹ E.g., on *Epistles* 1.: Campbell (1924, 261-80) points to the book's Stoicism; Moles (1985, 33-60) to its Cynicism; Moles (2002, 141-157) to various philosophical influences; Armstrong (2004, 276-298) points to Philodemus' influence. Mayer, (1986, 55-73) plays down the role of philosophy in the *Epistles*.

² Palmer, 1883 (1st edition, reprinted 1905); Wickham, 1891.

³ Lejay, 1911.

⁴ Fiske, 1920.

⁵ Fraenkel, 1957; Rudd, 1966.

⁶ Brown, 1993; Muecke, 1993.

the extent of these influences and their effect on the poems. Furthermore, although Lejay's and Fiske's works on Horace's *Satires* are, indeed, quite expansive with regard to the philosophical content, the wave of scholarship in Hellenistic philosophy over the last twenty years or so invites a re-appraisal of the philosophical material in Horace (and in classical Latin literature), almost irrespective of scholarship in the subject before this time.

If anything, Fiske's *Lucilius and Horace* is somewhat too expansive, and as a result some of his points on the philosophical material seem unconvincing.⁷ But from the point of view of researching the philosophical background, Fiske's study, because of its fullness, is undoubtedly useful.

Fraenkel's and Rudd's books are now somewhat dated, particularly with regard to the possible influence of Aristotelian and Philodemian literary theory. Brown's and Muecke's commentaries, both published in 1993, are by their nature limited; in any case, since 1993 there has been considerable work done in Hellenistic philosophy – and on Horace – which needs to be taken into account.

A brief look at two examples will tell us something about how past scholarship has contributed to an awareness of the philosophical influences, but also how these contributions deserve fuller exploration, and explanation. An example that appears, and is more fully discussed, in Chapter 3 (§3.6), is Muecke's comment on *Satire* 2.2.79-81, with reference to what is described as "Stoic-Pythagorean doctrine regarding the soul."⁸ Muecke gives references to back up the view that Horace is drawing from Stoic-Pythagorean doctrine, but these references also serve to question the very nature of what, at Horace's time, could be safely labelled as Pythagorean or Stoic doctrine: the assumption that Horace himself would have regarded the notion of the soul being derived from heavenly aether as Pythagorean is questionable, as is to what extent this doctrine can be said to be 'Stoic', when one looks at how far back it went.

⁷ For example, in discussing Horace's *Satire* 1.1, Fiske refers to fragments of Cynic popular philosophy commented upon by Gerhard (1909), where some of the correlations Fiske makes between the fragments and Horace seem very tenuous. (See Chapter 2 §2.3.)

⁸ Muecke, 1993, 125; Rudd, 1966, 171; Palmer, 1883, 267; and Wickham, 1891, 127, also refer to *Phaedo* 83D, where part of this doctrine is found, in their commentaries.

Again, in his analysis of *Satire 2.3*, which concerns the Stoic paradox ‘that all fools are mad,’ Rudd⁹ draws attention to Cicero’s treatment of the paradox in *Tusculan Disputations* 3.7ff where Cicero makes a distinction between *insania* and *furor*, and he notes that Horace deals with both these conditions indiscriminately; but this is as far as Rudd’s comparison goes: he does not look further into the possible implications of a Ciceronian influence on the satire. Rather, he leaves this as an interesting yet unexplored observation. As we will see in Chapter 6, the likelihood of Horace drawing from *Tusculan Disputations* is significant for our understanding of his portrayal of the Stoic argument, and the ways in which he both agreed and fundamentally disagreed with certain Stoic ideas of what constitutes wisdom and insanity.

1.2 The Relationship between Philosophy and Horace’s *Satires*

(i)

It should be clear, then, that in my view a reappraisal of the intellectual influences on Horace’s *Satires* is invaluable if one is to achieve a rounded interpretation. However, there is another question that should be addressed here, at the outset, regarding the relationship between philosophy and Horace’s *Satires*, or, more generally, between philosophy and poetry. A possible line of argument is that Horace’s *Satires* are poems, not philosophical tracts, and thus should not be taken as having much philosophical validity. As must have already become apparent, there can be no doubt that interpreting the poems even in the most general way requires some knowledge of the main ethical themes and viewpoints, and their philosophical context. Furthermore, to some extent the philosophical background is part of the literary background: the two are already entwined.

But this obviously raises the questions: to what extent is the philosophy relevant, and in what way? Some may suggest that the philosophy is relevant in a capacity subsidiary to more identifiably literary concerns,

⁹ Rudd, 1966, 181, 187.

others that the philosophy is of integral importance to the poem's interpretation, as well as being intrinsic to its literary aspects. As to the question: in what way is philosophy relevant? This, again, comprises two approaches. Firstly, in looking at the *Satires* themselves: how is the philosophical content relevant to the structure and interpretation of a particular poem? And secondly: how is the philosophical content relevant in terms of what it tells us about Horace's readership and Roman society at that time? (as well as what it might tell us about Horace).

It is important to clarify the inter-relation between the latter two questions. A proper interpretation of the *Satires* must include an awareness of the prevailing intellectual concerns of the time. While it may be possible to understand the general sense of a poem without regarding its ideology as "philosophical", *not* to recognise it as such would result in the unawareness of important implications (noticeable to a contemporary reader), which would surely amount to an incomplete and therefore flawed interpretation.

With regard to the interpretation of particular satires, one way of analysing the relevance of the philosophical content is in terms of how integral it is to the argument. Also, the philosophical content can be viewed as relevant simply in terms of the extent to which it contributes to the overall message or position of the satire. That said, these concerns must still be weighed against any other intentions within a particular poem; its humour, language, social observation and more exclusively literary aspects are obviously also important.

Alternatively, one could interpret *Satire* 1.1, for example, as concerning discontent and its connection with greed, and be aware that the poem advises moderation, without there being any need, on a *basic* interpretative level, to identify any of these themes as 'philosophical', or to regard them in their philosophical context. However, in a detailed analysis, considering the reasons behind the association of certain themes, the role of the philosophical content (being viewed as such) is seen to be relevant. And, in turn, this may explain the palatability of Horace's arguments (and premises to those arguments) to his contemporary readership.

(ii) What is Philosophy?

But the question which underlies all of the above, and which needs to be addressed first, is: what constitutes philosophy in the first place? More particularly: what constituted philosophy in the 1st Century B.C? To begin with, it is important to bear in mind the difference between the ancient and modern understanding of ethics. In more recent times moral philosophy has become more abstract and certainly less practical, whereas, as Macleod puts it, "Ancient ethics is at once more general and more concrete."¹⁰ Its concern, in essence, was how one ought to live, and it could cover much of what might now come under the heading of 'practical psychology', since it directly and practically sought solutions to everyday psychological and sociological problems, as well as moral problems.

In highlighting the practical application of philosophical doctrine in daily affairs, with reference to *Epistles* 1, Macleod cites two letters from Cicero (*Fam.* 5.13.1-2; 3.7.5).¹¹ In the first example, dealing with the common condition of bereavement, Cicero finds consolation in the Stoic doctrine that the only good is virtue; in the second he appeals to philosophical teachings as a guide to general conduct. In this context Macleod looks at Horace's *Epistle* 1.5 as raising the question of whether the wise man will ever get drunk¹² and, in *Epistles* 1.17 and 1.18,¹³ the question of how one ought to behave in society. Indeed Macleod regards *Epistles* 1.17 and 1.18 as dealing with the same sort of subject discussed by Aristotle on *philia* in books 8 and 9 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. On this reckoning then, concerns about appropriate behaviour, even everyday manners, can be considered as

¹⁰ Macleod, 1983, 281.

¹¹ Macleod, 1983, 281.

¹² cf. *SVF* 1.229, 3.643-4, 712: Macleod, 1983, 282; Macleod, 1986, 15, also comments, that Aristotle, in his lost *Symposium*, stated that the wise man should not be afraid to get drunk at times; also the themes discussed in *Epistle* 1.5 - correct behaviour of the host, use of money, how to deal with the release of inhibitions caused by drink - are subjects which belong to ethics (cf. Plutarch *Moralia* 613 B-C).

¹³ See Chapter 5, §5.2.

philosophical. And, if one accepts the view that 'philosophical' can encompass practical methods and solutions to everyday problems, one will find a good deal of philosophy in Horace's *Satires*. But, more than that, one will also find genuine philosophical theory behind the arguments.

However, in response to Macleod, Mayer argues that the philosophical content in *Epistles* 1 is, in fact, minimal.¹⁴ Although Mayer readily concedes that philosophy at that time could be of practical relevance, he is not convinced that Horace is dealing with philosophical issues to the extent to which Macleod argues he is. Two reasons for this view are: Horace's lack of explicitness (in terms of his reference to philosophical issues), and his inconsistency of philosophical position.

For Mayer,¹⁵ the connection between Horace's inconsistency and his therefore not being, in any serious sense, philosophical, rests on the view that anyone who took philosophy seriously at that time would have been consistently true to a particular sect: even if one were to take Cicero as a possible independent precursor, Cicero was, by his own description, a follower of the New Academy.¹⁶ However, such apparent philosophical allegiance may merely indicate that there was a *tendency* to a particular school and that it was often, in fact, quite nominal, as Glucker has suggested.¹⁷ Glucker, in fact, takes the view that Cicero changed his affiliations twice: from Philo of Larissa's Academic Scepticism to Antiochus' Old Academy and then back to Philonian Scepticism. It is agreed that in the period in which Cicero wrote *De oratore*, *De republica* and *De legibus*, he is more dogmatic and upholds certain Stoic principles (with the former two, in his belief in [virtuous] involvement in public affairs). In *De legibus* he presents the Stoic treatise on natural law as, in his opinion, correct, while at the same time bidding the Sceptics hold their tongue (*Leg.* 1.39). However, that this or his

¹⁴ Mayer, 1986, 55-73. Rudd, 1993, somewhat modifying his position from 1966, takes a similar line to Mayer with regard to philosophical material in Horace.

¹⁵ Mayer, 1986, 58.

¹⁶ This may in part be on the understanding – in a reaction against the formerly more sweeping use of the term eclecticism – that to be credibly engaged in philosophy one is either an eclectic or an adherent to a particular sect, and because eclecticism (in the ancient sense: see below §1.2.[iv]) is so rare, and Horace is not of a particular school, then he is not philosophical.

¹⁷ Glucker, 1988, 35.

more dogmatic preference for certain Stoic precepts at that time indicated a real shift in his affiliations is contested by Görler,¹⁸ who maintains that Cicero, in spite of there being a change in emphasis and agenda in the so-called middle period, remained, essentially, a Sceptic - as indeed had long since been the conventional view. In any event, the debate concerning Cicero's philosophical affiliation, which can still be viewed as consistently Sceptic, though with Stoic, Antiochean leanings, shows that the identification of a philosophical position is often not clear-cut; indeed, part of the Academic-Sceptic position is that one should not be committed to a particular view. Also, while Cicero may be considered to have been a Sceptic throughout, one need only look at the philosophical position of Antiochus, who was officially an Academic but in many respects really a Stoic¹⁹ to see how philosophical affiliation could, indeed, seem nominal. In addition, there were areas of overlap in opinion between philosophical schools which in practical terms made philosophical exclusivity by sect impossible.²⁰

Mayer also points out that Horace's appropriation and advocacy of various philosophical precepts does not cohere as a system, and claims that this suggests that Horace is not seriously engaging in philosophy.²¹ Admittedly, to pursue a particular philosophy, whether following a single school or not, may require adherence to a system, but the lack of a systematic philosophy surely does not preclude the possibility of one's being philosophical. Indeed one could regard Horace's position in *Epistle* 1.1 as, as

¹⁸ Görler, 1995, 85-113, with regard to *De legibus* 1.39, points out that Cicero is careful to concede that any Sceptical doubts will have to be aired at some time (*submovere non audeo...*), and that this indicates that he is still ultimately adhering to Scepticism. He maintains that this temporary silencing is also found in the later works (in the unquestionably Sceptical period), and cites *De legibus* 1.36 (dialogue between Cicero and Atticus) as also indicating Cicero's Scepticism (pg. 103).

¹⁹ Cicero: *Acad.* 2.132: *licetne – omitto per Aristotelen, meo iudicio in philosophia prope singularem – per ipsum Antiochum? qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus.*

²⁰ The exception perhaps being Epicureanism, although there was common ground between the Epicureans and Stoics in epistemology (the Stoics borrowing from the Epicureans): M. Frede, 1999a, 295-6 - and in more general ethical matters (i.e. of popular philosophy) concerning greed and adultery, for example.

²¹ Mayer, 1986, 64.

yet, philosophically undecided: he is open to various options, in the hope of arriving at such a system.²²

The possibility of Bion as a precursor to Horace, in terms of propounding an independent philosophy, is also momentarily suggested by Mayer, but is then dismissed on the grounds of insufficient evidence.²³ Bion of Borysthenes (c. 325-255) was a practitioner of the ‘diatribe’, and several of Horace’s satires are indebted to this tradition (often referred to as the “‘diatribe’ Satires”: 1.1-3; 2.2, 3, 7).

Whether or not the ‘diatribe’ was recognised as a literary genre at that time is irrelevant to this discussion: the important point here is that there existed before (and after) Horace a tradition of public street sermons, usually covering themes of popular philosophy (such as the folly of greed, adultery and ambition). The ‘diatribe’ was humorous, indeed satirical, employing the device of *spoudaiogeloion* (‘joking in earnest’) which is likely to have been derived from the Cynics.²⁴ Fragments of Bion’s works are found in Teles (c.235 B.C.), another practitioner of the form, though the extant evidence of the diatribe, particularly in its origins, is limited. However, from what has survived it seems that the diatribe often included an anonymous interlocutor; and it was colloquial, avoiding systematic, logical argument,²⁵ and included devices such as fable, obscenity and parody.²⁶ Thus a link between the diatribe and Roman satire, which shares all of these features, is clear.²⁷ Furthermore, Horace himself called his *Satires* ‘*Bionei Sermones*’ (*Epistles* 2.2.60): *sermo* being the Latin equivalent of the Greek word *diatribē*, at least, this is the term used by Diogenes Laertius (2.77) to describe Bion’s speeches²⁸ (irrespective of the etymology of the word diatribe). Thus it would seem that Bion should in fact be regarded as a *very likely* precursor to Horace, both in terms of his elusive philosophical position and as a practitioner of the diatribe. Also,

²² So Campbell, 1924, 262, who nevertheless thinks that Horace in fact tends to Panaetian Stoicism in *Epistles* 1.

²³ Mayer, 1986, 58.

²⁴ Demetrius of Phalerum. *De Elocut.* 261: πᾶν τὸ εἶδος τοῦ κυνικοῦ λόγου σαίνοντι ἅμα ἔοικε τῇ καὶ δάκνοντι.: Oltramare, 1926, 15.

²⁵ Brown, 1993, 5; Kenney, 1971, 17-20; R.D. Brown, 1987, 137-9.

²⁶ Brown, 1993, 5.

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ Moles, *OCD*, 2003, 463-464

although the evidence of Bion's work is scanty, some opinions as to his philosophical persuasions or, indeed, his very lack of a philosophical system,²⁹ suggest further similarities with Horace: Bion is generally regarded as a Cynic,³⁰ but he also attended the Academy under Crates the Academic, as well as the Cyrenaic school under Theodorus, and the Peripatos under Theophrastus.³¹

Horace's explicit championship of Homer over Chrysippus as a moral guide (*Epistle* 1.2.1-4) – i.e., poetry over philosophy – is also regarded by Mayer as showing Horace's disavowal of a philosophical agenda. But it may in fact denote otherwise: the Stoics themselves liked to claim Homer as an important philosophical precursor,³² so this apparent slight against Chrysippus is not necessarily at odds with Stoicism. But in fact, what seems more probable is that Horace has in mind Philodemus' essay *On the good King in Homer*, in which Philodemus discusses Homer's characterisations of kings as moral *exempla*, and thus the slight against Chrysippus is an indication of this Epicurean influence.³³

Mayer³⁴ also makes the point that much of Horace's language is not explicitly philosophical – he avoids using technical terms that would be recognisably applicable to philosophical doctrine. Mayer does not regard *recte vivere* (*Epistles* 1.2.41, 6.29 and 8.4) as especially indicating an ethical concern, and sees the fifth letter as concerning “appropriate conduct” – as opposed to Macleod who identifies the subject as philosophical.³⁵ But the point here is not really whether or not the letter concerns “appropriate conduct”, but whether appropriate conduct should be viewed as a philosophical topic or not, or as evidence for Horace advocating philosophical

²⁹ So Sharples, 1978, 179: “he may have taught a philosophy of life, though not in a systematic way.”

³⁰ So Kindstrand, 1976; Branham and Goulet-Cazé, 1996, 11: Bion's Cynicism, though, was less radical than Diogenes', and thus has been called “hedonizing Cynicism”. For this reason he could perhaps be regarded as an eclectic (so Fiske, 1920, 185; Dudley, 1937, 65).

³¹ D.L. 4.51-2.

³² e.g. Balbus' speech: Cicero, *ND* 2.63-72: Schenkeveld, 1999, 221.

³³ Armstrong, 2004, 277-279.

³⁴ Mayer, 1986, 60.

³⁵ e.g. with regard to *Epistles* 1.5, 9, 17 and 18: Macleod, 1983, 282.

precepts.³⁶ Again, Mayer³⁷ prefers not to read *decens* (*Ep.* 1.1.11) as pertaining to any particularly philosophical notion, and is critical of the tendency to connect this with the Ciceronian *decorum* (appropriateness) which Cicero used to correspond with the Panaetian *to prepon* (*De Officiis* 1.128). However, if one interprets the following lines 1.16-19, as explicitly suggesting philosophy - Stoicism and Cyrenaicism – then *decens*, in that context, *does*, in fact, look rather Panaetian; and this is in spite of the fact that, as Mayer points out, *decens* (or *deceat*, *decorum*) is a very common word and appears in non-philosophical contexts in the *Odes*. In fact it may rather be that Horace does not want to *appear* to be too philosophically dogmatic, nor want to detract from the *Epistles*' colloquial style; it does not mean that the *Epistles* are not philosophical (or only minimally so). And, as will see in Chapter 5, appropriate conduct can certainly be viewed as an ethical subject in the *Satires*.³⁸

(iii) The example of Cynicism

Whether Bion is regarded as essentially Cynic or not, with regard to the question of what constitutes philosophy it is worth considering whether Cynicism should in fact be described as a philosophy at all. Cynicism is notable for its lack of *dogmata* and *telos* (despite later rectifications, where its *telos* was said to be life according to virtue: D.L. 6.104), and rejection of all intellectual culture, thus setting it apart from the other Hellenistic schools (indeed it cannot even be classed as a school, in the sense that lectures were not given in a certain place).³⁹ Its negative approach could nevertheless be regarded as consistent, although it can be seen as falling short of propounding

³⁶ As to the *Epistles* being about life, not philosophy: "the dichotomy is false. The *Epistles* are about *recte vivere* as interpreted by different philosophies." (Moles, 2002, 149.)

³⁷ Mayer, 1986, 59.

³⁸ Although this debate between Macleod and Mayer deals with *Epistles* 1, Mayer also largely underplays philosophical content in Horace's *Satires* (Mayer, 2005, 146-159).

³⁹ Branham and Goulet-Cazé: 1996, 2.

an ethical system because of its lack of *telos*.⁴⁰ But, in spite of this, Mayer in fact mentions Cynicism as a worthy philosophical choice for the Augustan Roman (along with the other Hellenistic Schools), albeit for the “drop-out.”⁴¹

On the other hand Hippobotus,⁴² the Greek philosophical historian (late 3rd – early 2nd century B.C.) apparently did not regard Cynicism as a philosophical school (it is not mentioned in his list of *haereseis* in D.L. 1.19-20) and, in antiquity there were some who regarded it not as a philosophy but as a way of life (D.L. 6.103). Other critics of Cynicism who seemed to doubt its philosophical status were Galen, who refers to it as a shortcut to conceit,⁴³ and Lucian: a shortcut to notoriety (*Vitarum Auctio* 11); this was because the Stoic Apollodorus of Seleucia called Cynicism a shortcut to virtue: D.L. 7.121.

But, as already indicated, in their very rejection of intellectual culture and their lack of *dogmata* and *telos*,⁴⁴ the Cynics can still be regarded as consistent, and this may suggest a kind of dogma in itself. Their negative position consists of a rejection of custom (D.L. 6.72-3) culture (D.L. 6.73) and, indeed, of traditional philosophy (D.L. 6.64). Also, one could further argue that the important guiding principles of Cynicism – adherence to nature over custom, and self-sufficiency - could be regarded as a basic dogma. In any event, in taking a negative position against other philosophical systems they can be seen as engaging in philosophical debate in a consistent way, and in this respect Cynicism can indeed be regarded as a philosophy. Although Horace does not explicitly propound a *telos* himself in the *Satires*, which would more easily identify him with a particular school, the Epicurean goals of freedom from care (*ataraxia*), and ultimately pleasure (*hēdonē*) could certainly be seen as a goal in *Satires* 1.1-3, 5, 6; 2.2 and 2.6.

To mention Epicureanism in the context of Cynicism may seem incongruous bearing in mind the fact that the Epicureans aimed much of their

⁴⁰ Mayer, 1986, 59, states that ethics should be a consistent pursuit of a single goal (e.g. well being, pleasure, virtue).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² He was the author of works entitled *περὶ αἱρέσεων* and *τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀναγραφή*.

⁴³ Galen, *De Peccatorum Dignotione* 3.12-13 = vol. 5, p. 71 Kühn.

⁴⁴ Branham and Goulet-Cazé, 1996, 21-4.

polemic against the Cynics.⁴⁵ Indeed the Cynics are more readily aligned with the Stoics than the Epicureans:⁴⁶ Zeno, the founder of the Stoics, having been a pupil of the Cynic Crates. And the Stoic Epictetus spoke favourably of Cynicism, and regarded it as embodying, in a sense, a worthy practical application of philosophy.⁴⁷ Indeed Stoicism, in some respects, could be regarded as a systemisation of Cynicism, even though the Stoics Panaetius and Posidonius found the Cynic style, its disregard of modesty and *decorum*, objectionable.⁴⁸

But in fact there were certain points of similarity between the Cynics and Epicureans – some of which are relevant to Horace's *Satires*. These include:⁴⁹ the attitude to the teaching of philosophy itself – in the practical importance of memorising the tenets (D.L. 6.31, 48; cf. D.L. 10.12, 15, 35, 36, 83, 85); the role of *tuchē* (D.L. 6.38, 63, 105; cf. *KD* 16, *Men.* 10.131): that one should be strong in the face of the vicissitudes of life, aware that one is also powerless to determine what these vicissitudes may be.⁵⁰ In *Satires* 2.2, the rustic *sapiens* Ofellus advocates moderation and, at 126 and 135-6 sets this way of life against the changeability of fortune, thus evoking the view expressed at *Men.* 131:⁵¹

saeviat atque novos moveat Fortuna tumultus. (126)

let fortune seethe and stir up fresh problems. (tr. Muecke 1993)

⁴⁵ Gigante lists certain Epicurean sentiments as showing that some material acquisition is necessary D.L. 10.119, 120a *καὶ κτήσεως προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος* 120b, and are thus at odds with the Cynic idea of (practically) total self-sufficiency (Gigante, Naples 1992, 35-6); Among these Gigante lists *φιλαργήσῃν* ([the wise man] will be fond of the country) as being anti-Cynic, as a source of wealth (in the sense of procurement of the fruits of the earth), though surely this would not be the kind of wealth – or lack of self-sufficiency – of which the Cynics would disapprove.

⁴⁶ *SVF* iii 638.

⁴⁷ In one discourse (3.22) Epictetus depicts the ideal Cynic as a missionary for Stoicism Long, 2002, 58-59.

⁴⁸ See below, Chapter 5, §5.2.

⁴⁹ Gigante, 1992, 64-69.

⁵⁰ cf. below, on *Fortuna* in *Ode* 1.34: Chapter 8, §8.4.; cf. also the Cynics, D.L. 6.105 and Horace, *Odes* 1.11.8.

⁵¹ "To habituate oneself, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune." (tr. Hicks, 1925).

..... *quocirca vivite fortes*
fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus. (135-6)

therefore live bravely, and confront adversity with brave hearts.
(tr. Muecke 1993)

There are also similar views expressed in the Cynic and Epicurean attitude to prayer (D.L 6.42; cf. fr 388 Usener) where both schools criticise the tendency for people's prayers to be selfish, which is relevant to Horace's non-petitionary hymns in the *Odes*, and his sceptical views on religion generally, as discussed in Chapter 8. The Cynic and Epicurean positions on sex and death are also not far removed from each other. In the case of sex and erotic love both schools are critical of the idea of falling in love, opting for an approach which favours as little trouble as possible (D.L. 6.6, cf. D.L. 10.118). This view, also taken up with rhetorical verve by Lucretius in book 4, lies behind *Satires* 1.2, where Horace promotes this general attitude through, in part, a merging of Cynic and Epicurean material.⁵² In addition, if one considers Horace's argument on greed and discontent in *Sat.* 1.1, and his mainly Epicurean attitude towards religion in the *Satires* generally, the attitude to death expressed by the Cynics and Epicureans is also pertinent. The fear of death, which both Cynics and Epicureans find logically objectionable, (D.L.6.68 cf. D.L. 10.25, Lucretius 3 *passim*) is an implicit ingredient in the social diseases of discontent (*mempsimoiria*), competitive go-getting (*pleonexia*) and greed (*avaritia*) in 1.1, and seems also to lie behind superstitious behaviour at *Sat.* 2.3.281-295. Other points of similarity between the two schools noted by Gigante are their disapproval of rhetoric (D.L. 6.47, cf. D.L.10.118), and of tyrants and tyranny (D.L. 6.50, cf. D.L.10.119), though these are less directly relevant to Horace's *Satires* - but for his advocacy of an apolitical life in *Satire* 1.6.

Furthermore, Bion's influence is an important factor in bringing Cynicism and hedonism together (though Bion's hedonism was Cyrenaic

⁵² See Chapter 2, §2.3.

rather than Epicurean). Indeed although Philodemus, a prominent 1st century B.C. Epicurean, would disagree with Cynic asceticism (though Bion, as a milder, ‘hedonising’ Cynic would be less rigid in this respect) and their theological position,⁵³ he is also seen to be influenced in certain respects by Bion and the so-called Cynic-Stoic diatribe.⁵⁴ In any case, if Cynicism is to be regarded as philosophy, and the diatribe philosophical, which, I believe, they can be, then Horace’s *Satires*, some of which are seen to consist of theoretical argumentation and association of themes, must surely also be regarded as philosophical. In fact, Horace could be said to be propounding a relatively coherent ethical system in his ‘diatribe’ satires, in spite of their apparently casual, almost inconsequential structure.

(iv) Eclecticism and Seneca

Although Bion is generally regarded as a Cynic, the variety of philosophical sources which shaped his particular brand of Cynicism has resulted in his being labelled by some as eclectic,⁵⁵ a label which has also been attached to Horace.⁵⁶ However, if one accepts the particular definition of eclecticism - that it is a *consistent philosophical system* based upon doctrines from various schools - then actual instances of eclecticism would seem to be rare. There appear to be only three examples of eclecticism, as explicitly described as such, in antiquity,⁵⁷ which may suggest that the term is too narrow to warrant its application to anyone else. On the other hand, more generally, eclecticism could be applied to the practice of forming an outlook drawn from the precepts of various schools, irrespective of whether that outlook is itself

⁵³ Diels, 1917, 26; Gigante, 1992, 107 n.51.

⁵⁴ In his essays on *Anger*, *Frank Criticism* and *Death* Philodemus uses rhetorical methods associated with the diatribe – poetic citation, examples, the folly of human behaviour: Gigante, 1992, 106-113. See below Chapter 1, §1.4 (iii).

⁵⁵ See above, n. 30.

⁵⁶ Maguinness, 1938, 27-46, as cited by Rudd, 1993, 64.

⁵⁷ Donini, 1988, 16, cites as eclectics Potamo of Alexandria, who founded an eclectic school (D.L. 1.21), the Christian writer Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* 1.37.6); Galen refers to a medical school as *eklektikē*, (Kühn 14.684; 19.353).

systematic or explicitly professed as eclectic, and in this sense the term eclectic could certainly be attributed to Horace.

Horace did not explicitly profess an allegiance to a particular school, and in this respect he clearly differs from Seneca whose overriding sympathies were undoubtedly Stoic,⁵⁸ but in their drawing from diverse sources, both Seneca and Horace could be regarded as eclectic. Indeed Seneca is explicit about the diversity of his philosophical influences; in *De Brevitate Vitae* 14.2 Seneca says:

*disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicuro
quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis
excedere.*

We may argue with Socrates, we may doubt with Carneades, find peace with Epicurus, overcome human nature with the Stoics, exceed it with the Cynics.⁵⁹

Again, in *Epistle* 12.11:

*"Epicurus" inquis "dixit: quid tibi cum alieno?" Quod verum est
meum est.*

"Epicurus," you reply, "uttered these words: what are you doing with another's property?" What is true is my own property.⁶⁰

So Seneca claims that Epicureanism can be as relevant to his individual philosophy as (one would suppose) Stoicism, if it is seen to be getting at 'the truth'. In fact, Epicurus is the philosopher that Seneca mentions most in his prose writings.⁶¹

⁵⁸ e.g.: in respect of self-discipline, serving one's fellow men, and following Nature and God. *Ep.* 58.27; *De Clem.* 2.5.3; *De Vita Beata* 3.3: Motto and Clark, 1968, 38-42.

⁵⁹ Tr. Basore, 1932.

⁶⁰ Tr. Gummere, 1925/ 1967 (adapted).

⁶¹ Motto and Clark, 1968, 39.

When it comes to popular ethics, to matters concerning greed, ambition, sensual pleasures and the path to inner contentment, there is much common ground between the Hellenistic schools, including the Stoics and Epicureans. Indeed, although the Epicureans can be seen as philosophically exclusive in the sense that much of their doctrine was incompatible with other schools,⁶² on certain principles of ethics which could be described as pertaining to moderation in general, they were essentially in tune with the Stoics.⁶³ One could claim that in the sphere of popular ethics, which forms much of the philosophical material in the *Satires* (as well as Seneca's *Epistles*) Horace's criticism of Stoicism is often more to do with their style than the substance of their ethical doctrine.⁶⁴ In response to Seneca's occasional advocacy of Epicurean doctrine, Frede tells us to bear in mind the "pastoral" (his own inverted commas) nature of much of his writing⁶⁵ - an epithet which would certainly apply to Horace. But Seneca's pro-Epicurean moments are nevertheless genuine, even though his advocacy of Epicureanism is deliberately selective so that it is compatible with his Stoicism.⁶⁶ his aim in these instances is to highlight the similarities between the schools. A further point made by Frede is that Seneca's Epicurean, or non-Stoic episodes can sometimes be explained by the philosophical persuasion of his addressee,⁶⁷ which is also applicable to Horace.⁶⁸ But the important point is that in what he has actually written, Seneca - like Horace - certainly *does* appropriate different philosophical viewpoints, and does so quite unequivocally.

Seneca's *Epistles* are concerned with the practical application of moral philosophy⁶⁹ and are relatively colloquial, at least by comparison with his treatises. Although Seneca's *Epistles* are thematic, their structure is not necessarily logical, and they develop by an association of ideas rather than

⁶² Frede, 1999b, 786.

⁶³ Cf. above, note 20.

⁶⁴ E.g. in their apparent extreme self-righteousness, exemplified by his criticism of the Stoic Paradoxes in 1.3, 2.3 and 2.7

⁶⁵ Frede, 1999b, 786.

⁶⁶ e.g. he cites Epicurus at: *Epistles* 2.5, 8.7, 9.20, 12.1, to highlight similarities between the Stoics and Epicureans: Motto and Clark, 1968, 38-42.

⁶⁷ Frede, 1999b, 786.

⁶⁸ With reference to *Odes* 1.20 and 2.3: Nisbet and Hubbard vol.ii, 1978, 2.

⁶⁹ This tendency towards the practical application of philosophy to life is continued, in the Stoic tradition, by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius: Frede, 1999b, 779-80.

through systematic argument.⁷⁰ Again, this may owe something to the influence of the diatribe. He raises the topic of greed and ambition on a number of occasions (e.g. *Ep.* 17, 87.23ff, 94.60ff, 108.11ff, 110.14ff, 115.10).⁷¹ In this respect his sentiments are similar to those of Bion and, indeed, Horace.⁷² And, in *Epistle* 28 Seneca apparently has Horace's *Epistle* 1.11 in mind: he alludes to it in the first paragraph: *animum debes mutare, non caelum*: cf. *Ep.* 1.11.27: *caelum non animum, mutant*.⁷³

Seneca's *Epistles*, in spite of their humour, colloquialism and literary and rhetorical technique, are regarded as philosophical: their overall purpose is to address particular moral issues, and in so doing they draw on philosophical doctrine. So why are Horace's *Satires* not also (generally) regarded as philosophical? One reason could be that Seneca also wrote philosophical treatises, so there is perhaps a readiness to regard his less rigidly philosophical works as philosophical too, whereas Horace did not; but then some of Seneca's other writings would appear to be relatively non-philosophical (as one could claim with regard to many of Horace's *Odes*), such as his tragedies (in spite of their Stoic aspects); indeed, if one looks at Horace's works as a whole, the 'philosophical' *Satires* and *Epistles* account for more than half, by which reckoning one might assume that the non-philosophical aspect in Horace's *Satires* and *Epistles* is greater than that in Seneca's *Epistles*. On balance, this may be true, but the comparison still raises the question of why Horace's *Satires* are not, in themselves, regarded as philosophical. The other reason may simply be because they are poems.

⁷⁰ Coleman, 1974, 288.

⁷¹ Coleman, 1974, 283.

⁷² Also, on the folly of blaming one's faults on external circumstances: Horace *Sat.* 1.1, *Epistles* 1.11; Teles (p.86 Hense) who draws from Bion; Seneca *Epistle* 50.1.

⁷³ Coleman, 1974, 289: "The verse *Epistles* of Horace on moral themes are in many respects the closest precedent we have in extant literature for what Seneca was doing in prose."

(v) Poetry, Philosophy and Lucretius

The suggestion that poetry, by its very nature, cannot be regarded as a serious means of philosophical communication, begs a comparison with Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura*: the most obvious example of philosophy written to a metre, and, indeed, a major influence on Horace's *Satires*. Importantly, too, it seems that sections of *DRN* were also influenced by the diatribe tradition.⁷⁴ Indeed, in his discussion of the satirical element in Lucretius, Dudley draws attention to Lucretius' use of humour,⁷⁵ metaphor,⁷⁶ to how he exposes the ridiculousness of human behaviour,⁷⁷ and to the likely influence of Lucilius at the end of book 4.⁷⁸ The satirical tone at the end of book 3 (830-fin), comprising Lucretius' argument against the fear of death, is also of particular relevance to Horace's *Satires*, both in terms of its imagery and ideology.⁷⁹

The influence of didactic poetry (going back to Hesiod) and of the philosophical poets, Parmenides and Empedocles,⁸⁰ on Lucretius is clear, but Lucretius' literary sources are varied: in book 4, for example, he draws from erotic Greek epigram,⁸¹ Greek Bucolic poetry⁸² and drama.⁸³ But *De Rerum Natura*, in spite of its being poetry, and its various literary dimensions and

⁷⁴ R.D. Brown, 1987, 137-9; Kenney, 1971, 17; Dudley, 1965, 124-5.

⁷⁵ e.g.: In stating that men, in their ignorance, erroneously used to poison themselves, whereas nowadays they poison each other on purpose (5.1009-10).

⁷⁶ e.g.: in 4.858-76, on hunger and thirst: hunger being caused by a loss of atoms from the body. The body is described in terms of its being a building: being undermined (*subruitur*) and needing support (*suffulciat*): Godwin, 1986, 5.

⁷⁷ As in the attack on erotic love, and the intimation of what goes on behind closed doors in a lady's quarters (4.1175-6).

⁷⁸ Dudley, 1965, 124, notes striking similarities between, for example, 4.1133-7, 1071 and frs.1157 and 1160 W of Lucilius.

⁷⁹ See Chapter 2, §2.3.

⁸⁰ Kenney, 1971, 14: Empedocles is actually eulogised at l. 716-33. Parmenides: *DRN*: 1.925-6 cf. Parmenides Proem (Frag. 1.27): Kenney, 1970, 370.

⁸¹ Kenney, 1970, 380-88, notes Lucretius' drawing from the imagery of erotic Greek epigram, and cites Meleager's *Garland*, in particular.: e.g. of being wounded by love (1048) cf. Meleager *Garland*, (*Palatine Anthology* V 189, 3-4) of love's weapons (*DRN* 1053 cf. Meleager: love's 'bow and arrows': *Palatine Anthology* V 177, 9-10; 215, 3-1).

⁸² i.e. Theocritus: see Chapter 2, §2.7.

⁸³ See Chapter 6, §6.6.

influences, is still, in its exposition and promotion of Epicureanism, a philosophical work. Even if the philosophical component of the *Satires* is less explicit and systematic than in Lucretius, it is certainly there, and should not be discounted any more than the literary component should be in Lucretius.

It is clear, in fact, with regard to the *Satires*, *De Rerum Natura* and Seneca's *Epistles*, that this relationship between the philosophical and the literary is an important one to gauge when attempting to come to a considered interpretation of a particular work as a whole. Even if one's main concern is literary or historical, the philosophical element must still be recognised as serving an important purpose and, indeed, connected to these other concerns. For Seneca and Lucretius, the overall aim could be described as philosophical in that they are both propounding philosophical opinions in a relatively systematic way. In the *Satires* the emphasis, generally, is to expose the folly of human behaviour, rather than to promote systematic solutions to it. Nevertheless, in individual satires definite philosophical positions are adopted, and an underlying thread of ideas, effected by the association of philosophical themes, is identifiable. Furthermore, in those *Satires* where the philosophical content is less pronounced, its recognition is no less important in gaining a full interpretation, and in ascertaining the intellectual tastes and concerns of the contemporary readership, as well as of the poet.

1.3 *Satire* 1.2: A case in point

A debate over the interpretation of *Satire* 1.2 centres on the question of whether or not these satires are really philosophical. *Satire* 1.2 will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, and in a slightly different context, but an overview of this debate will demonstrate the sorts of issues pertinent to judging the relevance of the philosophical content in the *Satires* generally.

Baldwin, Bushala, Dessen, Curran and Mayer⁸⁴ essentially play down the philosophical aspects of *Satire* 1.2, unlike Fraenkel, Rudd (1966),

⁸⁴ Baldwin, 1970, 460-5; Bushala, 1971, 312-5; Curran, 1970, 220-45; C. Dessen, 1968, 200-8; Mayer, 2005, 146-159.

Armstrong and Brown.⁸⁵ Baldwin⁸⁶ and Curran⁸⁷ are explicit in their disagreement with previous interpretations where, in their opinion, there has been a tendency to associate the poem too much with a philosophical argument. As Baldwin states: "If any affinities are sought, Ovid's *Ars Amatoria* is a better place to look than philosophical diatribes against physical passion."⁸⁸ He also regards the poem as having little to do with the doctrine of the mean⁸⁹ - unlike Fraenkel, Rudd and Brown. Curran is similarly critical of the tendency to look at *Sat* 1.2 with a view to determining a philosophical argument: "We do violence to the poetic integrity of 1.2 ... when we try to extract a systematic argument from it."⁹⁰ But there is a pre-supposition here, which in my view is flawed, that the satire's philosophical credibility must rely on the existence of systematic argument. As Curran would no doubt maintain, the poem is *not* a philosophical tract, and yet it is almost as if he were initially judging it as such in order to prove it not to be, so forming the premise, in the first two pages of his article, that the poem has no effective philosophical argument and is therefore not philosophical. While it is clear that the poem is not a formal philosophical tract, this does not preclude its argument - which in fact does exist - casual and unsystematic as it may appear, from having a philosophical basis.

In fact, Baldwin's reference to "philosophical diatribes"⁹¹ suggests that the poem, in its apparently unsystematic argument, *may* still be regarded as philosophical anyway (though Baldwin dismisses the diatribe as a worthwhile comparison). At least, if one is prepared to describe a diatribe as philosophical, then systematic argument is not a prerequisite for *Satire* 1.2's being philosophical. From what can be deduced from the minimal evidence, the 'diatribe' was, if anything, noted for being *unsystematic*, and even illogical, as we have seen. Indeed, it may be that Horace's 'datribes' are

⁸⁵ Fraenkel, 1957, 79; Rudd, 1966, 10-11; Armstrong, 1964, 86-96; Brown, 1993, 100-101; However, as already mentioned, Rudd, 1993, plays down the philosophical material in Horace generally.

⁸⁶ Baldwin, 1970, 460.

⁸⁷ Curran, 1970, 221.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*

⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁹⁰ Curran, 1970, 220.

⁹¹ Baldwin, 1970, 460.

more logical and systematic than the earlier Greek prototypes. If one is to describe a diatribe as “philosophical” (as Baldwin does) because of adherence to *some* argument, (whether systematic or not) then one should certainly describe *Satire* 1.2 as philosophical.

In fact, there are philosophical themes and allusions in 1.2 which do point to a reasonably systematic argument, and it is unclear why the identification of such an argument should in any way damage its “poetic integrity”, as Curran fears it would. Surely an appreciation of the poem’s argument would enrich its interpretation, rather than detract from it. That said, Curran does in fact discuss the role of nature, which he regards as being expressed in Epicurean terms and imagery, as being the satire’s most important philosophical theme.⁹² Both Baldwin and Curran comment on the apparent influence of Lucretius, and, in this regard too, Baldwin plays down the philosophical aspect of this influence. Although Horace’s position with regard to sex seems similar to Lucretius’ and there are several linguistic similarities,⁹³ Baldwin views this as simply advocating an anti-elegiac position, rather than its having any philosophical significance. There is no doubt that Horace, like Lucretius, does take an anti-elegiac position,⁹⁴ but there is surely philosophical reasoning behind this, in both Lucretius and Horace.

While Bushala⁹⁵ recognises the structure of the poem’s argument as an issue, and, in some respects, a philosophical issue,⁹⁶ he regards Horace’s categorisations as to suitability of sexual partner simply as a vehicle for making the overall point that what is important for men is not the kind of sexual partner they choose, but the kind of relationship they have (whatever the partner).

⁹² Curran (1970, 229-239) makes a good observation in noting references to clothing as symbolising custom, and obscenity as symbolising nature.

⁹³ Baldwin (1970, 461) mentions, for example, Horace’s adoption of the Lucretian – *ier* ending of the present passive infinitive, e.g. *laudarier* (35), *sectarier* (78), and *avellier* (104).

⁹⁴ See Chapter 2 §2.3.

⁹⁵ Bushala, 1971, 312-5.

⁹⁶ Bushala views “the motif of sexual choice” as perhaps deriving in part from philosophical sources (he cites a similar categorisation in Plato *Laws* 8.841d, e and, with reference to the Cynic Crates, in Diogenes Laertius 6.88-9). Also, as noted by Cichorius (1908, 158-163) and Fiske (1920, 248-251) Bushala points out that the same categorisation of sexual choice is found in Lucilius (see below, Chapter 2 §2.3).

Dessen's interpretation of the poem does, in fact, adhere to the structure of an argument drawn from the doctrine of the mean. However, although Dessen attempts to identify a mean (a sexual and financial mean), she does not comment on the possible relevance of the Aristotelian doctrine, or seek to put Horace's rendering of the doctrine in any sort of philosophical context.

Most recently, Mayer does not regard the mean in 1.2 as necessarily philosophical:⁹⁷ "Horace never plays the Aristotle card to play the trick." However, Horace's terminology, where *vitia* = excess/vice, does seem to be much more identifiably Aristotelian than the vaguer applications of the mean in the poetic tradition.⁹⁸ Mayer's comment that Horace does not appeal to philosophical authority or refer to philosophical argument again recalls Curran's views of what a philosophical satire ought to look like: a philosophical treatise. Are we to think that *Sat.* 1.5.101, for example, is not Epicurean because Horace does not actually mention Lucretius or explicitly refer to philosophical argument on religion?

In my opinion, the dismissal of Horace's categorisation of type of sexual partner as an explicit reference to Aristotle's doctrine of the mean - at least with regard to gauging Horace's real message - is flawed. The initial categorisations by type⁹⁹ (*Sat.* 1.2.28-36, 47) are not a red-herring but form an important stepping stone in the argument's progression. The argument, in essence, runs as follows: when it comes to *type*: avoid frequenting seedy prostitutes, or getting involved with married women (28-36); stick to a middle of the road, available *libertina* or *meretrix* (47). But (the argument continues) that said, avoid infatuation (a misguided and excessive attitude to sex *per se*) with women of any kind, whether *matronae*, *libertinae* or brothel-prostitutes. The best course, the mean is, in the qualitative (type) sense, sex with *meretrices* or *libertinae*, and in the quantitative sense, a dispassionate, casual

⁹⁷ Mayer, 2005, 150. Rudd, 1993, does not see the mean as necessarily Aristotelian, but as a commonplace. This modifies his 1966 position where he referred to Horace's abandonment of 'the Aristotelian framework' (see below, Chapter 2, §2.5). Its being a commonplace does not, however, rule out its also being Aristotelian.

⁹⁸ See below, Chapter 2, §§2.1, 2.5 (i).

⁹⁹ In Chapter 2, in the discussion of *Sat.* 1.2, a distinction is made in Horace's argument between type of sexual partner (qualitative) and *amount* of sex, sexual desire (quantitative).

attitude to sex itself. Through what could be regarded as an Epicurean framework Horace merges these two sets of criteria (which had been presented initially in an Aristotelian framework) to advise this overall mean in the second half of the poem.

Thus the interconnection between Epicureanism, Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, and, as will become clear in Chapter 2, modern debate on the doctrine of the mean, is crucial to grasping the association between type of sexual partner and attitude/ behaviour, and our interpretation of the poem as a whole. The role of philosophy is therefore fundamentally important in interpreting the poetry where philosophical themes do, in fact, dictate the argument.

1.4 The Historical Background to the Intellectual Activity of 1st Century B.C.

Rome

(i)

In order to discuss the philosophical aspects of the *Satires*, mindful of how these aspects would be received by an audience in Horace's time, we need to look at the background to Rome's intellectual scene in the 1st Century B.C. By this time Rome was undoubtedly a major philosophical centre. Athens' dominance was certainly secure until the latter half of the second century B.C.: until then philosophers would come to Athens (if they were not Athenian) and would generally stay there.¹⁰⁰ Indeed Athens' importance as a philosophical centre at that time is clear from the fact that philosophers were averse to the idea of leaving Athens, in spite of attractive requests to live at court.¹⁰¹ The embassy sent to Rome in 155 B.C., consisting of three scholars - the Academic Carneades, the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and the Peripatetic Critolaus - which was perhaps partly intended as a means of stamping Athens' intellectual superiority over Rome, in fact almost seems to

¹⁰⁰ Frede, 1999b, 790.

¹⁰¹ For example, Zeno declined the offer of joining the court of Antigonos, sending Persaeus instead (D.L. 7.6-9); Cleanthes declined Ptolemy's offer of going to Alexandria, as did Chrysippus (D.L. 7.185): Frede, 1999b, 791.

foreshadow the diminution of Athens' philosophical dominance, and the emergence of Rome and other places such as Alexandria and Rhodes.¹⁰² With particular regard to Rome, it is notable that the Stoic Panaetius left Athens for about fifteen years, during which time he associated with the intellectual group around Scipio Aemilianus,¹⁰³ (sometime between 146 and 120 B.C.) returning to Athens to take his place as scholar.

Increasingly, from the beginning of the 2nd century B.C. onwards, after Rome's conquest of the Greek world, there was an influx into Rome of Greek culture generally – Greek scholars often being employed as tutors in Roman households¹⁰⁴ – and Roman intellectuals adopted the then prominent schools of philosophy from Greece: i.e., the Hellenistic Schools: Stoicism, Epicureanism and Academic Scepticism. The prominence of the Hellenistic schools certainly persisted into the 1st Century B.C. in spite of the rumblings of a revival of Platonism and Aristotelianism starting as early, perhaps, as the end of the second century B.C.¹⁰⁵ But it was perhaps not really until Sulla's sack of Athens in 86 in the first Mithridatic War, and the ensuing disbanding of the Peripatetic school, that Rome became as important a centre for philosophy as Athens: indeed the Romans ransacked the libraries of the Peripatos, taking newly found works of Aristotle and Theophrastus back to Rome.¹⁰⁶ Frede remarks that, although it was still customary in the 1st Century B.C. for well-to-do Romans to send their sons to Athens for a philosophical education¹⁰⁷ (Cicero sent his son to Athens, where he was an

¹⁰² Frede, 1999b, 791.

¹⁰³ On the 'Scipionic Circle', see below, §1.4 (v).

¹⁰⁴ Polybius 31.24.6f says large numbers of teachers educated in Greece came to Rome c.167 B.C.

¹⁰⁵ By dating the revival of Aristotelianism and Platonism at about 100 B.C., or a little earlier, Frede (1999b, 778-9) justifies the fact that the *Cambridge History* stops at 100 B.C. But the dating for the revival of these two sects is controversial. It may be plausible to date the revival of Aristotelianism, under Andronicus, between 40 and 20 B.C. (though some have dated his activity earlier in the 1st century B.C.) and the revival of Platonism under Eudorus at about the same time. However, Frede suggests that both Andronicus and Eudorus were exponents of philosophical movements that in fact began sometime before. This is further discussed in connection with the possible extent of Horace's familiarity with Aristotle's works in Chapter 2, §2.5 (ii).

¹⁰⁶ Lynch, 1972, 160-2.

¹⁰⁷ *ibid*: Lynch remarks that most of the student population of Athens at this time was foreign.

exact contemporary of Horace's), for the purposes of such an education, they may have done better to stay at Rome.¹⁰⁸

(ii) The Sceptics

The Academic Philo of Larissa, who was not happy with Carneades' rigid Scepticism and formed an outlook which was more inclined to accept opinions, came to Rome in 88 B.C. But as it happened this firmer approach in the Academy still did not go far enough for Antiochus of Ascalon, Philo's pupil, under whom Cicero studied in Athens, and whose views Cicero recorded and made known to educated Romans.¹⁰⁹ Although Antiochus could be credited, in part, with the revival of Platonism,¹¹⁰ he must still be regarded as part of the Hellenistic tradition, both because of his Stoicism,¹¹¹ and because his philosophy owed much to other, not specifically Platonic, traditions: for example, in Cicero *Fin.* v.7 Piso refers to the Old Academy, i.e. the position of Antiochus, as including the early Peripatetics as well as Plato; in *Fin.* v.14 the speaker Calpurnianus sets forth Antiochus' doctrine as Peripatetic.¹¹² Indeed, although Antiochus was a renegade from the Academic school, and was critical of Philo,¹¹³ it seems that he regarded himself as returning to what he called 'the ancients', (i.e. Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, Aristotle and Theophrastus).¹¹⁴ On the other hand, the fact that he headed his own 'Old Academy'¹¹⁵ (which, being a renegade pupil of Philo's, was a different school from Philo's Academy) and thus to the tradition which stems from Plato, he can nevertheless be regarded as effecting a shift in the

¹⁰⁸ Frede, 1999b, 792.

¹⁰⁹ Cicero refers to the views of Antiochus in the *Academica*, although Cicero himself sides with the Academic Sceptics.

¹¹⁰ Frede, 1999b, 776.

¹¹¹ So Tarrant, 1985, who takes the convincing view that Antiochus' Stoicism effectively precludes him from consideration as a Platonist, particularly in adopting an epistemology based on the senses (111).

¹¹² Dillon, 1977, 57.

¹¹³ Antiochus published a book in Alexandria which was critical of Philo and advocated Stoic doctrine: Glucker, 1978, 106.

¹¹⁴ Antiochus also links himself with the Stoic Zeno: *Academica* 1.35ff: Dillon, 1977, 55.

¹¹⁵ *Lucullus* 70 : Glucker, 1978, 104.

direction of Platonism, even though the view of himself as a Platonist is not one with which everyone would agree. There are certainly references to Plato in Horace's *Satires* – e.g. *Sat.* 2.3.11-12, the opening of *Satire* 2.4 (cf. *Phaedrus* 227a)¹¹⁶ – and Horace's philosophical independence could in a sense be regarded as in line with a Sceptic viewpoint; but as a philosophical force in the *Satires*, Academic Scepticism does not play a big role.

(iii) The Epicureans and Cicero's Influence.

Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* made Epicureanism more widely known to educated Romans, as did the Epicurean Philodemus,¹¹⁷ who may have been an acquaintance of Horace's.¹¹⁸ And Cicero, too, recorded a good deal of Epicurean doctrine and it is possible that in so doing he may have introduced aspects of Epicureanism to Romans. However, one would suppose that Lucretius was a more attractive source of material: if an educated Roman was interested in finding out about Epicureanism it would seem more reasonable to turn to the works of the Epicureans: Lucretius, Philodemus or Epicurus himself (even though the latter two authors' works were in Greek). In fact, Epicureanism had already been put into Latin prose by Catius,¹¹⁹ Amafinius and Rabirius¹²⁰ – and through these writers Epicureanism had already become known to an extent. In a letter to Cassius Cicero remarks that there are far from learned Epicureans in every village¹²¹ (*mediocriter docti: Tusc.* 2.7), whose knowledge is explained by these expositions of Epicureanism in Latin prose which Cicero holds in such contempt. Thus, Cicero seems to have felt that he was putting Epicurean philosophy into respectable Latin prose

¹¹⁶ See Chapter 3, §3.5.

¹¹⁷ Philodemus' *On Flattery* is particularly relevant to *Satires* 1.9 and 2.5, discussed in Chapter 5. Although Gigante comments on the relevance of this work to the *Satires* (1998, 37-8) Brown, 1993, and Muecke, 1993, make no mention of it. Oberhelman and Armstrong, 1995, and Armstrong, 2004, have recognised the importance of Philodemus' influence, with regard to *Sat.* 1.4 (see Chapter 7) and *Epistles* 1 (see Chapter 4, §4.6)

¹¹⁸ See below, Chapter 4, §4.6.

¹¹⁹ *Fam.* 15.16.1; perhaps the Catius Horace has in mind in *Sat.* 2.4 (see Chapter 3).

¹²⁰ Cicero *Fam* 15.16.1. Amafinius and Rabirius are both referred to at *Acad. Post* 1.5 (cf. *Tusc.* 1.6, 2.7): Rawson, 1985, 49.

¹²¹ Rawson, 1985, 49.

(Lucretius having put it into verse), though his objections to the attempts of Amafinius and Rabirius may in part be due to his hostility to Epicureanism generally rather than these works being particularly inferior.¹²²

There is no doubt that Cicero found little in Epicureanism to incur his favour and his antipathy can make his recounts of their arguments and doctrine rather misleading. In Books 1 and 2 of *De finibus*, for example, his use of Epicurean doctrine is selective and aimed at emphasising the materialism of the pleasure principle, and thus plays down its moderation and asceticism (*Fin.* 2.76).¹²³ But it is also possible that Cicero's bias may be a reaction to these populist works on Epicureanism, and was an attempt to set the record straight, so to speak: to suggest, in his eyes, what Epicureanism really entailed. In any case, Cicero clearly thought that his philosophical works in general, as Latin versions of Greek philosophical doctrine, would serve a purpose by virtue of their very Latinity (*Academica* 9-10).

Bearing in mind Cicero's philosophical expositions - not just of Epicureanism - it is worth considering here the extent of his influence in the 1st century B.C. after his death in 43. In general it appears that his influence was minimal.¹²⁴ Nevertheless there are instances which suggest his stylistic influence (in spite of there being, in fact, a tendency towards a more direct, concise style) such as Tacitus, in his *Dialogue on Orators*, and certainly Cicero was still revered by some - Livy advised his son to read Cicero;¹²⁵ Quintilian, some time later, was another admirer. But as a Latin author relating philosophy which was originally expressed in Greek, it seems likely that Cicero's philosophical works (just as Lucretius' poem) were read by Horace and those who were interested in expressing philosophical language in Latin.¹²⁶ Horace was a student of philosophy in Athens in 44, when Cicero

¹²² The fact that Cicero criticises them for the same flaws he attaches to Epicurus - namely, in their misguided logic, division and definition (at *Fin.* 1.7.22, 2.9.26, 2.10.30): Castner, 1988, 63 - could suggest that their works in fact had some technical substance.

¹²³ MacKendrick, 1989, 146; or again, *Tusc.* 3.36-51: a tirade against Epicureanism: MacKendrick, 155.

¹²⁴ Rawson, 1975, 299; MacKendrick, 1989, 258.

¹²⁵ Rawson, 1975, 299.

¹²⁶ Silk, 1952, 147-158, comments on the influence of certain passages in *Tusculan Disputations* on the *Odes*; Wili, 1948, notes the likely influence of Cicero's philosophical works on, particularly, the *Satires* and *Epistles*.

was still alive, and an exact contemporary of Cicero's son.¹²⁷ With this in mind it seems very likely, at least, that Horace would have been familiar with Cicero's philosophical works. Even if in the years immediately after his death Cicero became somewhat out of fashion, his influence would still have been felt indirectly, through those who became familiar with his works while he was still alive - such as, one could suppose, Horace - and who later wrote about philosophical matters themselves in Latin. Certainly, there are striking resemblances between Horace's *Satires* 2.7 and Cicero's *Stoicorum Paradoxa* 5 (though this could be regarded as a rhetorical work) which strongly suggest Horace's familiarity - and there are other instances in the *Satires* where a Ciceronian influence seems likely.¹²⁸

As well as the fact that Lucretius and Philodemus had put Epicureanism in a more contemporary Roman context, it seems that there may also have been doctrinal developments, in spite of the perceived conservatism of Epicureanism and its dogged adherence to the tenets of Epicurus. At least, De Lacy has argued that for the purposes of philosophical polemic against the Stoics, later Epicureans may have borrowed from the Academics.¹²⁹ De Lacy draws attention to four instances where the Epicurean argument is seen to resemble that of the Academics. Two of these are arguments used to attack the Stoic position on providence. One is used both by Velleius, the Epicurean, at Cicero *ND* 1.23, and Cotta, the Academic at *ND* 3.70.¹³⁰ Another example is the argument used by Lucretius at 2.167-181 and 5.195-234, which is perhaps briefly alluded to by Velleius at *ND* 1.23, and used by Cicero himself, where he is taking a Sceptic position, at *Acad.* 2.120.

¹²⁷ Cf. below, Chapter 2, 2.5 (ii).

¹²⁸ As in *Satire* 2.3, for example (see below, Chapter 6, §6.5). Muecke, 1993, 7, comments: "It is easy to recognise in his work [i.e. Horace's] the influence of texts that we still possess, Lucretius and Cicero's philosophical works, for example, which were written for a non-specialist public."

Another indication of Horace's familiarity with Cicero's works is his use of characters which appear in Cicero's letters: such as Trebatius (*Sat* 2.1), Catus (2.4), and Damasippus (*Sat* 2.3): Treggiari, 1973, 245-61, at 246 n.4.

¹²⁹ De Lacy, 1948b, 12-23.

¹³⁰ This was an attack against the Stoic position of Divine Providence, which the Stoics claimed was a beneficial force on mankind. Velleius and Cotta question whom Divine Providence actually benefits: if it benefits the wise, then that would only be a very few, and if the stupid then it was a waste of time because the stupid are ruined by their own stupidity. The same argument is also found in Plutarch (*De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 1048F): De Lacy, 1948b, 16.

On the basis of these two parallels it may be just as likely that the Academics borrowed from the Epicureans as vice versa, but De Lacy considers another parallel which he regards as making the case for the Epicureans borrowing from the Academics. This comes in Lactantius *De Ira Dei* 13.20-21, which is attributed to Epicurus himself, and in Sextus Empiricus *PH* 3.10-11. De Lacy feels that the Lactantius passage cannot be attributed to Epicurus, because ‘it rests on a conception of god that is not Epicurean:’¹³¹ i.e. that the gods intervene in human affairs, and so he assigns the argument to a *later* Epicurean, having been adopted from the Academics,¹³² and, bearing in mind the other parallels he cites and Lactantius’ attribution to Epicurus, he feels that the source is, in fact, (later) Epicurean.

It seems possible that Epicurus himself could have used such an argument, simply in order to prove that such a conception of the divine was wrong, but the dialectical form of the argument does appear to owe more to the New Academy than to traditional Epicureanism.¹³³ Thus it is probable that these Epicurean positions were, indeed, later developments.

It is possible that Zeno of Sidon could have been responsible for these borrowings,¹³⁴ and that they were disseminated in Rome via the Neapolitan group, perhaps coming through Phaedrus, who became head of the school after Zeno’s death (though Zeno is nowhere actually described as being head of the school), and who has been regarded as the possible founder of the Neapolitan group.¹³⁵ But in any case Philodemus himself attended the lectures of Zeno of Sidon, so it may be that Philodemus, the most prominent member of the Neapolitan group, was responsible for the dissemination of these arguments.

In fact Zeno wrote several essays, including one on the use of poetry.¹³⁶ Although this purports to discuss the Epicurean position on education (according to Philodemus, from whom the fragment referring to this

¹³¹ De Lacy, 1948b, 19.

¹³² The passage has been attributed to the speech of the Academic Cotta in book 3 of *ND*: De Lacy, 1948b, 19. Pease, 1958, 1142; Ingremau, 1982, 310-311.

¹³³ As De Lacy (1948b, 19) suggests.

¹³⁴ Although Zeno disagreed with Carneades he also admired him (Cicero *Academica* 1.46): Maslowski, 1978, 218.

¹³⁵ Maslowski, 1978, 218.

¹³⁶ *περί ποιημάτων χρήσεως* : Fr. 12, Angeli, Colaizzo, 1979, 47-133.

work comes) along with essays on history, grammar, proverbs, diction and piety, and is not a contradiction of Epicurus,¹³⁷ the title itself seems to point towards the discussion of poetry continued by Philodemus. Certainly, it appears that Philodemus was more open to the possibility of poetry's uses than Epicurus¹³⁸ – and Lucretius' poem could be regarded as embodying such a change in attitude on this subject.¹³⁹ And, later Epicureans took on board the fact that rhetorical techniques were useful in communicating their philosophy – a position which Epicurus himself would certainly not have taken – as has already been seen in Bion's influence on Philodemus earlier in this chapter.¹⁴⁰

Also, adherence to Epicureanism in 1st Century B.C. Rome did not preclude active political involvement: for example, the Epicurean Velleius was a senator (Cicero *ND* 1.15);¹⁴¹ and it has been suggested that Julius Caesar was an Epicurean: the portrayal of the good king, in Philodemus' *On the Good King in Homer*, having points of contact with Caesar's *Commentaries*.¹⁴² Indeed *On the Good King* is itself proof that the Epicurean position was not altogether opposed to political involvement. Although for Horace Epicureanism, as an ideal, involves a rejection of public life in favour of quietism¹⁴³ – and this must still be regarded as the ideal Epicurean position – it would seem that Roman Epicureans in the 1st Century B.C. were more tolerant of political involvement than would have been the case in Epicurus' time. This is certainly relevant to Horace (though I am by no means suggesting that Horace was a purist Epicurean) who, although not politically ambitious himself, was on friendly terms with important political figures – most notably his patron, Maecenas, (who may have been an Epicurean himself)¹⁴⁴ and Augustus.

¹³⁷ Erler, 1994, 270.

¹³⁸ See Chapter 7, §7.3.

¹³⁹ Remains of Lucretius' *DRN* were found in Philodemus' library: Kleve, 1997, 49-66. See below, Chapter 7, §7.3.

¹⁴⁰ As well as Philodemus and Lucretius, De Lacy (1948b, 21) notes that the Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda wrote a work on old age, which took the form of a speech by an older man addressed to a younger audience.

¹⁴¹ Momigliano, 1941, 156-7.

¹⁴² Castner (1988, 85) lists him as an *Epicureus incertus*.

¹⁴³ e.g. *Satires* 1.6, 2.2 and 2.6.

¹⁴⁴ André, 1967, 15-61; Castner, 1988, 87-88.

Thus, with regard to philosophical activity in the 1st Century B.C., it should be clear that developments in Epicureanism did take place. In their attack against the Stoics on providence the Epicureans seem to have adopted new arguments from other schools, and in literary theory and attitude to politics there was actual doctrinal change.

(iv) The Stoics

But the dominant philosophical school, until the 2nd Century A.D., was Stoicism.¹⁴⁵ Cicero can again be given much credit for the accessibility of Stoic doctrine to the educated Roman, though in this regard he took his cue from Panaetius. Cicero's work, *De officiis*, was an adaptation of Panaetius, and it seems that Panaetius himself did much to shape Stoicism to the existing Roman ideology.¹⁴⁶ Thus it seems that Roman traditional wisdom (i.e. that which can be regarded as not specifically belonging to or apparently derived from any particular philosophical system) helped shape Stoicism at that time; that said, by shaping Stoicism to Roman thought and custom, it seems that aspects of Stoicism are likely to have become accepted as aspects of traditional Roman thought, even by the time Horace was writing. In the *Aeneid*, for example, aspects of Aeneas' character can be seen to be deliberately associated with Stoic values, while at the same time appearing to be quintessentially Roman.¹⁴⁷ And indeed Cicero can also be regarded as colouring Stoicism with traditional Roman ideology in *De officiis*.¹⁴⁸

It is tempting to regard this Romanisation of Stoicism as tending towards an emphasis on a more practical application of philosophy. The main

¹⁴⁵ Frede, 1999b, 778.

¹⁴⁶ Fiske, 1920, 72ff; Rawson, 1989, 238, recognises Panaetius' possible Romanisation of aspects of Stoicism (as suggested by Cicero: *Republic* 1.15, 34) but sees this more as Scipio's doing than Panaetius'. From a Stoic viewpoint, it would be natural that traditional Roman ideology would be in keeping with these Stoic principles, which were themselves an expression of the fundamental nature of the universe.

¹⁴⁷ e.g. *pietas* (Quinn, 1969 111-112), *honestas*; *apatheia* (Hardie, 1986, 280 n.132).

¹⁴⁸ As Long notes (1995, 214): "the ethical problems that Cicero treats in it are not those of persons in general. His detailed focus throughout is on actual and potential statesmen, the Roman ruling elite."

proponents of Stoicism in imperial times - Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius – certainly seem to be more concerned with the application of philosophy in actual life, than theory,¹⁴⁹ though they are all later than Horace. At Horace's time it is possible that the most prominent active philosopher was the Epicurean Philodemus. But there is no doubt that Stoicism was very much an active, influential force,¹⁵⁰ and Horace's *Satires* provide further evidence for this.¹⁵¹ Horace mockingly mentions the contemporary Stoics Fabius at *Sat.* 1.1.14 and 1.2.35 and, in a similarly disparaging light, Crispinus at 1.120 and 1.3.139 – both of whom, according to the scholiasts, wrote voluminously on Stoic philosophy. *Satire* 2.3, essentially a Stoic sermon delivered by one Damasippus, is presented as being a verbatim rendition of a sermon by the Stoic Stertinius, who is reported to have written some 220 books.¹⁵² As was indicated above, there is a good deal of Stoicism in Virgil's *Aeneid*, and this may in part be due to the Stoic colouring of Augustus' court.¹⁵³ Indeed, the court philosophers of Augustus: Athenodorus, Arius Didymus and Theon were all Stoics, though nothing of their work survives (except perhaps that of Arius Didymus).¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, Panaetius himself was in fact widely read at Horace's time, as is attested by Horace at *Odes* 1.29. 13ff:

*cum tu coemptos undique nobilis
libros Panaeti, Socraticam et domum
mutare loricis Hiberis,
pollicitus meliora, tendis?*

¹⁴⁹ Frede, 1999b, 779.

¹⁵⁰ As shown in Cicero's dialogues, and in the political arena in the shape of Cato Uticensis, for example.

¹⁵¹ Rawson (1985, 49) suggests that the Stoics Stertinius and Fabius, who feature in the *Satires*, may well have already begun writing and teaching in Latin for some time before Horace; the *rustici Stoici* mentioned in Cicero *Fam.* 16.19.1, 2 may have learnt their Stoicism from these writers.

¹⁵² According to the scholiasts: Muecke, 1993, 137.

¹⁵³ Cairns, 1989, 37; Bowra, (1933-4, reprinted 1990) 363-377.

¹⁵⁴ There is debate as to whether the Arius Didymus of Augustus' court was the same Arius Didymus whose writings on Stoicism and Peripateticism appear in Stobaeus. On the confusion surrounding his identity, see Chapter 2, §2.5.

When you, who promised better things, are intent on exchanging
Panaetius' famous books, bought from every quarter, and the Socratic
school, for Spanish corselets. (tr. Bennet, 1914, adapted).

As I have indicated, in the first three 'diatribe' satires of book 1, Horace is somewhat critical of Stoicism, and this is in spite of the fact that on the whole the subject matter – greed, sexual folly – is all dealt with in a way which would generally find favour with Epicureans, Stoics and Cynics. He mocks the Stoic pontificators Fabius and Crispinus, and openly criticises the Stoic paradox that all faults are equal, in 1.3. It has been suggested that this anti-Stoic (and pro-Epicurean) slant is not merely an avowal of his personal opinions (or a poetic presentation of such) but is also politically motivated. Du Quesnay¹⁵⁵ has argued that Horace's criticism of extreme, dogmatic Stoicism is a veiled criticism of the younger Cato – or rather the Republicanism that the younger Cato stood for. Du Quesnay admits that this political element is subtly employed, and suggests that for that very reason it is all the more effective.¹⁵⁶ However, although Du Quesnay explicitly states that it is "extreme, dogmatic Stoicism", which Horace is criticising here (for underlying political purposes) it is notable that Du Quesnay does not refer to the Stoicism of Augustus' court (even if this was not extreme). Indeed, this sits somewhat awkwardly given that Du Quesnay is quick to mention Maecenas' possible Epicureanism¹⁵⁷ (and Horace's). One is left asking: but what about the philosophical sympathies of Augustus himself? Again, the fact that it is *extremism* that Horace is criticising – the idea being that the Republicans, the so-called upholders of *libertas*, are in fact more extreme, more unreasonable, than the triumvirs, who may at that time still have been otherwise perceived as dictatorial – is worth stressing; but it is surely doubtful whether Augustus' courtiers would have been particularly happy with Horace's well-argued attack on Stoic justice in *Satire* 1.3, for example.

¹⁵⁵ Du Quesnay, 1984 33.

¹⁵⁶ Du Quesnay, 1984, 57.

¹⁵⁷ Du Quesnay, 1984, 33; cf. below, Chapter 4, §4.6.

(v) Neopythagoreanism, Cynicism and Lucilius

Rome itself can also be credited with the revival of Pythagoreanism in the 1st century B.C., according to Cicero. In his preface to his translation of the *Timaeus*, Cicero names Nigidius Figulus as responsible for this revival,¹⁵⁸ although this Neopythagoreanism was at first philosophically rather insubstantial.¹⁵⁹ Nevertheless, it seems that this was the start of a revival, which was then further developed by Eudorus of Alexandria.

Neopythagoreanism is relevant to some of Horace's *Satires*, in terms of its connections with diet and magic – discussed in Chapter 8 - and again with regard to the origin, constitution and duration of the soul (at *Sat.* 2.2. 77-9).¹⁶⁰

Bearing in mind what was said earlier in this chapter about the philosophical status of Cynicism and Horace's merging of Cynic and Epicurean material (most notably *Satire* 1.2) one could almost go so far as to say that in his satires Horace himself was Romanising Cynicism. Furthermore, Cynicism, in terms of its rhetorical and literary aspects, not only exerted an influence on satire (e.g. the *Menippean Satires* of Varro, and Lucilius' *Satires*) but on other, more distinctly philosophical literature, in terms of the 'diatribe', such as Lucretius, Seneca (as already discussed) Epictetus¹⁶¹ and Marcus Aurelius.¹⁶² The rhetorical influence of Cynicism on satire must also be weighed against the claim that satire was a Roman invention (Quintilian, *Inst.* 10.1.93-5). Mayer's remarks¹⁶³ that satire is defiantly Roman, reflecting Roman distrust of change and things foreign, sit uneasily with the strong Hellenising influence of Cynicism on satire. While Mayer rightly points out that satire, in appropriating Greek philosophical doctrine, nevertheless retained a particularly Roman identity¹⁶⁴ - and was, indeed, a Roman invention - it ought also to be recognised that its rhetorical,

¹⁵⁸ Dillon, 1977, 117.

¹⁵⁹ Dillon, 1977, 117-119.

¹⁶⁰ See below, Chapter 3, §3.6.

¹⁶¹ Although Long, (2002, 42-3) while recognising that Epictetus' *Discourses* may owe something to the diatribe, regards this as a misleading label for the *Discourses* as such, which show a good deal of methodology.

¹⁶² Griffin, 1996, 200; Rutherford, 1989, 21-22.

¹⁶³ Mayer, 2005, 146.

¹⁶⁴ Mayer, 2005, 149.

subversive aspect (as much its defining stamp as its being Roman) was in fact largely influenced by Cynicism.

Given the common ground between the schools with regard to popular moral philosophy, it is no surprise that Horace draws from various philosophical sources in the *Satires*. As a satirist, Horace is not promoting a particular philosophical system. In taking views from various sources, whether to promote them or satirise them, he must also be seen to be following the example set by Lucilius.¹⁶⁵ Again, the lack of material and the fact that, from the evidence that does survive, Lucilius holds both Stoics and Epicureans up for ridicule as well as advocating aspects of both philosophies, suggests that it would be unwise to associate him with a particular philosophical school.¹⁶⁶ But it is nevertheless clear that there is philosophical content in Lucilius' *Satires*.

Lucilius is regarded as being attached to the intellectual group associated with Scipio: 'The Scipionic Circle'. This label is in effect an invention of modern scholarship.¹⁶⁷ Although Cicero does refer to a group associated with Scipio in *De amicitia* 69,¹⁶⁸ it is doubtful whether those who are referred to as belonging to the circle (in essence, the *dramatis personae* of Cicero's *Republica*) actually regarded themselves as doing so. Nevertheless, aside from the association with Scipio, these figures shared a common interest in Hellenising Roman culture¹⁶⁹ – though this should not be regarded as the exclusive, defining aspect of the group.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, it would seem that when Lucilius wrote his *Satires*, the relative novelty of this Hellenisation may

¹⁶⁵ As Horace refers to him: satire's *inventor* (*Sat.*1.10.48).

¹⁶⁶ Gratwick, 1982, 167.

¹⁶⁷ R.M. Brown, 1934, finds the term first used by the German scholar Bernhardt (1872, 191f.): Astin, 1967, 294.

¹⁶⁸ Laelius says: *saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege*: Astin, 1967, 294.

¹⁶⁹ Mayer (2005, 146-148) draws attention to Lucilius' ridicule of the excessively Hellenised Albucius (87-93W), and the ridicule of philosophers in both Lucilius and, indeed, Horace, as indicating the satirist's wariness of foreign imports, including philosophy. But the main point in both cases is the ridicule of perceived excess – whether in taking on Greek customs or apparently extreme philosophical dogma. The fact that (excessive) Hellenisation is an object of ridicule simply shows the extent to which it was such a contemporary phenomenon.

¹⁷⁰ e.g. Accius' poetry had a strong Greek influence. His patron was D. Iunius Brutus Callaicus and he is not associated with Scipio like a number of his contemporaries: Astin, 1967, 296.

account for the frequency of Greek interpolations in his work. By Horace's time such Hellenisms seem to have lost their charm; at least Horace himself certainly found them objectionable (*Sat.* 1.10.20-35).

Although Lucilius was writing at a time when much of the doctrine of the Hellenistic schools would have been less well established in Roman intellectual society generally than in Horace's time - he was writing before Cicero and Lucretius - his *Satires* still include philosophical ideas and references, which would have no doubt been recognised by his readers. Much of this philosophical content, or what may be regarded as such from the fragmentary evidence, which deals with ideas of popular philosophy, may owe something to Cynic-Stoic popular sermonising¹⁷¹ – again, the ‘diatribe’ – and so would have been recognised by his readers as being in a general sense Cynic-Stoic. It appears that he also expresses Epicurean ideas (as at Bk 26, *Sat.* 5 W) on friendship, and there are more specific examples of references to philosophical ideas and people, such as the reference to Stoic paradoxes (1189-90W) *nondum etiam <qui> haec omnia habebitis, formonsus dives liber rex solus feretur*, (cf. Horace *Sat.* 1.3. 124-5); Epicurean physics (820W); the Stoic jurist Q. Mucius Scaevola Augur, on trial for alleged extortion in book 2, and his prosecutor, the Epicurean T. Albucius are both held up for ridicule.¹⁷² From what survives of Lucilius one would nevertheless conclude that the philosophical content of his satires lacks the depth, width and subtlety of Horace's. Indeed it is clear that Horace's *Satires*, which Horace himself felt were an improvement on satire up to that time,¹⁷³ are, in terms of both literary skill and philosophical content and argument, more developed than the *Satires* of his predecessors, and thus reflect the relative development in the philosophical activity of Rome by that time.

¹⁷¹ For example, in Warmington, 1938: Book 26, *Sat.* 4; Book 29, *Sat.* 5; Book 30 *Sat.* 6 – which all deal with ideas of popular philosophy in an apparently Cynic-Stoic context.

¹⁷² Gratwick, 1982, 167.

¹⁷³ *Sat.* 1.10.46ff:

*hoc erat, experto frustra Varrone Atacino
atque quibusdam aliis, melius quod scribere possem...*

Chapter 2

Moderation

2.1 Introduction

The philosophical theme most identifiable with Horace is perhaps that of moderation or, as Horace himself puts it in *Ode* 2.10, ‘the golden mean’. In this Chapter I will concentrate on its presence and significance in *Satires* 1, and in Chapter 3, in *Satires* 2. Furthermore, although moderation can be seen to underpin other philosophical topics discussed in later chapters, these two chapters will deal, rather, with moderation as a specific theme as discussed in the *Satires*.

The underlying question in the satires which deal explicitly with moral issues, particularly the so-called ‘diatribe’ satires (*Sat.* 1.1-3, 2.2,3 and 7) is how can we be happy: the fundamental question in ancient ethics. For Horace, one answer is to practise moderation. In *Satire* 1.1 the opening discussion of discontent turns to the subject of greed at 28 - greed being suggested as the real cause of discontent (107-9) - and moderation is advocated as the antidote. Moderation is the main theme of *Satire* 1.2 from the outset, although this narrows down to discussion of moderation (and excess) as applicable to sex in particular from 28. In *Sat.* 1.3 Horace begins with general observations on consistency (strongly associated with moderation), and then, at 25 – in a similar way to the openings of 1.1 and 1.2 - turns to the discussion of friendship and, at 96, justice.

However, before looking at examples of Horace’s advocacy of moderation in apparently philosophical terms, it must be noted that moderation was a commonplace in traditional Greek (and subsequently, Roman) popular morality. The words *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, for example, were inscribed above the gates of the Delphic Oracle,¹⁷⁴ and Cleobulus (one of the seven

¹⁷⁴ Rudd, 1966, 23

sages) is attributed by Diogenes Laertius (1.93) with the apophthegm μέτρον ἄριστον.¹⁷⁵ poetic

tradition.¹⁷⁶ Also, Horace's precursor as a satirist, Lucilius, advocates moderation (also in terms of there being a limit, in a similar way to Horace, as we shall see): *virtus quaerendae finem re scire modumque* (1201W)¹⁷⁷.

Moderation is also a commonplace in ancient philosophical doctrine, found in Plato (*Republic*. 349E; *Philebus* 64D-65D,¹⁷⁸ *Charmides* - on self-control), Lucretius (*DRN* 5.1432-3),¹⁷⁹ Epicurus (e.g. *ad Menoeceum* 127ff, *KD* 21) and, in the exposition of the doctrine of the mean, Aristotle (e.g. *NE* 1107a28-1109b15).¹⁸⁰ In book seven of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle regards self-control as essentially pertaining to sensual pleasures (and therefore to the sphere of temperance, of which the excess is licentiousness),¹⁸¹ and only related to other spheres (e.g. courage) by analogy. The tendency to view self-control as pertaining to sensual pleasure (particularly with regard to eating and drinking too much) is also suggested in, for example, Plato's *Gorgias* (494b, 496d, 499d). Indeed it would seem that moderation, when related to the sensual pleasures (as it is in the first two satires, by analogy to greed, and directly to sex) in practice generally involves restraint from excess, rather than from deficiency.

¹⁷⁵ Fiske, 1920, 228

¹⁷⁶ e.g. Pindar, *Pythian Odes* 11, 52f: τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλιν εὐρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρω; / ἄλβη τε θαλότη μέμφομαι αἶσαν τυραννίδων. "In the affairs of the city I find the middle ground abounds with greater blessings and I abhor the lot of tyrants." (tr. Conway, 1997, adapted): Nisbet and Hubbard, 1978, 160; Euripides, *Medea* 125 ff: τῶν γὰρ μετρίων πρῶτα μεν εἶπεῖν / τοῦνομα νικᾷ, χρῆσθαι τε μακρῶν / λῦστα βροτοῖσιν. "For moderate fortune has a name that is fairest on the tongue, and in practice it is by far the most beneficial thing for mortals." (tr. Kovacks, 1994.)

¹⁷⁷ Rudd, 1966 note 32, p.276

¹⁷⁸ Rudd, 1966, 23.

¹⁷⁹ Rudd, 1966, n. 32, p.276.

¹⁸⁰ The possible influence of Aristotle on Horace with regard to the mean is discussed below (§2.5).

¹⁸¹ Hursthouse, 1999, 92, n.1.

2.2 Epicurean Moderation in *Satires* 1.1 and 1.2

The folly of the *avarus*, Horace's main topic in *Satire* 1.1, is clearly an obvious target for the satirist (cf. *Sat.* 1.4.26),¹⁸² as it was in the diatribe,¹⁸³ and moderation could perhaps be regarded as fairly obvious (and traditional) countering advice, but what is notable is the extent to which moderation is presented in terms that are recognisably derived from earlier philosophical treatments.

In *Sat.* 1.1, an Epicurean influence is particularly detectable. In *KD* 29 and *ad Menoeceum* 127ff Epicurus divides desires into those that are natural and necessary, natural and unnecessary, and unnatural and unnecessary. At 1.1.73-5 Horace gives us some idea of what he regards as a reasonable level of material acquisition: enough to satisfy what may be called natural and necessary desires, at least in so far as the denial of such desires would aggrieve human nature: *quis humana sibi doleat natura negatis* (75). In the preceding lines he lists a modicum of requirements in terms of food and wine, which, as Brown puts it, "correspond exactly with the Epicurean requirements for the avoidance of bodily pain."¹⁸⁴ Freedom from such pain, together with a mind free from fear and worry is all that is required.¹⁸⁵ Here Horace is not suggesting total disregard for material possessions, he is advocating existence by means of the first of the categories of desires in *KD* 29,¹⁸⁶ i.e. by satisfying desires that are both natural and necessary - necessary, that is, in order to survive without undue worry.

¹⁸² Cf Lucilius 581-2W - reckoned to be from a satire on gluttony:

*milia ducentum frumenti tollis medimnum
vini mille cadum.*

Varro *Menippean Satires: Eumenides* fr.122, p.527 J-P Cèbe, 1972.

¹⁸³ Oltramare, 1925, 63.

¹⁸⁴ Brown, 1993, 96.

¹⁸⁵ *DRN* 2.16-19: *nonne videre/ nil aliud sibi naturam latrare, nisi utqui/ corpore seiunctus dolor absit, mensque fruatur/ iucundo sensu cura semota metuque?* 'not to see that all nature barks for is this, that pain be removed away out of the body, and that the mind, kept away from care and fear, enjoy a feeling of delight!' (tr. Rouse/Smith 1992.)

¹⁸⁶ *KD* 29: "Of desires, some are natural and necessary, some natural and not necessary, and some neither natural nor necessary but occurring as a result of empty opinion." Throughout the thesis, translations of Epicurus' writings by Inwood/Gerson 1994, [with adaptations]; unless otherwise indicated.

This idea of conducting one's life in adherence to the dictates of *natura*, is also brought up at 1.49-50 (*intra/ naturae finis viventi*).¹⁸⁷ And the examples that follow indicate that living within the bounds of nature effectively means checking a tendency to exceed rather than fall short - which, as I mentioned above, is how moderation is generally applied to sensual pleasure in ancient ethics. And this is indeed the implication in Epicurus' categorisation of desires (*ad Menoeceum* 127ff¹⁸⁸ and *KD* 29): if one is living just within such bounds and advised not to transgress, it is more likely that he has at least what is necessary and is in danger of wanting too much rather than too little. This call to the limits of nature at 1.50 comes in a passage where Horace again sets forth examples which are suggestive of what he regards as reasonable resources, and as excessive (1.49-56):

..... *vel dic quid referat intra
naturae finis viventi, iugera centum an
mille aret? 'at suave est ex magno tollere acervo.'*
dum ex parvo nobis tantundem haurire relinquo,
cur tua plus laudes cumeris granaria nostris?
ut tibi si sit opus liquidi non amplius urna
vel cyatho et dicas 'magno de flumine mallem
quam ex hoc fonticulo tantundem sumere.'

Again, tell me what difference it makes to the man living within the limits of nature whether he ploughs a hundred or a thousand acres? 'But it's nice to draw from a big heap.' Provided you leave us free to scoop the same amount from a small one, why should you praise your granaries more than our bins? It's as if you needed no more than a

¹⁸⁷ Cf. *Sat* 2.3.178: *quod satis esse putat pater et Natura coercet*. As we will see in Chapter 6, the main themes of Horace's diatribe satires in book 1 (and 1.6), such as greed, ambition and erotic love, feature in *Sats.* 2.3 and 2.7.

¹⁸⁸ *Men.* 127ff: "One must reckon that of desires some are natural, some groundless; and of the natural desires some are necessary and some merely natural; and of the necessary, some are necessary for happiness and some for freeing the body from troubles and some for life itself."

pitcherful or a glassful of water and said, 'I'd sooner draw the same amount from a big river than from a little fountain.'¹⁸⁹

Here, rather than championing a life of ascetic frugality, Horace emphasises the absurdity of people's desire to procure far more than they need. In all three of the above examples the amounts (in terms of resources) are seen as being more than satisfactory in both of the options in each case: i.e. a hundred acres is clearly enough, so why desire to plough a thousand? The response to this, *at /suave est ex magno tollere acervo*, perhaps suggests an understandable, indeed, *natural* tendency to desire more than is necessary, but Horace's point is to show how absurd such a desire can be if not checked, and actually insisted upon.¹⁹⁰

The Epicurean appeal to moderation in terms of keeping within the limits set by nature is also alluded to in *Satire* 1.2 at 111-3:

*nonne, cupidinibus statuat natura modum quem,
quid latura sibi quid sit dolitura negatum,
quaerere plus prodest et inane abscindere soldo?*

Wouldn't it be more profitable to enquire what limit nature sets for the desires, what she can do without and what will cause pain if denied her, and to sunder what's empty from what's solid?

¹⁸⁹ Throughout the thesis, translations of *Satires* 1: Brown, 1993, with adaptations; *Satires* 2: Muecke, 1993, with adaptations.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. Annas' (1993, 190-3) example, where the enjoyment of lobster may be classed as a natural and unnecessary desire but when *insisted* upon the desire becomes unnatural; this idea is not found in *KD* 29 but is supported in *KD* 30: "Among natural desires, those which do not lead to a feeling of pain if not fulfilled and about which there is an intense effort, these are produced by an empty opinion and they fail to be dissolved not because of their own nature but because of the empty opinions of mankind." It is one's empty (misguided) opinion (*kenodoxia*) that makes the desire unnatural. A possible objection to this may be that if a desire is natural in the first place, then it seems odd if its non-procurement does not particularly bother the agent. But the point is that the purpose of lobster – as a food – is to satisfy hunger (and in that respect it is a natural desire), and if one's hunger can be satisfied by some other food then to *insist* on lobster would thus be unnatural (as well as unnecessary). An important difference between this example and the above passage (*Sat.* 1.49-56), however, is that for Horace the insistence is for a greater *amount* of something (quantitative) rather than for a particular *type* of thing (qualitative). This distinction will be seen to be important in the interpretation of *Sat.* 1.2 (§2.5).

Here Horace is advising moderation in the conduct of one's sex life. Again, *natura* is seen as the overriding guide (the sentiment of 1.2.112 is essentially the same as that expressed at 1.1.75: *quis humana sibi doleat natura negatis*). In addition, the categorisation of desires into the empty and solid (*inane...soldo*) is also likely to derive from Epicurean doctrine. Although *inane* and *soldo* here act as nouns ('what's empty... from what's solid') it is clear that they both relate to *cupido* and there would appear to be a correspondence here with *cupidine falso* at 1.1.61: the idea of desires being illusory, misguided or empty being distinctly Epicurean.¹⁹¹ The terminology is applicable to both Epicurean physics and ethics. Lucretius (*DRN* 1.329-482) speaks of *inane* in contrast to *corpora* (bodies made up of divisible atoms), and Epicurus of *kenon* in contrast to *sōmata*;¹⁹² and in his ethics too Epicurus speaks of empty desires/opinions¹⁹³ (e.g. *KD* 29,15,30; *ad Menoeceum* 127ff), as does Lucretius (e.g. *DRN* 5.1430, 3.998).¹⁹⁴

In *Sat.* 1.2.111-3, Horace is advising against the folly of pursuing the unobtainable (in this case, a high-class and/or married woman), a pursuit which is *inane*. On the other hand, the obtainable, *soldum*, is recommended since it is easily procurable within the limits of nature (cf. *KD* 15, 21).¹⁹⁵ In fact, Horace has already made a similar point, in similar terms, at 1.2.74-6, where he again recommends keeping one's desires within the limits of nature and of differentiating between what is to be sought and what avoided (corresponding to 'solid' and 'empty') at 1.2.113:

¹⁹¹ *Kenodoxia* (empty opinion) is certainly most identifiable with Epicureanism, though it does appear in other philosophical contexts, in Cynicism: Julian, on Plato and Diogenes at *Or.* 6.188 (Krueger, 1996, 232) and in Philo (see below, Chapter 6, §6.3).

¹⁹² Diogenes Laertius: *Letter to Herodotus*, 10.39: τὸ πᾶν ἐστὶ σῶματα καὶ κενόν.

¹⁹³ Rudd, 1966, 24.

¹⁹⁴ *DRN* 5.1430: *ergo hominum genus incassum frustra laborat/ semper et [in] curis consumit inanibus aevum...*

However, at 3.68, Lucretius favours *falso*, cf. Horace *Sat.* 1.1.61: *cupidine falso*.

¹⁹⁵ *KD* 15: "Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire. But wealth [as defined by] empty opinions extends without limit."

KD 21: "He who has learned the limits of life knows that it is easy to provide that which removes the feeling of pain owing to want and make one's whole life perfect. So there is no need for things which involve struggle."

.....tu si modo recte
dispensare velis ac non fugienda petendis
immiscere.

If only you were ready to manage them properly and not to confuse
what you should avoid with what you should seek.

The example of drinking (in a rational, moderate and civilised way) from a fountain, rather than dangerously attempting to drink from a rushing river (at *Sat.* 1.1.56-8), shows Horace's sense of the absurd.¹⁹⁶ With regard to the absurdity of excess there are further similarities here with *Satire* 1.2. Just as Horace highlights the absurdity of insistence on taking from unnecessarily vast resources at 1.1.49-56, so he highlights the absurdity of insistence upon drinking from a golden cup (*aurea pocula*) in 1.2.114-115 when one is thirsty, or on eating peacock and turbot (*num esuriens fastidis omnia praeter/ pavonem rhombumque?* 1.2.115-116) when one is hungry. It seems likely that Horace is also satirising the vanity of people who insist on particular kinds of things, whether it be women or food, simply because they happen to be fashionable or desirable, as he does at greater length in *Satire* 2.2.22-52.¹⁹⁷ As well as these connotations of vanity and absurdity, all these above examples also relate to *KD* 29, in that Horace appears to be suggesting desires that are natural but unnecessary, and so, if insisted upon, empty.

¹⁹⁶ Mention of the river Aufidus (58), which also appears in *Odes* 3.30.10 and 4.9.2, with its autobiographical connotation, gives the passage a particularly personal stamp: Brown, 1993, 94.

¹⁹⁷ See Chapter 3, §3.3.

2.3 Lucretius

These examples of Epicurean influence in the first two *Satires* of book 1 may - as indicated - have been drawn in part from Lucretius, although it is also quite likely that Horace was familiar with Epicurus' original writings, as well as those of other Epicureans.¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, there are other aspects to Horace's reasoning in these opening poems where the influence of Lucretius, in particular, is detectable. One point of similarity between Lucretius and Horace in the treatment of moderation is that they both draw attention to the immediate danger of excess. For example, Horace suggests that greed can lead to death (figuratively, in the river Aufidus example [1.56-8], and actually, in the demise of the miser Ummidius [1.95-100]). And the fact that greed can be directly dangerous (in the case of Ummidius, on account of the ill-will of others towards the rich and miserly) is also put by Lucretius (*DRN* 3.73-7), in that others' envy is a likely by-product of one's own greed¹⁹⁹ - and, in the case of Lucretius, also of one's pursuit of power and fame.²⁰⁰

Hatred towards the *avarus* can also come from his own family, as Horace suggests at 1.80-85:

*'at si condoluit temptatum frigore corpus,
aut alius casus lecto te adfixit, habes qui
adsideat, fomenta paret, medicum roget, ut te
suscitet ac reddat gnatis carisque propinquis.'
non uxor saluum te vult, non filius; omnes
vicini oderunt, noti, pueri atque puellae.*

'But if your body aches with an attack of fever, or some other mischance has confined you to bed, you have someone to sit by you, to

¹⁹⁸ See Chapter 1, §1.4 (iii).

¹⁹⁹ Cf. *Odes* 2.10.7-8.

²⁰⁰ In *Sat.* 1.6 envy is also suggested as a reason for eschewing political involvement. See below, Chapter 4, §4.8 (iii).

prepare fomentations, to call the doctor so that he can revive you and restore you to your children and dear relations.’ Your wife doesn’t want your recovery, nor does your son; all your neighbours hate you, all your acquaintances, even boys and girls.

Here Horace first explodes the misguided (‘empty’) belief of the *avarus* that wealth is helpful in times of illness, 80-82, which ties in with the assertion made by Lucretius that wealth cannot speed recovery (*DRN* 2.34-6).²⁰¹

However, it must be noted that the fact that wealth can incur such hatred (and is thus one of its most dangerous pitfalls) seems likely to have been a stock argument in popular philosophical invective against *philarguria* (greed): very similar sentiments are found in Plutarch’s *On the love of wealth* (περὶ φιλοπλουτίας) where he describes the children’s feelings for their wealthy father as, οὐ φιλοῦντες ὅτι πολλὰ λήψονται, ἀλλὰ μισοῦντες ὅτι μήπου λαμβάνουσι and also in an anonymous attack on ‘shameless acquisitiveness’: περὶ αἰσχροκέρδειας.²⁰²

The concurrence of envy and the pursuit of wealth, *pleonexia*, is further illustrated at 1.113-116:

*sic festinanti semper locupletior obstat,
ut, cum carceribus missos rapit ungula currus,*

²⁰¹ Brown, 1993, 96. Though Shackleton Bailey (1982, 27) thinks the *avarus*, in fact, has a fair point: “The miser is rich, and when rich curmudgeons fall ill they are not left unattended.”

²⁰² This is on line 72 of *On shameless acquisitiveness*, which describes the frantic, busy pursuit of wealth. It appears in the Heidelberg Papyrus 310, which along with the Papyrus Lond. 155, and Papyrus Bodl. Ms. Gr. Class. 1, f.1 (p), Gerhard (1909) edited. Both these papyri and the Plutarch example above are cited by Fiske (1920, 221-234). Fiske demonstrates, mainly from other extracts from the above works, Horace’s appropriation of various motifs of Cynic, popular philosophy. The general sentiments in these works are in keeping with Horace’s though some of Fiske’s correlations are tenuous. For example, in line 45 of *On shameless acquisitiveness* he notes the appearance of the word γαστήρ, in *Sat.* 1.1.46, the Latin equivalent *venter*; but the context of γαστήρ is unclear, and even Fiske’s suggested context, “that one must not be a slave to food and drink” is rather different from that of *Sat.* 1.1.46. Again, in line 34 of *On shameless acquisitiveness* the miser takes his wealth from everywhere (πάντοθεν), which Fiske correlates with *Sat.* 1.1.70, where the miser sleeps with his sacks of money *undique*: the two descriptions here are completely different. Gerhard (p.3) puts the possible date of the Heidelberg papyrus in the second century B.C.

*instat equis auriga suos vincentibus, illum
praeteritum temnens extremos inter euntem.*

As he hastens like this he always has someone richer in his way, just as, when the pounding hooves sweep on the chariots once they've been released from the starting-gates, a charioteer presses hard upon the team of horses which are leading his own, disdaining that other man whom he's passed and who's fallen back into the pack at the rear.

This illustrates the struggle that these pre-occupations incur, a struggle that Epicurus maintains is unnecessary if one keeps within life's limits (*KD* 21). Following these Epicurean sentiments, Horace concludes the poem with a further simile, again likely to have been drawn from Lucretius (*DRN* 3.938), in which life is likened to a dinner from which one should contentedly retire.²⁰³

A possible Lucretian influence which has not previously been noted, and which, as we will see below (§2.4) may well lie behind the progression of Horace's argument in this satire, is the link between greed and the fear of death. This is suggested in the demise of Ummidius at 1.95-100. Lucretius' argument is that people are eager to acquire wealth and political/social position because they think this will somehow distance themselves from death, which they erroneously fear (*DRN* 3.60-80). Or, to put it another way, the fear of death leads people away from the path of moderation. At 1.97-99 Horace describes Ummidius as follows:

..... *adusque*
supremum tempus ne se penuria victus
opprimeret metuebat.

Yet right up to his last breath he was afraid of being overtaken by lack of essential sustenance.

²⁰³ Although it seems most likely that Horace used this image with Lucretius in mind, it also appears in Bion via Teles (Hense, 1889, 16) and Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* 5.118 (in connection with Epicurus): Rudd, 1966, 278, n.53.

If one takes *victus* here to mean the essential sustenance required for living as, in fact, seems quite appropriate in the context, the fear of death through lack of security is strongly implied.²⁰⁴ The blackly comic circumstances of Ummidius' death - axed down the middle by his freedwoman - are related with relish, and again the absurdity of these circumstances is highlighted by the mock-heroic description of the *liberta* at v.100, *fortissima Tyndaridarum*.²⁰⁵

In *Satire* 1.1 Horace does not choose to discuss ambition and monetary greed together, reserving the subject of ambition for *Sat.* 1.6, although he does mention the two together elsewhere (*Sat.* 1.4.26, *Epistles* 2.2.205-7, *Odes* 2.16 9-12). Lucretius²⁰⁶ groups together monetary greed and the desire for fame and power in the same passage (*DRN* 3.59-89), and points to the fear of death as their cause. It is worth noting, however, that at 1.1.62 - "*nil satis est,*" *inquit* "*quia tanti quantum habeas sis*"; 'Nothing is enough,' [a good many men] say, "because you're valued according to the scale of your possessions" - Horace does, in passing, strongly imply the link between greed and the desire for social/political position. This apparently traditional view seems to have been taken from Lucilius (1194-5 W):²⁰⁷

aurum atque ambitio specimen virtutis virique est.
tantum habeas, quantum ipse sies tanti habearis.

Gold and going the rounds for the votes²⁰⁸ are a token of a man and his manliness. See that you hold and are held to be worth as much as you represent (tr. Warmington 1938)

²⁰⁴ Indeed, in the Loeb translation Fairclough, 1926, translates these lines: "up to his last hour he feared he would die of starvation."

²⁰⁵ cf. the absurd circumstances of the death of the miser, Opimius in *Sat.* 2.3.142-157, who would rather die than spend any money: an anecdote which - with similar incongruity to 1.1.95-100 - follows the story of Orestes' madness, and murder of his mother.

²⁰⁶ Sallust also discusses the two together, e.g.: *Cat.* 10-13; as does Cicero, *Fin.* 1.60-61.

²⁰⁷ Brown, 1993, 95.

²⁰⁸ According to Warmington, *ambitio* here means political ambition in particular.

In *Satire* 1.2 Horace's recommendation of available, trouble-free sex probably also owes something to Lucretius' views (*DRN* 4. 1058-1287), and, as with Lucretius, strongly contrasts with the attitude of the Elegists:²⁰⁹ a position that persists in Horace's love poems in the *Odes*.²¹⁰ There are verbal echoes; as well as Horace's use of the Lucretian *-ier* ending for the present passive infinitive (35, 78, 104),²¹¹ and the reference to *inane*, in the Lucretian sense (113) which I have already mentioned, *parabilem... Venerem* (119) also brings Lucretius to mind: the word *Venus* = love/sex appears on numerous occasions in *DRN* 4.1052ff, and, in *vulgivaga... Venere* (1071) we have a similar use to Horace's in 119. Indeed, there are clear Epicurean overtones in *parabilis* in that it could be regarded as the Latin for *εὐπόριστος*, used in *KD* 15 and 21 in connection with necessary desires.²¹² With regard to Horace's depictions of sex in the *Satires* and *Epodes*, a Cynic influence is certainly suggested: there being a well-known association between Cynicism and bawdiness,²¹³ and it is also likely that Lucretius was influenced by Cynicism in the passage on sex in book 4.²¹⁴ In *Sat.* 1.2 it appears that Horace may have drawn from a fragment of the Cynic Cercidas of Megalopolis at 125-7:

haec ubi supposuit dextro corpus mihi laevum
Ilia et Egeria est: do nomen quodlibet illi,
nec vereor...

²⁰⁹ Lucretius uses the Latin vocabulary of love, *dulcedo/dulcis* (4.1059, 1062) *cura* (1060, 1067) *furor* (1069, 1117) *sanus* (1075) *deliciae* (1156) etc. (R.D. Brown, 1987, 140) - only to satirise and thus de-romanticise it.

²¹⁰ E.g. 1.5,8,13,19, 25, 30, 33, 23; 2.4,8; 3.9,10,26; 4.1. But in the *Odes* he is far more reticent and detached on the subject than the Elegists. Lyne (1980) describes Horace in the *Odes* as "anti-elegiac" (205). For Horace love, like wine, is to be enjoyed (or suffered), as an amusing, incidental side to life, rather than it becoming life itself (as it does for the Elegists): Lyne, 1980, 202. Horace's stance seems also to be that of a man who has learnt from experience and put such youthful pursuits behind him (e.g. 1.5.13-16; 2.4.21-4). Although older when he wrote the *Odes*, in his youth too (as here in the *Satires*) he avoids the self-indulgence of the Elegists, preferring the bawdy humour of sex (e.g. *Epodes* 2, 8, 11, 14, 15).

²¹¹ Baldwin, 1970, 461.

²¹² Brown, 1993, 113.

²¹³ Cynic advocacy of nudity: Epictetus 3.22.100; sex in public: Augustine *Civ. Dei* 14.20, Lucian, *Philosophers for Sale!* 10: Krueger, 1996, 222-239.

²¹⁴ On the influence of the diatribe on *DRN* 4: R.D. Brown, 1987, 137-9.

When a girl like this has tucked her left side under my right, she is Ilia
and Egeria; I give her any name I please, and I'm not afraid...²¹⁵

R.D. Brown may well be right in suggesting that these sentiments may have come via Philodemus, to whom Horace explicitly refers just before at 121.²¹⁶ Indeed, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, love and sex is an area in which there was common ground between Cynics and Epicureans, ground not also shared by the Stoics.²¹⁷

2.4 The Argument of *Satire* 1.1

As I indicated at the beginning of the chapter, the 'diatribe' satires of book 1 (and *Sat.* 1.6) open by means of a somewhat circuitous introduction to the main subject of the poem in each case. In 1.1, Horace begins by discussing discontent, but after twenty eight lines turns to the subject of greed. He begins by exposing the tendency for people to envy other people's lives - such as the soldier envying the tradesman (and vice versa), the lawyer the farmer, and so on (4-12).

²¹⁵ Ilia, also known as Rhea Silvia, was Romulus' mother; Egeria was a prophetic nymph and wife of King Numa. Rudd, 1966, 25: n.38, p.277, translates the fragment of the Cynic, Cercidas of Megalopolis (second half of the third century B.C., Knox, 1953, 204) as follows: "As for Aphrodite of the market-place... there is no fear, no disturbance. Lay her for a shilling and fancy yourself son-in-law to Tyndareus. (i.e. imagine she is Helen of Troy.)" Fiske (1920, 251) thinks it likely that Cercidas was also an influence on Lucilius. The influence of Lucilius on *Sat.* 1.2 appears to be considerable. Sex was a favoured subject for Lucilius (fr.206-7, 238-9, 263, 269-71, 278-83, 296-7, 303-7, 330, 234-5, 678-86, 817, 857-69, 891-3, 933-7, 940-1, 1039-44, 1047-9, 1058, 1186, 1222, 1257-8, 1271, 1296-7, Marx 1904: R. Brown, 1987, 137.). Fiske, following Cichorius (1908, 159-163) comments that in one of Lucilius' satires, possibly entitled *fornix*, there appears to be a three-fold contrast between relations with married women (863-865M), *libertinae* (857-858M) and women from the *fornix* (866-867M) – similarly to *Sat.* 1.2. Lucilius appears to recommend the *fornix* prostitute, and Fiske holds that this is also the case for Horace. But, as is shown below (§2.5), Horace in fact recommends the *meretrix/ libertina*. In fact, it appears that Horace uses this three-fold categorisation to promote his own argument through the application of philosophical ideas. Much of the vocabulary in Horace's satire, the catalogue of contemporary names and the names of various women also bear out a Lucilian influence (Fiske, 1920, 270).

²¹⁶ cf. Philodemus *Palatine Anthology* 5.46: a similar sentiment on the use of a prostitute: R.D. Brown, 1987, 199.

²¹⁷ See also below: §2.6.

The transition between these general, opening remarks on discontent and the ensuing argument concerning greed seems, on the face of it, to be somewhat illogical.²¹⁸ Although this occurs between 23 and 40, it is foreshadowed at 15, where Horace makes the point that if a god were to give these malcontents the opportunity to change their professions, they would still refuse to do so. It is Horace's explanation for this refusal which seems problematic. This comes at 30-2:

..... *hac mente laborem*
sese ferre, senes ut in otia tuta recedant,
*aiunt, cum sibi sint congesta cibaria....*²¹⁹

They say they endure their hardship with this in mind, that in old age they withdraw to a secure retirement, when they've heaped themselves up a sufficiency.

On strictly logical grounds, it would seem that one would be as able to save for the future in another (even preferable) profession, as in one's current profession. Horace does not explain his reasoning here, although the implication may be that people do not change professions for fear that this may be a mistake, and that their security may be further endangered by venturing into the unknown. In any event, the answer of the discontented clearly denotes that their concern is material security, and it is this concern which, unchecked, develops into greed: they are discontented because of an excessive pre-occupation with building up material security, which effectively means greed. While this may be a logical explanation for the link between greed and discontent, (and, as will be apparent, ties in with Epicurean views) Horace is not explicit in stating it. It seems possible, too, that this link is derived from other treatments of discontent (*mempsimoiria*) and greed (*philarguria*) in the tradition of popular philosophy, notably Teles' *περί*

²¹⁸ e.g. Palmer, 1883.

²¹⁹ As clarified by Rudd, 1966, 12: "if they don't like what they're doing, then why not give up? *Answer*: they want to save up enough for a secure retirement."

αὐταρκείας (on self sufficiency) which drew considerably from Bion.²²⁰ In these examples the logical connection between security, greed and discontent is again unclear – perhaps not surprisingly, given that they are diatribes.

However, there is a logical explanation for the connection between security and greed which is found in Epicurean doctrine, and given the Epicurean overtones in the satire, Horace may well have this in mind. And in fact, Horace does explicitly make the connection between security and greed at *Epistles* 1.18.23–4.²²¹ Lucretius explains the link in the passage (*DRN* 3.59–89), which I mentioned above in connection with the danger of excess, and with the fear of death as the underlying cause of greed. While security is desirable, the fear of death seems to pervert this desire into something more unnatural, leading people to seek more wealth than is really necessary. In *KD* 14 Epicurus says that the purest security comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from the multitude, though a certain degree of security *from other men* comes by means of the power to repel attacks and by prosperity. Epicurus may not primarily be speaking here of security in the knowledge that one has provision for the future – it is security against the threat of others that is specified – but, by mentioning prosperity, financial security (simply to afford the necessities for survival) is surely also recommended. The fact that in *KD* 15 Epicurus draws attention to the limits of wealth seems particularly pertinent; while he concedes that to an extent prosperity is a good thing, he is keen to make clear that natural wealth is limited (unlike the limitless wealth desired by the *avarus*). It is evident, then, that from an Epicurean standpoint there is a link between security and greed, although, in accordance with the conversational style of the *Satires*, the onus is not on the poet to provide a

²²⁰ Fraenkel, 1957, 92–4; the connection between greed and discontent is similarly presented in the seventeenth letter of pseudo-Hippocrates. Although Fraenkel maintains the pseudo-Hippocrates letter is later than Horace, Smith (1990, 29) leaves the dating of the Democritus sequence of letters (from which this comes) as having been written any time in the two centuries prior to the first century A.D. papyrus, which is as far back as the transmission of these letters can be traced.

²²¹ *quem tenet argenti sitis importuna famesque,
quem pauperitatis pudor et fuga...*
who is held by an insatiate thirst and hunger for money, by the shame and dread of poverty...
(tr. Fairclough, 1926, adapted)

systematic, progressive argument, but to present his ideas in a casual, even inconsequential way.

Importantly, the appeal to moderation is thus already implied if people's discontent comes from false beliefs derived from a desire for security (which, as Horace shows, may tend to be excessive). The false beliefs of the discontented, in erroneously assuming that those in other professions are having a better time of it, also smack of a tendency to be extreme, or to exaggeration, in themselves. As in the merchant's belief that the soldier's life is better:

*'militia est potior. quid enim? concurritur: horae
momento cita mors venit aut victoria laeta.'* (7-8)

'An army life beats this! No question! Battle is joined, and in one decisive hour comes quick death or the joy of victory.'

The feeling that others' lives are so much easier and that they are wealthier and so on does not equate to excessive desire in itself, but the connection is surely that these exaggerated notions lead to envy (itself extreme) and so to an extreme desire to compensate for that which they (exaggeratedly) believe they lack by comparison, and so to greed.

2.5 The Argument of *Satire* 1.2

(i) The Doctrine of the Mean

As we saw in Chapter 1 (§1.3) scholars have questioned the nature of Horace's argument in *Satire* 1.2. Although the influence of the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean has been generally recognised, what has not been appreciated is the way in which recent discussions of this doctrine can help us interpret Horace's position.²²² *Satire* 1.2 opens (up to v.28) with various

²²² On Horace's possible familiarity with Aristotle's ethics, see below: §2.5 (ii).

examples showing the folly of running to excess and thus the advisability of moderation. We are first given a list of various unsavoury types mourning Tigellius' death.²²³ It would seem that in the first word Horace is hinting at the subject matter of the poem from v.28 on: *ambubaiae* (flute-girls) being notorious for their sexual availability.²²⁴ Tigellius is described as 'so generous' (*quippe benignus erat* 4): i.e., excessively so; presumably, his mourners had benefited financially from his acquaintance. In contrast we are then given the example of someone who, for fear of being called profligate, would not give enough for a poor friend to stave off hunger. Further illustrations of contrasting extremes of behaviour (initially regarding money)²²⁵ are depicted and then explained by people's wish to *avoid* running to extremes, or to avoid being regarded as doing so – only, in so doing, to run to opposite extremes (as at 7-11). At 25 Horace turns his attention to extremes in style of dress and personal hygiene and then, at 28, he effectively introduces the principal subject of the poem, which is sex.

A more specifically Aristotelian aspect to Horace's forthcoming argument (rather than it merely being pro-moderation in general terms) is suggested in: *dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt*; 'in avoiding one fault, fools rush to the opposite extreme' (24), and again, in connection with this: *nil medium est* (28). The use of the word *vitia* to describe the polarised behavioural extremes that are to be avoided is reminiscent of Aristotle's exposition of the doctrine of the mean in relation to virtue, where the vices are polarised extremes on either side of the virtuous mean (e.g. *NE* 1107a1-2).²²⁶

²²³ Tigellius was a well-known contemporary figure, who had been on familiar terms with Julius Caesar and Octavian: Brown, 1993, 101.

²²⁴ cf., e.g., with reference to flute-girls generally, Aristophanes *Thesmophoriazusae*, 1160ff, *Wasps* 1326ff; to *ambubaiae* in particular: Suetonius, *The lives of the Caesars: Nero* 27.2: Brown, 1993, 101.

²²⁵ It seems possible that the accent, in the first section of opposing extremes, on tendencies towards money spending/hoarding is a link to the previous satire (on greed). Although the second satire is likely to have been one of the earliest composed – Rudd, 1966, 10: "The bawdy theme and treatment, the plentiful use of names, and the absence of any reference to Maecenas all point to an early date" – and earlier than the first, Horace may still have quite deliberately placed it after the first when the book was published as a whole.

²²⁶ Cf. *Epistles* 1.18.9: *virtus est medium vitiorum et utrimque reductum*. The terminology suggests an Aristotelian influence rather than its being an adoption of a traditional poetic commonplace: *pace* Mayer, 2005, 150.

Another instance where Horace is seen to advocate a mean (or middle way) between two extremes in the *Satires* is at *Sat.* 1.1.106-7:

*est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines,
quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.*

Things have a proper measure, there are in other words definite limits,
beyond or short of which the right course can't lie.

Here the advocacy of a mean between two extremes (in line with the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean) is presented in a way that is also reminiscent of Lucretius, who advocates moderation in terms of the importance of keeping within limits (notably with regard to greed) at *DRN* 5.1432-3:

*nimirum quia non cognovit quae sit habendi
finis et omnino quoad crescat vera voluptas.*

Plainly because it [mankind] does not know the limit of possession,
and how far it is ever possible for real pleasure to grow.²²⁷

Thus, it would seem that at 1.1.106-7 Horace is fusing Epicurean and Aristotelian ideas.

Aside from *Satire* 1.2 the most notable instance of Horace's advocacy of the mean, as the central theme in the poem, is *Odes* 2.10, written later though before 23 B.C. (when the first three books of the *Odes* were published), where it is generally acknowledged that he coined the phrase 'the golden mean' (*auream..... mediocritatem*, v.5).²²⁸ Here the mean is again rendered in an apparently Aristotelian way, as the ideal point between two antithetical extremes. Although there are other examples in precedent

²²⁷ All translations of *DRN* are by Rouse/Smith (1992), with adaptations, throughout the thesis, unless otherwise indicated.

²²⁸ Cf. Lucretius' referring to the precepts of Epicurus as *aurea dicta* (*DRN* 3.12) (Nisbet and Hubbard, 1978, 160).

literature of the folly of going to opposite extremes, these are, by comparison, brief and inconsequential, whereas *Odes* 2.10 does come across as more of a systematic exposition.²²⁹

Commentators²³⁰ generally relate *Odes* 2.10 to the Aristotelian doctrine, and it is likely that, given this essential similarity of format and its repetition throughout, in albeit general terms the doctrine of the mean is being advocated. Indeed Nisbet and Hubbard²³¹ take the Peripatetic flavour of the poem as offering further evidence that Licinius (the poem's addressee, v.1) was Licinius Murena, Maecenas' brother in law, who was put to death for plotting against Augustus in 22.²³² Murena was likely to have been a Peripatetic, and the coincidence of the Peripatetic sentiments of the poem and the probable Peripateticism of the addressee make it very likely that Horace had Aristotle's doctrine of the mean in mind when he wrote *Odes* 2.10.

(ii) Horace's Knowledge of Aristotle's Works

However, bearing in mind the uncertainty surrounding the availability of Aristotelian doctrine at this time (i.e., around the publication of the first book of *Satires*) it would be helpful to consider what Horace's knowledge of Aristotelian doctrine may have been.

Firstly, and most importantly in terms of this discussion, it seems possible that Horace could have come into contact with Aristotle's doctrine of the mean from several sources. It was covered by Arius Didymus, in specific terms of virtue being a mean between two vices.²³³ Whether the Arius Didymus to which this is attributed was the court philosopher of Augustus is questionable, but if he was, or wrote at the same time, he may have been

²²⁹ Cf. above, §2.1.

²³⁰ e.g.: Page, 1920, 253-4; Quinn, 1980, 217; Nisbet and Hubbard, 1978, 151-160; Wickham, 1877, 130.

²³¹ Nisbet and Hubbard, 1978, 152-3.

²³² Dio 54.3: Nisbet and Hubbard, 1978, 152.

²³³ 2.137.14-143.24: *Ecl.* 2. 7. 20 Wachsmuth, 1884.

another possible source for Horace's Aristotelian knowledge²³⁴ - though the *Satires*' relatively early date makes this rather unlikely.

It seems that *metriopatheia* (moderation of the passions) had been adopted by the Academics in opposition to Stoic *apatheia*.²³⁵ This is notable since although moderation of the passions may not seem necessarily to relate directly to the doctrine of the mean, The Academics are viewed as adopting this principle from the Peripatetics (Cicero *Tusc.* 3. 22/ 4. 38ff.) in connection with the view that virtue is a mean between two extreme vices (Cicero *Brutus* 149).²³⁶ The fact that it seems likely that *metriopatheia* was already being contrasted with Stoic *apatheia* in the first century B.C. is possibly significant given Horace's hostility to the more extreme aspects of Stoicism, as, for example in *Sat.* 1.3, which will be discussed in due course.²³⁷ In any case,

²³⁴ Although Diels (1879) and more recently Hahm (1990, 2935-3055) take the view that the doxographer Arius Didymus was also the court philosopher Arius, Göransson (1995, 211-226) effectively exposes the lack of proof for this supposition and, indeed, suggests that, if anything, it is more likely that the doxographer Arius Didymus was either unattached to any philosophical school or of a Sceptic or Academic persuasion. Göransson's reason for this is the detached objectivity of the doxography, and total lack of polemic (which one might expect from the Stoic court philosopher, Arius). Hahm's claims of geographical and chronological compatibility (between what is known of the doxographer and Arius the court philosopher) do not prove that they were one and the same person. The date of the doxography could, in fact, be anything from the middle of the first century B.C. to the end of the second century A.D (Eudorus is mentioned in the doxography). It is therefore possible that the doxographer, Arius Didymus, even if he was *not* the courtier of Augustus, Arius, was of a similar period.

²³⁵ On the Academics' approval of the doctrine of the mean: Cicero, *Acad. Prior.* 2. 135 (*mediocritates illi probabant*): Gottschalk (1987, 1144). Also, with regard to Crantor's (335-275 B.C.) adoption of *metriopatheia*: Praechter, 1973 (first published 1897), 33-7. Praechter compares a fragment of Pseudo-Archytas (Stob. 3. 1,106 pp.56-7 Wachsmuth) - the date of which is uncertain [100B.C-100A.D]: Kahn, 2001, 76 - with Plutarch *cons. ad Apoll.* 3, and Cicero *Tusc.* 3.12, where there are marked similarities in the presentation and reasoning behind *metriopatheia*, relating back to Crantor. Moraux, 1984, 642ff, also discusses the strong Aristotelian influence in pseudo-Pythagorean writing (though with no specific mention of the doctrine of the mean). Gottschalk, 1987, 1144 also says that the doctrine of the mean "featured in the teaching of Antiochus," though gives no evidence for this. Dillon, 1977, 73, interprets Cicero *De finibus* v. 26-7, in connection with the sentiments of Antiochus: 'perfection according to nature' as referring to the Aristotelian mean, though there seems to be nothing in the text to support a link with the mean.

²³⁶ *Cum omnis virtus sit, ut vestra, Brute, vetus Academia dixit, mediocritas, uterque horum [Crassus & Scaevola] medium quiddam volebat sequi.*

²³⁷ *Metriopatheia* appears to be a specific reaction to Stoic *apatheia*. Diogenes Laertius uses the word *metriopathēs* in reference to Aristotle, (D.L. 5.31) but the term itself is not found in Aristotle. In the extant evidence the term does not appear until the 1st century A.D. (Dillon, 2003, n.123) though Praechter (above) suggested that it

these instances in Cicero (*Brutus* 149, *Tusc.* 3.22) where he refers to the doctrine of the mean surely indicate that Horace would have been familiar with the doctrine to some extent. It also seems likely that Philodemus drew from this doctrine in his *On Vices and Their Opposing Virtues*, but the evidence for an actual familiarity with Aristotle's works in particular is difficult to adduce. Nevertheless, one could certainly assume that Philodemus was aware that the doctrine was Aristotelian.²³⁸

In fact, it seems possible, from what can be deduced from the story of Aristotle's esoteric works,²³⁹ that Horace gained a knowledge of the doctrine of the mean directly from the works themselves (from which our ten book *Nicomachean Ethics* is drawn). The availability and possible knowledge of these works may not have necessarily depended upon Andronicus' edition.²⁴⁰ Instead Andronicus may have been part of a general Peripatetic movement of which these works were already a part (along with interest in Peripatetic doctrines on the basis of later sources, rather than Aristotle's own esoteric works). These esoteric works were said to have been kept in a cellar in Skepsis, left to Neleus, and acquired by the Peripatetic Apellicon in about 100 B.C., who then took the works to Athens. Thence they were taken to Rome by Sulla, after the Mithridatic War, and kept in his library. Here they came under

may have in fact been used by the Academic Crantor (335-275 B.C.). It seems then that *metriopatheia*, both as a term and an idea, considerably pre-dates Horace.

²³⁸ Philodemus' *On Virtues and their opposing Vices* is a work of at least ten books, including perhaps three books *On Flattery* (Glad, 1995, 102; Gigante, 1995, 38-9). It seems likely that Philodemus regarded flattery as the antithetical vice to enmity, and friendship as the mean; though this is not explicit: in *P.Herc* 1082, he contrasts friendship and flattery (φιλία.... ἥς ἀντίπαλος ἐστὶν ἡ κολακεία), aligning frank speech with friendship: Konstan et al., 1998, 6; also see Chapter 4, §4.6. The connection with Aristotelian doctrine is vague: there is certainly no detailed evidence of a specific knowledge of Aristotle's discussions of the mean in *NE* book 2.

²³⁹ The details regarding the esoteric material stored in Skepsis and its eventual editing by Andronicus and publication are largely drawn from Frede, 1999b, 773-4.

²⁴⁰ The date of which has been estimated at between 40 and 20 B.C.: Frede, 1999b 77; Horace's first book of *Satires* was published c.35 B.C. However, Moraux (1973, 58) actually puts the possible date of Andronicus' publication at some forty years before this, thinking Andronicus became the head of the Peripatetic school c.80-78. Moraux's reasoning is partly based on the idea that Cratippus and Aristo of Alexandria's conversion to Peripateticism was likely to have been sparked by Andronicus' publication. However, "the argument of silence," as Barnes puts it (1997, 21-3), that Cicero does not mention Andronicus (and he mentions Cratippus and other Peripatetics of the time) does indeed suggest that Andronicus' publication post-dates Cicero; Barnes puts the date of Andronicus' publication as not before the twenties.

the consideration of the Greek Grammarian Tyrannio, and were then edited by Andronicus. So it seems that Apellicon, at the beginning of the first century B.C., was in some way engaged in Aristotle's esoteric writings. In addition, the conversion to Peripateticism of Cratippus and Aristo of Alexandria,²⁴¹ originally students of Antiochus, seems all the more understandable if there was something of a revival of Aristotelianism by the middle of the first century B.C.. Also, it must be unlikely anyway that the copies found in the cellar were the only ones, which further raises the possibility of their being known separately from, and before, Andronicus' publication. In fact, Horace himself could have benefited from such a revival in Aristotelianism during his philosophical education in Athens. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, it is likely that he attended lectures given by Cratippus, who was present in Athens in August 44 B.C.²⁴²

It is possible then that Horace came into contact with the esoteric material, and thus book 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (as we know it) before Andronicus' edition (if this was not published before the twenties).²⁴³ In fact, in *De finibus* 5.12 Cicero refers to a *Nicomachean Ethics* and another work, which may have been either *Eudemian Ethics* or *Magna Moralia*.²⁴⁴ So it is

²⁴¹ Philodemus, *Acad. Hist.* col.35. 11-16: Frede, 1999b, 774.

²⁴² Horace mentions his stay in Athens at *Epistles* 2.2.43ff, which was disrupted by civil war, i.e. Brutus' arrival in August 44. It seems probable that Horace's education was not confined to the Academy. Plutarch, on Brutus' arrival in Athens in August 44, mentions the Peripatetic Cratippus. Also, Cicero: ... *te, Marce fili, annum iam audientem Cratippum idque Athenis* (*De officiis*, 1.1). Further, on Cratippus, about whom Cicero speaks favourably: *De off.* 2.8; 3. 5-6, 33, 121; *Ad fam.*, 16. 21. 3 & 5; 12.16. 2: Stenuit, 1979, 249-253

²⁴³ Much of what follows on the possible availability of Aristotle's works to Horace is deduced and taken from Barnes' chapter which discusses the availability of such material to Cicero (Barnes, 1997, 57-9 [esp.]). Düring, 1950, 60 asserts that Cicero acquired his Aristotelian knowledge through Panaetius and Posidonius; he would have listened to Posidonius in Rhodes, and doubtless visited its library. Although Cicero may certainly have become acquainted with Aristotelian doctrine in this way, this does not rule out the possibility of his Aristotelian knowledge coming from other sources as well.

²⁴⁴ It seems unlikely that this *Nicomachean Ethics* was the one known to us today; the earliest evidence for a ten book *Nicomachean Ethics* is late, references to it being found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, (Bruns, 1887) 151.9 and 11 and 153.21; if Alexander was the author or compiler of *mantissa* then the date would be c. 200 A.D. (Kenney, 1978, 37-8 n.4); it is also found in Stobaeus (1997, 58) and in the anonymous *Vita Menagiana* which derives from Hesychius of Miletus' *Onomatologos*: Barnes, 1997, 40-41. Barnes (1997, 59) also suggests that 'our' *NE* is unlikely to have been unified by an editor or author (such as Andronicus), and this

quite possible that Horace came into contact with Aristotle's works, whether directly - in whatever form they may have been circulated - or more indirectly through his studies in Athens.

This suggests that Horace would have been familiar with the doctrine of the mean as a specifically Aristotelian doctrine, and one could reasonably deduce that the same would have been true of many of his readers.

(iii) The Doctrine of the Mean: Quantitative or Qualitative

The likelihood of an Aristotelian influence in *Satire* 1.2 suggests that recent discussions on the doctrine of the mean can further help us understand Horace's use of ideas and argument in this satire. A particular question in interpreting this Aristotelian doctrine, addressed by Hursthouse²⁴⁵ and (in response to Hursthouse) Curzer,²⁴⁶ is whether it should be interpreted as wholly quantitative, and, as we will see, a distinction between a quantitative and qualitative measurement is key to the interpretation of this satire.

Excess, deficiency and the mean in the field of temperance (by Aristotle's categorisation) are judged quantitatively in terms of size of appetite and to what extent that appetite is gratified (and/or on how many occasions). But at *NE* 1118b21-27 Aristotle also talks of people who go wrong (i.e. in this context, err towards excess) by desiring and enjoying the wrong objects.

Curzer believes that the doctrine of the mean is to be taken (and can be taken) as wholly quantitative, in opposition to Hursthouse, who in turn was opposing the quantitative interpretation of Urmson.²⁴⁷ Against Urmson, Hursthouse holds that for Aristotle excess and deficiency do not always simply equate to too much and too little.²⁴⁸ Although Curzer asserts that the doctrine of the mean is expressed in quantitative terms,²⁴⁹ the fact that Aristotle also states that it is possible to go wrong simply by enjoying the

is perhaps indicated by the double treatment of pleasure. But the important point is that the material found in our *NE* 2 is still likely to have been available to Horace.

²⁴⁵ Hursthouse, 1981, 57-72.

²⁴⁶ Curzer, 1996, 129-138.

²⁴⁷ Urmson, 1973, 223-230.

²⁴⁸ Hursthouse, 1981, 60.

²⁴⁹ Curzer, 1996, 129.

wrong objects or what is odious, may suggest another non-quantitative qualification for judgements of excess, deficiency and the mean. As Hursthouse maintains, wrong objects need not necessarily equate to ‘too many objects’ (even if, in practice, this may tend to be the case).²⁵⁰ Thus Curzer’s further comment that there is “no hint that he [Aristotle] is speaking metaphorically”²⁵¹ – i.e. therefore the doctrine of the mean is being expressed as wholly quantitative – seems, strictly speaking, questionable in itself. As far as sex is concerned, which pertains to the sphere of temperance, Hursthouse cites the connection between adultery and licentiousness (which Aristotle explicitly links at 1130a29f)²⁵² as an instance where one cannot apply a wholly quantitative interpretation to the doctrine of the mean. Hursthouse argues²⁵³ that it is surely possible for someone with a normal sex drive (or even a low sex drive) to commit adultery (on, say, just one occasion) and that this cannot be regarded, in any quantitative sense, as excessive, since the perpetrator is not having too much sex or (necessarily) desiring sex too much (or too much sex) on too many occasions. Rather, he is licentious and therefore excessive because he is enjoying a wrong object, which constitutes dishonourable behaviour, and is not conducive to temperate living (1119a18-19).

Against Hursthouse, Curzer maintains that a quantitative application can always hold. To commit adultery once would be once too often and therefore excessive: it would be desiring something more than it is worth: too

²⁵⁰ Hursthouse, 1981, 62-8. The tendency for men who are quantitatively licentious, in that they have too great an appetite for (for example) sex, to transgress in desiring and enjoying wrong objects (as when committing adultery) Hursthouse calls ‘a fortuitous overlap’. In this respect qualitative transgression would seem, in practice, to reflect quantitative licentiousness. Indeed such an overlap, where adultery would seem to tie in with quantitative excess, may, in practice, perhaps not be so fortuitous (see below, n. 252)

²⁵¹ Curzer, 1996, 129.

²⁵² This is assuming that adultery is sexually motivated. At 1130a24f, Aristotle says that someone who commits adultery for money would not be licentious but unjust. Although *μοιχεία* (adultery) could mean sexual intercourse with the wife, widowed mother, unmarried daughter, sister or niece of a citizen (Hursthouse, 1981, 65; Dover, 1974, 209), and in that respect the likelihood of a licentious man committing adultery would be considerable; but at *EE* 2.1221b18ff it is clear that Aristotle has married women in mind when he speaks of adultery, so it would be reasonable to assume the same in *NE*.

²⁵³ Hursthouse, 1981, 66.

much.²⁵⁴ Although this quantitative interpretation seems logical, there is clearly a difference here between a licentious oversexed man, who through his immoderate appetite for sexual gratification is liable to commit adultery, and the one-off, temperate adulterer. It would seem, at least, that the ‘quantitative’ excess of the one-off adulterer is dependent upon another qualification (in this case, the *type* of sexual object) so that as an excess, or rather transgression (since the English term excess perhaps has a generally quantitative connotation) it might be better described as *qualitative*. It is not sexual excess *per se*, but enjoyment of the wrong object.²⁵⁵ In fact Aristotle lists adultery (along with theft and murder) as not admitting of a mean at all because of its inseparable connotation of depravity (1107a11). On the one hand this might imply that it is a wrong action in itself (or the woman involved a wrong object) and thus may be deemed a qualitative excess. On the other hand Aristotle then explains (1107a18ff) that these actions do not admit of a mean since, if they did, that would suggest that there was a mean of excess.

Aristotle also mentions adultery in connection with quantitative excess at *EE* 2.1221b18ff,²⁵⁶ where he states that a man is not an adulterer because he has too much sex with married women (i.e. has sex with married women more than he ought). Thus it would seem that Aristotle is pointing out that excess (in quantitative terms) does not apply. Adultery is a vice ‘in itself’, because of what it is, which suggests (if one is to view it as an excess – or transgression) that it is qualitative.

It will be apparent, in fact, that in *Sat.* 1.2 Horace, in talking of sexual excess and extremes, at times centres on extremes (or wrongness) and preferability of type (qualitative), and at times on excessive amount of sexual desire, and gratification of that desire (quantitative), and also appears to merge the two. Brown’s interpretation does recognise distinctions dictated by type and amount, in Horace’s change of emphasis from discussing kinds of woman,

²⁵⁴ Curzer, 1996, 136.

²⁵⁵ Another non-quantitative aspect to the vice of licentiousness with respect to sex (or other vices – see Hursthouse, 1981, 67-8) could also pertain to right or wrong occasions: there is a time and a place, to transgress which would be wrong and dishonourable (e.g. in, or in the precincts of, a temple).

²⁵⁶ Rist, 1989, 139.

to infatuation (with any woman),²⁵⁷ but the implications of this distinction in terms of the philosophical context is barely mentioned. Brown and other commentators (e.g. Rudd) do, indeed, mention the Aristotelian aspect to 1.2 (Brown and Shackleton Bailey suggesting that the doctrine of the mean can be consistently implied throughout the poem)²⁵⁸ but they make no further comparisons with Aristotle in interpreting Horace's argument.

(iv) Quantitative and Qualitative Moderation in *Satire* 1.2

Horace begins his argument on the folly of sexual vice (excess) by indicating a threefold set of options which could be regarded as corresponding to this Aristotelian framework of two polarised extremes on either side of the mean. Also, in pointing to extremes in terms of type of object, the argument would appear to begin on a qualitative footing. The two extremes initially comprise the sexual preference for the *matrona* (married woman) on the one hand: *illas/quarum subsuta talos tegat instita veste*; 'those whose heels are covered by the flounce trimming their dress' (28-9), and the seedy prostitute on the other: *olenti in fornice stantem*; 'the woman standing in a stinking brothel' (30). And the recommended mean between these two extremes is the *libertina* (freedwoman), whom Horace categorises as *in classe secunda* (47-9). In fact it is unclear here under what criterion (given that it is qualitative) sexual excess is being judged. It seems possible that various criteria are implied with preferability or otherwise depending on questions of legality, class, physical danger (as expressed directly afterwards at 37-46), seediness and availability. Also, from 31 to 63 there seems to be some confusion as to where Horace stands, exactly, with regard to the relative inadvisability of these two extremes, and, indeed, to what he sees as the mean.²⁵⁹ The problem first arises at 31-36:

²⁵⁷ Brown, 1993, 101.

²⁵⁸ In fact, although Shackleton Bailey (1982, 13) mentions the doctrine of the mean, he makes no direct reference to Aristotle.

²⁵⁹ e.g. Rudd, 1966, 10-11; Wickham, 1891, 29: "the thread is not kept perfectly of the unreadable discussion of vice in which it ends." (Though, for reasons of Victorian propriety he does not expand on why this is.) Palmer (1883) on the other

*quidam notus homo cum exiret fornice, "macte
virtute esto" inquit sententia dia Catonis:
"nam simul ac venas inflavit taetra libido,
huc iuvenes aequum est descendere, non alienas
permolere uxores." "nolim lauderier" inquit
"sic me" mirator cunni Cupiennius albi.*

When a well-known individual was making his exit from a brothel,
'Well done! So may you continue!' was the inspired verdict of Cato:
'As soon as the bane of lust has swollen their members, it's right for
young men to come down here rather than grinding away at other
men's wives.' 'I shouldn't like to be praised for *that*,' says
Cupiennius; what turns *him* on is a cunt that's clad in white.

It could appear that, having just denigrated the man who only seeks sexual gratification in a stinking brothel, Horace immediately proposes an argument (via the mouth of Cato) which suggests that such behaviour is right (*aequum*), and certainly preferable to sex with other men's wives. Admittedly, Cato's sentiments here are expressed with some irony, as the over-blown *dia*²⁶⁰ suggests, and the juxtaposition of *taetra* and *aequum*, but, even so, it still appears that Horace disapproves of adultery more than the brothel. The bawdily recounted details of the dangers to which the adulterer exposes himself (36-47) seem to further suggest Horace's relative disapproval of relations with a married woman,²⁶¹ as opposed to a seedy prostitute (essentially backing up the preceding Cato quotation). Rudd regards this as

hand, states that the subject of the poem is summed up in v.24, but, for similar reasons to Wickham, does not go into any further detail.

²⁶⁰ Brown, 1993, 104.

²⁶¹ Adultery in Rome (*adulterium*) - unlike Greece - has to involve a married woman. It was illegal. In Rome a special court tried cases for adultery and the usual punishment (after the *Lex Iulia*, 18 B.C.) was banishment for wife (adulteress) and adulterer (to different islands). However this satire was written before the *Lex Iulia*, at a time when violence against the adulterer - or even his death - at the hands of the husband was often condoned (Bosworth, Nicholas, Treggiari, *OCD*, 2003, 14-15) - as implied at 46: '*iure*' omnes.

inconsistent, in that the brothel appears to be “half-condoned”,²⁶² but the fact that one of two polarised extremes is less acceptable than the other need not contradict the argument that both are still extremes to be avoided. A comparison here could again be made with Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, where, of two opposing vices, one may be more preferable than the other.²⁶³ And again it must be said that these satires, like the diatribe from which they partly derive - should not appear to present logical, systematic arguments (even if, to an extent, they do).

From 49-63, after Horace has personally recommended the *libertina* (47-9) as being the advisable mean between the seedy prostitute and the married woman, this option is in due course criticised, which may again seem contradictory.²⁶⁴ However, this is all in fact quite in keeping, logically, with the statement at v.24: *dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt*. Indeed his own quasi-admission to *stultitia* in such affairs is intimated at the end of the poem.²⁶⁵ Horace wants to highlight the elusiveness of the mean, as well as to recommend it. And again, a comparison can be made with Aristotle, where the variability of the mean, as dependent on the individual, (1106a25-

²⁶² Rudd, 1966. 11.

²⁶³ cf. Aristotle *NE* 1125a5-1125b1. This is simply to show that Horace’s argument need not be regarded as inconsistent, rather than to suggest an Aristotelian influence on this particular point.

²⁶⁴ Fraenkel (1957, 78, n.2) notes that the promotion of the idea of the freedwoman as a preferable mean becomes discarded, and that at 63 “dealings with an *ancilla togata* seem to be just as harmful as those with a *matrona*”: this apparently being at odds with Horace’s argument up to 49. Rudd (1966, 10) believes the satire would have been clearer (though perhaps even less consistent) if, having begun with a recognisably three-term, ‘Aristotelian’ argument, Horace then abandoned the notion of the mean altogether and stuck to a two-term argument from then on, rather than doing “now one, now the other.” Shackleton Bailey (1982, 12-14) suggests an interpretation of the passage from 31 to 63 by means of a dialogue between a pro-brothel spokesman (31-35a), Horace (35b-48a, 49b-53a), and a pro-adultery spokesman (48b-49a, 53b-63). Shackleton-Bailey suggests a question mark after *moechatur* (49), but following the standard punctuation, the progression seems logical enough: airing options (i.e. freedwomen) but then suggesting how one can go wrong there too; the pro-adultery section from 53b (following Shackleton Bailey) is only necessitated by the former interjection at 48b: without 53b being a continuation of this position, 48b-49a being pro-adultery would otherwise seem somewhat random and inexplicable.

²⁶⁵ Cf., e.g. *Satires* 1.5.82-3: *hic ego mendacem stultissimus usque puellam/ ad mediam noctem exspecto*. However, at *Sat.* 1.6.68, Horace says that no one could accuse him of resorting to low brothels. In *Sat.* 2.7, although Horace denies involvement with married women (*non sum moechus*, 72) he has no response to Davus’ accusation of his degrading and servile involvement with *meretrices* (88-94).

1106b35)²⁶⁶ can perhaps be seen as being partly responsible for this elusiveness: it is difficult to define exactly what the mean is.

Thus, between 49 and 63, having recommended the *libertina* as a mean, Horace then warns against infatuation with such a woman (or indeed any woman):²⁶⁷ although a *libertina* may be a mean between the brothel-prostitute and the *matrona*, one must still take care to avoid infatuation (another form of sexual excess) with *any* sort of woman. In so doing, Horace now judges sexual excess in quantitative terms – infatuation relating to excessive preoccupation and gratification (quantitative), as well as qualitative in its concentration on a particular woman.

The emphasis of Horace's argument then turns to the danger of adultery (which, in comparison with casual, accessible sex, is seemingly presented as being, in practice at least, more aligned with infatuation) as opposed to the advisability of satisfying one's desires on a casual, detached basis (64-134).²⁶⁸ In this way, then, the argument appears to have become twofold. But this is because the other extreme opposed to infatuation, namely celibacy, and not thinking about sex at all, is simply not mentioned.²⁶⁹ The possible implication in the last half of the poem (64-134) that adultery is somehow aligned with infatuation seems to be evident in the way in which Horace advocates the more cool-headed alternative of casual (safer) sex: 119, 125ff.

Indeed the very fact that there is such a high price to pay if one is caught as an adulterer might suggest that one would *have* to be infatuated to indulge in such relations. At 68-76 and at 111ff the emphasis is perhaps on sexual excess in qualitative terms (and, as discussed earlier, in relation to 1.49-56, in an Epicurean framework). At 68-73 Horace comically asks

²⁶⁶ Aristotle compares two athletes, one (Milo) being stronger and larger than the other. A larger amount of food would be deemed as the mean for Milo, and a smaller amount for the smaller athlete. (Clearly, in this instance the mean quantitative.) This variability may allow for a degree of interpretation on the part of the individual as to what the right amount is. Terzis, 1995, 175-189, considers the question of the influence of a person's physiological condition on ethical choices in relation to the mean.

²⁶⁷ Brown, 1993, 101: "This passage clearly represents infatuation with any category of woman as an extreme to be avoided."

²⁶⁸ So Brown, 1993, 101.

²⁶⁹ Ibid. Though the absence of any mention of sexual abstinence may reflect a more general ancient attitude: see below, §2.6.

whether the *muto* would have a preference for a particular type of woman, namely a married woman of noble birth (70ff), and, from 73ff - as mentioned before - Horace recommends adherence to the dictates of nature, by which such desires can be easily gratified (cf. *KD* 15, 21) - implying that this is really all the *muto* requires. In short, in the second half of the poem, Horace seems on the whole to be adopting the Epicurean notion that one should desire and pursue only what is easily obtainable by nature. At 119 he directly refers to, and quotes, an epigram of the Epicurean Philodemus,²⁷⁰ who advises against wasting time with inaccessible women, although there is also a Cynic flavour, as noted above (§2.3) in connection with Lucretius.

Notably the Epicurean exposition of moderation could be regarded as both quantitative and qualitative. The need to gratify desires that are natural and necessary may suggest, rather, a quantitative amount to ensure survival and moderate security, whereas desires that are natural and non-necessary (and unnatural and non-necessary) could imply a further qualitative aspect to living within limits. This is demonstrated by Annas' lobster example, (see above, note 190) involving insistence on a type of food, and in Horace's depiction of infatuation with married women, where the allusions to Epicureanism at 73ff and 111ff (in terms of types of women and food, or the quality of drinking cups), enhance this fusion of quantitative and qualitative.

Also, there is no reason to suggest that by concentrating on the disadvantages of adultery as opposed to sex which is more available (*namque parabilem amo Venerem facilemque*; 'for I like love available and on tap', 119) Horace is condoning the stinking brothel of v.30.²⁷¹ One could imagine that the sort of sexual partner alluded to at 119 would be a more salubrious option than the one at 30, and it is quite likely that the freedwoman (who could also be a *meretrix*)²⁷² is still implied in this role. Also, while the dangers of adultery are undoubtedly great, over-use of the brothel would

²⁷⁰ Horace also appears to allude to a poem of Philodemus' at 92-3. In this instance, however, Philodemus' erotic sentiments are a source of parody; indeed it would seem that in his capacity as poet Philodemus rejects the anti-romantic stance of Epicureanism. The Philodemus poem is found in *Greek Anthology* 5.132.

²⁷¹ As Shackleton Bailey maintains (1982, 13).

²⁷² So Brown, 1993, 101.

surely be damaging to one's reputation and financial resources: a reason to avoid infatuation with prostitutes or women of any kind:

..... *bonam deperdere famam*
rem patris oblimare, malum est ubicumque. quid inter-
est in matrona, ancilla peccesne togata? (61-3)

To destroy your good name, to fritter away your family inheritance is wrong in any circumstances. What difference does it make, whether your transgression involves a married woman or a toga-clad maid?

Importantly, it is therefore possible to interpret the poem as advocating the mean throughout: even though the criteria change, essentially, from qualitative to a merging of quantitative and qualitative from 49 in infatuation, with the emphasis on adultery from 64. It would seem, then, by the end of the poem, that Horace is criticising extremes in sexual behaviour both in regard to insistence on particular kinds of sexual partner, and infatuation with any kind of sexual partner (though the *matrona* is emphasised). Rudd regards the apparent abandonment of the mean at 49-63 and the adoption of an apparently twofold categorisation of sexual behaviour, as abandoning the "Aristotelian framework".²⁷³ However, the fact that Horace has chosen to concentrate on a particular extreme does not necessarily preclude the possibility of his still advocating the mean. 'The golden mean', then, is certainly seen to dominate the poem up to 48-9, and Horace's general argument from 28-49 could be regarded as recognisably Aristotelian in its exposition (particularly given the preceding v.24). In addition, it seems that the mean - in spite of the argument becoming twofold from 64 (in adultery/infatuation versus casual, detached sex) - could be regarded as at least consistent with the argument of the poem throughout. And there is certainly enough allusion to the mean, in apparently Aristotelian terms, to suggest an Aristotelian influence.

²⁷³ Rudd, 1966, 10-11.

2.6 Is Sex Necessary?

In regarding infatuation as an excess and casual, dispassionate sex as a mean, it is worth questioning why no mention is made of celibacy. It has already been mentioned that in ethical discussions on sensual pleasures, excess comes under more scrutiny than deficiency, and indeed the perils of excess certainly provide more entertaining subject matter for satire; and again there is no reason why Horace *should* present a three-fold categorisation in such explicit and overtly logical terms. But it may also be that celibacy, or having too little sex, was simply not deemed worthy of mention: in antiquity it would appear that celibacy was practically out of the question. Looking again at Aristotle (simply as representative of an ancient viewpoint) sex is regarded as a necessity (1147b23-8). Indeed Aristotle regards those who are insensitive to the pleasures of eating, drinking and sex as sub-human (οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναίσθησία 1119a6-7).

The Cynic and Epicurean view of sex is similar and it would seem that both schools would regard it as a necessity. Diogenes, the founder of Cynicism, accepted Plato's society of women, and the practice of random sex (D.L. 6.72).²⁷⁴ Epicurus is purported to have indulged in courtesans (D.L. 10.7),²⁷⁵ though he is also accredited with having said (D.L. 10.118) that sexual intercourse never benefited anyone and you would be lucky if it did not do you harm.²⁷⁶ However, this should be measured against the fuller version in *VS* 51 (LS 21G [3]), where it is sex as specifically related to excessive desire that is being warned against.²⁷⁷ Lucretius had much more to say on the subject (*DRN* 4. 1058-1287), and his general position - as I discussed earlier - is certainly similar to Horace's in *Satire* 1.2, although he is keener to ridicule

²⁷⁴ Sorabji, 2000, 274. Diogenes also thought that masturbation could suffice (D.L. 6.46), so sexual intercourse may not be strictly necessary, but this would not be due to lack of interest, or due to being, in Aristotelian terms, ἀναίσθητος.

²⁷⁵ It must be noted that this allegation is made by a detractor, Timocrates, who criticises Epicurus generally (and possibly unfairly) for gluttony and debauchery. On Epicurus and his detractors: Sedley, 1976, 119-159.

²⁷⁶ Sorabji, 2000, 284.

²⁷⁷ The Epicurean position as to sex being necessary could be deduced from *Men.* 127ff, where sex could be deemed as necessary to ensure the body's being free from disturbance (Sharples, 1996, 87).

erotic *love*, with all its attendant emotional pain, which Horace, for the most part, avoids discussing.²⁷⁸ The early Stoics seem to have taken a similar view, to the disapproval of later Stoics, (D.L. 7.33-34), in that they accepted Plato's community of women for the wise (*Republic* 457B–471E) and sex on a random basis as a better alternative to the institution of the family and the jealousy brought about by adultery.²⁷⁹ But the Stoics nearer Horace's time seem to have taken a more puritan attitude, recommending chastity before marriage, although at the same time conceding that in reality this is probably not feasible.²⁸⁰

In any event, if one regards these views towards sex as, in some way, representative of the attitude to sex in antiquity generally, it would seem that sex was regarded practically as a necessity, and this may explain to some extent why, in *Satire* 1.2, Horace does not even consider celibacy as a viable option.

2.7 Moderation and Consistency

Moderation is also intimated in *Satire* 1.3, though Horace does not explicitly refer to it. Although, in the first 25 lines, there is a strong similarity with the opening of 1.2 in the examples of inconsistent (and, in fact, immoderate) behaviour, there is nevertheless a distinction to be made in that Horace's theme here is *aequabilitas* (consistency), rather than *mediocritas*. Again, as in 1.2 (1-4) Horace uses the death of Tigellius Sardus as an indirect introduction to his main topic which, from 25 to 124, largely consists of an attack on extremes of intolerance. Tigellius,²⁸¹ from 3-19, is described as someone who

²⁷⁸ Although Horace certainly mentions the harm caused by infatuation, he is more concerned with possible damage in terms of finances and reputation. (Though Lucretius makes this point too: *DRN* 4. 1123-4.)

²⁷⁹ Sorabji, 2000, 274.

²⁸⁰ e.g. Cicero, *De officiis*: 1.106, 2.86. Rudd, 1966, 277 n.41; Epictetus, *Enchiridion* 33.8: Arnold, 1911, 347. Musonius Rufus (1st Century A.D.) took the view that sex in marriage should be for reproduction only, and that husbands should not have sex outside of the marriage (frag. 12 Hense 1905): Sorabji, 2000, 276, 278.

²⁸¹ As already noted with reference to 1.2, this Tigellius is the same as the one in 1.2, but is not the Tigellius Hermogenes mentioned later in this *Satire* (129) and also at 4.72, 9.25, 10.18, 80 and 90 (of book 1). (Hermogenes, also a singer, is still alive.)

exemplified inconsistency in many aspects of behaviour. As a singer he shared the vice common to all singers²⁸² of never wanting to sing when requested and of never stopping singing when having not even been asked to sing in the first place, and his singing itself was inconsistent (1.3.6-8). At 9 Horace defines Tigellius in the statement, *nil aequale homini fuit illi*, (reminiscent of *nil medium est* at 1.2.28) and then gives further examples of the man's absurd inconsistency, which is summed up, or rather parenthesised, by the further statement: *nil fuit umquam sic impar sibi* (19).

While consistency could be regarded as being separable from moderation, in that someone who is regularly excessive (say, in his eating and drinking habits) could be regarded as behaving consistently, it is clear that in the sense implied here balance and, therefore, moderation, is also implied.²⁸³ Consistency (*aequabilitas*, which also means balance) was a quality particularly upheld by the Stoics (e.g. Cicero *De off.* 1.90 and 111; *De amic.* 65 and 92) where its implication is not merely adherence to the same behaviour pattern, but to behaviour that is consistently rational and controlled and therefore reliable, and unaffected by vicissitude. In this respect, then, one can see that there is a considerable (perhaps in real terms almost all-encompassing) overlap between consistency and moderation. And, in the depiction of Tigellius' inconsistencies up to 19 it is notable that some of them could be regarded as excesses. For example, his tendency was to walk *too* quickly or *too* slowly (9-11)²⁸⁴ or, at 15-17:

..... ...*decies centena dedisses*
huic parco, paucis contento, quinque diebus
nil erat in oculis.

²⁸² It is notable that the opening sentence in all of the first three satires is a generalisation (1.1.1 *nemo*, 1.2.2 *hoc genus omne*, 1.3.1 *omnibus*).

²⁸³ However, in *Sat.* 2.7. 18-20 (see Chapter 6, §6.3) where Horace also discusses inconsistency, he has Davus point out that consistency *in one's vices* is less problematic than inconsistency.

²⁸⁴ Cf. the stately pace of Aristotle's *megalopsuchos*. (*NE* 1125a10-17) Also cf. Virgil *Aeneid* 1.46, where *incedit* suggests the dignity of Juno's movements (Page [1964, first ed. 1894] p.146) I owe these references to Aristotle and Virgil to R.W. Sharples.

Suppose you'd given a million to this frugal, easily satisfied individual: within five days his pockets were sure to be empty.

The implication, then, is not simply that one's various modes of behaviour should be compatible with each other but that there should be balance and self-control, which necessarily suggests moderation.

As a commonplace in Greek (and, later, Roman) thought, the virtue of consistency is mentioned by Plato, quoting a proverb in *Lysis* 214c.²⁸⁵ The advisability of balance and harmony (more generally) is also found in the *Republic* 4.443d and *Philebus* 31c-32b, 64d-65d.²⁸⁶ Consistency of character is also promoted by Aristotle (e.g. *NE* 1166a10-1166b29).²⁸⁷ It is important, with respect to *Satire* 1.3, however, that the most obvious proponents of consistency were the Stoics,²⁸⁸ since, from 75 to the end they comprise the target of Horace's criticism. The connection with the Stoics in particular as being upholders of consistency is perhaps further suggested in Tigellius' inconsistent walking, something advised against in *De officiis* (a work which represents, particularly in books 1 and 2, the views of the Stoic Panaetius), at 1.131, where Cicero also refers to an excessively slow walk as looking like walking in a procession.²⁸⁹

One can cite further instances where moderation is implied together with consistency. *Satire* 1.3's main concern from 25-53, is friendship which is at first related to the inconsistent way in which men regard their friends' faults as disproportionately greater than their own. And clearly, to have an excessive awareness of others' faults and deficient awareness of one's own is not only inconsistent, but in both respects immoderate. By comparison Horace looks at the tendency of lovers to go to the other extreme, in indulging

²⁸⁵ Rudd, 1966, 27.

²⁸⁶ Rudd, 1966, 276, n.34.

²⁸⁷ Rudd, 1966, 277-8, n.46.

²⁸⁸ Fraenkel, 1957, 86, n.4: "The Tacitean model of the ideal Stoic, Helvidius Priscus, culminates in the clause *cunctis vitae officiis aequabilis*." (Tacitus, *Historiae* 4.5). Also, the original Zenonian definition of the τέλος: ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν (to live in agreement) strongly suggests consistency, as does the later ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν – also referring to internal consistency in one's life, and the Stoic notion of the well-flowing life, εὐροια βίου. [LS 63A-B.]

²⁸⁹ ... *ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur, aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates* (Rudd, 1966, 28). Also, cf. Sallust *Catiline* 15.5: *citus modo modo tardus incessus*.

or even praising his beloved's shortcomings: 1.3.38-40:

*illuc praevertamur, amatorem quod amicae
turpia decipiunt caecum vitia, aut etiam ipsa haec
delectant, veluti Balbinum polypus Hagnae.*

Let's turn our attention to this point, that the unsightly defects of a girlfriend escape her lover, in his blindness, or even actually delight him, as Hagna's wen did Balbinus.

This is reminiscent of *Sat.* 1.2.90ff where Horace says that one should not be too fussy, on the one hand, nor be too blind to a woman's blemishes, on the other, and also of Lucretius (*DRN* 4.1153-4). Indeed Horace also alludes to Lucretius at 43-49, in describing the indulgent way a father would regard his son's faults:

*at pater ut gnati, sic nos debemus amici
si quod sit vitium non fastidire: strabonem
appellat paetum pater, et pullum, male parvus
si cui filius est, ut abortivus fuit olim
Sisyphus... (43-47)*

But, supposing a friend has some defect, we ought, just like a father with his son, not to feel disgust at it; a father talks of a cross-eyed son as 'having a cast', and calls him 'wee chick' if he's woefully stunted like the midget Sisyphus...

Here Horace inverts Lucretius' list of the unctuous euphemisms which men attribute to their objects of desire at *DRN* 4.1160-1169 so as to support indulgence of faults rather than criticism.²⁹⁰

It may seem, in fact, that in suggesting that men indulge their friends' faults he is suggesting a somewhat immoderate, or at least irrational course of

²⁹⁰ cf. Plato, *Republic* 474d, Theocritus 10. 24-27: Brown, 1987, 129.

action. However, the point is clearly that such indulgence is necessary to counter the far more excessive tendency for men to overlook their own faults and exaggerate those of their friends. From 56-67 Horace, in fact, gives a list of insults (as opposed to Lucretius' euphemisms) to highlight this tendency towards excessive criticism, and between 68 and 75 he concludes that one should aim at fairness in regarding the faults of one's friends, which is suggestive of moderation. Further, at 68, *nam vitiis nemo sine nascitur*; 'for no one is born without faults', seems to complement the Epicurean view expressed at 76-7, that faults cannot be eradicated (as Lucretius *DRN* 3.307-322: 310: *nec radicitus evelli mala posse putandumst*).²⁹¹ The idea that one is born with faults and that they cannot be eradicated may suggest that for Horace *one's own* faults can only, realistically, be moderated. This would seem also to evoke the Peripatetic notion, adopted by the Academics in opposition to the Stoics,²⁹² that one should moderate one's emotions (*metriopatheia*) rather than aim to be devoid of emotion altogether (*apatheia*). Indeed, Horace specifically mentions the emotion of anger as an example of *vitium* at 76 whereby he effects a transition in his argument to discussion of appropriate penalties for particular crimes (up to 124) - as opposed to the Stoic view that all crimes are equal (96).

Importantly, *aequabilitas* actually dictates the very structure of *Satire* 1.3. Indeed, in terms of structure and argument 1.3 is the most systematic and consistent of the first three diatribe satires. After the opening twenty four lines, from 25-75 (50 lines) Horace discusses fairness in one's criticism (or otherwise) of friends, and from 76 to 124 (48 lines) the fairness argument extends to appropriate punishments for particular crimes, and that offences should be graded (in opposition to the Stoic view that all offences are equally wrong). Finally, there are contrasting depictions, at 1 to 24 and 124 to 144, of inconsistency and rigid inflexibility respectively. Also, fittingly, at the centre of the poem (69-75) the notion of balance is directly mentioned and thus emphasised, i.e. at 69-70, *ut aequum est,/ cum mea compenset vitiis bona*; at 72: *hac lege in trutina ponetur eadem*; and, at 74-5: *aequum est/ peccatis veniam poscentem reddere rursus*. The implication of the poem's balanced

²⁹¹ Brown, 1993, 121.

²⁹² See above, §2.5. (ii).

structure, and particularly the polarised extremes depicted at the beginning and end, suggest that Horace's own view, as far as consistency and inconsistency is concerned, is not surprisingly a middle way between the two.²⁹³

2.8 Conclusion

The fact that this discussion has concentrated on the first three 'diatribe' satires of Book 1 also suggests the importance of moderation by virtue of its prevalence in the most deliberately philosophical satires of the book (further emphasised by their position at the beginning). Indeed, in *Satire* 1.6 moderation could again be implied as an underlying factor in securing *ataraxia*, a state free from the stresses caused, in this case, by (excessive) ambition.²⁹⁴ Thus, in the most explicitly philosophical satires of Book 1, where Horace seems to be promoting his personal philosophical message, moderation is seen to be an important theme: in the first two satires, explicitly so, and in the third it is obviously present without being directly referred to. In *Satire* 1.2, more strikingly than in the other *Satires*, the question of an Aristotelian influence is raised. This is suggested by the apparent adoption of the doctrine of the mean. Given Cicero's familiarity with the doctrine it would appear that it would have been generally known to educated Romans, and known (in the specific sense of virtue being a mean between two excesses) as originating from Aristotle. Recent discussions of this Aristotelian doctrine concerning its interpretation as to whether the mean should always be considered in quantitative terms, help elucidate the connection of ideas in Horace's argument: how he merges a quantitative and qualitative measurement of the mean and excess (in mainly Epicurean terms) in the second part of the satire.

In addition to the strong Epicurean flavour on the importance of living in accordance to what is natural (and necessary), there are numerous Lucretian echoes, both in Horace's more direct exposition of Epicurean doctrine (e.g. of

²⁹³ So Ruch, 1970, 517.

²⁹⁴ See below, Chapter 4.

living within limits, *Sat.* 1.1. 50, 1.106-7 and Lucretius 5. 1432-3) and for more generally rhetorical devices (e.g. 1.3.43-9; Lucretius 4.1160-1169); and Lucretius' views on the fear of death, greed and ambition are likely to underpin Horace's argument in *Satire* 1.1. It is clear, then, that an awareness of the philosophical content in these poems is crucial for a proper interpretation.

Chapter 3

Moderation: 2

3.1 Introduction

In the second book of *Satires* Horace's presentation of moral argument is less personalised than in the first. In book 2 he takes a back seat, as it were, and relates the arguments of various other '*sapientes*': in 2.2, the countryman, Ofellus; in 2.3 he directly quotes the Stoic Stertinius (through Damasippus), and in 2.7, the slave-as-Stoic-*sapiens* Davus. In 2.6, however, Horace could be regarded as presenting himself, if a little ironically, as a *sapiens* (but then the presentations of '*sapientes*' in the other satires, as far as this label can be applied – and Horace's presentation of himself in the first book – are also somewhat ironic).²⁹⁵

One reason for this different format, this detachment of his *persona* in book 2, is perhaps to some extent due to the fact that the moral issues discussed are essentially the same as those in book 1. And, just as in the moralising satires of book 1, so in *Satires* 2 and 6 in book 2,²⁹⁶ moderation is seen to be consistently essential to the underlying theme: the attainment and maintenance of happiness. The aim of this chapter then, will not only be to demonstrate the prevalence of moderation as a theme, and the extent and importance of the specific philosophical influences involved in promoting it, but also to assess the particular way in which it is presented in the second book.

²⁹⁵ Muecke, 1993, 195.

²⁹⁶ Moderation also appears, in Aristotelian/Epicurean terms, at 2.3. 171ff and, in the idea of people tending to opposite extremes, at 2.3.223ff. But in this chapter I will concentrate particularly on 2.2 and 2.6; 2.3 and 2.7 are discussed in Chapter 6.

As I have just said, although Horace's *persona* does not dramatically monopolise the satires of book 2 as it does in book 1, 2.6 is an exception, and 2.2, like 2.6 but unlike the remaining six satires of the book, is not presented, directly, as a dialogue. In addition to this common feature, in 2.2 and 2.6 moderation is advocated through another important Horatian theme: town versus country. And, in idealising the simplicity and tranquillity of country life, Horace advocates the Epicurean ideal of *ataraxia*.²⁹⁷

3.2 *Ataraxia*

Ataraxia, absence of mental pain, was, for the Epicureans, essential for pleasure, and thus for happiness (Epicurus. *Men.* 128).²⁹⁸ Indeed, it was in describing pleasure (in the sense of pleasure as the ultimate long-term goal of life) as freedom from pain – both mental and physical (*aponia*) – rather than as some kind of active self-indulgence, that the Epicurean take on pleasure can be distinguished from hedonism as concerned with indulgence in immediate, sensual pleasure.²⁹⁹ *Ataraxia* also lay behind Horace's argument against

²⁹⁷ On Epicurean fondness for the country: D.L. 10.120. Lucretius 2.29-33. Horace also expresses his fondness for the country in the *Odes*, (e.g. *Odes* 1.7, 1.17, 2.3, 2.18, 3.1, 3.4, 3.6, 3.18, 4.3: Nisbet and Hubbard, 1978, xx,) and the *Epistles*, often with reference to his Sabine farm, and often in a context of Epicurean *ataraxia* and friendship (see Chapter 4, §4.6-7).

²⁹⁸ 'The unwavering contemplation of these enables one to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom of the soul from disturbance, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For we do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in terror. As soon as we achieve this state every storm in the soul is dispelled, since the animal is not in a position to go after some need nor to seek something else to complete the good of the body and the soul. For we are in need of pleasure only when we are in pain because of the absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no longer need pleasure. And this is why we say that pleasure is the starting-point and goal of living blessedly.' cf. Lucretius 2.16ff.

²⁹⁹ The Cyrenaics advocated the tenet that the sensory pleasure of the moment was the supreme good (D.L. 2.89). At least this was the view of Aristippus the younger (effectively the founder of Cyrenaicism) and Hegesias (who later headed his own Cyrenaic school); however, Anniceris modified Aristippus' position, actually rejecting an ultimate goal for life (which for Aristippus was pleasure), and Theodorus (after Anniceris, before Hegesias) relegated bodily pleasure and pain to an intermediate level between good and bad character. It is also generally acknowledged that some of Epicurus' ethical doctrines were deliberate reactions to Cyrenaicism (D.L. 10. 136-7): Long, 1999, 633-638. Epicurus responds to misinterpretations of Epicurean hedonism thus: *Men.* 132: 'For it is not drinking

excessive ambition in *Sat.* 1.6, which is discussed in Chapter 4, and indeed there is a connection between 1.6 and 2.6 in the autobiographical nature of both poems and in Horace's advocacy of a trouble-free way of life. However, whereas in 2.6 Horace's newly acquired country retreat is idealised as a symbol of Epicurean *ataraxia*, in 1.6 Horace makes do with detachment from the busy side of the city in which he is still a resident as a means to such contentment. And in the most engaging, intimately autobiographical passage in the *Satires*, Horace brings out this sense of *ataraxia*: *Sat.* 1.6.105-28:

...quacumque libido est,
 incedo solus; percontor quanti holus ac far;
 fallacem Circum vespertinumque pererro
 saepe Forum; adsisto divinis; inde domum me
 ad porri et ciceris refero laganique catinum;
 cena ministratur pueris tribus, et lapis albus
 pocula cum cyatho duo sustinet; adstat echinus
 vilis, cum patera gutus, Campana supellex.
 deinde eo dormitum, non sollicitus mihi quod cras
 surgendum sit mane... (1.6.111ff)

I step out wherever I fancy, on my own; I enquire the price of vegetables and meal; I often wander through the trickster-thronged Circus and the Forum as evening descends; I stand next to the fortune-tellers; then I go back home to a dish of leek and pea soup. My meal is served by three slave-boys, and a white marble slab has on it two cups with a ladle; next to them stands a cheap cruet and an oil-flask, with its saucer, of Campanian ware. Then I go off to bed, not worried at having to get up early tomorrow...

bouts and continuous partying and enjoying boys and women, or consuming fish and other dainties of an extravagant table, which produce the pleasant life, but sober calculation which searches out the reasons for every choice and avoidance and drives out opinions which are the source of the greatest turmoil for men's souls.'

Indeed this rendering of a way of life which is simple and free from care is perhaps all the more effective *because* he is a city dweller, and can look upon the business, the comings and goings of others, in a disengaged way, contented by the fact of his own comparatively harmonious existence. That Horace has in mind the Epicurean notion of *ataraxia* in these lines is made explicit in his closing remarks, where *suavius*,³⁰⁰ in this context, clearly implies the Epicurean goal of pleasure: (128-131)

...haec est
vita solutorum misera ambitione gravique;
his me consolor victurum suavius ac si
quaestor avus pater atque meus patruusque fuisset.

...This is the life of those free from the miseries and burdens of ambition; these are my consolations as I prepare to lead a more pleasant life than if my grandfather, my father and my uncle had each been quaestor.

By the time he comes to write *Sat.* 2.6, however, the picture presented is that city life has become too fraught with various inconveniences and obligations, perhaps due to his rising literary success and his relationship with Maecenas and other important figures.³⁰¹ At 2.6.20-39 Horace describes his irksomely busy life in Rome: how the ‘father of morning’ (*matutine pater*) harasses him with the routine of obligations. These obligations must be met whatever the weather (25-27). One has to deal with the crowds and, if recognised by anyone, envy of his friendship with Maecenas (30-31). As in 2.6, the blights to *ataraxia* that are discussed in 1.6 and 2.2 – ambition and vanity - are also aligned with town life.

³⁰⁰ Cf. Lucretius: 1.141, 2.1ff:

*Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis,
e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem;
non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas,
sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est.*

³⁰¹ Muecke, 1993, 194.

In *Satire* 2.2 it is clear that the excesses and vanities that Horace associates with food – a prevalent theme in the second book – and thus a particular way of life, are also associated with city life. The first section of 2.2, up to 52, which concentrates on folly/excess through wrong judgement and vanity, is clearly associated with the city. Indeed adherence (or excessive adherence) to fashion, clearly an urban phenomenon, is used as an example to show how misguided judgement can lead one to folly (and thus away from *ataraxia*):

...ergo,
si quis nunc mergos suavis edixerit assos,
parebit pravi docilis Romana iuventus (*Sat.* 2.2. 50-52).

... So, if someone were now to decree roast sea gull delicious, the youth of Rome, quick in learning wrong, will obey.

Although the goal of *ataraxia*, presented by means of an ideal, secluded life in the country, is the more specific theme in 2.2 and 2.6, moderation is put forward as the crucial means to achieving this goal, both in Horace and the Epicurean doctrine from which he draws.³⁰² Furthermore, from a Lucretian and, for that matter, Horatian point of view, *ataraxia* cannot be achieved simply by a change of geographical situation,³⁰³ by abandoning the town for the country: equanimity comes from within. Although it may be granted, then, that *ataraxia* is possible irrespective of location, it seems that it is not possible without moderation. Indeed this becomes clear when one considers the Epicurean notion of finding satisfaction within the limits of nature, which is tantamount to moderation: it is only those who are unaware of these limits (or unable to live within them) who will find disturbance because of struggle: those who understand these limits and abide by them, will be free of such disturbance (*KD* 21). It is understandable then, that while Horace's opening lines of votive thanks in 2.6 eulogise the trouble-free simplicity of country life, they also eulogise moderation:

³⁰² Cf. above Chapter 2, §2.2.

³⁰³ *DRN* 3.1053-1075; *Epistles* 1.11.27.

*Hoc erat in votis: modus agri non ita magnus,
hortus ubi et tecto vicinus iugis aquae fons
et paulum silvae super his foret. auctius atque
di melius fecere. bene est. nil amplius oro.*

It was this I used to pray for: a parcel of land (not too big), where there would be a kitchen garden and a spring of ever-flowing water close to the house and above them, a little bit of forest. The gods have provided better and more generously. I am content. I ask for nothing more.

Country life and moderation are seen, in these opening words, as particularly compatible. That said, there is no reason why moderation should not be pursued in the city (as Horace's own mode of life, particularly his moderate diet, at 1.6.115 suggests). Indeed, Horace himself would admit to over-indulgence in the country (e.g. *Odes* 2.7, 3.8), though this is always put in a healthy, convivial light. In *Epistles* 1.4.16 Horace refers to himself as a pig from Epicurus' herd, which could be regarded as a self-mocking reference to his Epicurean hedonism,³⁰⁴ and this seems fair after Horace's description of himself as *pinguem... nititidum* in the line before; but Farrington³⁰⁵ regards this as a possible reference to Epicurus' preference for the 'city of pigs' rather than the luxurious city, as described in Plato's *Republic* (372dff: Glaucon dismisses Socrates' idyllic picture of an 'uncivilised' city); i.e. the Epicurean preference for the simple life: for what is natural and necessary. In any case, life in the country, secluded from the obligations, pressures, vanities and consequent excesses of the city, is certainly depicted here as more conducive to moderate living, and thus to *ataraxia*, perhaps partly because Horace himself is prey to these urban temptations.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁴ E.g. Mayer, 1994, 136. Also Porcius, in *Satire* 2.8.23–4, is a man who is clearly fond of his food.

³⁰⁵ Farrington, 1967, 17.

³⁰⁶ e.g. *Sat.* 2.7.28, 33ff (i.e. the temptation of fashionable dinner parties); *Epistles* 1.8.12.

3.3 *Kenodoxia*

In the discussion of *Sat.* 1.2 in the previous chapter, distinctions were made between judging excess, moderation and deficiency quantitatively and qualitatively in order to demonstrate the different ways in which Horace regarded excess, but also to help elucidate how he applied particular ideas in Epicurean and Aristotelian ethics to his argument. In *Sat.* 2.2 there also appears to be a structural division in the argument on similar grounds; up until 53 Horace looks at excess - or perhaps, rather, transgression - in a qualitative sense, and from 53 he introduces a quantitative aspect as well.

Empty opinion (*kenodoxia*)³⁰⁷ - mainly in the form of vanity - is seen to be the main target in the first part of *Satire* 2.2 (up to 52), in antithesis to Epicurean moderation and *ataraxia*. Fiske³⁰⁸ takes *Sat.* 2.2 as, essentially, an application of Aristotle's mean: "Just as in *Satire* 1.2 Horace applied in a form suited to Roman tradition the Aristotelian theory of the 'mean' to the sexual passion, so in the second satire of this book he applies the same theory to the pleasures of the table." But Horace first concentrates on qualitative transgression via *kenodoxia* - the emphasis being on type, in terms of luxury, fashion and exoticism,³⁰⁹ relating to the Epicurean warning against empty opinion in *KD* 29, *Men.* 127ff - and the doctrine of the mean does not come into play until 53.

The tendency to be misled by the appearance of things, by their empty glitter, (the form which *kenodoxia* takes here) is in fact intimated at the

³⁰⁷ Fiske, 1920, 379 regards *kenodoxia* (i.e., as 'meaningless show') as an extreme opposed to 'sordidness' though it would be more accurate to say that meaningless show is here a result of *kenodoxia* (empty opinion): indeed sordidness could also be regarded as due to *kenodoxia*, of a different sort.

³⁰⁸ Fiske, 1920, 378-9.

³⁰⁹ As was discussed, in a different context, in the previous chapter in relation to the Epicurean division of natural/necessary desires; see also above Chapter 2, §2.2. Here, though, the important point is not whether an empty desire (or belief) can result in a desire that may be natural becoming unnatural, but that excess through false belief, in this instance, relates more to type than amount.

beginning of the satire, which is presented as Horace relating the precepts of the *rusticus* Ofellus:³¹⁰

*cum stupet insanis acies fulgoribus et cum
acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat...*(5-6).

when the vision is dazed by crazy glitterings and when the mind is inclined to false appearances and rejects better things...

However, *kenodoxia* is not specifically emphasised as a major cause of folly and excess until 23ff. Although 8-22 certainly deals with the foolishness of erroneously seeking pleasure through luxurious food, the reasons behind this mistaken practice are not given as explicitly as they are from 23 onwards. For example, at 23-28, Horace explicitly targets vanity, in this instance in terms of the latest fads in food, but also relates this to luxury and to gluttony:

*Vix tamen eripiam posito pavone velis quin
hoc potius quam gallina tergere palatum,
corruptus vanis rerum...* (23-25)

All the same, when a peacock has been put before you, I will not find it easy to eradicate your desire to brush your palate with this rather than with a chicken, for you have been corrupted by vanities...

Here the criteria by which the Epicureans judge natural and unnecessary desires are again brought to mind. Although food is a necessary desire, food that is eaten primarily because of its appearance, its cost and exoticism is clearly unnecessary. Indeed, in line with *KD* 29, insistence on fashionable,

³¹⁰ Bond (1980, 112-126) does not regard the character of Ofellus as having been portrayed in an entirely flattering light, and this is perhaps partly indicated by Horace's opening description of him, where *rusticus*, *abnormis* and *crassa* could all have disparaging connotations (though they also have endearing connotations). This does seem to indicate a certain ironic detachment on Horace's part, but there is no doubt – particularly compared with *Satires* 2.3 and 2.7 – that Ofellus' sentiments are presented as very much in keeping with those of the poet.

exotic food is both unnatural and unnecessary, and is a result of empty opinion (*κενήν δόξαν*). At 20-22, before the more specific emphasis on the absurdity of *kenodoxia*, an incidental connection between excess in terms of type and amount is made in that quantitative excess renders one incapable of enjoying particular kinds of food: the implication being that these specific kinds of food would also tend to be indulged quantitatively:

.....*tu pulmentaria quaere*
sudando: pinguem vitiis albumque neque ostrea
nec scarus aut poterit peregrina iuvare lagois.

Earn your sauce through your sweat; the man whom excess has made bloated and pale will not be capable of enjoying oysters and parrotfish or the exotic ptarmigan. (20-22)

In fact, at 33-7 Horace actually uses the concept of quantitative excess in order to highlight the absurdity of qualitative transgression (in this case, vanity):

.....*.....laudas, insane, trilibrem*
mullum in singula quem minuas pulmenta necesse est.
ducit te species, video; quo pertinet ergo
proceros odisse lupos? quia scilicet illis
maiores Natura modum dedit, his breve pondus.

... you praise a three-pound mullet, you lunatic, which you must cut down into single servings. It's just the look that attracts you, I see: what is the point then of rejecting lengthy bass? To be sure it's because Nature has given them a greater length, mullets a short weight.

The three-pound mullet is praised because it is large, but then the lengthy bass (*procerus lupo*) is rejected... because it is large. Here the large size of the mullet is a rarity, but the large sea-bass commonplace, and so undesirable. In

applying this quantitative judgement to a qualitative judgement (relating to the kind of fish) Horace neatly shows the potentially extreme nature and absurdity of *kenodoxia*.

3.4 Aristotle

From 2.2.53 Horace combines quantitative and qualitative criteria in his discussion of excess. The quantitative aspect is introduced through the apparent reference to the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. Although the prime target up until 52 has been qualitative excess influenced by vanity, the quantitative excess of over-indulgence is also implicit and is seen, more often than not, to coincide with qualitative excess.³¹¹ At 53-5, the further distinction between the stingy and the moderate diet thus completes the three Aristotelian distinctions of excess, mean and deficiency.

*Sordidus a tenui victu distabit Ofello
iudice. nam frustra vitium vitaveris illud,
si te alio pravum detorseris.*

The stingy diet and the simple one will be found distinct, in the judgement of Ofellus. For it will be pointless for you to avoid the former fault, if you set off going askew in the opposite direction.

tenui victu would seem to imply quantity, *sordidus* could imply quantity or quality, though when Horace goes on to describe Avidienus' diet (55-62), Horace again concentrates on kind of food rather than the amount consumed. A particular connection with Aristotle may also be hinted at in Horace's image of 'bending' oneself (*detorseris*), which is also found in Aristotle (*NE* 1109b5-7)³¹² although the point is slightly different: in Aristotle the image is

³¹¹ The gourmand who has a predilection for particular kinds of food is also likely to eat too much of it: See above Chapter 2, §2.5 (iii): adulterers may well also have a large sexual appetite.

³¹² Coulter, 1967, 39-41.

of bending a warped stick in the opposite direction to straighten it, whereas Horace is warning that one should not bend (oneself) *too far*, in the opposite direction, and thus over-compensate. Reference to Aristotle is also strongly implied by the fact that Horace made an identical point, in similarly Aristotelian terms, in *Sat.* 1.2.24 and 28, as discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed, there can be little doubt that in this passage (53-69) Ofellus' advice appears to owe much to Aristotle's doctrine of the mean.

The fact that Avidienus earned the nickname '*Canis*' implies that his sordid, meagre diet is a sign of Cynicism. And this Cynic way of life is not disapproved of simply for its extreme nature in itself, but because such a diet actually causes offence,³¹³ as is suggested when Ofellus recommends the mean and in so doing warns against the two corresponding vices (63-66):

*quali igitur victu sapiens utetur, et horum
utrum imitabitur? hac urget lupo, hac canis, aiunt.
mundus erit qua non offendant sordibus atque
in neutram partem cultus miser.*

Which style of life, then, will the man of sense adopt, and which of these two will he copy? 'Caught between the wolf and the dog,' as they say. He will be refined enough not to give offence through squalor, and not in either direction follow a wretched mode of life.

Muecke³¹⁴ points out that the ideal of the mean, suggested in *in neutram partem*, is also found in Terence *Haut.* 440ff, though in Horace this comes in the context of a deliberate argument, as in *Sat.* 1.2, whereas in Terence it is fairly incidental: if Horace is perhaps using Terence's language here, the idea which it expresses comes from an identifiably philosophical source. In fact the phrase is also found in Nepos, *Atticus*: 13. 5,³¹⁵ and Muecke describes it as

³¹³ The Cynics being remarked upon for their offensive behaviour elsewhere, e.g. *Ep.* 1.18.5ff. (See below, Chapter 5, §5.2.)

³¹⁴ Terence, *Haut.* 440ff: *vehemens in utramque partem, Menedeme, es nimis, / aut largitate nimia aut parsimonia*: Muecke, 1993, 124.

³¹⁵ *supellex modica, non multa, ut in neutram partem conspici posset*: Muecke, 1993, 124.

“a set phrase in the context of the mean.” Nevertheless, the fact that Horace almost certainly draws from Terence at *Sat.* 2.3. 258-72 (see Chapter 6, §6.6), makes a connection with Terence quite likely here too.

As I have already said, 2.6, like the moral-based *Satires* of book 1, is presented in such a way as to suggest that here we are being given Horace’s views, rather than those of other *sapientes*. And, at 2.6.6-15, Horace repeats, in brief, views for which he has already argued in the first book. For example, at 2.6.6-7:

*Si neque maiorem feci ratione mala rem
nec sum facturus vitio culpave minorem...*(6-7)

If I’ve neither made my wealth greater by evil means nor am going to make it smaller by waste or neglect...

This is another appeal to moderation: suggesting the middle course and the possible vices on either side, and thus the Aristotelian mean. Here Horace is applying the mean to material wealth, as an antidote to *mempsimoiria* – the tendency to complain about one’s own lot while envying the lot of others: the opening theme of *Sat.* 1.1., discussed in the previous chapter. While some may pray for material acquisition (*o si urnam argenti fors quae mihi monstret...*; O, if only some stroke of luck would show me a pot full of silver, 10), Horace is glad that he is free of such misguided priorities. In contrast to *Sat.* 1.1, where the subject of greed was in fact introduced somewhat illogically via *mempsimoiria*, in 2.6 it is clear from the outset that we are dealing with material wealth and the folly of greed. Also, although it is obvious that *mempsimoiria* would detract from *ataraxia*, in the context of 2.6, where there is an emphasis on the ideal of *ataraxia* at the beginning of the poem, the fact that greed will blight *ataraxia* in particular (rather than happiness generally) is made more explicit.

3.5 *Kenodoxia* and *Convivium*: Satire 2.4

Kenodoxia is also applicable to the two other food-oriented satires in the second book: 2.4 and 2.8. *Satire* 2.8 appears to be more concerned with *kenodoxia* as it is presented in 2.2, with an emphasis on the vanity of the gourmet. Behind Nasidienus' vain wish to appear fashionable is his desire to impress and ingratiate himself with the more important of his guests.³¹⁶ One could presume, at least, that both Catius (in 2.4) and Nasidienus suffer from misguided opinion with regard to food, and the fact that these satires are preceded by 2.2, where food and hospitality is introduced as a specific topic in connection with *kenodoxia*, such a presumption is reasonable.

In *Sat.* 2.4 a mock philosophical vein is introduced in the first few lines, in that Horace makes an allusion to the *Phaedrus*.³¹⁷ 2.4. begins: '*Unde et quo Catius?*' Cf. *Phaedrus* 227a: ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν; - where Phaedrus tells Socrates that he has heard a speech of Lysias. In the *Phaedrus* it is because Phaedrus has learnt the main points that Socrates thinks that he has learnt the speech by heart (which, in fact, he has not) eventually resulting in Phaedrus reading from the actual text, which he has with him, hidden, unconvincingly, under his cloak. Indeed, the fact that in 2.4 Catius appears to know all the details (as if by heart) suggests an element of vanity, in that, like Phaedrus, he probably wanted to bump into Horace for the express reason of showing off his new-found knowledge and abilities as a speaker. More basically, this allusion to Plato serves to show up the absurdity of the notion that gastronomy can really be considered as a philosophically pertinent subject. To make absolutely sure that this allusion is not lost on his readers, Horace has Catius refer to what he has heard as *praeceptis*³¹⁸(2) – philosophical teachings – 'of a kind superior to those of Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato' (3): ... *qualia vincent/ Pythagoran Anytique reum doctumque Platona*. The absurdity of regarding cookery as a philosophical issue is the

³¹⁶ This is discussed in relation to the subject of good conduct in Chapter 5, §5.4.

³¹⁷ Fraenkel, 1957, 136-7.

³¹⁸ cf. *Off.* 1.1.1.

main joke that runs throughout the satire and is enhanced by the didactic, Lucretian style of Catius' sermon,³¹⁹ and his philosophical/gastronomical vocabulary throughout.³²⁰

Fraenkel³²¹ also recognises Platonic allusions at the beginning of 2.2 and 2.8; in 2.2 the second line: *nec meus sermo est, sed quae precepit Ofellus*, cf. Eryximachus' speech in the *Symposium* (177a): οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλὰ Φαιδρου τοῦδε, ὃν μέλλω λέγειν. And the opening dialogue of 2.8 is similar to the beginning of the *Timaeus*, where the events of yesterday's ἐστίασις are related; in addition, *da si grave non est, quae prima iratum ventrem placaverit esca* ('tell me, if it's not a problem, which delicacy first appeased the angry belly') can be compared with:

εἰ μή τί σοι χαλεπόν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διὰ βραχέων πάλιν ἐπ'ἀνελθε αὐτά, ἵνα βεβαιωθῇ μᾶλλον παρ' ἡμῖν. (*Timaeus* 17b)

If it is no trouble, recount them again briefly from the beginning, so as to fix them more firmly in our minds. (tr. Bury, 1929)

Indeed, although, the philosophical doctrine from which Horace draws in the second book is mainly Hellenistic, the *convivium* theme and the dialogue form indicates a Platonic influence: irony lying in the deliberately unbalanced nature of the dialogues (Horace barely gets a word in), and the fact that while Plato uses the *symposium* setting to discuss philosophical topics, Horace uses the topic of food and the *convivium* in order to discuss matters pertaining to food and dining *as if* they were worthy philosophical subjects.³²² And this has a serious moral point: that in the decadent society of the time people regard the intricacies of dining as a more important topic for discussion than moral

³¹⁹ Classen, 1978, 342: "The questions (81-2; 83-7) as well as the inserted methodological considerations which interrupt the continuous flow of the precepts (35-6; 48-9) are clearly meant to parody the practice of didactic poetry as it is most familiar to us from Lucretius"; Rudd, 1966, 209, 211.

³²⁰ e.g. *doctus* 19; *sapiens* (44) which could here mean gourmet, and is indeed from *sapio* = to have a flavour; *cura* 8, 48, 85, *deceit* 26, *decebit* 65: Gowers, 1993, 137.

³²¹ Fraenkel, 1957, 136-7.

³²² In these two satires which deal with food and dining, Horace is also alluding to Plato's metaphorical use of feast standing for words (i.e. philosophical discourse): Gowers, 1993, 162-3.

philosophy.³²³ Indeed 2.4 and 2.8 contrast with 2.2 and 2.6, in that in the latter two satires discussion is demonstrably philosophical in content,³²⁴ as at 2.6.70-76:

.... *Ergo*
sermo oritur, non de villis domibusve alienis,
nec male necne Lepos saltet; sed quod magis ad nos
pertinet et nescire malum est agitamus: utrumne
divitiis homines an sint virtute beati;
quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumque, trahat nos;
et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius. (70-76)

....And so conversation
arises, not about other people's villas or town-houses, nor
whether Lepos dances badly or not, but we discuss what has more
relevance to us and not to know is an evil: whether it is wealth or
virtue that makes men happy; or what leads us to friendships, self-
interest or rectitude; and what is the nature of the good and what its
highest form.

With regard to the allusions in 2.4 and 2.8, satires which both concern dining or the dinner party, one may also be reminded of what Socrates says about cookery in the *Gorgias* (462dff) where cookery is regarded as not a real *technē* because it is concerned with gratification rather than actually benefiting the body, whereas medicine is a real *technē* because its aim is to do good; and this is paralleled with rhetoric as not being a real *technē*, unlike philosophy, which is. Socrates regards cookery and rhetoric as forms of the same branch, both aimed at gratification: flattery (*kolakeia* 463a-c). In *Satire* 2.4 then, it would seem that, although Catius includes among his precepts advice that does relate to good health (e.g. 2.4.21-3), he has confused these with precepts whose sole purpose is to gratify the palate. In fact, had his

³²³ Cf. Gowers, 1993, 136.

³²⁴ Horace's use of the *convivium* is further discussed, in relation to friendship, in Chapter 4.

sermon concentrated on diet for its health benefits (rather than the gratification of pleasure and vanity) his precepts would have been of philosophical relevance since such matters were an area of concern to philosophers: notably the Pythagoreans held particular opinions about diet.³²⁵ Indeed Pythagoras is ridiculed for his dietary stipulations at 2.6.63, and his inclusion alongside Plato and Socrates in line 3 of 2.4 may be partly for this reason, as well as his being an eminent philosopher of the past.³²⁶

Although the identity of Catius is not certain, Classen³²⁷ has revived Porphyrio's suggestion that he may be a certain T. Catius, an Insubrian Gaul from northern Italy, an Epicurean who, according to Porphyrio 'wrote four books about the nature of the universe and the highest good.' Before Classen, Palmer had taken the view that the reference was to C. Matius, the author of various cook books.³²⁸ But irrespective of whether he was in fact the Epicurean T. Catius or not, to some extent this satire can be seen as parodying Epicureanism, as well as the pompous gourmet: indeed it seems probable that in these possible identities Horace is deliberately intimating a sort of Epicurean, gourmand, recipe-writing hybrid.³²⁹ As already mentioned, the satire's didactic nature (and 'philosophical' flavour) puts one in mind of Lucretius, and there is a specific allusion to Lucretius in the last lines of the poem:³³⁰

..... *...at mihi cura*
non mediocris inest, fontis ut adire remotos
atque haurire queam vitae praecepta beatae. (93-95)

But I have no moderate desire to be able to approach the far away
springs and to drink deep the teachings of the happy life.

Cf. Lucretius 1.927-8:

³²⁵ Pythagoreans portrayed as vegetarians, e.g.: Antiphanes fr. 135 K., Aristophon fr. 9: Dodds, 1951, 17. Also on diet: *Timaeus* 89c; Edelstein, 1967, 25, n.69.

³²⁶ cf. Muecke, 1993, 168.

³²⁷ Classen, 1978, 343ff.

³²⁸ Palmer (1883; p315-6, 1905 edition).

³²⁹ Cf. Gowers, 1993, 141.

³³⁰ Muecke, 1993, 177.

...iuvat integros accedere fontis
atque haurire...

I love to approach virgin springs and there to drink.

Indeed the subject itself, gastronomy, is likely to have suggested Epicureanism, since opponents of Epicureanism tended to aim much of their criticism (misguided, perhaps, cf. *Men.*132) at the Epicurean tenet ‘the beginning and root of all good is the pleasure of the belly’ (fr. 409 Us).

As I have said, Catius’ obsessive, indeed excessive, fuss and detail in his instructions can be regarded as being due to *kenodoxia*: the erroneous opinion here of attributing too much importance to the niceties of what is gastronomically fashionable. This is certainly implicit when one considers the prevalence of this theme in 2.2, which, although in a different way, was advanced with regard to food and in an Epicurean context. Catius, in his *kenodoxia*, is an Epicurean hypocrite. This is suggested in his warning against succumbing to the better-looking Tiburtine apple instead of the actually tastier Picenum variety³³¹ (70-71). In a sense this seems in keeping with the points made against the empty appearance of things in 2.2. But here Catius appears to imply this moral, Epicurean view against *kenodoxia*, while at the same time betraying that he is culpable of it: his apparent advice against judging by appearance is itself ironically undercut by the fact that from an Epicurean point of view such differences with regard to food do not matter: an apple is simply an apple, and insistence on a particular kind of apple (even in regard to taste, which would merely vary the pleasure, rather than increase it) would constitute empty opinion.

And the resultant, misguided care taken to adhere to the particulars of a diet in which the right kind of food must be prepared in just the right way for particular people in particular circumstances (thus, in a sense, compatible with the idea of moderation), in order to induce the most beneficial effects on the consumer, actually causes the obsessed gourmet considerable anxiety: at 8 he

³³¹ Gowers, 1993, 140: “the precepts seem biased towards the distinction between appearance and inner-worth.”

refers to *curae*; at 48 he says: *nequaquam satis in re una consumere curam*; ‘in no way is it enough to exhaust your care on one thing.’³³² The repeated use of *cura*, as well as the Epicurean connotations of the satire as a whole, suggest that the fussy gourmet is steered away from moderation and thus the goal of *ataraxia* - which, as a probable Epicurean, is clearly counter-productive.

Although Horace may himself be inclined towards Epicureanism, he would not pass up the opportunity to satirise a well-known image of the school, and no doubt such ill-practising, misguidedly hedonistic Epicureans did exist. But it is precisely because in 2.2 Horace has already put forward what, for him, constitutes real Epicureanism (in terms of moderation, pursuit of *ataraxia*, and avoidance of empty opinion) in the example of Ofellus, that he can now satirise another Epicurean who, as far as Horace represents him in this satire, is not a real Epicurean at all.³³³

3.6 Satire 2.2.77-9

Although Ofellus is described by Horace at the beginning of 2.2 as *rusticus*, *abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva*; ‘a countryman, an irregular philosopher of homespun wisdom’ (3), in the passage from 53 to the end, Ofellus’ advice on plain living is related in terms which suggest an acquaintance with philosophical doctrine,³³⁴ not merely in the content of the sentiments, but in the particular terminology used to express them. For this reason it seems that we are to take the first part of Ofellus’ advice on plain living – i.e. before he is directly quoted at 116ff – as being philosophically embellished, as it were, by Horace: Horace wants the reader to recognise that he has applied philosophical doctrine to Ofellus’ rustic wisdom. As well as the doctrine of the mean and the Epicurean view of *kenodoxia*, a particular example of this is at 77-9, where, as we will see, the ideas expressed raise questions about their

³³² Gowers, 1993, 142.

³³³ Cf. Classen, 1978, 346-7.

³³⁴ Rudd, 1966, 171.

origin and to which philosophical persuasion they were regarded as belonging in Horace's time:

...quin corpus onustum
hesternis vitiis animum quoque praegravat una
atque affigit humo divinae particulam aurae.

Moreover the body laden with yesterday's excesses weighs
down the soul too together with it and nails to the ground that
particle of divine breath.

Here the image of 'nailing to the ground' is likely to derive from Plato *Phaedo* 83d, where pleasure and pain are described as nailing the soul to the body, thus making it 'body-like' *σωματοειδῆ*.³³⁵ In Horace, too, it is the pain (albeit from the excessive 'pleasure' of the night before) that nails to the ground 'the particle of divine breath'. In fact the phrase *divinae particulam aurae*, which refers to the soul (*animum*) in the previous line, brings to mind the Stoic description of the soul as being a part of divine *pneuma*,³³⁶ and so here we appear to have a fusion of Platonic and Stoic doctrine. Although this is encapsulated in just two lines, it is comparable to the fusion of Stoic theology and physics, and Platonic eschatology in *Aeneid* 6.724-751. In this passage, where Aeneas meets his father, Anchises, in the underworld, Anchises tells Aeneas about the rational essence of the universe: an elemental fire from which the soul comes³³⁷ (for the Stoics: *pneuma*). This Stoic doctrine is fused with Platonic and Pythagorean theories on death, catharsis and rebirth.³³⁸ In

³³⁵ Muecke, 1993, 125.

³³⁶ cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 5.38: *humanus autem animus decerptus ex mente divina*. ND 2.37; Epictetus 1.14.6: τὰς ψυχὰς συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια εἶναι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. Muecke, 1993, 125.

³³⁷ *Pneuma* consists of air and fire, e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias: *De anima*, 26.16 (Sambursky, 1959, 2). *Psūche* consists of *pneuma*, e.g. Galen (on Chrysippus' *On the soul*) PHP iii.1.10 (De Lacy 1978), Calcidius 220 = *SVF* 2.879, part = LS 53G.

³³⁸ For example, at 724ff Anchises refers to the *anima mundi* thus: *Principio caelum ac terras campos liquentis lucentemque globum lunae Titaniaque astra/ spiritus intus alit...*, and at 734, there is a reference to the Pythagorean-Orphic idea – as mediated by Plato – of the soul being locked in the body, as if imprisoned (*Crat.* 400C, cf. *Gorgias* 493A, *Phaedo* 82E, *Phaedrus* 250C. Austin (1977, 220-232).

Horace, too, the image of nailing to the ground is likely, through Plato, to have a Pythagorean association. In *Phaedo* 81e5-82b8, Socrates introduces the idea of the transmigration of human souls into animal bodies, which was certainly Pythagorean³³⁹ and then, from 82e, the Pythagorean idea of the soul being imprisoned in the body is discussed, and it is in relation to this idea that, at 83d, pleasure and pain are described as nailing the soul to the body, in that it is for this reason – the lusts of the body – that the soul is thus ‘imprisoned’ (82e).

Muecke suggests that the reference to Stoic doctrine (*divinam particulam aerae*) in the following line was also regarded as deriving from Pythagoreanism,³⁴⁰ and in so doing cites a passage from Cicero’s *De Senectute*, which refers to the idea of the soul emanating from the divine universal mind:

audiebam Pythagoran Pythagoreosque, incolas paene nostros, qui essent Italici philosophi quondam nominati, numquam dubitasse quin ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus (78).

I used to hear that Pythagoras and his disciples – who were almost fellow countrymen of ours, inasmuch as they were formerly called “Italian philosophers” – never doubted that our souls were emanations of the Universal Divine Mind. (tr. Falconer 1923, adapted)

The possibility that this indicates that this idea was regarded as Pythagorean in Horace’s time will be looked at shortly, but first there is the question whether there is any actual evidence that this belief was held by early Pythagoreans – and that its origin was Pythagorean – a question that has resulted in considerable investigation and deserves some discussion here.

Burkert considered the origins of the idea of the soul emanating from and returning to divine air in his discussion of the origins of ‘astral

Euxitheos, a Pythagorean whether real or imaginary, was said by Clearchus to have held the idea that the body is a prison of the soul (Clearchus fr. 38 Wehrli 1948); Dodds, 1951, 171 n95.

³³⁹ D.L. 8.36, *Hdt.* 2.123.

³⁴⁰ Muecke, 1993, 125.

immortality.³⁴¹ He noted that the basic idea of the soul being divine breath can be traced back to Anaximenes.³⁴² Indeed, that the souls go up to the heavenly aether whence they came seems to have been a fairly widespread belief in fifth century Attica, as is attested by the epitaph for those who fell at Potidea in 432 B.C.,³⁴³ and the belief also appears in medical writing.³⁴⁴ A Euripidean reference to this idea, however, has in turn been linked with Epicharmus,³⁴⁵ and Epicharmus has been regarded as a Pythagorean.³⁴⁶ But Burkert notes that it is possible that Euripides may have been influenced in this respect by Anaxagoras³⁴⁷ (though this does not necessarily lessen the possibility of its being a Pythagorean belief). Indeed, although Diogenes of Apollonia, too, spoke of the soul as *morion theou*,³⁴⁸ he is also shown to have similar views regarding the soul as Alcmaeon in Aristotle (*De Anima* 405a29). Even if Alcmaeon was not himself a Pythagorean, his book was likely to be addressed to Pythagoreans and, according to Aristotle, his doctrines were similar to theirs (*Met.* 986a30-31).³⁴⁹ He believed in the soul's immortality because of its similarity to immortal, divine things, such as the sun, moon and stars, in that, like these, the soul is in perpetual motion (Aristotle *De anima* 405a29-405b1).³⁵⁰ It is possible that this could be regarded as at least connected to the idea of astral immortality, and Alcmaeon's opinions here could be another reason why Pythagoreanism was linked with the less

³⁴¹ This is Burkert's term, (1972, 350ff) which refers to the idea of people's souls, on their death, becoming stars.

³⁴² Anaximenes: DK 13 fr.2 (Burkert, 1972, 362). It has been suggested both that Anaximenes influenced Pythagoras (J. Burnet, 1957, 8f, 108), and Pythagoras Anaximenes (Chiappelli, 1888, 582-94) - though in the latter instance this would seem to be chronologically improbable: Burkert (1972, 291 n71).

³⁴³ IG 12 945 = Peek no.20 line 5: αἰθερὲς μὲν φσυχὰς ὑπεδέχσατο, σό[φ]ματα δὲ χθόν (Burkert, 1972, 361).

³⁴⁴ e.g. Hippocrates, *De Carnibus* 2 (DK 64C3): Burkert, 1972, 361. Also, later, Galen held that there was a part of the soul that was air: *psūchikon pneuma* (PHP III 8.32: De Lacy 1978-1984), and that it was corporeal in the treatise *Quod Animi Mores Corporis Temperamenta Sequuntur* [Tieleman, 1996, 10-11].

³⁴⁵ Epicharmus DK 23B9 συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη κ' ἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθεν πάλιν· γὰρ μὲν εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω; Euripides, Supp. 531ff: ἑάσατ'..... ὅθεν ἕκαστον ἐς τὸ φῶς ἀφίκετο, ἐνταῦθ' ἀπελθεῖν· πνεῦμα μὲν πρὸς αἰθέρα, τὸ σῶμα δ' ἐς γῆν: Burkert, 1972, 361.

³⁴⁶ D.L. 8.7, 8.78; Iamblichus *De Vita Pythagorica* 241ff, 266; Plutarch *Numa* 8: Burkert, 1972, 289.

³⁴⁷ Burkert, 1972, 361.

³⁴⁸ Diogenes of Apollonia A20, 19: Burkert, 1972, 361.

³⁴⁹ KRS, 339, n1.

³⁵⁰ KRS, 347.

specific, core idea of the souls emanating from and returning to divine aether. But it is clear, in fact, that Alcmaeon's reference here (or Aristotle's report of this) to the heavens are by way of analogy, rather than his stating an actual bond between the heavens (and the stars etc. therein) and the soul.

On the one hand, the fact that Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia also held similar views regarding the soul may suggest that this view was not *specifically* Pythagorean, but on the other it may suggest quite the opposite: that - with respect to the idea of the soul's emanation from and return to divine aether - they adopted a Pythagorean view. At any rate, it would seem that the evidence (thus far) is simply not convincing enough to suggest that this idea originated in Pythagoreanism, as, indeed, Burkert concluded.

Aristotle tentatively recognises this soul/aether relationship to have been an Orphic belief,³⁵¹ which may suggest that it was also a Pythagorean idea, but again this gives no proof, either way, as to whether it *originated* in Pythagoreanism. On several key issues the Orphics and Pythagoreans held the same views: on the notion of the body being a prison of the soul; on the practice of vegetarianism;³⁵² on catharsis after death;³⁵³ and on the transmigration of souls, as could be inferred from the belief of the body being a prison of the soul and catharsis – transmigration itself is not actually attested, explicitly, as an Orphic tenet.³⁵⁴ But, as Burkert shows, there seems to be no definite case for labelling the idea of the soul's emanating from and returning to the aether as specifically Pythagorean. Although gold plates from the excavation of burial sites in Magna Graecia and Southern Italy (where Pythagoreanism was practised) show beyond doubt an early belief in the notion of the soul emanating from the heavens, Burkert does not regard these

³⁵¹ Aristotle *De Anima* 410b28, although the phrasing suggests doubt about the poems' authenticity (Hicks, 1907, 295) : 410b27-30: τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἔπεσι καλουμένοις λόγος· φησὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων, φερομένην ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων. 'The theory in the so-called poems of Orpheus presents the same difficulty; for this theory alleges that the soul, borne by the winds, enters from the universe into animals when they breathe.' (tr. Hett, 1935).

³⁵² See above note 325.

³⁵³ Dodds, 1951, 175; Aristoxenus, fr. 26; Iamblichus *De Vita Pythagorica* 64f., 110-114, 163ff; Porph. *Vita Pythagorae* 33.

³⁵⁴ Dodds, 1951, 149.

as reliable proof of astral immortality.³⁵⁵ As it stands, this would all seem to suggest that the notion of the soul returning to the divine aether, or, in Cicero, the divine universal mind, was not specifically Pythagorean from an early date but that it was adopted by Neopythagoreans and Stoics, and originally derived from ideas that were widely prevalent.³⁵⁶

Burkert in fact suggests that the Pythagorean link with astral immortality specifically (that is, in terms of the soul returning to the stars) was perhaps only inferred from Plato.³⁵⁷ One could deduce that such an inference would in turn strengthen the idea of a connection between Pythagoreanism and the general theory of the return of the soul to the universal divine mind or aether. It is possible that in *Timaeus* Plato adds certain details of astral immortality himself, which in fact may not be strictly Pythagorean, to the core idea of the relationship between the soul and the universe (which is likely to be Pythagorean, if not, as we have seen, exclusively so); and so, given the intentional Pythagorean context of the *Timaeus*, these views on astral immortality have thus been misleadingly regarded as definitively Pythagorean – when this is only true in part.

Easterling also discusses the origin of this idea (the relationship between the soul and aether) in relation to a passage of Philo (*Quis re. div. heres* 283)³⁵⁸ which raises the question of whether Aristotle, bearing in mind

³⁵⁵ Burkert, 1972, 363 n71: “The traces of astral immortality in the gold plates is uncertain” (i.e. in DK 1B17, 7, from Petelia, and DK 1B18.7 from Thurii. This would include the gold plate discovered in Southern Italy in 1974 from Hipponion modern Vibo Valentia: G. Pugliese Carratelli, 1974, 108-126, and 1976, 458-66 - with its reference to Bacchism, so reviving Herodotus (2.81), who equated Bacchic and Orphic funeral practices, saying that they were in fact Egyptian and Pythagorean). Zuntz (1971, 355ff) regarded the previous gold plates (before the 1974 discovery) as specifically Pythagorean. KRS (p.29) regard the 1974 discovery as suggesting Orphism rather than Pythagoreanism (through the Bacchic reference: one notable difference between the Orphics and the Pythagoreans concerned cult: Apollo was important to the Pythagoreans, Dionysus to the Orphics: Dodds, 1951, 171 n95.). In any case, the common ground between Orphism and Pythagoreanism suggests that these practices were also generally, if not specifically, Pythagorean.

³⁵⁶ So Burkert, 1972, 361ff; Easterling, 1964, 83-4.

³⁵⁷ Burkert, 1972, 368, i.e.: *Phaedrus* 246b-247a; *Timaeus* 41dff.

³⁵⁸ ‘But the soul whose nature is intellectual and celestial will depart to find a father in aether (*αιθέρα*) the purest of substances. For we may suppose that, as the men of old declared, there is a fifth substance, moving in a circle, differing by its superior quality from the four. Out of this they thought the stars and the whole of heaven had been made and deduced as a natural consequence that the human soul also was a

the reference to a fifth element, regarded the soul as emanating from universal aether. In doubting that this theory is genuinely Aristotelian, Easterling considers, first, the possible influence of Stoicism, and notes that although this theory cannot be attributed to early or middle Stoicism, it would certainly fit in with Stoic physics, in that both Zeno and Cleanthes believed that vital fire is to be found in both human souls and the heavens.³⁵⁹ Also, for the Stoics, the entire cosmos consists of and is ruled by *pneuma*, though the base of this ruling is the heavens, and the human soul also consists of *pneuma*: of a particular superior kind. But, even so, there is nothing in the doctrine of early or middle Stoicism which states that they held the view that souls emanate from divine aether (i.e. for the Stoics, heavenly fire) and, on corporeal death, return to it. However, later evidence does suggest that this was a Stoic tenet,³⁶⁰ though perhaps not part of orthodox Stoicism.³⁶¹ In any case, Easterling suggests that this idea ought not be attributed solely to the Stoics, or that the Stoics necessarily be regarded as the sole influence, (just as Burkert suggests with regard to the Pythagoreans) but that it was more widely prevalent.

It is also possible that the Pythagorean view of immortality in general was subsumed and modified by Plato and related by him in a deliberately Pythagorean context, and that the Neopythagoreans, from the first century B.C. were responsible for this idea (of the soul's bond with the aether) being regarded as Pythagorean.³⁶² Thus, even if the Pythagoreans did hold this particular view of the soul's origin, destiny and immortality in the fifth century B.C., the reason for its presence among Neopythagoreans may be due

fragment thereof (τὴν ἀνδρωπίνην ψυχὴν ἀπόσπασμα.)' (tr. Colson, 1929): Easterling, 1964, 81.

³⁵⁹ Zeno: *SVF* 1, 120; Cleanthes: *SVF* 1, 504 (Cicero, *ND* ii 40).

³⁶⁰ Easterling, 1964, 82; *SVF* 2, 813 = Lactantius *Diu. Inst.* 7, 20.

³⁶¹ Easterling, 1964, 83.

³⁶² There may be a reference to the universal soul in pseudo-Ecphantus *peri basileas*, according to Thesleff, 1961, 70: "θεομοιρῆς εμπνοήσις is, I think, the universal soul with, perhaps, a touch of the Stoic *pneuma*". This work has been variously dated at anywhere between 3rd century B.C. and 3rd Century A.D. [O' Meara, *OCD*, 2003, 505] and so perhaps before Cicero's reference to '*universa divina mente*' as Pythagorean (*Sen.* 78). Another Neopythagorean writing that refers to this idea – the relationship between the soul and divine air, and the soul's emanation from and return to the universal soul/air on death – is later than Cicero, i.e. Iamblichus (c. 245-c.325 A.D.) (*De Vita Pythagorica* 217-219).

rather to the influences of Platonism and Stoicism, than to the possible influence of early Pythagoreanism.

A likely source of the Neopythagorean Nigidius Figulus (whom Cicero claims to have spearheaded the revival of Neopythagoreanism in Rome)³⁶³ was Alexander Polyhistor,³⁶⁴ who taught in Rome in the 70s B.C. and who wrote a work on Pythagorean symbols and a *History of Philosophy*, which included Pythagoreanism.³⁶⁵ Alexander claimed to have drawn his material from certain ‘Pythagorean commentaries’³⁶⁶ – the date of which is disputable, but may well indicate specifically Pythagorean writings before the 1st century B.C. In these fragments of Alexander relating to Pythagoras, there appears to be a specific reference to the idea of the soul being a part of the aether: *εἶναι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπόσπασμα αἰθέρος καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ* [FHG III pg.241, Fr.140.27]. The wording here is the same as the Stoic *ἀποσπασμα αἰθέρος*³⁶⁷ and may suggest a Stoic influence, but even so, if Alexander is relating this concept from his Pythagorean commentaries, then it seems that this theory was certainly regarded as specifically Pythagorean before the 1st century B.C. – even if not exclusively so.³⁶⁸ In addition, the Greek scholar Castor of Rhodes (1st century B.C.) was of the opinion that some early Roman customs were Pythagorean:³⁶⁹ one of those so mentioned pertaining to the idea of astral immortality.³⁷⁰

³⁶³ In the preface of his version of the *Timeaus*: Rawson, 1985, 291. Though Pythagoreanism in fact also seems to have revived in Alexandria, a little later (i.e. post Cicero) under the guidance of Eudorus. Eudorus apparently drew from the writings of Archytas and Philolaus (real Pythagoreans) as well as those of various Platonists and Peripatetics (Dillon, 1977, 119), which may suggest that his Pythagoreanism was closer to the original than Figulus’. It is in any case likely that both Eudorus and Figulus differed from early Pythagoreanism – in different ways. There is nothing in the fragmentary evidence of Nigidius concerning the relationship between the soul and the divine aether.

³⁶⁴ Dillon, 1977, 117; Rawson, 1985, 3.

³⁶⁵ Dillon, 1977, 117; D.L. 8. 25-35.

³⁶⁶ Rawson, 1985, 293.

³⁶⁷ Cf. Epictetus 1.14.6 (see above, n 336; Philo, n. 358)

³⁶⁸ Varro, although he too discusses Pythagorean theories, refers to the theory of the world soul (connected, in Stoicism, to the idea that the soul is a part of the aether) in an Antiochean context (*Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum* XVI fr. 227 ed. Cardauns, 1976): Lehman, 1997, 151.

³⁶⁹ Rawson, 1985, 293. Also, cf. Numa’s visiting Pythagoras (Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 15).

³⁷⁰ Plutarch *Quaestiones Romanes* 10/ 282A “Is this, [i.e. why they that come from distinguished lineage wear crescents in their shoes] as Castor says, an emblem of the

To return to the quote cited by Muecke from Cicero's *De senectute*: *audiebam Pythagoran Pythagoreosque, incolas paene nostros, qui essent Italici philosophi quondam nominati, numquam dubitasse quin ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus.* (78) The first word, *audiebam*, suggests vagueness about the Pythagorean origin of the idea. But the overall impression seems to be that the idea of the soul emanating from and returning to the aether was, in Horace's time, regarded as having some Pythagorean connection but exactly how, and how far back, is likely not to have been known.

3.7 The significance of 2.77-9 in the narrative

This preceding discussion on the origin, and possible Pythagoreanism, of the phrase in 79, *divinae particulam aerae*, and the comment in *De Senectute* (78) may appear to detract somewhat from the practical purpose of lines 77-9 in the narrative of *Satire 2.2*, which is to point out the potential damage caused by over-indulgence. However, the consequences of excess are in fact shown in these lines to be greater and more fundamental than the mere inconvenience of a headache and upset stomach. The explicit reference to the effect of excess and lust for sensual pleasure on the soul could be viewed as what is ultimately behind Horace's argument in the satire as a whole, and thus the underlying reason for moderation. In general terms, Horace has concentrated on the practical reasons as to why excess and (less so) deficiency is to be avoided: it is not conducive to living a happy, balanced life. But in 77-9 the implication is that excess can have a more fundamentally corrupting effect on the soul – indeed to succumb to the lusts of the body is to subordinate the soul to the body: the soul is in turn ruled and imprisoned, and is no longer the guide of its own destiny.³⁷¹ The thought behind these lines certainly adds a more serious dimension to the folly of excess.

fabled residence on the moon, and an indication that after death their souls will again have the moon beneath their feet; or was this the special privilege of the most ancient families?" (tr. Babbitt, 1927).

³⁷¹ Scarpa, 1972, 229-237; Muecke, 1993, 125.

2.77-9 evokes other specific ideas from philosophical sources. The observation that mind and body are rendered less effective after a great meal is expressed in *Tusc* 5.100, *Div.* 1.60-1 and Plutarch *Advice* 127B.³⁷² Ofellus' advice here need not seem, on the face of it, to be particularly philosophical – it is common knowledge that excess in food and drink is likely to cause sluggishness, if not illness, the following day - but the thought here may also be relevant to Horace's somewhat idealised picture of a *convivium* in *Sat.* 2.6.65-76. Muecke³⁷³ notes that these guests are not directed in their drinking by a *magister bibendi* – as was usually the case at formal dinner parties - but because, in their wisdom, they are aware of their limits, they drink as they so please (*prout cuique libido est*, 67). The fact that the ensuing conversation (70-76) consists of the major themes of ethics perhaps suggests that they do not drink too much.

Indeed the fact that conversation concerning Lepos' dancing is rejected (*nec male necne Lepos saltet* 72) in favour of discussing what makes an individual happy (74), could also be regarded as a statement about Horatian satire. Clearly, to mock Lepos (for example) would also be in line with the business of satire, but for Horace the underlying ethical question of how to achieve happiness is what underpins his more morally based satires – such as 2.2 and 2.6. In addition, with reference to 2.77-79, moderation is not simply an important tenet for the achievement of happiness, but a pre-requisite for the actual business of philosophy itself. In *Tusc.* 5.100 it is said that Timotheus felt pleasant the day after dining, moderately, with Plato, because it is when one eats and drinks immoderately that one cannot make good use of one's mind (as well as body), which is to say that one cannot, effectively, engage in philosophical thought or discussion. Thus, in 2.6, Horace's dinner companions eat and drink moderately – the appropriate amount for the individual – so that they can then engage in philosophical discussion.

Nevertheless, after all this advice on moderate living, a little indulgence is also advocated: an idea which also bears an Epicurean stamp,³⁷⁴ and this is what Horace has Ofellus advocate at 82ff:

³⁷² Muecke, 1993, 125.

³⁷³ Cf. Catullus 27.3: Muecke, 1993, 205

³⁷⁴ Epicurus *Ep.* 3.131: Muecke, 1993, 126

*hic tamen ad melius poterit transcurrere quondam,
sive diem festum rediens advexerit annus
seu recreare volet tenuatum corpus...*

Yet he will be able to change over to something better occasionally
if the returning year has brought round a holiday or if his body
has shrunk and he wants to restore it...

3.8 Conclusion

The overriding picture of *Satire 2.2*, in its rustic idealism, and its attack on vanity in the first section through a qualitative assessment of moderation dictated by the notion of empty, erroneous opinion (*kenodoxia*) is certainly Epicurean. Horace shows the absurdity of excess by deliberately applying a quantitative judgement to qualitative excess at 33-37, and, again, the doctrine of the mean is the focal part in the satire, effecting a shift in emphasis from excess in terms of type to both type and amount. In addition, Ofellus' moderate, simple country life is not only an *exemplum* of how best to achieve *ataraxia*, but, more specifically, is in keeping with the Epicurean doctrine of living within the parameters of what is natural and necessary. These are themes which certainly appear in the first book but in book 2 they are developed and put in a more specific context. *Kenodoxia*, explicitly responsible for vanity and excess in 2.2, is implicitly responsible for vanity and folly in 2.4, and, one could presume, throughout the book. And in concentrating on culinary matters in 2.2, 2.4 and 2.8, Horace drives home the absurdity of *kenodoxia* by repeating the idea in a similar context.

The allusion to Stoic, and possibly Pythagorean doctrine of the soul, highlights Horace's appropriation of relatively esoteric Greek philosophy (at least, this is not simply a philosophical commonplace) to satire, presented as constituting the views of an Italian *rusticus*. It also highlights the specific problem of identifying exactly what the doctrine is, where it comes from, and

its implication in the poem as a whole; as well as in what philosophical context it would have been regarded by Horace's readers.

The allusions to Plato bring another dimension to the second book, suggesting Horace's use, or deliberate misuse, of the Platonic dialogue model, and the way in which the *convivium* setting is employed to illuminate particular moral issues, as well as the lack of moral concern, vanity and greed of Roman society. But the main force of Horace's philosophical message is again promoted in Epicurean terms: the folly of empty opinion, the pursuit of moderation, and the goal of *ataraxia*.

Chapter 4

Friendship and Ambition

4.1 Introduction

Friendship features widely in Horace, both in those *Odes* which are of a demonstrably convivial or personal nature,³⁷⁵ and with reference to his relationship with Maecenas, referred to throughout his work; it is also a prominent theme in the *Satires* and *Epistles* (the latter partly by virtue of the fact that they are presented as letters addressed to friends). Horace's *amicitia* with Maecenas in particular gives rise to another issue, namely that of social and political ambition. In this chapter I will look at the themes of friendship and ambition as separate entities, but also in connection with each other since, as *Satire* 1.6 shows, they were certainly connected as far as Horace was concerned.

In discussing *Sat.* 1.3 in Chapter 2, it was noticed that Horace raises friendship within the guiding philosophical theme of moderation (through *aequabilitas*), but friendship was also considered to be an important philosophical topic in its own right, as can be seen in the writings of Plato (*Lysis*, *Phaedrus* 255b), Aristotle (*NE* 1155a3-1172a15), and of the Stoics³⁷⁶ and, particularly, the Epicureans.³⁷⁷ Indeed Horace himself explicitly refers to friendship as a philosophical topic in the context of ethical questions worthy of debate at *Sat.* 2.6.75:

*quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos;
et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius.*

³⁷⁵ E.g. *Odes* 1.3, 9, 27, 36; 2.3, 7, 11, 14, 17; 3.8, 19, 21, 29; 4.11.

³⁷⁶ e.g. D.L. 7.124 = *SVF* 3.631 = LS 67P.

³⁷⁷ *KD* 27, 28, *VS* 23, 28, 34, 39, 52, 56-57, 66 78; Cicero, *De finibus* 1.65-68; D.L. 10.118, 120.

Or what leads us to friendships, self-interest or rectitude; and what is the nature of the good and what its highest form.

However, what friendship, or, more broadly, *amicitia*, entailed in 1st Century B.C. Rome first needs some clarification.

4.2 *Amicitia*

In Horace's time *amicitia* was not simply confined to the concept of friendship as an emotional attachment, consisting of mutual good-will, irrespective of other conditions, it had an important function in the social structure. There was generally an understanding between both parties involved in an *amicitia* that there was a commitment to confer some kind of favour or benefit upon the other party,³⁷⁸ and this sense of reciprocal obligation was also integral to the Greek concept of *philia*, as is shown in books 8 and 9 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle describes three kinds of *philia*: with respect to utility, pleasure, and goodness (1156a6-1156b35); and he also regards *philia* in terms of the varying degrees of superiority of one party over the other (1158b11-1159a12). In Roman society, too, unequal relationships, such as the one between a patron and client, were still regarded as constituting *amicitia*. In this instance the richer, socially superior patron would give financial support, or similar benefits, to the poorer, in return for the poorer's political or private support (or both).³⁷⁹ It would seem that this was in effect a formalisation of the commitments that could exist in *amicitia* generally, where such disparities might exist, though to a lesser extent. Thus, although true *amicitia* involved good-will and genuine affection for its own sake (cf. Cicero, *De amicitia* 20-21), *amicitia* also existed on a more practical, self-interested basis (and in relationships between equals, too, it was important

³⁷⁸ Treggiari, 2002, 46-7; Brunt, 1988, 355.

³⁷⁹ Treggiari, 2002, 47.

that commitments to one's friends were honoured).³⁸⁰ The relationship between Horace and Maecenas could be regarded as involving both such kinds of *amicitia* – as patron and client, and as true friendship based on genuine mutual affection.

4.3 Friendship: Tolerance and Criticism

As I indicated above, in *Sat.* 1.3 Horace raises friendship in relation to the philosophical idea of moderation through *aequabilitas* (consistency) – particularly identifiable with the Stoics (see above, Chapter 2, §2.7). As we saw in Chapter 2, however, consistency, as concomitant with moderation, can also be seen as a philosophical commonplace – its particularly Stoic aspect here is made all the more evident by Horace's anti-Stoic position later in the satire.

Ironically, this Stoic idea is used to shape a point of view which is pitched as anti-Stoic. And there are further specific ironic touches involved in introducing the argument, which reflect Horace's attitude to the subject matter in general, as well as the implied Stoic position in particular. Firstly, there is irony in the fact that Horace's criticisms of the singer Tigellius (for his inconsistency) seem somewhat hypocritical set against his main argument from 25, which is tolerance of faults.³⁸¹ Then, at 19-20 Horace imagines someone taking him to task about his criticisms of Tigellius:

..... *nunc aliquis dicat mihi "quid tu?
nullane habes vitia?" immo alia et fortasse minora.*

At this point someone may say to me "What about you? Haven't you any faults?" Yes, but others, and perhaps they're smaller.

³⁸⁰ Brunt, 1988, 381: "The range of *amicitia* is vast... it covers every degree of genuinely or overtly amicable relation."

³⁸¹ Indeed Shackleton Bailey (1982, 23) notes that Horace, at 21-25, is criticising Maenius for doing to Naevius what Horace himself (1-19) does to Tigellius (though Tigellius is dead and not a friend of Horace's).

The irony here is that, after having said this Horace actually goes on to criticise men who regard their own faults as less serious than those of the friends they criticise (25-37). Indirectly Horace is thus criticising himself. Indeed, it seems that Horace himself is being somewhat inconsistent. Also, a source of irony lies in the subject matter – criticism of intolerance of others’ faults (coupled with a disregard for one’s own faults) – since this would appear to be an odd subject for a satirist to attack: a primary function of the satirist being to be critical of others’ faults. On the other hand, Horace’s satire is not particularly severe, and perhaps this pro-tolerance argument in 1.3 further suggests this. In *Sat.*1.4 too Horace maintains that his criticisms are reasonable: he is not writing satire simply to get cheap laughs (34-5), and will only criticise those who deserve it (65-70) - and this is further qualified by the fact that Horace rarely criticises contemporary individuals anyway. But Horace’s stance in 1.3 in particular still seems somewhat inconsistent; and this also applies to his use of philosophical dogma: he apparently recommends Stoic *aequabilitas*, while subtly presenting himself as a poor practitioner of this virtue, and this is largely why he goes on to recommend tolerance of faults (which, as we will see, can be regarded as essentially anti-Stoic): human beings are not perfect. The irony in Horace’s position as tolerant satirist, his inconsistency, and his general non-seriousness seem to act as a foil against the inflexible seriousness of the Stoic ideal of consistency, though this Stoic inflexibility is not explicitly referred to until 96, with the criticism of the paradox that all sins are equal.

Indeed, given his non-ironic approval of moderation in connection with *aequabilitas* one would expect him not to criticise people unduly or excessively. And in fact, with regard to friendship Horace would appear to err more towards indulgence (rather than criticism) when it comes to a friend’s faults.³⁸² However, this is not to say that good character is not important in forming good friendships, as is suggested at *Sat.*1.6. 69-70:

..... *purus et insons*

³⁸² cf. Cicero *De amicitia* 61, where Laelius advises indulgence but also maintains there must be limits to such indulgence: *est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit.*

(ut me collaudem) si et vivo carus amicis...

If (to sing my own praises) I live a life which is pure and innocent and endears me to my friends...

And one could suppose that his friends (like himself) are men of good character and thus the kinds of misdemeanours from which Horace envisages turning a blind eye would not be very grave. According to Laelius in Cicero's *De amicitia* it is important that one chooses one's friends after consideration (78),³⁸³ and this is also recommended by Epicurus (*VS* 28).³⁸⁴ Indeed, it will become clear that Horace's discussion of tolerance in *Satire* 1.3 seems to be in keeping with certain Epicurean views regarding friendship.

Also, one could presume that the Stoic view that only the wise can have friendships (D.L. 7.124, LS 67B = D.L. 7.32-3) would be too extreme for Horace, given that the Stoic qualification for wisdom was, practically speaking, unattainable.³⁸⁵ Although Aristotle (1165b23-36) and Cicero (*amic.* 77) both state that if the corresponding levels of virtue between the two parties in a friendship become incompatible, then the friendship can be terminated, the Epicurean view was different: when forming a friendship one entered into

³⁸³ cf. Theophrastus : "judge before making friends, not make friends before judging them" as quoted by Plutarch *De fraterno amore* 482b, and referred to by Seneca *Ep.* 3.2. Aristotle advises judgement and caution in making friends (*NE* 8.3.1156b25ff).

³⁸⁴ *VS* 28: 'One must not approve of those who are excessively eager for friendship, nor those who are reluctant. But one must be willing to run some risks for the sake of friendship.'

³⁸⁵ It has been argued by Steinmetz (1967, 191, 199) that the Stoic Panaetius was a source for Cicero's *De amicitia*, on the grounds that there are similarities between the latter and *De officiis*, and on the further assumption, as Powell comments (1990, 18-19), that the *De officiis* is entirely based on Panaetius: Powell sees no evidence for naming Panaetius as such an influence. But *some* influence, suggested by the link with *De officiis*, at least seems likely. In any case it seems likely that friendship could well have been treated in a more practical context by Panaetius, given his more practical approach to ethics generally. Indeed the fact that for the Stoics the achievement of wisdom was a process (Sen. *Ep.* 72.6) meant that they could follow the Peripatetic view of friendship as a possible means to self-improvement: i.e. through the example of one's friends (*NE* 1179 a 3, *EE* 1145b1-9, Cicero *Amic.* 8); this Peripatetic view is also compatible in the case of friendships between *sapientes* (for the Stoics; for Aristotle: *μακάριοι*), which would not so much involve self-improvement as the contemplation of one's friend's virtuous actions (and thus by comparison, one's own actions); and, again on a practical level, friendship was a preferred indifferent (*Fin.* 3.70): Griffin, 1997, 96.

a kind of contract (*foedus*: Cicero *Fin.* 1.69), and was thus obliged to stick by the friend – unless the friend actually behaved unjustly to oneself and thus effectively broke the contract.

For the Epicureans, friendship was an intrinsic virtue (*VS* 23)³⁸⁶ and living without friends a source of pain. This seems to originate in the idea that friendship promotes security (and a sense of security)³⁸⁷ through the mutual benefit of the parties involved: indeed it is said to originate from benefiting (*VS* 23). Thus one had to choose friendship to avoid a source of pain (and to avoid pain is to achieve pleasure).

Also, the Epicureans were aware that friendship can carry risks (*VS* 28). Clearly, if a friend were to meet with serious misfortune one should not abandon him, (*DL* 10.120) but one should also remain in the friendship if the friend were committing some kind of injustice, provided the friend still behaved decently to oneself.³⁸⁸ Cicero was critical of the Epicurean view of friendship as derived from utility and the enhancement of one's own pleasure, which he felt debased the idea of friendship (*Fin.* 1.66, 69, 2.80). But this may be partly due to a misunderstanding of what the Epicureans meant by utility and, indeed, pleasure. Rist emphasises the Epicureans' regard for *pistis*, trust, in friendship (*VS* 34),³⁸⁹ and that this was one of friendship's particularly pleasurable qualities: the existence of this trust, in spite of the risks, is what makes the friendship genuine and, indeed, pleasurable.

However, Mitsis and Annas³⁹⁰ regard the Epicurean position on friendship as incompatible with Epicurean hedonism. For Annas the risks of friendship (in essence, the threat of pain) are at odds with the goal of pleasure, so she suggests that a possible solution for Epicurus would be a two-tier view of hedonism in relation to friendship: every act or consequence of friendship is not specifically related to increasing the agent's pleasure: its aim is genuine

³⁸⁶ 'All friendship is an intrinsic virtue, but it originates from benefiting.' (tr. LS).

³⁸⁷ i.e. that what promotes safety is a natural good: *KD* 6, 7.

³⁸⁸ Rist (1980, 128) argues this point from *VS* 15 – following Bailey's text – where Epicurus says that one should value one's neighbours' characters if they are "decent" (*epieikeis*). Rist suggests that this implies approving of behaviour which is seemingly as far as oneself might be affected by it; it does not necessarily mean requiring that one's friends behave justly.

³⁸⁹ *VS* 34: 'We do not need utility from our friends so much as we need confidence concerning that utility.'

³⁹⁰ Mitsis, 1987, 98-128; Annas, 1993, 243-4.

“other concern”; but at the same time this nevertheless fits in with an *overall* view of friendship as being preferable (more pleasurable) than a situation of living without friends.³⁹¹ However, Annas notes that Epicurus proposes no such view of friendship and his writings suggest that he would reject the idea.³⁹² Mitsis is of the view that Epicurus in fact recognises an end in friendship completely separate from pleasure, which denotes altruism (Annas’s “other concern”) and this is indicated in *VS* 23: δι’ ἐαυτὴν αἰρετή; ‘Choiceworthy for its own sake.’³⁹³

However, *VS* 23 could also be interpreted as ‘pleasant in itself’: i.e. choiceworthy because it is intrinsically pleasant, rather than as something separate from pleasure.³⁹⁴ O’ Connor³⁹⁵ raises this possible interpretation although prefers a reading where there is no implied concessive in *VS* 23: i.e.: every friendship is choiceworthy for its own sake, *and* (*de*) - rather than though - it takes its origin from benefiting: the second clause explains, rather than contrasts with, the first. Certainly, the idea of its being pleasant in itself seems most in keeping with Epicurus’ eulogies of friendship in general, and complements the importance of trust in friendship: this too is pleasant *in itself*, irrespective of the actual, tangible benefits on which such trust originally rests.

In response to Mitsis, O’ Connor claims that Epicurean friendship is compatible with a hedonistic ethical system. By O’ Connor’s reckoning, the kinds of risks in friendship that trouble Annas would barely exist in genuine Epicurean friendship (as Epicurus envisaged it). Epicurean friendship should be regarded rather as “friendly fellowship,”³⁹⁶ based on a mutual understanding of shared philosophical values: values which denounce greed, ambition, and the fear of death, even, indeed, physical pain, so that the idea that utility was a cause of friendship (*VS* 23) should not be confused with notions of advantage in the sense of monetary or social improvement, but

³⁹¹ Annas, 1993, 240-241.

³⁹² As *KD* 25 would suggest: “If you do not on every suitable occasion refer each of your actions to the end given by nature, but stop short and make your avoidance or choice with reference to something else, your actions will not be consistent with your theories.” (tr. Annas, 1993, 240-1.)

³⁹³ Mitsis, 1987, 104.

³⁹⁴ So Rist (1972, 132) who makes a parallel with Stoic preferred indifferents, which are preferred for their own sake (i.e. they are not necessary for virtue): D.L. 7.107.

³⁹⁵ O’ Connor, 1989, 165-186.

³⁹⁶ O’ Connor, 1989, 176.

rather as a means to ensure that one has the basic requirements (of food and shelter) to live without undue worry. The fact that the parties involved in such a friendship would not fear death, and even regard physical pain as something merely transient and which can be mitigated by bringing to mind pleasurable memories, also answers the criticism that the possible blight to *ataraxia* caused by a friend's fallen circumstances would be at odds with their hedonism.³⁹⁷

Horace's view of friendship is probably not quite the purist Epicurean kind described by O'Connor, although in the perhaps less ideal Epicurean friendship practised in 1st Century B.C. Rome, a sort of fellowship between the wise is implied in the idea of there being an agreement – *foedus* - as mentioned by Torquatus at *Fin.* 1.66: the friendship is on Epicurean terms.

This idea of an agreement – for which Epicurus felt no need because within an Epicurean community the implications of such a contract would already be understood - is also in keeping with the importance of *pistis* (trust), emphasised by Rist. This trust would be strengthened by such an agreement, and in turn strengthen the friendship against risks. This sense of loyalty, of *pistis*, seems also to be at the heart of Horace's views on the importance of tolerance in friendship in *Satire* 1.3, particularly in its diametric opposition to Stoic perfectionism and intolerance. It is certainly in keeping with Horace's readiness to forgive minor misdemeanours (83-95), and to indulge friends' faults on the basis that one is a friend, and that one is obliged to such loyalty, as at 32-3:

..... *at est bonus, ut melior vir*
non alius quisquam, at tibi amicus...

But he's a good man – there's none better – he's your friend...

Indeed, in effect the only instances where one would question the nature of a friendship are when this trust, this agreement in friendship, is brought into question:

³⁹⁷ E.g. Annas, 1993, 243.

.....*quid faciam si furtum fecerit, aut si
prodiderit commissa fide sponsumve negarit?* (94-5)

What am I to do if he commits theft, or betrays a trust or disowns his
pledge?

Clearly, this is why it is important to judge wisely before entering a
friendship: that such an outcome does not arise. If one has trust based on an
agreement between like-minded people, the risks of friendship are worth
taking.

Although the sentiment in Horace's argument is closely associated
with Epicureanism, the idea of balance, as well as drawing from the Stoic
notion of *aequabilitas*, may also owe something to Theophrastus. Aulus
Gellius renders Theophrastus' views, on the possible conflict between the
obligations of friendship and justice, (which Cicero also deals with: *De
amicitia* 61) thus (1.3:25):

*cum vero amici utilitas nimio est amplior, honestatis autem nostrae in
re non gravi levis iactura est, tunc, quod utile amico est, id prae illo,
quod honestum nobis est, fit plenius, sicuti est magnum pondus aeris
parva lamna auri pretiosus.*

But when the advantage of a friend is far larger and the sacrifice of our
reputation in a matter of no importance is trifling, then that which is
advantageous for a friend becomes more important in comparison with
that which is honourable for us, just as a great weight of bronze is
more valuable than a small liver of gold. (tr. FHS &G)³⁹⁸

This particular issue of conflicting interests seems to have certainly been
developed by Theophrastus, having been touched upon by Aristotle in the

³⁹⁸ *Attic Nights* 1.3: 25: FHS&G, vol.2 1992, fr. 534, p.358.

broader sense of weighing obligations of friendship against other obligations (NE 1160a2ff, 1165b22ff).³⁹⁹

The idea of balance is also apparent in Horace's view that criticism of oneself should be consistent with criticism of one's friends: i.e. do not be over-critical of friends and under-critical of oneself. To counteract such a tendency and so restore *aequabilitas* Horace suggests indulgence of friends' faults. Here, (as discussed in Chapter 2) Horace presents the example of a father's indulgence of his son's shortcomings, giving a list of the endearing euphemisms with which a father might, indulgently, refer to his son, reminiscent of Lucretius' list of euphemisms which a lover would blindly attribute to his beloved (DRN 4.1160-1169)⁴⁰⁰ – a comparison which Horace himself makes at 38-40. Indeed, Horace's explicit reference to this tendency in lovers, and his own comparison of father to son, reflects the wider connotation of *amicitia* generally, suggesting a similarity between these sorts of relationships.⁴⁰¹ This, fittingly, is counter-balanced from 56-67 by a catalogue of insults, illustrating people's tendency to unjustifiably exaggerate the faults of their friends. Thus Horace appears to be using an Epicurean source (Lucretius) to make a different point: to back up the notion of *aequabilitas* (most affiliated with the Stoics) while, in turn, implicitly attacking Stoic inflexibility and extremism. Indeed, Horace's use of philosophical material here seems to enhance the theme of consistency/inconsistency: although his position is clear, in that he is defending balance and tolerance, there is an ironic inconsistency in the way he has used these philosophical sources.

Horace depicts himself as being potentially subject to unfair criticism at 63-5, when referring to his friendship with Maecenas:

³⁹⁹ Griffin, 1997, 87. In NE 1158b20 Aristotle states that if the gap becomes too wide in respect of virtue and vice between friends, then such a friendship cannot persist. In all these instances some notion of proportion is important (as it is in Horace).

⁴⁰⁰ See Chapter 2, §2.7. A further difference between the Horatian and Lucretian list of euphemisms (or, in Horace's case, euphemisms and insults) is also stylistic, in that Lucretius uses Greek terms to highlight the unctuousness of the euphemisms (Greek being the language of love). In Sat 1.10.20-36 Horace rejects the interpolation of Greek, although Lucretius' use of Greek at 4.1160-1169 would perhaps seem to be an instance where such a stylistic turn was warranted (the interpolations not being at all gratuitous) and, cf. Sat 1.2.1.: *ambubaiaurum collegia pharmacopolae*.

⁴⁰¹ Cf. Catullus, who, in 75, seems in some way to have wrongly (to his own cost) regarded his relationship with Lesbia as a sort of *amicitia*: Lyne, 1980, 27-28.

*simplicior quis et est, qualem me saepe libenter
obtulerim tibi, Maecenas, ut forte legentem
aut tacitum impellat quovis sermone molestus.*

Or someone's rather direct, which is how I may have blithely shown myself to you, Maecenas, - so as to interrupt a person who is reading or quietly reflecting, and to pester him with some chatter or other.

But even here there is a sense in which although criticism of such behaviour would be unfair, Horace still recognises that his behaviour would be irritating. Certainly we can agree with Horace that there is nothing wrong with being rather direct (*simplicior*), but his explanation of what this entails perhaps leaves us less sure. In fact, the pest, or 'bore' in 1.9 is momentarily brought to mind; clearly Horace does not want to represent himself in that bad a light, but it would seem that Horace's position is again tinged with irony.

These concessions to his own imperfections back up his view that one should be more aware of one's own faults, as well as, given his criticism of others, redressing the balance, as it were, and keeping a sense of *aequabilitas*. The idea at 68 that no one is born devoid of faults (*nam vitiis nemo sine nascitur*)⁴⁰² is given as another reason why such faults should be indulged, and relates to the later Lucretian observation that one's faults cannot be completely eradicated at 76-7.⁴⁰³

Horace's advocacy of tolerance of friends' faults, couched within the Stoic notion of *aequabilitas*, would surely oppose the Stoic view that only the virtuous can have friends which to all intents and purposes means no one at all, given that the truly wise or virtuous man for the Stoics is as rare as the Phoenix. As we have seen, Horace presents his position somewhat ironically, and this is reflected in his use of philosophical material. The use of a Lucretian rhetorical device at 1.3.44-54 does not of itself indicate that Horace

⁴⁰² That this section (25-75) stresses interaction with friends in particular is evident (26 *amicorum*, 33 *amicus*, 43 *amici*, 50 *amicis*, 54 *amicos*, 73 *amicum*): Fraenkel, 1957, 87.

⁴⁰³ Cf. *DRN* 3.310, see above, Chapter 2, §2.7.

is promoting an Epicurean view, but the explicitly anti-Stoic stance which follows from 96, the importance of trust, and thus tolerance, in Epicurean friendship, as well as these Lucretian echoes and the Epicurean enthusiasm for friendship generally, show that the preceding argument on tolerance of friends' faults is undoubtedly Epicurean in spirit.

4.4 The Stoic Sage

Horace saw that the Stoics' extreme position regarding the perfect kind of wisdom required to be a sage – or, indeed, to avoid being mad and a slave – was an easy target for satire. In *Sat.* 1.3 Horace refers to the Stoic paradoxes that only the wise man is rich, king, handsome and a cobbler, (124-5) and that all faults are equal (96) and in book 2 he presents two Stoic sermons each of which pertain to a particular paradox (2.3, that all fools [i.e. the non-wise] are mad, 2.7 that all fools are slaves).

However, it appears that by this time Stoic ethical theory had in fact tended towards a more practical approach. From Cicero's *De officiis* it is clear that Panaetius put more emphasis on the *process* of becoming wise, or as wise as one could be, rather than the goal of absolute wisdom itself. This is also evidenced in Panaetius' four-fold division of human personality.⁴⁰⁴ This, in its consideration of the fact that humans have different personalities could suggest that people should regard this Stoic ideal of the sage only as applicable to themselves as individuals:⁴⁰⁵ some will be further on the journey than others; and even those who might (somehow) achieve sagehood, would still be different from each other, depending on differences suggested by Panaetius' four-fold division.

Clearly, the possible practical applications of Stoic idealism would still not deter critics of Stoicism from lampooning these apparently pompous

⁴⁰⁴ *De officiis* 1.107, 1.115. This four-fold division consisted of 1) that which marks one as human, 2) that which marks him as an individual – these first two being natural facets – 3) his personality as dependent on the effect of events and circumstances and 4) his personality as influenced by the decisions he himself has made.

⁴⁰⁵ Sandbach, 1975, 126-127.

statements. Indeed some Stoics certainly were austere and sanctimonious, and thus no doubt perceived as unreasonable, steadfastly standing by these ideals (as far as they could), such as Cato (Cicero: *Murena* 61-2, 74, *Att.* 1.18.7) and, one could suppose, the Stoic Horace himself satirises: Crispinus 1.1.120, 1.3.139, 1.4.14, 2.7.45; Fabius 1.1.14, 1.2.134), and in 2.3 Stertinius, and Crispinus (more indirectly), again, in 2.7.⁴⁰⁶

4.5 Friendship and Justice

The discussion of tolerance of friends' faults turns to one of justice, and in so doing becomes explicitly anti-Stoic. This change is marked by the introduction and consequent attack against the Stoic tenet that all transgressions are equal, at 96: *quis paria esse fere placuit peccata*.⁴⁰⁷ At 80ff Horace compares the possible extreme reaction of a master to a slave's minor transgression of helping himself to left-overs (which is to have him crucified), with someone over-reacting to the minor offence of a friend by hating and avoiding him.⁴⁰⁸ At 90ff Horace gives a few examples of the kinds of trivial offences he means:

comminxit lectum potus mensave catillum
Evandri manibus tritum deiecit; ob hanc rem,
aut positum ante mea quia pullum in parte catini
sustulit esuriens, minus hoc iucundus amicus

⁴⁰⁶ Indeed the ideal of the Stoic Sage continued, eg. Seneca *De constantia sapientis*: Donini, 1999, 727. But this should be considered against Seneca's own occasional criticisms of the Stoic paradoxes.

⁴⁰⁷ Zeno, fr. 224, *SVF* i.54; D.L. 7.120. Ruch, 1970, 518-521, compartmentalises Horace's argument into 'moral' (vv.29-75) and 'philosophique', (76ff) thus differentiating between the more everyday observations and advice as regards friendship, and the more specifically philosophical question of grading faults and propounding a practical view of justice as to some extent dependent on present social circumstances.

⁴⁰⁸ Although the general and important point is that one should not over-react to minor transgressions, it is possible that Horace, if only incidentally, is drawing attention to the fact that there is such an imbalance in the way in which people are judged for crimes simply because of their status. This seems possible, at least, bearing in mind Horace's background and the fact that his father had been a slave.

sit mihi?

He's wet the couch while under the influence, or knocked a bowl worn thin by the hands of Evander off the table: is this, or his having, in his hunger, helped himself to a chicken served up on my side of the dish, any reason why I should find him a less agreeable friend?

Although we must take Horace's point at face value in the run of the argument: that one should forgive trivial faults, indeed overlook them (85), there is perhaps again some irony here in that the misdemeanours mentioned would certainly cause most hosts considerable annoyance (as, to a lesser extent, might be the case in his behaviour to Maecenas at 1.3.63-5). Indeed, the behaviour here described takes place within the setting of the *convivium*, which is where we find uncouth behaviour elsewhere in the *Satires* (at 1.4.86ff and 2.8), and in these instances it is presented as being objectionable. That said, the misdemeanours Horace describes in this passage (90ff) are presented either as accidental or at least not deliberately offensive, which is not the case in the behaviour of the boor-cum-satirist in 1.4 or Nasidienus in 2.8.

A point of particular note in relation to the run of Horace's argument, and which has been overlooked by commentators, is that although the progression in Horace's argument from friendship to justice seems incidental, though logical enough, for the Stoics and Epicureans friendship and justice were very much connected. For the Stoics friendship and justice were connected through *oikeiosis*:⁴⁰⁹ the natural impulse of human beings to identify with other human beings.⁴¹⁰ Although *oikeiosis* was not explicitly put forward by the Epicureans as an explanation for societal development, a similar idea of association could also be implied in Lucretius' account of the

⁴⁰⁹ The concept that one's natural concern for oneself spreads outwards, by degrees, to include (ultimately) all human beings is expressed by Hierocles in Stobaeus 4.617-673, 11 Wachsmuth = LS 57G. On the connection between *oikeiosis* and justice: Schofield, 1999, 760-768.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid: Cicero *De finibus* 3.63. *De officiis* 1.55-6.

beginnings of human society and the development of justice.⁴¹¹ At 5.1019

Lucretius says:

*tunc et amicitiam coeperunt iungere auentes
finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari.*

Then also neighbours began to join friendship amongst themselves in their eagerness to neither harm nor suffer violence.

Although this does not refer to friendship in the more developed, sophisticated way in which Epicurus discusses it, and is rather an explanation for justice (cf. *KD* 31), Long⁴¹² regards the above passage as describing the “imagined origins” of friendship, and one can infer a parallel with Stoic *oikeiosis*, and, indeed, the basic relationship between justice and friendship.

Horace certainly seems to have Lucretius, and this particular passage (5. 926ff) in mind in the narrative from 96-124, in its didactic style, language and imagery. *Denique* (76), used, as in Lucretius, to begin a new section in the argument,⁴¹³ foreshadows the Lucretian-style polemic to come from 96, as does the aforementioned Lucretian idea that faults cannot be completely eradicated (76-77). At 109-111 the depiction of human beings (pre-justice) as snatching random love (*Venerem incertam*) echoes *DRN* 5.962; *more ferarum* (109) directly echoes Lucretius 5.932.⁴¹⁴ Horace’s description of the arrival of language as being the starting point for civilised society (104-6) may also derive from what Lucretius says at greater length at 5.1011-91.⁴¹⁵ At 107, the mention of Helen’s adultery with Paris, which is linked with Horace’s view of the possible violent repercussions from *Venerem incertam*, before the introduction of conventional law, may also be connected with Lucretius’ depiction of Paris’ love for Helen (which led to the Trojan War) at *DRN*

⁴¹¹ Mitsis, 1987, 106.

⁴¹² Long, 1986, 310.

⁴¹³ Brown, 1993, 121.

⁴¹⁴ More purely stylistic similarities include Horace’s use at 1.3.111 (*fateare necessest*) of a subjunctive form commonly found in Lucretius (e.g. 1.399 *esse in rebus inane tamen fateare necessest*), *vincet* 115, = ‘prove’ cf. Lucretius 5.735 (Brown, 1993, 124); cf. *Sat.* 1.2.134.

⁴¹⁵ Brown, 1993, 124.

1.473-7.⁴¹⁶ Although the use of the obscenity *cunnius* is clearly an obscene, satirical touch,⁴¹⁷ it is also possible that *cunnius* is a pun on *kunos* (bitch) as rendered twice in the *Iliad* 6.344/ 356, where Helen is describing herself in such pejorative terms, as being the cause of war.⁴¹⁸ Thus, this obscenity itself is nevertheless linked to Homer, and in turn Lucretius.

Against the Stoic tenet that all sins are equal, Horace appeals to common sense as the best guide to justice, at 97-8:

..... *sensus moresque repugnant*
atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi.

‘Instinct and tradition are ranged against them [i.e. the Stoics], and so is expediency, which is in essence the mother of justice and fairness.

Indeed the Epicurean view is that it is natural for justice (essentially an agreement not to harm or be harmed: *KD* 31) to develop, in order to meet the needs of a given society.⁴¹⁹ The Stoics, on the other hand, regarded law as divine reason,⁴²⁰ and thus inflexible. This makes what Horace says at 113-4 appear to be a reaction to Stoicism, and an affirmation of Epicureanism:⁴²¹

nec natura potest iusto discernere iniquum
dividit ut bona diversis, fugienda petendis

⁴¹⁶ *ibid.*

⁴¹⁷ In fact *cunnius* is not found in satire anywhere else other than in Horace’s *Satires*: Adams, 1982, 81.

⁴¹⁸ Indeed the pun would have a double effect, in that the straight Latin equivalent of *kunos*, i.e. *canis*, could have been used instead.

⁴¹⁹ For the Epicurean view of justice as conventional: *KD* 31, 32, 33; Lucretius *DRN* 5.1019-1027, 1143-1160; as mutable, depending on circumstances: *KD* 36, 37, 38; as a deterrent against would-be wrong-doers: *KD* 34, 35.

⁴²⁰ LS 67R, 67S.

⁴²¹ Cf. *Sat.* 1.2.75-6, *ac non fugienda petendis/ immiscere*, (Brown, 1993, 12). Cf. also *Sat.* 1.4.115-6: ‘*sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu/ sit melius...*’ Horace is differentiating, in an Epicurean context, between the empty and the solid, *KD* 29, what is naturally easy to obtain and what is naturally hard to obtain (*ad Menoeceum* 130), and thus what is to be sought and what avoided (*Men* 129ff, 132).

nature cannot tell the unjust from the just as she marks off good things from bad, what is to be sought and what avoided.

The fact that his position on friendship is anti-Stoic (i.e. before 96) is also suggested by the way in which the Stoic view that all faults are equal is initially brought in to conflict with his view on friendship. At any rate it would seem that a Stoic should regard a minor misdemeanour of a friend as tantamount to a serious offence, which is in keeping with the view that only the wise can enjoy true friendship and thus would not need to concern themselves with the business of forgiving or condemning a friend's misdemeanours anyway. In addition, it is also likely that Horace's progression from friendship to justice shows an awareness of the Stoic idea of *oikeiosis*, in an argument which is demonstrably anti-Stoic.

The connection between friendship and justice through the common theme of tolerance is made explicit at the end of the poem (124b-142). In fact, the link between this last section and the preceding polemic is incidentally made in the run of the narrative at 123-4a (*si tibi regnum/ permittant homines*; 'if men were to grant you regal power'). This is then picked up by an attack on the Stoic paradoxes that the wise man alone is rich, handsome and king. Then, at 137-142, Horace makes the point that the Stoic wise man, because of his inflexible views on justice (and therefore friendship) and indeed his views of himself (as at 124b-133), will in fact be quite friendless, whereas Horace, in his relative Epicurean tolerance, will never be short of friends:

*ne longum faciam: dum tu quadrante lavatum
rex ibis neque te quisquam stipator ineptum
praeter Crispinum sectabitur, et mihi dulces
ignoscent, si quid peccaro stultus, amici,
inque vicem illorum patiar delicta libenter,
privatusque magis vivam te rege beatus. (137-142)*

To put it briefly: while you, king that you are, go to bathe for your farthing with no escort to attend you save the absurd Crispinus, my kindly friends will pardon me if I, in my folly, commit some

transgression, and I in turn will gladly put up with their offences, and in my private station I shall live a happier life than Your Royal Highness.

4.6 Friendship in *Satire* 1.5, the *Odes* and the *Epistles*

Friendship is the dominant theme of *Satire* 1.5,⁴²² and the emphasis is on the pleasure it brings, as at 1.5.44:

nil ego contulerim iucundo sanus amico.

while I'm in my right mind, there's nothing I'd compare with the pleasure of friendship.

Here Horace is summarising the eulogy of friendship at 39-44, where he relates the pleasure of meeting his friends, Plotius, Varius and Virgil. The Epicurean overtones are unmistakable, as at *KD* 27: "of the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of one's whole life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship." The light-hearted anecdotal recount of events of the journey in general is imbued with a sense of camaraderie.

The Epicurean sentiment is further indicated by his quoting Lucretius on a theological point at the end of the poem (101),⁴²³ and by the fact that it is likely that the travelling party (Maecenas, Virgil, Varius and Plotius) were Epicureans – to some extent – themselves: there is evidence to suggest that they were connected with the Neapolitan group around Philodemus.⁴²⁴ In light of this, Horace's eulogising of friendship seems all the more deliberately

⁴²² Political *amicitia* in *Sat.* 1.5 is discussed below, §4.8 (ii).

⁴²³ i.e. that the gods do not intervene in human affairs, cf. *DRN* 6.58. This is discussed in Chapter 8 on religion and superstition.

⁴²⁴ Castner, 1988, categorises Virgil, (pp. 77-80) Varius (73-75) and Plotius (45-47) as *Epicurei Certi*; Maecenas (87-88) as an *Epicureus Incertus*, and Horace (91-95) as an *Epicureus Dubius*. The names of Virgil, Varius and Plotius are often found grouped together, suggesting a fellowship indicative of the Epicurean school (45), as in two Philodemus fragments: *P.Herc. Paris* 278b and 279a: Janko, 2000, 6; Kleve, 1997, 49-66.

Epicurean, perhaps almost self-mockingly so. Indeed, the particular passage at the end of 1.5 where he practically quotes Lucretius (and which has been given as grounds for Horace's Epicureanism) has also been regarded as not to be taken at face value. Gantar⁴²⁵ has suggested that Horace's advocacy of Epicureanism here is not entirely serious: he is self-mockingly putting himself across as a new disciple of Epicureanism, as if having just been introduced to it by his Epicurean friends. But this does not mean that Horace does not stand by these Epicurean sentiments. Rather, Horace is mocking the whole idea of this Epicurean travelling company, as he might expect others to regard it. The passage 39-44, for example, is still essentially to be taken at face value. If not, would not Horace be coming rather too close to insulting his friends, particularly Maecenas? It seems that for the most part 1.5's Epicurean aspects are straightforwardly intended, though perhaps with a touch of ironic self-consciousness.

In the *Odes* Horace adds the themes of *ataraxia* and the *carpe diem* motif to that of friendship. It has been suggested that the *carpe diem* motif should not necessarily be attributed to Epicureanism: the appeal to wine, women and song and to enjoy life while it lasts is underpinned by an anxiety about the brevity of life, and an Epicurean would have no truck with such anxiety.⁴²⁶ However, when the *carpe diem* theme is ranged with those of *ataraxia* and friendship, as it so often is in Horace, it can be seen as being in an Epicurean context. Moreover, the Epicureans certainly did promote enjoyment of life while it lasted,⁴²⁷ and clearly this view, along with their attitude to death, was in order to dispel anxiety: if people did not have these anxieties there would be little need for Epicureanism in the first place.

⁴²⁵ Gantar, 1972, 5-24.

⁴²⁶ e.g. Rudd, 1966, 251 and 1993, 68-69.

⁴²⁷ On the phrase *carpe diem* itself in *Ode* 1.11 Nisbet and Hubbard (1970, 142) draw attention to the possibility that *carpe* (line 8) is connected with Greek *karpizein*, which could bring to mind Epicurus *Men* 126; more generally, the appeal to enjoy life while it lasts and to distrust the future is also found at *Men* 127, and frs. 204, 490, 491 Usener. Also cf. Philodemus' epigram (*Palatine Anthology* 9.412), where he describes a dinner that will not take place because of the death of two friends, so contrasting life and death and implying that life's transience demands that it be enjoyed. Gigante (1995, 54) describes the epigram as "in the spiritual context of Epicurean philosophy. Everything is ephemeral, except for omnipresent death, which attacks our life and suddenly takes away friends." (tr. Obbink.)

Through the *convivium* Horace can allude or directly refer to friendship, as well as other themes: it is used as a sort of microcosm of life⁴²⁸ in that it must be enjoyed, hence the *carpe diem* motif – and above all else this demands the enjoyment of good company. *Ode* 1.4, for example, does not directly draw attention to friendship but advises enjoyment of the moment, the pleasures of the *convivium*, and thus the enjoyment of other people's company; in *Ode* 2.11, Horace advises his addressee not to worry: the connected Epicurean goal of *ataraxia*.

Indeed, Horace's advisory tone (in some poems) has led to its sometimes being identified with the Epicurean, more particularly Philodemean, precept of *parrhēsia* (frank speech/criticism). De Witt regarded several odes as suggestive of this tenet (those that contain both admonition and reproof, e.g. 2.10),⁴²⁹ as well as some epistles.⁴³⁰ Indeed, the admonitory tone of the *Epistles* does seem to suggest the influence of this concept. Philodemus wrote a *peri parrhēsias*,⁴³¹ which mainly concerns frank criticism of students by their teachers, but *parrhēsia* was also very much a feature of friendship, where frank speaking can be seen as beneficial for mutual moral development.⁴³² Philodemus' views on the importance of frank speaking in friendship are found in *P. Herc* 1082 (col. 2. 1-14), which is from *On Flattery*:

Let us make it clear to them that the goods of friendship are very durable and that flattery is the antagonist of friendship; let us also consider well the goods that arise from frank speech, both (the frank speech) directed towards one's intimate associates, and (the frank speech) directed towards all men, and let us avoid as vain the company

⁴²⁸ Cicero draws attention to the etymological significance of *convivium* - a living together: *Fam.* 9.24.3; *Sen.* 13.45. (Gowers, 1993, 131). Also, cf. Lucretius 3.938: the dinner party as a metaphor for life (see below, Chapter 5, § 5.4).

⁴²⁹ De Witt, 1935, 318.

⁴³⁰ Michels (1944, 173-177) and later Hunter (1985, 480-490) also regard *parrhēsia* as an element in the *libertas* and corrective moral nature of Horatian satire. Hunter points out that the *Satires*' audience would to an extent be Horace's friends. Indeed, at 1.4.132, Horace points to a friend's frankness (*liber amicus*) as being a possible aid to his moral rectitude.

⁴³¹ This comes from a larger work: *On Conduct and Character* (Glad, 1995, 102).

⁴³² Konstan, Clay, Glad, Thom, Ware, 1998, 6.

of adulators, and still more let us not mix with them but seek
cohabitation with those who speak candidly. (tr. Glad, 1995, 109)

In lines 1-4 friendship and flattery are contrasted,⁴³³ so here frank speech can be seen as a particular behavioural facet of friendship.⁴³⁴ *Parrhēsia* may also account for the tenor of *Epistles* 1.17 and 18,⁴³⁵ and to an extent other epistles where the advice is less severe and direct (as in *Ep.* 1.2, 5).

In *Epistle* 1.4 Horace actually suggests friendship itself as a relief from anxiety, and thus as an inducement to *ataraxia*,⁴³⁶ and again Horace's frank interest in Tibullus's health, and his consequent advice, may owe something to Philodemian *parrhēsia*.⁴³⁷ Horace in fact recommends his own company as a cure to Tibullus' troubles, and does this with self-mocking charm in the last two lines:

*me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises,
cum ridere voles, Epicuri de grege porcum.*

As for me, when you want a laugh, you'll find me in fine fettle, fat and sleek, a hog from Epicurus' herd. (tr. Fairclough 1926)

This is not a serious admission of philosophical adherence. However, given the sentiments of the poem, the likely context of *parrhēsia*, the call to *ataraxia*, the *carpe diem* motif (12-13), and the recommendation of friendship, one can regard this epistle as Horace in fully Epicurean guise, particularly with regard to his own role in the poem, which above all else is that of a friend.

⁴³³ This comes from a larger work of at least ten books, of which three seem to have dealt with flattery, on *Vices and their Opposing Virtues*, which, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, §2.5 (ii), perhaps draws from Aristotle's doctrine of the mean: friendship being the mean between flattery and enmity.

⁴³⁴ Glad, 1995, 102.

⁴³⁵ Armstrong, 2004, 287.

⁴³⁶ Kilpatrick, 1986, 58.

⁴³⁷ Armstrong, 2004, 282.

4.7 Horace and Maecenas: The Relationship between Friendship and Ambition

(i) The *Satires*

Horace's *amicitia* with Maecenas – in terms of client/patron, and friend - is depicted from different perspectives throughout his work. But it seems that this relationship can be regarded as consistently Epicurean – or at least as reflecting certain Epicurean principles regarding friendship.

In *Sat.* 1.6 Horace is at pains to show that his friendship with Maecenas is not due to his own sycophancy and unscrupulous desire for self-advancement.⁴³⁸ For Horace, an ideal friendship is one derived from mutual appreciation of character – as clearly implied by the fact that Maecenas himself chooses his friends on that basis:

*praesertim cautum dignos adsumere prava
ambitione procul.* (1.6.51-2)

Especially when you're careful to adopt those who deserve it and are above unscrupulous self-seeking.

..... *qui turpi secernis honestum.* (63)

...who can tell the honourable from the base.

One could regard the apparent consideration taken by Maecenas regarding Horace's character prior to embarking on this *amicitia* as in line with advice common to Epicurus, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Cicero's *De amicitia* on the importance of judging character before entering into a friendship, as

⁴³⁸ It is perhaps worth noting that in 1.6 it appears that Horace did not push to be introduced to Maecenas, but that Virgil and Varius (being friends of Horace and clients of Maecenas) effected the introduction. As Mayer (1995, 281) points out, if Horace *had* misrepresented how he became friends with Maecenas, Virgil and Varius would have been alive to expose this rendering of events as spurious.

mentioned earlier – something that would have been recognised by those familiar with such discussions.⁴³⁹

As well as judgement of character, it is also notable that this *amicitia* is initiated with a view to mutual benefit on both sides, which ties in with Epicurus' views on what initially lies behind friendship (*VS* 23). The fact that Maecenas was a literary enthusiast goes some way to explain his initial interest in Horace, but he would have also benefited from Horace's being a public voice of support.⁴⁴⁰ For Horace's part, *amicitia* with Maecenas would involve the reception of Maecenas' *beneficia*: the opportunity (or sometimes, obligation) to travel with Maecenas, to cultivate friendships with other distinguished figures, and to ensure his poems were published.⁴⁴¹

With regard to 1.6 and 2.6 as a whole, Horace implies that this *amicitia* can serve as a platform for the Epicurean goal of *ataraxia*, even though aspects of it can conflict with the pursuit of this goal. The harassment he is subjected to in 2.6.28-58 (and in 1.6.45-8 with regard to his being the object of envy) is due to his *amicitia* with Maecenas. But Horace also stresses that it is because of this *amicitia* that he can in fact pursue a quiet life which is free from ambition, due to Maecenas' generous patronage and the gift of the Sabine Farm. Also, the fact that this *amicitia* and the pursuit of *ataraxia* can co-exist for Horace suggests that this relationship is not one borne out of unscrupulous motives: its compatibility with the Epicurean goals of *hēdonē* and *ataraxia* shows that it is honourable.

In *Satires* 1.6 and 2.6, through his *amicitia* with Maecenas, Horace combines the themes of ambition and friendship. At 1.6.45-8 it is Horace's past military career (suggestive of political ambition), and now his *amicitia* with Maecenas (which could also denote political ambition) which seems to excite envy:

*nunc ad me redeo libertino patre natum,
quem rodunt omnes libertino patre natum,*

⁴³⁹ On the availability of philosophical discussions on friendship, cf. Cicero *Fam.* iii.8.5: Brunt, 1988, 354.

⁴⁴⁰ DuQuesnay, 1984, 24.

⁴⁴¹ DuQuesnay, 1984, 25.

*nunc quia sim tibi, Maecenas, convictor, at olim
quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno.*

I now come back to myself, son of a freedman father, whom they all run down as son of a freedman father, nowadays because I'm an associate of yours, Maecenas, but formerly because a Roman legion was under my command as tribune.

It has been suggested, in fact, that in *Satire* 1.6 - the main thrust of which is a disavowal of any wish to engage in the political life – Horace may in fact have been turning down Maecenas' offer of a quaestorship;⁴⁴² but no doubt he also wanted to make his position clear to the 'omnes' of line 43. However, as has already been indicated in the sorts of advantages Horace no doubt wished from this *amicitia*, he does have literary and social ambitions, so a distinction must be made:⁴⁴³ Horace's social and professional advancement has nothing to do with the sort of political ambition he advises against in *Satire* 1.6 generally.

That said, political ambition need not be bad and can be honourable, as Horace's friendships and apparent admission of his ambivalence to political involvement (*Ep.* 1.1.16-18) show.⁴⁴⁴ It is, specifically, *excessive* ambition which is the real vice. Indeed the word *ambitio* in Horace is always coupled with an adjective to make its negative, excessive, connotation clear.⁴⁴⁵

Horace's social and literary ambitions – as far as we can tell – are in keeping with an Epicurean view of friendship: it is clear that he wanted to

⁴⁴² Brown, 1993, 150.

⁴⁴³ As Brown (1993, 151) notes.

⁴⁴⁴ Indeed, Horace himself assumed a political role of sorts through his poetry, particularly in the *Odes* (e.g. 1.2, 3.1- 6) and the *Carmen Seculare* (see Chapter 8, §8.4 [ii]). However, this is far removed from the kind of active political involvement which Horace would avoid, and thus by implication advise others to avoid, in *Sat.* 1.6.

⁴⁴⁵ *misera Sat.* 1.4.26, *prava, Sat.* 1.6.51-2, *mala, Sat.* 2.3.78, *inanis Ep.* 2.2. 206-7. Cf. Mayer, 1995, 283; Brink (1982) on *Ep.* 2.2. p.400ff. Indeed, it would seem that by and large *ambitio* has a negative connotation in Latin literature generally: to some extent unscrupulous or excessive activity is implied. In Lewis and Short and the Oxford Latin Dictionary *ambitio* is given as possibly having a good (or at least not bad) connotation, as well as a bad one, although from the examples given there, and certainly in Horace, the word seems, in fact, to have a generally negative connotation.

benefit from his *amicitia* with Maecenas, which is in line with Epicurus' views (*VS* 23), and certainly does not equate to unscrupulous self-seeking, to *ambitio* (as Horace uses the term). Moreover, his friendship with Maecenas, begun on what could be viewed as Epicurean lines (on judgement of character as well as mutual advantage), is also seen to be at least partly conducive to *ataraxia* (though these advantages must be weighed against the necessary *officia* of this *amicitia*), and, indeed, it continues to develop on Epicurean lines in the *Odes* and the *Epistles*.

(ii) The *Odes* and the *Epistles*

In the *Odes* Horace's references to his friendship with Maecenas (beyond the addresses of client to patron) emphasise their relationship as one of mutual affection, and suggest that this friendship has indeed developed since the *Satires*.⁴⁴⁶ And this is in spite of the fact that to an extent this professed intimacy – just as when Horace addresses Virgil (*Ode* 1.3.1-8) – should also be viewed in the context of the genre: the important point being that Horace presents his friendship with Maecenas as more intimate, as genuine, and wants us to see it that way too. The fact that this client/patron *amicitia* develops into a genuine mutual fondness seems to exemplify the Epicurean notion that friendships are initially motivated by self-interest, but that this can be later superseded by affection (Cicero *De finibus* 1.69).⁴⁴⁷ Indeed, Aristotle also speaks of friendships which originate through utility but are still genuine

⁴⁴⁶ Maecenas' words to Augustus, according to Suetonius (*Hor. Vit.* 2.2): *Horati Flacci ut mei esto memor*, appear to testify to the fact that their friendship did become genuine. Nisbet and Hubbard (1970, xxi-xxii) throw some doubt onto the genuine nature of their friendship by drawing attention to the fact that their relationship remained an unequal one, and that Horace respected his role as client. But given their probable Epicurean values these discrepancies need not have interfered with their becoming genuine friends.

⁴⁴⁷ The likelihood that Horace and Maecenas were aware that their friendship could be related to Epicurean theory can be compared to the friendship between Cicero and Matius, as rendered in *Fam.* 11.27, 28, where, as Griffin (1997, 95) notes, their friendship can be related to Peripatetic theory.

friendships of mutual affection (*NE* 1156a21-2), though this is in a sense by accident, and the friendship may well terminate if the common benefit stops,⁴⁴⁸ which would not be the case in an Epicurean friendship.

Horace's invitation to celebrate the Matronalia with him in *Ode* 3.8, suggests that he sees Maecenas as friend rather than patron.⁴⁴⁹ As with other *Odes* concerning friendship, 3.29 contains the themes of *ataraxia* and the *carpe diem* idea, and although the opening address again refers, in the customary way, to Maecenas' ancestry, the tone is unmistakably warm and affectionate:

*Tyrrhena regum progenies, tibi
non ante verso lene merum cado
cum flore, Maecenas, rosarum et
pressa tuis balamus capillis*

iamdudum apud me est. (1-5)

Maecenas, descendant of Etruscan kings, there is some mellow wine in a jar not yet tilted that has long awaited you at my house, along with rose blooms and balsam pressed for your hair. (tr. Rudd 2004)

In the *Epistles* Horace's apparent frankness towards Maecenas indicates a further development in this *amicitia*. The refusal at the beginning of *Epistle* 1.1 is notably different from other, self-deprecating *recusationes*, where the poet disavows his ability to write a certain poem – while inadvertently in fact writing such a poem, or something equally meritorious (as at *Odes* 3.3.69-72, *Epistles* 2.2.20); but here Horace's refusal to write more lyric poetry in favour of turning to philosophical matters does come across as a deliberate sign of his independence. And yet the address to Maecenas here,

⁴⁴⁸ Konstan, 1997, 72.

⁴⁴⁹ West, 2002, 84: "The wearisome dispute about the relations between Horace and Maecenas – friends? or patron and client? – is settled in one blow by the word *centum*. (*sume, Maecenas, cyathos amici/ sospitis centum et vigiles lucernas/ perfer in lucem* 13-15.) Nobody asks a man to drink to him in a hundred ladles of wine... unless they are friends."

and at the end of *Epistles* 1, certainly emphasises his continued loyalty to Maecenas, and indeed the idea of friendship itself.⁴⁵⁰

But it is Horace's defiant independence in *Epistle* 1.7 - to the extent that some have regarded Horace's tone as aggressive⁴⁵¹ - which stands out. Though again, this seems to denote a natural development in their friendship, a sign of greater familiarity; and in fact Horace is still tactful in referring to Maecenas' generosity at 24. But his frankness here should perhaps also be seen in the context of Epicurean *parrhēsia*.⁴⁵² It appears that Horace's comparison of himself to Telemachus (41-43) may be an allusion to Philodemus' *On the Good Kind according to Homer* where, in col. 23, 14-18 (Dorandi 1982), the educational nature of Telemachus' journey is referred to, before which Telemachus was inexperienced in *parrhēsia*.⁴⁵³ In such a context, as Armstrong comments, "it's actually a compliment to talk this way to a poem's honorary addressee.... As Philodemus says, one uses this kind of frank criticism to the grown men among the students 'those stronger than the soft ones.'"⁴⁵⁴ Thus Maecenas would have regarded the frankness of tone in *Epistle* 1.7, together with its personal appeal to *ataraxia*, in an Epicurean context, and as an indication of the strength of their friendship.

The final instance where Horace refers to this relationship is in *Odes* 4.11. Here, it seems, is proof again that Horace and Maecenas' friendship was genuine. Importantly, it appears that by this time Maecenas was no longer in Augustus' favour. In an invitation poem to a girlfriend, Horace explains why the day of the proposed dinner party is so important to him:

*iure sollemnis mihi sanctiorque
paene natali proprio, quod ex hac
luce Maecenas meus adfluentes
ordinat annos. (17-20)*

⁴⁵⁰ Kilpatrick, 1986, 7.

⁴⁵¹ Pseudo-Acro; Shackleton Bailey, 1982, 55-56.

⁴⁵² see above, §4.6.

⁴⁵³ Armstrong, 2004, 279 and 295-6 n.18.

⁴⁵⁴ *On Frank Speaking*, fr.7: Armstrong, 2004, 288.

a date I have good reason to observe, one which is almost more special to me than my own birthday, because from this bright day my dear Maecenas counts the course of his years. (tr. Rudd, 2004)

This loyalty, the enduring nature of their friendship, and Horace's sincere, almost defiant reference to it (since by now Augustus was essentially his patron) in spite of Maecenas' fall from Augustus' favour, reflects the Epicurean idea of the importance of trust (as discussed in §4.3), the notion of an agreement which one must stick to, as well as an overriding belief in the importance of friendship itself.

4.8 Ambition

(i)

As we have seen, the issue of ambition is also pertinent to Horace's *amicitia* with Maecenas, as is made clear at *Sat.* 1.6.45-48, and thus the distinction was made between social and political ambition: Horace is not averse to professional or social advancement (provided that this is not unscrupulously or excessively pursued) but is essentially against political ambition (for Horace personally, whether excessive or not) which he regarded as a blight to *ataraxia*.

Given his championship of the mean, another significant aspect of Horace's discussion of political ambition in 1.6 is that for Horace there is no antithetical deficiency to the excess of *ambitio* (as there is for *avaritia*); and this suggests his sympathy with the Epicurean position of *lathe biōsas*⁴⁵⁵ - living unnoticed. In *Satire* 1.1 Horace applies the doctrine of the mean to greed (at 1.1.106-7) - there is a right amount for one to secure: not too much, not too little. In the discussion of *ambitio* in 1.6 the doctrine of the mean, in the sense of there being an excess and a deficiency, does not apply. Indeed,

⁴⁵⁵ Usener 551.

for Aristotle there is a mean where ambition is concerned, although there is no name for it (*NE* 4.4. 1125b-1125b25), and one could suppose that Horace would regard his own social and literary careerism as in line with this. However, Horace never objects to what Aristotle would regard as the deficiency to the antithetical excess of ambition: that is, total disinterest in one's own social or political advancement. Although Horace recommends the mean at *Epistle* 1.18.9, which has some connection with ambition in as much as it concerns how to win favour with a superior, the mean is related specifically to behaviour in terms of the extremes of rudeness and sycophancy. In *Epistle* 1.17, which also concerns how to get on in society, Horace only gives his advice after having recommended the wiser, Epicurean route of detachment from these concerns, and thus Horace actually approves of the Aristotelian *vice* of excessive *lack* of ambition - Epicurean *lathe biōsas*, at *Epistles* 1.17. 10:

*nec vixit male, qui natus moriensque fefellit*⁴⁵⁶

And he has not lived badly, who from birth to death has passed unknown.

The other point, which rather pulls in the other direction, is that the Epicurean attitude to politics was not necessarily always one of unconditional detachment. The Roman Epicurean was not always opposed to political activity (as the example of Maecenas himself may indicate, though it is perhaps notable that he never became a senator) – a point which has already been discussed in Chapter 1 in connection with the possibility of developments in Epicureanism at that time.⁴⁵⁷ But, in spite of what is said at *VS* 58 and *D.L.* 10.119,⁴⁵⁸ there may also have been circumstances where early Epicureans would have condoned engagement in politics. One is where the political situation or system at a given time was so extreme that an Epicurean would feel obliged to intervene in an attempt to bring about

⁴⁵⁶ cf. *KD* 14.

⁴⁵⁷ Chapter 1, §1.4 (iii).

⁴⁵⁸ “Nor will he [the wise man] engage in politics...”

change.⁴⁵⁹ Another involves Epicurus' apparent concession to those who, by their own nature, are unable to lead a quiet life - to the extent that to do so would cause them more disturbance than if they were to lead an active political life. As Fowler notes, this is found in Plutarch *De tranquillitate animi* (465F = fr. 555 Usener)⁴⁶⁰ and similar Epicurean sentiments are found in Lactantius 3.17.6 (=Usener 557).⁴⁶¹ The view put forward in these instances appears to be to accept that some people, because they desire it so much, will have to pursue a political life, but also to maintain that this would not - in the vast majority of cases - be conducive to mainstream Epicureanism. Certainly, the more political Roman Epicureans would have found this concession ideologically convenient, and, as we will see (below, §4.8 [iv], Chapter 5, §5.2) this may further complement Horace's position in *Epistles* 1.17 and 18.

(ii) *Satire* 1.5

It nevertheless holds that the orthodox, *ideal* Epicurean view was that political involvement would detract from the goal of *ataraxia*, and in *Sat.* 1.5, which deals to some extent with both friendship and politics (and the relationship between the two), this Epicurean *telos* underpins the narrative. Indeed although the journey to Brundisium in 1.5 is a diplomatic expedition, it is notable that Horace scarcely makes any mention of the fact (hence the uncertainty as to the reason for the expedition).⁴⁶² Horace himself, as 1.5.39-44 makes clear, apparently sees his role simply as travelling companion, and

⁴⁵⁹ Cicero *De Re Publica*. 1.10): the wise man will steer clear of politics *extra quam si eum tempus et necessitas coegerit*; and Seneca (*De Otio*): *nisi si quid intervenerit*. Fowler, 1989, 127.

⁴⁶⁰ "Not even Epicurus thought men who were in love with fame and honour should lead a quiet life, but they should indulge their nature by taking part in politics and public life, because they are constitutionally more likely to be disturbed and corrupted by inactivity, if they do not attain what they want." Tr. Fowler, 1989, 125.

⁴⁶¹ *qui claritati ac potentiae studet, huic praecipitur reges colere, qui molestiam ferre non potest, huic regiam fugere*. (Fowler, 1989, 133)

⁴⁶² It is generally reckoned that the journey took place in spring 37, coinciding with the Treaty of Tarentum. Autumn of 38 has also been considered a possibility, when Octavian, after the naval defeat of Sextus Pompeius, sent Maecenas to Antony in Athens: Brown, 1993, 139.

as such it would be churlish of him to disapprove of his companions' involvement in politics. At 27-9 he could be interpreted as interposing the idea that the purpose of the mission is to unite a political friendship: ⁴⁶³

*huc venturus erat Maecenas optimus atque
Cocceius, missi magnis de rebus uterque
legati, aversos soliti componere amicos.*

Here the good Maecenas and Cocceius were to come, despatched, each of them, as ambassadors on a mission of moment, and well used to reconciling estranged friends.

Here, rather than a deliberate contrast between political alliance and genuine Epicurean friendship, Horace is perhaps intimating that the influence of Maecenas' Epicureanism might be just what is needed to secure the alliance. Certainly, as a detached observer, and Maecenas' client, Horace would no doubt prefer political alliance rather than enmity.

Indeed, the fact that Horace stresses the pleasure of companionship and makes little mention of the real political circumstances could be regarded as evoking a detached, moderate Epicurean stance.⁴⁶⁴ To criticise the political reasons behind the journey would perhaps cause offence to Maecenas and, in any case, as has already been noted, it is likely that Horace's companions are all Epicureans themselves – indeed are more readily associated with Epicureanism than Horace – so it would be odd for Horace to take the Epicurean high ground.

(iii) *Satire 1.6*

To an extent, one could regard 1.6 as addressing a subject that is notable by its absence in 1.5: in 1.5 one might have expected a little more on politics than the vague reference at 27-9. The reference to his *amicitia* with Maecenas in

⁴⁶³ Classen, 1973, 235-50.

⁴⁶⁴ Cf. Brown, 1993, 140.

1.6 has already been mentioned, but it is also important to note the way in which Horace wholeheartedly aligns himself with Maecenas, in terms of his views on contemporary society and politics (1-18). Horace propounds the principle that true nobility lies in a man's deeds rather than his birth, a view shared by Maecenas:

*cum referre negas quali sit quisque parente
natus, dum ingenuus.* (7-8)

When you say it doesn't matter what sort of parent anyone has, as long as he's a gentleman.

Although the *populus* managed to realise and act upon the incompetence of Laevinus,⁴⁶⁵ the implication is clearly that this runs contrary to the usual habit of the *populus* (certainly now), being so in awe of the trappings of fame and illustrious ancestry as to bestow office on the undeserving:

..... *populo, qui stultus honores
saepe dat indignis et famae servit ineptus,
qui stupet in titulis et imaginibus.* (15-17)

...by the people, which often foolishly bestows office on those who don't deserve it, which is stupidly enslaved to renown, which is dazzled by inscriptions and ancestral busts.

Indeed this eulogy of Maecenas and his (and Horace's) views on the superficiality and unfairness involved in political careerism seems to be heading towards a fuller argument against the tendency for familial origin to dictate whether or not one is (unduly) honoured or discriminated against. But at 17-22 Horace unexpectedly modifies the argument (in a similar way to his modifications after the openings of *Satires* 1.1-3), essentially suggesting that

⁴⁶⁵ It is uncertain to which period Laevinus belongs, but he is clearly dead at the time Horace is writing. It was suggested by Ritter (1856-7, ad.loc) that Laevinus may have appeared in Lucilius: Fraenkel, 1957, 102.

things being as they are (i.e. that people are generally rated according to their familial origin), it would be misguided for people from humble backgrounds to aim for such political advancement (23ff). And so begins his argument against political ambition.

Horace's argument is undoubtedly coloured by Epicureanism. By turning his argument to the practical reasons for eschewing ambition and the possible trappings of 'success' that such ambition might bring about, Horace airs a recognisably Lucretian sentiment at 26: *invidia accrevit, privato quae minor esset*; 'It increased your unpopularity, which would have been less without office.' This practical point: that perceived success (through political power, fame) will cause envy is an important part of the Lucretian argument⁴⁶⁶ against ambition (as it was against greed, see Chapter 2, §2.4), as at *DRN* 3.74-7:

*consimili ratione ab eodem saepe timore
macerat invidia ante oculos illum esse potentem,
illum aspectari, claro qui incedit honore,
ipsi se in tenebris volvi caenoque queruntur.*

In like manner and through the same fear, they are often consumed with envy that before their very eyes **he** is clothed in power, **he** is the sight of the town, who parades in shining pomp, while they complain that they are wallowing in darkness and mire.

Envy as a reason to avoid the political life is a point that is also found in Philodemus' *Rhetoric*.⁴⁶⁷ It has been noted that such envy of another's success is described by Sallust in a similar way to Lucretius.⁴⁶⁸ A striking point of similarity here is the use of *ille*⁴⁶⁹ in order to enhance the sense of envy felt towards 'them' as highlighted above and in Sallust, *Catiline* 20.7-8:

⁴⁶⁶ In Bion (via Teles) and in Horace *Sat.* 1.1.1, envy is certainly a factor in *mempsimoiria*, though envy *per se* is not given much emphasis. There are few references to *invidia* in the fragments of Lucilius, and these are incidental.

⁴⁶⁷ On *Rhetoric* 11. 155ff Sudhaus, 1892: Fowler, 1989, 139 n.77.

⁴⁶⁸ Earl, 1961, 112.

⁴⁶⁹ Fowler, 1989, 139.

itaque omnis gratia potentia honos divitiae apud illos sunt aut ubi illi volunt; nobis reliquere pericula repulsas iudicia egestatem.

Because of this, all influence, power, rank, and wealth are in **their** hands, or wherever **they** wish them to be; to us they have left danger, defeat, prosecution and poverty. (tr. Rolfe 1921)

There is perhaps a more direct echo of Lucretian language (from the same passage in Lucretius on ambition and greed) at 17-18:

..... *quid oportet*
nos facere a vulgo longe longeque remotos?

What ought we to do, who are far, far removed from the common herd?

cf. *DRN* 3.69:

*effugisse volunt longe longeque remosse.*⁴⁷⁰

They want to escape and be far, far removed.

However, the similarity of the sentiment expressed in Sallust and Lucretius does not suggest a common advocacy of Epicureanism, but is rather an indication of the political climate in which Lucretius was writing (*DRN* being likely to have been published less than a decade after the Catiline conspiracy – at least, by 54 B.C. which was when Cicero wrote a letter to his brother referring to Lucretius’ *poemata*). Although this could refer to selections only of the poem, it could be reasonably presumed that the entire poem had been published by this time (P. Fowler and D. Fowler, 2003, 888) – and Sallust is writing about the Catiline conspiracy. So Earl, 1961, 112: “The source is not any philosophical school, but the political vocabulary of the late republic.” That said, Sallust was certainly influenced by philosophical writings. The beginning of the *Catiline*, where Sallust contrasts humans with other animals, derives from ideas at the end of Plato’s *Timaeus*.

⁴⁷⁰ Brown (1993, 153) comments that this Lucretian echo is “no doubt largely unconscious.” But the connected subject matter (the Lucretian passage also pertains to ambition), surely suggests otherwise.

It is worth noting that Horace here could be interpreted as implying the Epicurean idea of *ataraxia* by means of seclusion (cf. *KD* 14), whereas Lucretius is expressing the folly of seeking security by a wrong route (cf. *KD* 7) because of the fear of death. Thus Horace would appear to be using Lucretian language to make a different, though in a sense connected point. Although, in fact, Horace may also have another line of *DRN* in mind where Lucretius is talking about the perfect state of *ataraxia* enjoyed by the gods:

*Omnis enim per se divum natura necessest
immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur
semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe. (DRN 2. 647-8)*

For the very nature of divinity must necessarily enjoy immortal life in the deepest peace, far removed and separated from our affairs.

Indeed, Horace and Maecenas, far removed from the crowd, are in a sense in the place where Lucretius' misguided people would wish to be (or at least, for the purposes of their own happiness, *ought* to wish to be) but their fear of death has set them in the wrong direction, *towards* ambition, rather than away from it.

In *DRN* 3.59-86, as well as claiming that the fear of death is at the root of greed and ambition, Lucretius also stresses that such behaviour is in itself dangerous and can lead to death. In this respect Horace differs from Lucretius considerably. Rather than suggesting the possibility of death through others' envy, (as Lucretius does at *DRN* 3.70ff), Horace's message in *Sat.* 1.6 is that political ambition, whether for a *novus homo* (as at 44-70) or irrespective of ancestry, is simply more trouble than it is worth. We are saved the more lurid reasons for avoiding such a life as given by Lucretius. There are no examples of ambitious men coming to particularly unfortunate ends, as in the case of the miser Ummidius at *Sat.* 1.1.95-100.

Indeed, the fact that in the Stoic sermon, *Sat.* 2.3, Damasippus (quoting the Stoic Stertinius) does give us lurid examples of how ambition can lead to ruin, further suggests that by comparison in 1.6 we are being given Horace's more personal, less extreme view of why he is disinclined to politics.

It is clear, then, that Horace's position is Epicurean in that he, personally, is against political involvement since this would conflict with the pursuit of *ataraxia*, and, in spite of this Epicureanism – and his use of Lucretius – his views on ambition are shown to be notably different from those of Lucretius. Indeed he does not lampoon those who are involved in politics (though, considering his connections, and position, this is an understandable feature of Horatian satire): he is content to let them indulge their ambition, as long as he himself (and other like-minded men) can remain apart from the political maelstrom.

(iv) *Epistles* 1.17 and 1.18

The fact that political involvement was acceptable to an Epicurean in Horace's day is clearly relevant to Horace's views on the subject. In *Epistles* 1.17 and 18 his advice is not dissimilar, in essence, to that given by Cicero (or Panaetius through Cicero) in *De officiis*, in its concern for good conduct dictated by restraint and moderation.⁴⁷¹ But it is briefly worth noting here that Horace gives his career advice, as it were, with his own tranquil life in the country as his present point of reference; indeed this is where the *Epistles* appear to have been written, and this acts as a check against any idea of his championing active political ambition. As has already been noted, in *Epistle* 1.17.6-10 Horace first recommends – as an ideal – the quiet life as advocated by the Epicureans. Realistically, however, such a life is not for Scaeva, and in that sense what Horace goes on to advise is still not wholly at odds with even traditional Epicureanism, as indicated in the aforementioned passages from Plutarch and Lactantius, where political involvement is acceptable for those whose happiness would be compromised if forced not to lead such a life.⁴⁷² Again, in *Epistle* 1.18, where he advises Lollius on how to curry favour with one's social superiors, Horace ends (96ff) by recommending that Lollius also

⁴⁷¹ See below, Chapter 5, §5.2.

⁴⁷² As will be discussed in Chapter 5, §5.2, Horace's apparent advocacy of Cyrenaicism may also be in line with current trends in Epicureanism regarding involvement in public life.

takes care to pursue *ataraxia* and study philosophy.⁴⁷³ And Horace makes his own priorities clear:

..... *quid credis, amice, precari?*
sit mihi quod nunc est, etiam minus, et mihi vivam
quod superest aevi, si quid superesse volunt di;
sit bona librorum et provisae frugis in annum
copia, neu fluitem dubiae spe pendulus horae. (106-110)

What do you think, my friend, are my prayers? May I have my present store or even less; may I live for myself for what remains of my life, if the gods wish that anything remain. May I have a good supply of books and food to last the year; nor may I waver to and fro with the hopes of each uncertain hour. (tr. Fairclough, 1926 adapted.)

Horace's advice on how to get on is thus tempered by his own ethical standards which, in many ways, are symbolised by the quiet, simple life he professes to lead in the country.

4.8 Conclusion

Horace's expositions of friendship and ambition are primarily informed by Epicurean sentiment. We are given a good idea of what Horace regards as true friendship in *Satires* 1.3 and 1.5, his convivial *Odes*, and in many of the *Epistles*. In short, the most important aspect of true friendship is the pleasure it brings, a pleasure which results from genuine mutual affection, and this idea is often promoted as part of an Epicurean view of life (and death): life is to be enjoyed, *ataraxia* and pleasure pursued.

In *Sat.* 1.3 Horace views friendship as applied to the philosophical themes of balance and fairness (*aequabilitas*) and, by extension, moderation, in connection with his own seemingly Epicurean (and anti-Stoic) view of justice. In so doing Horace actually promotes *aequabilitas* while also

⁴⁷³ Konstan, 1997, 142.

attacking the inflexibility of the Stoic position on *aequabilitas*. Indeed, Horace's own position seems at times to be ironically inconsistent, and his use of philosophical material enhances this irony. His position in favour of tolerance, however, is unequivocal, and is seen to reflect Epicurean views on the importance of *pistis* in friendship, and their more realistic view of human nature generally. Again, he makes use of the connection between friendship and justice, found in both Stoicism (through *oikeiosis*) and Epicureanism to formulate the most explicitly anti-Stoic argument in the *Satires*.

In *Satire* 1.6 friendship (a secondary theme to the overall theme of political ambition) is introduced by a recounting of his introduction to Maecenas, and thus is dealt with more personally. Indeed, it can be seen that Horace presents this friendship, from the *Satires* through to *Odes* 4, as reflecting certain aspects of friendship advocated in Epicureanism. The personal aspect to 1.6 also reflects an actual involvement with politics by virtue of this *amicitia*, though, in his promotion of *ataraxia* Horace makes it clear that the political life is not for him; and, by comparison with *Satires* 1.1-3, he avoids philosophical didacticism. Indeed, in his gentler approach to the subject of ambition he differs from Lucretius, although he draws from Lucretian material on ambition to put forward this personal view. Later, in the *Epistles*, he actually gives advice to younger men on how they might succeed in, or at least effect successful introductions to, public life: he is not against politics in principle (for those who are that way inclined) but only excessive ambition, with which it is often linked. As is made clear in *Satires* 1.6 and 2.6, and with reference to his country seclusion in the *Epistles*, his own inclination is for the quiet life.

Chapter 5

Good Conduct

5.1 The Relationship between Good Conduct and Ethics.

We have already seen how the themes of moderation, friendship, and ambition in Horace's *Satires* draw from philosophical, particularly Hellenistic, doctrine. But it is also apparent, from Horace's use of social *exempla* – crucial to the satire form – that on a purely practical level these issues involve social interaction and conduct.

Also, as was discussed in Chapter 1 with reference to the Macleod/Mayer debate, the important, practical question in ancient ethics of how one ought to live, suggests that manners and good conduct can be included within the realm of ethics. This is not to say that observations and opinions about human behaviour need always be regarded as philosophical, but social behaviour is certainly discussed within such a context (e.g. Aristotle, *NE* 8 and 9, and Cicero *De off.* 1.93-153). Having sided with Macleod in regarding Horace's discussions on conduct as being concerned with ethics, in this chapter I will further attempt to show the philosophical relevance of good conduct as discussed in the *Satires*.

Inasmuch as good conduct involves human interaction, one's behaviour within a society, and how this may have implications for one's own happiness (and the well-being of society at large), in an ancient context good conduct is clearly connected to the themes of friendship and ambition – and to an extent Aristotle deals with good conduct in his discussion of *philia*. Indeed, it should be noted that good conduct in such a context – and as discussed in this chapter – refers to behaviour which can be seen to have certain moral implications (even if, from a modern perspective, such

behaviour seems morally inconsequential),⁴⁷⁴ and the aim of this chapter will be, in part, to show these moral consequences. Thus good conduct here does not include the more arbitrary, ritualistic conventions of a particular society, which, if they concern consideration, or morality at all, do so only in the limited sense of appeasing others who follow these arbitrary, essentially morally inconsequential practices – it is not about knowing which knife goes with which course.⁴⁷⁵ But it will also become apparent that certain aspects of behaviour which from a modern perspective would perhaps be regarded as pertaining to etiquette (such as manner of speech, how one ought to walk, see §5.4) do have moral implications from an ancient perspective.

In terms of its philosophical implications, the difference between good conduct and the themes of friendship and ambition is that its emphasis lies on the appearance of behaviour rather than the nature of the behaviour itself (though these are clearly inextricably linked), as Sherman puts it: “it is not just what we do, but how we do it, that matters ethically.”⁴⁷⁶

Concentrating on how to behave, rather than the nature of the action, also suggests an emphasis on a practical, non-theoretical side to ethics. Phillipson⁴⁷⁷ regards the relationship between *decorum* and *honestum* (or, for Panaetius, *to prepon* and *to kalon*) in *De officiis* 1.93-99 as that of non-theoretical to theoretical, and compares this relationship with a passage from the Stoic Hecato (D.L. 7.90-91) where a distinction and inter-relationship between the non-theoretical and theoretical is discussed. Hecato gives examples of theoretical virtues, such as prudence and justice, and of non-theoretical virtues, such as health and strength. He maintains that these latter virtues generally relate to theoretical virtues, e.g. health may relate to temperance. Certainly, in *De officiis*, and in the *Satires*, certain kinds of behaviour which could also be regarded as non-theoretical can be seen to have

⁴⁷⁴ “Contemporary philosophers are loath to include etiquette under ethics.” Sherman, 2005, 63.

⁴⁷⁵ In this respect I am following Sherman’s approach (2005, 59-82).

⁴⁷⁶ As Sherman shows, looking at Seneca’s *De beneficiis*, that how one ought to behave when giving and receiving gifts is as important as the action of giving itself, e.g., that mode of behaviour is an indication of inner virtue (*Ben.* 2.2.1); that showing arrogance when giving undermines the deed itself (*Ben.* 2.4.1); that demeanour and appearance signifies moral rectitude (*Ben.* 1.2.4): Sherman, 2005, 59-82.

⁴⁷⁷ Phillipson, 1930, 357-413; Dyck, 1996, 244.

a moral aspect, as will become apparent. Dyck,⁴⁷⁸ however, in his commentary of *De officiis*, finds Phillipson's comparison with Hecato limited, mainly because Cicero himself discusses practical and theoretical virtues at *Off.* 1.16-17 in a more general way, without any stress on the relationship between *decorum* and *honestum*, though, at the end of the section, the essential point that behaviour reflects moral condition is clear:

iis enim rebus, quae tractantur in vita, modum quendam et ordinem adhibentes honestatem et decus conservabimus.

For if we bring a certain amount of propriety and order into the transactions of daily life, we shall be conserving moral rectitude and moral dignity. (tr. Miller 1913)

Although Dyck does not want to take the comparison between Cicero and Hecato too far, he observes that there is a general parallel in the relationship between *to prepon* (what is seemly) and *to kalon*, (the good) where *to prepon* is the *epigenomenon* or *epiphainomenon* (the manifestation) of *to kalon*; and this can be compared with observations of characters in [Aristotle] *Physiognomica*⁴⁷⁹ where deductions are made about people's character based on their appearance and gestures. For example, soft hair is a sign of cowardice, coarse hair courage (806b6); slothful movements denote weak character, quick movements a hot temper (806b25); a deep voice signifies courage, a high-pitched voice, cowardice (806b26). The idea here then is that the moral nature of one's character is to some extent reflected in one's superficial behaviour (or even physical condition or appearance). Indeed this is certainly implied in Cicero's discussion of *decorum* in *De officiis* 1.93-141. In discussing seemliness (*decorum*) in human behaviour, which essentially amounts to good, appropriate conduct, Cicero states that such behaviour should reflect the characteristics of restraint, temperance and moderation: e.g. *Off.* 1.96:

⁴⁷⁸ Dyck, 1996, 243-244.

⁴⁷⁹ According to Schmidt (1941, 1070.48ff), this work is likely to be based on Aristotelian views (Dyck, 1996, 244).

quae autem pars subiecta generi est, eam sic definiunt, ut id decorum velint esse, quod ita naturae consentaneum sit, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali.

Their definition of the part subordinate to this takes the seemly to be that which agrees with nature in such a way that moderation and restraint appear in it, along with the appearance of a gentleman. (tr. Griffin/Atkins 1991)

(Off 1.98): sic hoc decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum, quibuscum vivitur, ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.

So this seemliness, shining out in one's life, arouses the approval of one's fellows, because of the order and constancy and moderation of every word and action. (tr. Griffin/Atkins 1991)

In other passages, where Cicero looks at particular behavioural traits, this relationship between behaviour and the inner character is again mentioned, as at *De off.* 128-32, 145-6.

As a general rule it would appear that moderation and the middle way is the most important guiding principle (so *Ep.* 1.18.9; ironically, at *Sat.* 2.5.89):⁴⁸⁰ moderate behaviour is appropriate behaviour, and this is maintained on several occasions in the section on *decorum* in *De officiis* 1.193-141.⁴⁸¹ On the basis of Cicero's discussion of *decorum* in *De officiis*, therefore, one can see how conduct is related to ethics. Bearing in mind the

⁴⁸⁰ See below, §5.3 (iii).

⁴⁸¹ The influence of Aristotle's views on Panaetius (and Cicero) regarding appropriate social behaviour, in terms of the doctrine of the mean, is also apparent, not merely in the general terms of moderation and restraint, as seen in the above examples, but more explicitly at, for example, *Off.* 1.140 on not building on too grand a scale, and 1.130 on grooming and dress. Although Cicero (representing Stoic views in *De officiis*) does not agree with the doctrine of the mean in all areas: on passions he advocates *apatheia* (1.69) so disagreeing with the Peripatetic/ Academic *metriopatheia*; cf. *Tusc.* 4.43 for a fuller Stoic criticism of *metriopatheia*.

agenda Horace sets for himself in *Epistles* 1.1, together with the statement, *quid verum atque decens, curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum* (11) ('What is true and seemly is my care and pursuit, and this is what I'm wholly concerned with'), '*decens*', in such a context, seems likely to allude to the concept of *decorum* as discussed by Cicero.⁴⁸² Indeed *deceo* appears a number of times in *Ep.* 1.17 (2, 23, 25, 42), which, as we will see, concerns good conduct. Thus, while the relationship between *decorum* and *honestum* can be seen to explain the relevance of good conduct to ethics, it also seems likely that Horace himself was aware of this relationship.

5.2 Horace's views on good conduct as represented in *Epistles* 1

The first book of the *Epistles* is an obvious place to look in order to determine where Horace stands with regard to good conduct, since his views are more clearly presented as his own, and he deals with the subject itself more directly. Horace actually gives advice on how to be ambitious in the *Epistles* - that is, on how to get on in society generally, rather than in any particularly excessive, unscrupulous sense. And in doing so, he pays attention to how to behave in order to give the right impression as to one's character. In discussing his own foray into high society in *Sat.* 1.6 - his introduction to Maecenas - Horace concentrates on the importance of character (as we saw in Chapter 4, §4.7 (i)) though in many respects his character is indicated by his behaviour.

This is evident at *Sat.* 1.6.56-60, where he depicts himself as an honest, rather shy man who knows his place:

ut veni coram, singultim pauca locutus
(infans namque pudor prohibebat plura profari)
non ego me claro natum patre, non ego circum
me Satureiano vectari rura caballo,
sed quod eram narro...

⁴⁸² Although Mayer would disagree (see Chapter 1, §1.2 [ii]).

When I came face to face, I gulped out a few words, because tongue-tied shyness stopped me speaking out further, and told you not that I was the son of a distinguished father, not that I rode round my country estates on a Tarentine nag, but the facts about myself.

Thus here the behaviour – Horace’s relative gaucheness – is seen as a direct result of, and, in a sense, subsidiary to, his character. Indeed behaviour is only important in that it is an indication of character: the emphasis is on character, as at 1.6.62-4:

..... *magnum hoc ego duco*
quod placui tibi, qui turpi secernis honestum,
non patre praeclaro sed vita et pectore puro.

I consider it a great distinction to have found favour with you – who can tell the honourable from the base – not because of an eminent father but because of integrity of life and character.

In *Ep.* 1.17 and 18, however, the emphasis seems to shift to behaviour (though clearly still as an important indication of character). Although Horace sees conduct as a facet of ethics, as Panaetius did, his own attitude towards social behaviour seems to be determined more by the *telos* of *hēdonē* than by the pursuit of *virtus*. Certainly, the example of Aristippus in *Epistle* 1.17 suggests that appropriate *behaviour* leads to a more pleasurable life - if one is not prepared to separate oneself from conventional public life after the Epicurean model of *lathe biōsas* ⁴⁸³(line 10).

*“Si pranderet holus patienter, regibus uti
nollet Aristippus.” “si sciret regibus uti,
fastidiret holus qui me notat.” utrius horum
verba probes et facta doce, vel iunior audi
cur sit Aristippi potior sententia. Namque*

⁴⁸³ See above, Chapter 4, §4.8 (i).

*mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut aiunt:
 "scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu; rectius hoc et
 splendidius multo est. equus ut me portet, alat rex
 officium facio; ut poscis vilia, verum
 dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem."*

"If Aristippus could be content to dine on greens, he would not want to live with princes." "If he who criticises me knew how to live with princes, he would sniff at greens." Of these two sages tell me whose words and deeds you approve; or, since you are the younger, hear why the view of Aristippus is better. For this is the way, as the story goes, that he dodged the snapping Cynic: "I play the buffoon for my own profit, you for the people's. My conduct is better and nobler by far. I do service so that I may have a horse to ride and be fed by a prince: you sue for paltry doles; but you become inferior to the giver, though you pose as needing nothing." (*Ep.* 1.17.13-32) (tr. Fairclough, 1926, adapted)

Horace's mention of Aristippus as representing an alternative to Stoicism in *Epistle* 1.1.18-19 is naturally brought to mind,⁴⁸⁴ and the fact that Aristippus is here portrayed as one who would, with pleasure in mind, engage in public life, suggests that this was also a reason for his mentioning Aristippus, rather than Epicurus in *Epsittle* 1.1.: Horace does not oppose Stoic public involvement with Epicurean withdrawal, but with Aristippean self-interest, which need not preclude involvement in public life. Armstrong's comment that in *Epistle* 1.1.14-19 Epicureanism is an implied mean between Stoicism and Cyrenaicism thus seems misapplied:⁴⁸⁵ in this instance Horace is in a sense

⁴⁸⁴ The common view is that this Aristippus (Senior) is the friend and pupil of Socrates – Aristippus of Cyrene – who was probably not, in fact, the founder of the Cyrenaic school. The school was founded by his grandson (also Aristippus) who learnt philosophy from his mother, Arete, Aristippus Senior's daughter, herself a pupil of her father: Long, 1999, 632ff. The anecdote is also found in D.L 2.8.68.

⁴⁸⁵ Armstrong, 2004, 275. Indeed, in quoting Johnson to complement the general, and fair point of his argument - that Horace's sympathies in the *Epistles* are mainly Epicurean - Armstrong (2004, 289, n.39) seems to contradict his idea of Epicureanism being the mean (rather than Cyrenaicism): "the *askesis* of Epicurus....

offering the Stoic extreme, and then the Cyrean *mean* - where one might have rather expected the antithetical extreme of Epicurean withdrawal.⁴⁸⁶

In fact, in *Epistle* 1.17 Horace does mention Epicurean withdrawal (*lathe biōsas* 10), and in as much as this is the first option mentioned it is also the most preferable in terms of *sapientia*. But, bearing in mind that some are not constitutionally able to lead such a life (as Epicurus conceded, see above Chapter 4, §4.8 [i]), Horace offers, through Aristippus, an alternative position which is perhaps more in keeping with the character, and hopes of his addressee - as well as in some respects himself.⁴⁸⁷ In the narrative of the poem a distinction is thus made between Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism (or at least a representative of Cyrenaicism). However, the Roman Epicurean, though aware of the ideal of withdrawal, would not necessarily regard the sort of ideas expressed in this anecdote as at odds with contemporary Epicureanism, which, as we have seen,⁴⁸⁸ was much more tolerant of involvement in public life. Furthermore, although Horace appears to make a distinction between Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism, he also links the two schools with an appeal to the value the Epicureans attached to friendship, in lines 11-12:

*si prodesse tuis pauloque benignius ipsum
te tractare voles, accedes siccus ad unctum.*

was divested of its surlier dogmatisms, *was softly tempered by Aristippean realities.*" (my italics): Johnson, 1993, 151.

⁴⁸⁶ Mayer, 1986, 64, suggests that Horace refers to Aristippus in *Epistle* 1.1, not Epicurus, because Cyrenaicism was essentially obsolete, and thus Horace is adopting an independent hedonistic position. However, the likelihood that the Cyrenaics had now been overtaken by Epicureanism (Glucker, 1978, 179) could also suggest that Horace is not precluding an affiliation with Epicureanism; it seems possible that hedonists who may have been of a more Cyrenaic persuasion (if the school had still been flourishing) would have fallen in with the Epicureans. Rather, the reason for mentioning Aristippus here, and not Epicurus, explicitly relates to the philosophical idea of adapting to circumstances, which is also the case at 1.17.13-22.

⁴⁸⁷ Moles (2002, 149) regards Aristippus as reflecting Horace's own view of inclusiveness; though (157) "Epicurean withdrawal is where his heart lies."

⁴⁸⁸ See above, Chapter 1, §1.4 (iii); Chapter 4. §4.8 (i).

But if you wish to help your friends and to treat yourself a little more generously, you in your hunger will make for a rich table. (tr. Fairclough, 1926)

The leading proponents of Cyrenaicism had different views on friendship. Anniceris conceded that friendship existed (D.L. 2.96), and he included social life and public distinction within the scope of pleasure;⁴⁸⁹ Theodorus, however, (similarly to the Cynics) regarded friendship as impossible between fools and unnecessary for the wise, and Hegesias (the last head of a Cyrenaic school) claimed gratitude and friendship did not exist: they were just self-interest under another name.⁴⁹⁰ In effect, then, Horace seems to intermingle Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism on premises that, in the strict orthodox sense, both schools ought not uphold (the Epicureans being in favour of social withdrawal, the Cyreanics – for the most part - regarding friendship as unnecessary). But, in so doing, he advocates a hybrid hedonism which, in practice, is likely to represent the views of contemporary Roman Epicureans – particularly if the would-be Cyrenaic hedonist would (with Cyrenaicism now defunct) have quite likely chosen Epicureanism as being the only remaining option.⁴⁹¹

The anecdote itself has a demonstrably practical, rather than theoretical flavour. As Macleod notes, Aristippus and Diogenes (and Cynicism generally) represent philosophical schools that are known more for their behaviour than their theory.⁴⁹² That the Cynics were more concerned with behaviour than theory was discussed in Chapter 1 (§1.2 [iii]). The Cyrenaics seem to have been known mainly for their moral hedonism; the fact that the heads of the Cyrenaic school had somewhat differing opinions,⁴⁹³ and that Cyrenaicism became obsolete, perhaps accounts for the fact that their philosophical activity was not well remembered.

What is also notable is that Horace here recommends Aristippus, explicitly, and not the Stoics, as an example of one who would engage in

⁴⁸⁹ Long, 1999, 637.

⁴⁹⁰ Long, 1999, 638.

⁴⁹¹ See above, note 486.

⁴⁹² Macleod, 1986, 49, on *Epistle* 1.17.

⁴⁹³ See above, Chapter 3, §3.1.

society in an appropriate way. Horace is not, at this stage, advocating political involvement, he is merely advising on how best to derive pleasure from the society one has been born into. However, as the *epistle* proceeds, we find a definite inclination towards Stoicism, and lines 41-2 recall the Stoicising of *Ep. 1.1.11, 16*:

.... *aut virtus nomen inane est,*
aut decus et pretium recte petit experiens vir (41-2)

Either virtue is an empty name, or the man who makes the attempt
justly aims at honour and reward. (Fairclough, 1926, adapted)

It is as if Horace has used the example of Aristippus to coax one into the idea of participation in public life, as a means to pleasure; but that once one is engaged in public life one ought then to feel duty-bound to behave honourably, that is, in the manner of a Stoic.⁴⁹⁴ Pleasure, perhaps in an almost incidental way, can thus be seen as the primary motive behind the life of *virtus* he recommends at 41-42. But all this comes after the wisest option (6-10) – detachment.

In contrast to Aristippus' adaptability, the Cynics' priority for speaking the truth and their total rejection of social custom and culture (D.L. 6.72-3), because of its deviation from, and irrelevance to nature, meant that, in effect, they deliberately made themselves social pariahs. Horace was certainly influenced by Cynic rhetoric, the diatribe, as well as their ethics, in his satires, but in terms of style and behaviour, he did not approve of the Cynics: because their behaviour was offensive, it was at odds with the goal of finding happiness in society (as *Epistles* 1.17.13-32 shows). In this passage Horace advocates social inter-action in connection with *hēdonē* against Cynic sordidness, and the later inclinations to Stoicism at 41-2, and 33-4 (a reference to Augustus in particular) also tie in with the Stoic objection to Cynic unseemliness, and its incongruence with a political career or successful participation in society. Thus, in *Off* 1.128 Cicero makes it clear that Stoics in

⁴⁹⁴ Indeed Moles (2002, 155) aligns Aristippus with Panaetius (pro-social dependence) against Cynic self-sufficiency.

the Panaetian mould would not wish to be associated either with Cynics, or those Stoics who are practically Cynics.⁴⁹⁵ In upholding *decorum*, and an appropriate sense of shame (which Cicero observes in certain specific Roman practices, such as a father never bathing with his son, or father-in-law with son-in-law), Cicero disapproves of Cynic *anaideia* (1.127-129),⁴⁹⁶ and opposes this with a Roman sense of propriety.

The association between Cynicism and rudeness amounted to the Stoics criticising bad behaviour as 'Cynic'. Griffin has brought attention to this tendency in Plutarch's biography of Brutus, where the accusation of 'Cynic' is again used as a denigration, as when Brutus castigates Favonius (*Brutus* 34.3-4) – who may have in fact been a Stoic, though, by Brutus' reckoning, his behaviour was certainly Cynic.⁴⁹⁷ As well as at *Ep.* 1.17.13-32, Horace also shows his disapproval of Cynicism at *Ep.* 1.18.1-8, where, in at first referring to Lollius' outspokenness and his understandable contempt of flattery, Horace actually suggests that the other extreme to flattery – rudeness – is, perhaps, an even greater vice: *est huic diversum vitio vitium prope maius* (5). The following description of the kind of offensive character Horace means suggests a typical (if derogatory) view of a Cynic. At least, given Horace's comments on Cynicism in the previous epistle, the implication of Cynicism here is extremely likely. And again, at *Sat.* 2.2.53-65, Horace is critical of the Cynics' unnecessarily offensive squalor, showing his preference for Peripatetic (and, in a sense, via *De officiis*, Panaetian) moderation.

It is clear then that in terms of conduct, of social inclusiveness, Horace has no sympathy with the offensive behaviour of the Cynics, and has some sympathy with the Epicureans, (in terms of inoffensive social exclusion altogether), and, perhaps more practically, the Cyrenaics (in terms of flexibility and self-interest, though this may well also represent 1st Century B.C. Epicurean views too) and Stoic seemliness aiming at *virtus*. Flexibility in social situations, aiming at self-interest, at pleasure, would in certain

⁴⁹⁵ Cicero *Off.* 1.128: *Nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici...* : Griffin, 1996, 192.

⁴⁹⁶ Griffin, 1996, 192.

⁴⁹⁷ At least, he was 'madly' keen on philosophy: Plutarch *Brutus* 34.2: ...πάθει μανικῶ φιλοσοφῶν. Madness often being applied to Cynics, e.g. Plato describes Diogenes as a mad Socrates: D.L. 6.54, Aelian, *Varia Historia* 14.33.

circumstances (as one would imagine in the Aristippus example in *Ep.* 1.17) amount to appeasing one's social superiors, and clearly this was pertinent to a particular form of behaviour discussed in Horace, and in certain ancient ethical texts - namely, flattery.

5.3 Flattery

(i)

Flattery is an aspect of conduct that is central to *Epistles* 1.17 and 18 and *Satires* 1.9 and 2.5. If one looks again at the *amicitia* between Horace and Maecenas, Horace's wish to emphasise the genuine nature of the friendship is in part due to others' suspicions of Horace's flattery (as suggested at 1.6.45-8 and, as we will see, in the poet's assumptions about Horace in *Sat.* 1.9). Horace's response to such a charge (if it was in fact made, or implied) is, in 1.6. 62-5 to refer to Maecenas' impeccable judgement of character, although, in referring to Maecenas in such glowing terms he is nevertheless, it would seem, laying himself open to the charge of flattery. The very fact that, looking at Horace's relationship with Maecenas, there would thus appear to be a thin line between flattery and appropriate behaviour towards a social superior, makes it all the more understandable why flattery was such an issue in Roman society, and so pertinent to Horace in particular.

(ii) Aristotle

In directly referring to the Aristotelian principle that virtue is a mean at *Ep.* 1.18.9, Horace relates this principle to how to conduct oneself with a superior. The extremes to be avoided (in 1.18) on either side are, explicitly, flattery and (by implication) rudeness (although clearly rudeness could be unintentional – as Horace notes in *Ep.* 1.18.94-95 where one's shyness and silence can be misinterpreted as deliberate rudeness). Because of people's desire to form mutually beneficial relationships in a society where advancement and, to an extent, security, could often depend on such

relationships, it is quite understandable that the way they were conducted or embarked upon were of interest to philosophers, whose primary concern in ethics was how to be happy, and thus how to live one's life. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle mentions flattery, specifically, on three occasions. At 1108a26ff he refers to flattery as an excess (as Horace does in *Ep.* 1.18.1-4) along with obsequiousness:

περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερις τις καὶ δύσκολος.

With regard to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in life in general, the man who is pleasant in the right way is friendly and the mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person if he has no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage, and the man who falls short and is unpleasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort of person. (tr. Ross, 1925)

This description seems comprehensive enough – notably a distinction being made between ‘flattery’ being for the sake of advantage, and ‘obsequiousness’ being, apparently, for its own sake – but Aristotle does not consider the problem of unintentional rudeness, which for Horace must play a part in why he is giving advice in these *Epistles*: presumably, his addressees would actually want to make the right impression, and to avoid unwittingly offending their superiors (or, at the very least, to avoid making a bad impression). Aristotle’s definitions certainly suggest the idea that moral character is reflected in behaviour, but Horace, it seems, is equally concerned with the problem of ignorance (a problem which the man of good character clearly ought not to have) perhaps because inexperience, and therefore ignorance, would not necessarily denote bad moral character, even if it may denote lack of wisdom. Aristotle’s discussion of the involuntary in *NE* 3.1 may provide some explanation as to why he does not concern himself with unintentional

rudeness at 1108a26ff, since that account would suggest that unintentional rudeness could reflect either ignorance of how to behave in certain circumstances, which would denote moral fault (1110b28ff) or actual ignorance of the circumstances, which need not necessarily denote moral failing, (1111aff). An example could be: not knowing another's identity (e.g. that he was a superior) would be ignorance of the circumstances, and the resultant behaviour pardonable, but knowing the person's identity and being ignorant of how duly to behave, would not be pardonable. Aristotle only briefly refers to the flatterer's characteristics, at 1125a2:

δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες.

For this is slavish, and for this reason all flatterers are servile and people lacking in self-respect are flatterers. (tr. Ross, 1925)

He also observes, at 1159a15 that most men love flattery, since most men wish to be loved rather than to love. This last reference to flattery is made in book 8, in the context of friendship between superiors and inferiors. However, Aristotle's specific references to flattery are brief and almost made in passing: it was later philosophers, such as Aristotle's successor, Theophrastus, who wrote a work *On Flattery*, as well as a character sketch of the flatterer (*Characters* 2), Cicero (in *De amicitia*), and Philodemus, who dealt with flattery in more detail.

(iii) Philodemus and Cicero

A very likely contemporary influence on Horace on the subject of flattery is Philodemus, who wrote a treatise *On Flattery* (*peri kolakeias*). There are certain details in Philodemus' *On Flattery* which are particularly relevant to Horace's views on how to (or, more particularly, how not to) conduct oneself with superiors in the *Satires*. Perhaps the most general and obvious point is

Philodemus' statement at *peri kolakeias* *P.Herc* 222, Gargiulo 1981:⁴⁹⁸ Col. 2. 2-7:

ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ὅμοιον μ[έν]/ οὐδὲν προσοίσεται κόλα[κι,]/ παρέξει δέ τισιν
ὑπόνοιαν [ὥς]/ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος, ὅτι κη[λεῖ φρέ]/νας οὕτως ὅν τρόπον οὐδ' α[ί]
μυ]/θικαὶ Σειρήνες (T. Gargiulo, *P.Herc* 222, [1981]).

Likewise the wise man will not have dealings with the flatterer, but will hold him in suspicion since he is that sort of man: in that he charms minds in such a way as not even the legendary Sirens could.
(My translation)

Philodemus also makes clear that the flatterer's motive is profit⁴⁹⁹ as is clearly the case in Horace's take on flattery in *Satire* 2.5 and, to an extent, in *Epistles* 1.17, in that the example of Aristippus' adaptability shows a willingness to enjoy pleasures which are costly [at 13ff]. And this is in line with Aristotle's specific definition of flattery (*κολακεία*) as distinct from obsequiousness (*ἄρεσκεια*) at 1108a26ff. In the opening definition of the flatterer in Theophrastus' *Characters* 2, the profit motive (financial or otherwise) is again mentioned, with identical wording to its reference in Philodemus, though, in Philodemus (from what can be deduced from what is extant) no reference is made to Theophrastus by name [thus, in *Characters* 2: τὴν δὲ κολακείαν ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις ὁμιλίαν αἰσχρὰν εἶναι, συμφέρουσιν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι. 'You might call flattery talk that is shameful, or profitable to the flatterer.' (tr. Rusten); Philodemus, *περὶ κολακείας* col. 12. 2-3: ...ἢ τὴν αἰσχρὰν ὁμιλίαν συμφέρουσαν τῷ κολακεύοντι. (Gargiulo)]. It has been suggested that some of the opening definitions in the *Characters* are later insertions into the

⁴⁹⁸ *CErc* 11 (1981) 103-27.

⁴⁹⁹ Gargiulo, 1981: Col. 3.3-7: [ἔ]τι δ' οὐ διὰ φιλι[κ]ωτέρου/ πράγματος ἀλλὰ διὰ κολα/κειίας ἐξαγίστου π[αρ'] ἀπ[άν]/των πάσας ἐκπορίζεται τὰ[ς]/ ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρείας. 'Yet not through a more friendly method but through abominable flattery of everyone does he provide all his means for living.' (my translation); Col. 5.1-5: χάριν περιου]/σίας ἢ δόξης ἢ καὶ τινος ἀ[ρ]/χῆς ἀρέσεντες ἀνθρώποις]/ μεγαλοπλούτοις καὶ δυν[α]/στευκοῖς ἢ καὶ δημοκό[ποις].] 'Appeasing very rich men and dynasts or even demagogues for the sake of wealth, reputation or even some power'. (my translation.) Also Col. 12.1-4.

text,⁵⁰⁰ indeed in *Characters* 2 the notion of profit is not mentioned again throughout the rest of the character sketch.⁵⁰¹ Self-advancement is also implied in the two extant fragments of Theophrastus' *peri kolakeias*,⁵⁰² inasmuch as the flatterers' aim is to ingratiate themselves with eminent, powerful (and no doubt wealthy) people.

Cicero's discussion of flattery in *De amicitia* (89-100) does not mention the motive of self-advancement explicitly: he concentrates on the servility and falseness of the behaviour, and that one should be on guard so as not to become a victim of flattery. Again, Plutarch (*Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur* 'How to tell the flatterer from the friend'), apparently expanding on Cicero (*Amic.* 95ff: *secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci...*), treats flattery in connection with friendship, and Plutarch briefly mentions that flatterers don't wait upon the poor (49C),⁵⁰³ but then also states that the flatterer's main concern is to give pleasure (54B)⁵⁰⁴ (as does Cicero).⁵⁰⁵

There is also a Philodemean observation of flattery in action which more specifically relates to Horatian satire. In *P.Herc* 222 (Gargiulo, 1981) Col. 7. 1-17 Philodemus describes the flatterer at a dinner party:

⁵⁰⁰ Rusten and Cunningham, 2002, 8; Ussher (1993, 7) regards them as "possibly authentic" and treats them as such.

⁵⁰¹ Rusten and Cunningham, 2002, 55, note 1. Rusten also states in this note that the notion that the flatterer's motive is profit is derived from Aristotle *NE* 1108a26, 1127a7. Although Ussher (1993, 43) notes this connection, he further comments that Aristotle seems to suggest at 1173b31 that the main motive of the flatterer is to give pleasure. However, this must be qualified by the fact that Aristotle is referring to differences between a friend and a flatterer, in the general context of a discussion of pleasure.

⁵⁰² Fragments 547 and 548 (p.373) in FHS&G vol. 2 (1992, 547): Θεόφραστος δ' ἐν τῷ Περί κολακείας φησίν, ὡς Μύρτις ὁ Ἀργεῖος Κλεώνυμον τὸν χορευτὴν ἅμα καὶ κόλακα προσκαθίζοντα πολλάκις αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς συνδικάζουσι, βουλόμενον δὲ καὶ μετὰ τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐνδόξων ὁρᾶσθαι... 'Theophrastus says in the (work) on Flattery that when Cleonymus the dancer and also flatterer repeatedly sat himself beside Myrtis the Argive and his fellow judges, wishing to be seen even with the eminent men of the city...' (tr. FHS & G).

548: Θεόφραστος δὲ φησι καὶ τοὺς ἐταίρους αὐτοῦ κολακεύοντας τὴν τυραννίδα... 'Theophrastus says that even his (Dionysius') comrades, in flattery of his tyranny...' (tr. FHS & G.)

⁵⁰³ Ussher, 1993, 43.

⁵⁰⁴ Ussher, 1993, 43.

⁵⁰⁵ *Amic.* 91: *vitium... levium hominum atque fallacium, ad voluptatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem.* 'a vice peculiar to fickle and false hearted men who say everything with a view to pleasure, and nothing with a view to truth.' (tr. Falconer, 1923).

μισεῖ δ' ὁ κόλαξ]/ πάντας ἀπλῶς τοὺς [ἐπιτη/δεῖους τῶν κολακε[ομένων,]/
 μάλιστα δὲ γονεῖς κ[αὶ τοὺς]/ ἄλλους συγγενεῖς κα[ὶ γαμε]/τὴν καὶ φίλους,
 οἷς [ἐπὶ δείπ]/νοῖς ἐξοχώτατα πολεμ[εῖ.]/ το[ύς] κόλακας δὲ τοὺς ἄ[λλους]/
 ἐ[ρῆμ]ους ἔχει μονοφα[γῶν κοῦ]/ π[ολυω]ρουμένους · μει[λίττει] δὲ τὸν
 κολα[κε]υόμεν[ον καὶ μὴ]/ νήφαντα - [οὐ]κ αὖ ἀτόπα[στον τοῦ/το] -
 γ[ιν]ωσκόμενος ὅτι [πρόδυ/μ]ος ὑβρίζειται καὶ πάννυ [πολλὰς]/ ἀναδ[έ]χεται
 παροινί[ας καὶ]/ προ[π]ηλακισμοὺς ἄχ[ρι ἅ]/μα [τ]ρ[ώσε]ων καὶ πληγῶν
 πολ[ύ]λων...

The flatterer absolutely hates everyone who is on friendly terms with those he intends to flatter, particularly the offspring and other relatives, wife and friends, with whom he contends most at dinner parties. And he eats alone, keeping the other flatterers and inferior types on their own, and he appeases the object of flattery even when aware that he is not sober – this is not to be guessed at – because he is eager to be insulted and submit to very many drunken outbursts and abusive behaviour, along with much wounding and beating.’ (My translation)

This depiction would appear to correlate with the *scurra*, as described at the beginning of *Epistles* 1.18. 1-20. In this *Epistle* the *scurra* is notable for his flattery rather than his buffoonery (as in *Sat.* 1.4.34-5, 81-91), although, in alluding to a dinner-party scene at *Ep.* 1.18.10-11, Horace merges the characteristics of buffoonery and flattery into the one character, the *scurra*, referring to him as a jester of the ‘lowest couch’: *alter in obsequium plus aequo pronus et imi/ derisor lecti...* ‘one man, over-prone to servility, a jester of the lowest couch’ (Fairclough 1926). While at Nasidienus’ disastrous dinner party, the buffoons and flatterers are in a sense separated: or at least the flatterers/buffoons of the guests behave uncouthly, unlike the host’s flatterers who, out of deference, abstain from such antics:

invertunt Allifanis vinaria tota
Vibidius Balaltroque; secutis omnibus imi
convivae lecti nihilum nocuere lagoenis. (Satires 2.8.39-41)

Vibidius and the Buffoon upturn whole wine jugs into the Allifanian cups; while all followed their lead, the guests on the lowest couch did no damage to the flagons.

(iv) Philodemus, Cicero and *Satire* 2.5

Philodemus' observation of the flatterer's hostility towards those who are essentially his rivals – particularly the object of flattery's relations – is a point that is emphasised in *Sat.* 2.5, which deals, specifically, with the Roman phenomenon of legacy-hunting (*captatio*)⁵⁰⁶ as at 27-31:

*magna minorve Foro si res certabitur olim,
vivet uter locuples sine gnatis, improbus, ultro
qui meliorem audax vocet in ius, illius esto
defensor: fama civem causaque priorem
sperne, domi si gnatus erit fecundave coniunx.*

If one day a case of greater or less moment is being contested in the forum, whichever party is rich and childless, a scoundrel, the sort who recklessly and unprovoked would summons a better man into court, of that man be the advocate: spurn the citizen with the better name and case, if he has a son or fertile wife at home.

And at 54-55:

*.....solus multisne coheres,
veloci percurrere oculo.*

⁵⁰⁶ The reasons for this phenomenon, as Muecke (1993, 177) summarises, were likely to have been the increase in personal wealth; greater freedom for heads of families in disposal of property; increased childlessness, and that people now expected that wills would take into account services rendered.

Scan with a swift eye to see if you are sole heir or co-heir with a multitude.

Indeed, Philodemus' observation (Gargiulo, 1981, Col. 7.1-3) of the flatterer's antipathy towards, in particular, his quarry's wife and kinsmen (i.e. possible heirs) may suggest that Philodemus too had the practice of legacy-hunting in mind in this passage.⁵⁰⁷

It seems, then, that flatterers come in different guises. In *Ep.* 1.18, the *scurra*-type flatterer is unashamed and unsubtle: the servility and stupidity (though such stupidity is perhaps a deliberate front) of his behaviour consigning him to a particular place at the dinner table – and it could be that Philodemus has the same sort of flatterer in mind in Col. 7. However, Cicero, having dealt with flattery of the more obvious kind in describing the behaviour of the out and out yes-man (*Amic.* 93), goes on to describe the other kind of flatterer, the more subtle, scheming kind, who would worm his way in (*callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet studiose cavendum est*), and may actually appear to be at odds at first with the person he is flattering:

quippe qui etiam adversando saepe assentetur, et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur, ut is qui illusus sit plus vidisse videatur (*Amic.* 99).

Since he often fawns even by opposing, and flatters by pretending to quarrel, until at last he gives in, allowing himself to be overcome so that his dupe may appear to have seen further into the matter than himself. (tr. Falconer, 1923)

In *Sat.* 2.5 Teiresias is instructing Ulysses in how to become a successful legacy-hunter, which effectively means a successful flatterer. Flattery is presented as a practised skill, which perhaps also suggests (as does *Amic.* 89-100) the extent to which flattery had become such a notorious

⁵⁰⁷ In addition to the fact that elsewhere Philodemus makes clear that the flatterer's motive is profit (Gargiulo, 1981: Col. 3.3-7, 5.2-3, 12.1-4) – even though the profit motive may not necessarily always be directly financial.

method of self-advancement. Clearly people were on guard against flattery and thus to be a successful flatterer one would have to acquire more subtle skills (though, that is not to say that the more obvious flatterer or parasite was not still rife – as the references in Horace and Philodemus suggest). Teiresias' advice to Ulysses "be attentive and gently worm your way into the hope..." (*leniter in spem/ adrepe officiosus...* Sat. 2.5.47-8) is reminiscent of the skilful flatterer who would worm himself in in *Amic.* 99, mentioned above. Indeed, the fact that Teiresias recommends the mean (at 2.5.89: *neu desis opera neve immoderatus abundes*; 'neither fall short in service, nor be inordinately overflowing with it') as being the best form of approach further suggests that a particular kind of measured, and thus more calculated form of flattery is being proposed than the obvious, servile kind.

Cicero's references in *De amicitia* (89, 93, 98) to the character of Gnatho from Terence's *Eunuchus* further testify to the notoriety of the flatterer, or parasite, in Roman society. Terence's *Eunuchus* was in fact based on Menander's play of the same name, (as Terence states: 19-20) and the characters of the flatterer and the boastful soldier were taken from Menander's *kolax* (30-32). Little survives of Menander's *kolax*, and what does survive does not tell us a great deal in the way of detailed characterisation about the flatterer, although something can be gleaned in this respect from quotations of the play in, for example, Plutarch and Athenaeus,⁵⁰⁸ where the flatterer is seen to be cunning and deceitful. The character of Gnatho in Terence's play is portrayed, in spite of the obvious immorality of his 'profession', as a quick-witted, sarcastic (in an indirect way) and even likeable character, which is clearly enhanced by the fact that Gnatho is instrumental in the play's happy ending. But this is to be expected in comedy, where the most disreputable character types nevertheless have a loveable side, and Gnatho's sarcasm is only understood as such by the audience, at the expense of Thraso, the *miles gloriosus*, he is flattering. Indeed, if Thraso were not *gloriosus* he too would doubtless regard Gnatho's flattery as sarcasm; it is not difficult to flatter someone who already flatters himself, as Cicero comments, quoting a scene

⁵⁰⁸ e.g. Plutarch *Moralia* 57a; Athenaeus, 13. 587d, says that Strouthias flatters Bias by listing the famous courtesans he has had as mistresses (M. Balme and P. Brown, 2001, 239).

between Gnatho and Thraso.⁵⁰⁹ Notably, Gnatho presents flattery, or his particular kind of flattery, as a new profession, a step up from buffoonery, (*Eumuchus* 248-253) and in this respect flattery is demonstrated as a skill that requires cunning, as it is in *Sat.* 2.5 (which is why one might expect Ulysses to succeed in it) and Cicero's *De amicitia* (99).

Because so little remains of Menander's *kolax*, it is impossible to make a comparison between the characterisation of the flatterer in Menander and Terence. But it seems very likely that Menander's character of the *kolax* may well have been drawn, in part, with Theophrastus' *kolax* in mind. Indeed Theophrastus' *Characters* look almost like a blueprint for the stock character-types of new comedy,⁵¹⁰ and the fact that Menander was a pupil of Theophrastus further points to a Theophrastean influence.⁵¹¹ That said, Menander, and later Terence, Cicero and Horace, would have all naturally added their own observations to this type, not least as dependent upon chronological and geographical differences in the instances where the *kolax*, the *parasitus* and (in Horace and Cicero) the *captator* are depicted.⁵¹² Chronologically the trend seems to be for flattery to be portrayed as an occupation requiring more and more subtlety.

Both on the stage and in the character studies of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and again in Cicero, Philodemus, Horace and Plutarch, the flatterer's behaviour, in as much as he is obsequious, is servile. From an ancient perspective the adjective *doulikos*, (Aristotle *NE* 1125a2) would have a particular resonance, in that it is behaviour one might associate with a slave. The slavishness of the legacy-hunter is stressed by Cicero in *Paradoxa* 5 which deals with the paradox that all fools are slaves, 39:

⁵⁰⁹ i.e. *Amic.* 97: *Ita fit ut is assentatoribus patefaciat auris suas maxime, qui ipse sibi assentetur et se maxime ipse delectet*; 'It follows that the man who lends the readiest ear to flatterers is the one who is most given to self-flattery and is most satisfied with himself.' (tr. Falconer, 1923.) At 98 Cicero quotes from Terence's *Eumuchus* Act iii 391-394.

⁵¹⁰ Walton and Arnott, 1996, 977-8.

⁵¹¹ *ibid.*

⁵¹² Gomme and Sandbach, 1973, 422: "The poets of middle and New Comedy used their ingenuity to depict varied and new types of *kolax* or 'parasite' (Athenaios vi. 236 b-262 a), and no doubt Menander's *kolax* was a striking and original creation."

An eorum servitus dubiast qui cupiditate peculii nullam condicionem recusant durissimae servitutis? hereditatis spes quid iniquitatis in serviendo non suscipit, quem nutum locupletis orbi senis non observat: loquitur ad voluntatem, quicquid denuntiaturst facit, adsectatur adsidet muneratur. quid horum est liberi, quid denique servi non inertis?

Again, is there any doubt about the slavery of those who do not shrink from any condition of the harshest service because of their avarice? The hope of a legacy – what injustice does it not drive a man to tolerate in its service? What nod from a dotard, rich and childless, does he not jump to? He speaks at his behest, runs on his errands, walks with him, sits by him, gives him presents. Which of these activities belongs to the free man? Which does not belong to the spineless slave? (tr. Wright, 1990)

Although there is not the same detail in discussing flattering behaviour here as there is in *De amicitia* 89-100, or in *Sat.* 2.5, the servility of the legacy-hunter is essentially that of the flatterer; and the common characteristic of servility in the legacy-hunter in *Paradoxa* 5:39 and the flatterer in *De amicitia* is indicated by Cicero's statement that flattery is not worthy of a freeman, let alone a friend: *quae non modo amico sed ne libero quidem digna est* (*Amic.* 89). Horace, too, shows the servility of the flatterer by the fact that Ulysses will have to demean himself to people who themselves may be, or may have been, slaves (*fugitivus* also being used in 2.7.113 because of its connotation of servility)⁵¹³ as at *Sat.* 2.5.15-17:

*qui quamvis periurus erit, sine gente, cruentus
sanguine fraterno, fugitivus, ne tamen illi
tu comes exterior, si postulet, ire recuses.*

⁵¹³ See below, Chapter 6, §6.3.

However perjured he may be, of no family, stained with a brother's blood, a runaway slave, nevertheless don't you refuse, if he asks you, to walk on his outside.

And Ulysses, in response, finds the prospect of such servile behaviour horrific:

*Utne tegam spurco Damae latus? haud ita Troiae
me gessi certans semper melioribus.* (18-19)

What! Am I to cover dirty Dama's side? This wasn't the way I behaved at Troy, always pitting myself against better men.

The dramatic presentation of 2.5 is itself worthy of comment in terms of literary/philosophical influences. It is the only satire in book 2 in which the *persona* 'Horace' does not participate, doubtless partly because he would not want to associate himself with such an unscrupulous practice.⁵¹⁴ But in dramatising a scene between two mythological characters, Horace is also likely to be drawing from specific models in Lucilian and Varronian satire. The Epic parody, at least, is found in Lucilius Book 1 'the council of the gods' and a conversation with Penelope is dramatised at 565-573W.⁵¹⁵ Varro's *Sesculixes*, ('Ulysses and a half') again appears to satirise Ulysses, and in Lucian's *Menippus*, Menippus consults Teiresias in the underworld; and the Cynic Menippus (first half of the third century BC) himself is said to have written a *Nekuia*, (Necromancy),⁵¹⁶ again most likely a parody in the mode of the Cynic Crates (c. 368/365-288/285 BC).⁵¹⁷ However, the points of similarity, from what one can tell from the scantiness of the material, are rather one-dimensional in each case – all that can be said is that Horace seems likely, in terms of dramatic representation, to be drawing, in part, from certain satirical models.

⁵¹⁴ Muecke, 1993, 179.

⁵¹⁵ Lucilius 565-573W: Muecke, 1993, 179.

⁵¹⁶ Lucian also made Menippus one of the chief speakers in his *Dialogues of the Dead*: Rudd, 1966, 237-8;

⁵¹⁷ Hunter, 2003, 959- 960.

Certainly, in presenting characters who are actually *advocating* the vice of flattery, the satire is all the more biting.⁵¹⁸ And yet, the advice given in 2.5 is comparable to that which Horace himself gives to Scaeva and Lollius in *Epistles* 1.17 and 18. In these *Epistles* Horace advises courteous, responsive behaviour which falls short of the extreme of flattery, whereas in 2.5 the ideal, as it were, is successful flattery itself. Thus, at 2.5. 89-90, as mentioned above, Teiresias appeals to the doctrine of the mean to ironically suggest that one can be too extreme even when deliberately practising a vice; and this can be compared with the statement at *Ep.* 1.18. 9 where Horace advocates the mean in the context of the extremes of flattery and rudeness. It is evident then that Horace has engaged with a good deal of philosophical material on flattery in his depictions of it in *Satires* 2.5 and 2.8, and that both these depictions and the accounts in ancient philosophical texts with which he is clearly familiar, show that this sort of behaviour was viewed in a moral context.

5.4 Bad Conduct in *Satires* 1.9, 3 and 2.8.

Flattery is clearly not the only form of bad social behaviour that Horace treats in the *Satires*, although in terms of conduct to social superiors, the notion of flattery (and the opposite fault of rudeness) is always pertinent. It would seem, at least, that in *Sat.* 1.9, the brilliantly depicted pest is perhaps too socially unaware to be an effective flatterer, while at the same time being too inadvertently offensive to be any kind of flatterer at all. Foolishly and offensively, although he desires to become part of Maecenas' circle, he wrongly assumes Horace's inclusion in that circle was through as unscrupulous methods as the pest would employ himself.

At *Sat.* 1.9.43-60 the pest makes clear his intention to insinuate himself into Maecenas' circle by means of flattery, under the assumption that Horace (as some sort of flatterer himself) will approve of, or at least sympathise with

⁵¹⁸ And, for this reason, (because it could be seen as more biting than the others) it has been regarded as having something of the flavour of Juvenalian Satire, as Sellar (1924, 70) and Fraenkel (1957, 145) concur: Rudd, 1966, 240.

the pest's intended course of action. In this way he inadvertently insults Horace, when a more successful tactic – if he were more subtle – may have actually been to flatter him.

The pest's characteristics – in spite of the social situation, in which the pest must be regarded as inferior – have more in common with other Theophrastean characters than the flatterer. It has been observed, at least, that Horace's pest shows certain similarities with Theophrastus' 'chatterbox' (*adoleschēs*) and 'windbag' (*lalos*). One might expect these two characters to be almost indistinguishable but, as Fiske points out,⁵¹⁹ the *adoleschēs* is unable to keep to the same point, and the *lalos* is unable to keep off the same point. Thus Horace's pest, who is, amazingly, guilty of both these foibles, could appear to be a fusion of these two Theophrastean characters. At *Sat.* 1.9.12-13 the pest chatters on indiscriminately: *cum quidlibet ille/ garriret, vicos, urbem laudaret*; 'while he babbled on about this, that or the other, praising the streets and the city'; but then he also keeps pressing Horace on his friendship with Maecenas – how he (the pest), also a learned man (*docti sumus*, 7) and accomplished literary artist, (22-5) ought also to be introduced to this group. Theophrastus' *lalos*, as thus described: *τοὺς ἀπιέναι φάσκοντας δεινὸς προπέμψαι καὶ ἀποκαταστῆσαι εἰς τὰς οἰκίας*, 'when people say they must go, he is apt to keep them company, or see them back home,' is certainly applicable to Horace's pest at 15: *sed nil agis; usque tenebo*; 'but it's no use; I shall stick to you all the way.' 19: *usque sequar te*; 'I'll follow you all the way;' and 42 (where Horace resigns himself to his fate): *ego, ut contendere durum cum victore, sequor*. 'As it's hard to contest the issue with one's victor, I follow in his wake.'⁵²⁰ It is quite possible then that Horace may have drawn from, or consulted, Theophrastus' *Characters*, in coming up with the pest, or, if not Theophrastus directly, then other sources which may in turn have drawn from Theophrastus.

In fact, a comparison can also be made between the pest and the character of Socrates as presented in the opening of the *Phaedrus*, from which Horace almost certainly draws in *Sat.* 2.4 (Chapter 3, §3.5). But the pest's motives are clearly different from Socrates'. Here Socrates ironically

⁵¹⁹ Fiske, 1920, 330; Rudd, 1966, 74 n.38.

⁵²⁰ Fiske, 1920, 330.

intimates his own tendency to irritatingly pester people in his thirst for philosophical discourse (227D):

ἔγωγ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεδύμηκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστ' ἐὰν βαδίζων ποιῇ τὸν
περίπατον Μέγαράδε, καὶ κατὰ Ἡρόδικον προσβὰς τῷ τείχει πάλιν ἀπίης, οὐ
μή σου ἀπολειφθῶ.

I am so determined to hear you, that I will not leave you, even if you extend your walk to Megara, and, as Herodicus says, go to the wall and back again.

It is also likely that in *Sat.* 1.9 Horace drew from Lucilius, who apparently wrote a poem in which Scipio is similarly pestered and in which the narration of the story begins (though not, apparently, the poem) – similarly to 1.9 – *ibat forte domum* (258W).⁵²¹ Also, the final words of 1.9: *sic me servavit Apollo* (78) are essentially a translation of Homer's τὸν δ' ἐξήρπαξεν Ἀπόλλων where Apollo is described as rescuing Hector from Achilles (*Iliad* 20.443); and Lucilius quotes this verbatim (W267, in Greek) to describe Scipio's deliverance from a pest. Fiske even implies a possible Theophrastean influence on Lucilius by suggesting that Scipio's insults against the pest show that he is adopting Theophrastus' advice on how to deal with the *adolesches* (*Characters* 3) – i.e. to get away from him – though this seems tenuous: what else would one try to do?⁵²²

The *exemplum* of Tigellius at the beginning of *Sat.* 1.3 (1-19) is another instance where Horace comments upon bad conduct. The fact that those inconsistencies of Tigellius' which might appear to be morally inconsequential – for example, in his singing (4-8), or his walking (9-11) – are ranged with those which would be more readily associated with moral consequences (his prodigality/frugality, 15-17), suggest that the more apparently superficial behaviour does reflect moral character: an issue that was discussed earlier in relation to Cicero's *De officiis* 1.93-141. Indeed, in

⁵²¹ Fiske, 1920, 331ff; in another fragment we find *ibat forte aries* (bk. 16, 534M=559W).

⁵²² Fiske, 1920, 331.

describing Tigellius' irregular walking speeds (1.3.9-11) Horace may have been drawing from *Off.* 1.131 since both Cicero and Horace refer to slow walking as looking like walking in a procession.⁵²³

In any case, given the fact that inconsistency in relation to moral issues – i.e. tolerance of friends' faults, social tolerance more generally, and justice – is *Satire* 1.3's major theme, it is notable that Horace begins with this light-hearted depiction of character faults, which could, at first sight, appear to be morally inconsequential, and from there the satire develops into a discussion which deals with more serious moral issues. Therefore the connection between irregular walking habits and inconsistent approaches to justice is in fact implied, and everyday, apparently superficial behaviour is seen to relate to ethics.

The relationship between apparently superficial behaviour and morality is also raised in *Sat.* 1.4 with regard to humour, and is depicted in the example of the *scurra* at 34-5 and 81-91. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, in 1.4 Horace uses the *scurra* example, that is to say an example of social behaviour, in order to suggest the literary role (or perhaps 'behaviour') of satire: his point being that while the *scurra* is in himself, through his behaviour, a reflection of weak moral character, and the purpose of his behaviour morally questionable, for Horace satire has a definite moral purpose – to do good.

Observation of behaviour and social interaction is a key ingredient in *Satire* 2.8, which relates the events of a dinner party. As was discussed earlier in Chapter 3 in connection with *Satire* 2.4, the moral aspect of *Satire* 2.8 essentially lies in the very absence of moral discourse or concerns at the dinner party – so different from the Platonic model of the symposium, and Horace's model at 2.6.70-76; and this in turn makes the pertinent, moral observation, that 1st Century B.C. Roman society is vain and amoral. In *Satire* 2.8 this essential point is backed up in the depictions of the characters at the dinner party, and their behaviour – in particular that of the host – which again brings to mind the Philodemian dinner party scene discussed earlier. Nasidienus, in his excessive and misguided efforts to impress, is shown to be

⁵²³ See above, Chapter 2, §2.7.

vulgar, socially ambitious and vain.⁵²⁴ Although Rudd comments on the prevalence of the symposium form, and its philosophical representations in classical literature, he also states: “The point to be made here is that none of the pre-Horatian material bears much resemblance to the dinner of Nasidienus, and certainly nothing should be regarded as its ‘model.’”⁵²⁵ Rudd also counters the suggestion that Horace may have been drawing from a Lucilian model, which, given the fact that the only evidence for a direct Lucilian influence is the correspondence of one line of Lucilius to one of Horace,⁵²⁶ seems fair. However, Gowers has noticed some parallels with Plato’s *Symposium*:⁵²⁷ that in the *Symposium* one of the guests is the comedian Aristophanes, in Horace, the comedian Fundanius; Agathon, the host, is a tragedian (173a), as is Varius, one of the guests in 2.8.

But the conversation at Nasidienus’ dinner is not philosophical, indeed does not deviate from the subject of food. And to an extent this is the fault of the host. Indeed Horace’s characterisation of Nasidienus is designed to incur disapproval and ridicule; again we see the characteristics of the flatterer. It is clear that he too (like the pest in 1.9) would like to ingratiate himself with Maecenas and boost his social standing. And, in this respect, he would appear to be something of a yes-man, e.g. at 2.8.16-17:

*hic erus: ‘Albanum, Maecenas, sive Falernum
te magis appositis delectat, habemus utrumque.’*

Here the master said: “If Alban, Maecenas, or Falernian pleases you more than what has been served, we have both.”

He is prepared to suffer the disrespectful liberties of Maecenas’ *scurrae*, Servilius and Vibidius, (perhaps mainly because they were part of Maecenas’ coterie, though no doubt Nasidienus would not want to make a scene): 33-40:

⁵²⁴ Rudd, 1966, 216ff.

⁵²⁵ Rudd, 1966, 214.

⁵²⁶ Lucilius: *purpureo tersit tunc latas gausape mensas*; ‘then he wiped the wide tables with a crimson towel (tr. Rudd); Horace *Sat.* 2.8.11: *gausape purpureo mensam pertersit*; ‘he wiped the table well with a crimson towel. (tr. Rudd): Rudd, 1966, 215.

⁵²⁷ Gowers, 1993, 164.

.....tum Vibidius Balatroni:
“nos nisi damnose bibimus, moriemur inulti,”
et calices poscit maiores. vertere pallor
tum parochi faciem nil sic metuentis ut acris
potores, vel quod maledicunt liberior vel
fervida quod subtile exsurdant vina palatum.
invertunt Allifanis vinaria tota
Vibidius Balatroque.

Then Vibidius says to the buffoon: “If we do not drink him bankrupt, we’ll die unavenged,” and he asks for larger cups. Pallor then transformed the face of the caterer who feared nothing so much as strong drinkers, either because they are too free with slander or because heating wines dull the subtle palate. Vibidius and the Buffoon upturn whole wine jugs into the Allifanian cups.

Nasidienus’ somewhat pathetic reaction to the tapestries falling down, much to the amusement of the guests, adds to the picture of his excessive worry about the social situation he has attempted to contrive, and from a modern point of view one is inclined to pity him. But, as Rudd⁵²⁸ points out, this is unlikely to have been the reaction of Horace’s readership, some of whom feature in the satire, and this, indeed, is a telling indictment on Roman behaviour: good conduct was clearly important in not eliciting others’ disfavour, but it seems that to show such disfavour, where it was deserved, was perfectly acceptable – provided that the person showing it was the social superior.

The abrupt ending of the satire which Rudd⁵²⁹ finds structurally dissatisfying seems, however, to serve a purpose, indeed a moral purpose (as, for Horace, satire should).⁵³⁰ Unlike a dinner from which the guests have

⁵²⁸ Rudd, 1966, 222.

⁵²⁹ Rudd, 1966, 222.

⁵³⁰ Cf. Gowers, 1993, 178-9, on the premature ending of *Sat.* 2.8 being deliberate.

retired satisfied (perhaps like that at 2.6.70ff) where morally constructive conversation has been prioritised, the dinner in 2.8 provides no sustenance either moral or, in the end, nutritional. Indeed, although - in line with the Lucretian metaphor alluded to at 1.1.16-19⁵³¹ - one should leave as a satisfied guest, Nasidienus' behaviour – his vanity, dullness and sycophancy - makes this impossible.

5.5 Conclusion

Observation of human behaviour lies at the heart of satire, and in holding up certain behaviour as foolish and ridiculous the satirist is clearly likely to imply some kind of moral judgement, whether that is his explicit intention or not. That there is a moral aspect to greed, ambition and sexual impropriety is to be expected - and this in the ancient sense of morality, as involving what makes people happy. In tackling these issues we have already seen how Horace has used philosophical doctrine to support and, indeed, shape his arguments. But behaviour which might appear – certainly from a modern perspective - to have little moral consequence was also, in fact, morally pertinent to the ancients, and Horace's *Satires* bear this out.

In discussing various aspects of conduct, both how to behave and how not to, Horace has drawn extensively from philosophical sources. Just as the theory behind the question why certain behaviour in social relationships and situations is conducive to happiness was important to philosophers, so too was the practical application of this behaviour, as is apparent in Aristotle's ethics, and Cicero's *De officiis* and *De amicitia*. The philosophical pertinence of these treatments would have been clear to Horace's readership, and it is clear in the example of the Cynics, referred to by Horace, and in the explicit connection between *honestum* and *decorum* in *De officiis*, that behaviour, even that which might seem trivial, was regarded as a reflection of moral character and could clearly have moral consequences in its effect on one's personal happiness.

⁵³¹ Gowers, 1993, 179: "The image of departing guests brings *Satires* 2 full-circle back to the end of *Sat.* 1.1."

/

The doctrine of the mean is again seen to be a guiding principle for Horace, and, although its Aristotelian origin was well known to him, it seems very likely that he has drawn from Panaetius' views on conduct which also refer to the mean – perhaps from Panaetius' original works⁵³² as well as from Cicero. Indeed, by virtue of the satirical genre, we are shown far more in the *Satires* how not to behave, and it is rather in the advisory *Epistles* where Horace tells us just where he stands. And yet in so doing his position is typically evasive. Although in the *Epistles* he shows an inclination towards withdrawal, he also thinks it important to know how to conduct oneself in society, and so to optimise one's enjoyment of life.

In antithesis to this in the *Satires* we are given portraits of a morally corrupt pest, dinner party host and an account of legacy-hunting, which all touch on treatments on flattery – an aspect of *philia* - in Aristotle, Theophrastus, Philodemus and Cicero. Just as in these treatments it is shown that knowledge of how, and how not to conduct oneself in society is pertinent to ethics, so it is also shown in Horace's deliberate appropriation of them.

⁵³² See above, Chapter 1, §1.4 (iv).

Chapter 6

Stoic Paradoxes

6.1 Introduction

The Stoics themselves described certain maxims which encapsulated particular principal ideas in their philosophy as paradoxes (Cicero *Paradoxa Stoicorum Prooemium* 4). They were paradoxical because although their meaning related to a particular philosophical context in which they might be regarded as a truth, on the face of it these sayings seemed to be false, or at least contrary to commonly held beliefs. The intention of the paradoxes was thus to put forward Stoic principles in a striking, thought-provoking way.

In his essay, *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, Cicero chooses to discuss six such paradoxes - three of which are also discussed in Horace's *Satires*⁵³³ - which he describes as being the truest and most Socratic:

eoque locos scripsi libentius quod mihi ista 'paradoxa' quae appellant maxime videntur esse Socratica longeque verissima, 4.

And I have written on these topics with all the more pleasure because what the Stoics call 'paradoxes' seem to me to be very much in the style of Socrates, and are far and away the truest.⁵³⁴

Cicero makes it clear that the aim of his essay is to argue the case for these paradoxes, and to bring out their underlying truths. It is notable from the outset then that Horace's aim was different: namely - in part at least - to

⁵³³ 'That all sins are equal' in *Sat.* 1.3, 'all fools are mad' (*Sat.* 2.3), 'all fools are slaves' (*Sat.* 2.7). At 1.3.124-5 Horace also mentions the paradoxes that only the wise man is rich, a good cobbler (i.e. master of every art and craft), handsome and king. Cicero also discusses the paradox that only the wise man is rich (*Paradox* 6).

⁵³⁴ Translations of Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* by Wright, 1991.

deflate certain paradoxes and expose them as absurd. Yet, as we will see, it seems highly likely that Horace was familiar with, and drew from, Cicero's writings on the Stoic paradoxes, both in his *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, and in *Tusculan Disputations* 3.

Although Horace's opinion of the Stoic paradoxes (at least those to which he refers) is certainly critical, it is not entirely one-sided. Indeed, in analysing Horace's treatment of the Stoic paradoxes in his *Satires* much can be gleaned, not only about his opinion of aspects of Stoic ethics, but also about his own views on ethical issues generally. In fact, his treatment of the Stoic paradox that all fools are mad, in *Satire* 2.3, is more complex than it appears at face value, and this in turn tells us much about how a grasp of the philosophical ideas are important in gaining a proper interpretation of the poetry, and that a knowledge of such ideas was probable among his readership.⁵³⁵

Because of the very nature of the Stoic paradoxes – that they are, on the face of it, paradoxical – it is not surprising that they became a target for satire, particularly Horatian satire, with its underlying philosophical agenda and Epicurean sympathies. But Lucilius also appears to have recognised the satirical potential of the Stoic paradoxes, and, although explicit evidence in the form of surviving texts is wanting, it is likely that he too lampooned the paradox that “all fools are mad”.⁵³⁶

Some comparison between Horace's treatment of the Stoic paradoxes and the treatments of Cicero (and as far as possible Lucilius) will be helpful in determining Horace's own particular take on the paradoxes and how he employs them in particular satires. But before making these comparisons, it is worth comparing Horace's treatment of the Stoic paradoxes in 1.3, 2.3 and 2.7, with each other, at least in outline, in order to make some initial observations about Horace's approach.

⁵³⁵ See below, §6.3.

⁵³⁶ See below: §6.6. cf. Juvenal 7. 109-191. Persius, on the other hand, upholds the paradox that all fools are slaves in *Satire* 5, seemingly written with Horace's *Satire* 2.7 in mind: Braund, 2004, 94.

6.2 Comparisons between 1.3, 2.3 and 2.7 in the treatment of the Stoic Paradoxes

Satires 2.3 and 2.7 are both styled as Stoic sermons. Although they are also dialogues, in that Horace is an interlocutor in both satires, Damasippus (in 2.3) and Davus (in 2.7) dominate the talking: Horace, in both cases, speaks only at the beginning and end. Damasippus champions the paradox that ‘all fools are mad,’ Davus, ‘that all fools are slaves’ – and they put forward their arguments in ways which are themselves recognisably Stoic. Unlike in the ‘diatribe’ satires of book 1 where Horace himself (or his *persona*) is arguing on particular issues of popular moral philosophy, in 2.3 and 2.7 Horace presents himself as being ‘on the receiving end’, as it were, of two Stoic diatribes.

One can compare Damasippus (or Damasippus quoting Stertinius) at 2.3.82-157 with Horace in *Sat.* 1.1 to note the difference in their approaches to the topic of greed. The position advocated is the same, but their method of argument a little different. In 2.3.104ff the flood of conditionals beginning *si*..(e.g. 104: *si quis emat citharas*..., and at 111, 115 127, 128; 214-220) seems to lack the more subtle approach of Horace in 1.1, where the examples are introduced by various means; in 1.1 Horace does not bring his points home with rather self-important rhetorical questions, as Stertinius/Damasippus does in 2.3 (e.g. 89, 158-62, 199-202, 253-257, 272-5, 295)⁵³⁷ as at 2.3.66:

*‘accipe quod numquam reddas mihi,’ si tibi dicam,
tunc insanus eris si acceperis? an magis excors
reiecta praeda quam praesens Mercurius fert?*

⁵³⁷ Fiske, 1920, 388. Although at *Sat.* 1.1.41-61 Horace puts forward a number of hypotheses and questions, the imaginary interlocutor also puts his questions, whereas in 2.3 the interlocutor (i.e. Horace) is silent (between lines 32 and 300). Horace’s examples of the miser of Athens (1.1.64) and Ummidius (1.1.95ff) are introduced more casually. In 1.1 there is a progression in the argument between the various illustrative examples, (facilitated by the questions of the imaginary interlocutor) which is lacking in 2.3, where we are given example upon example.

If I say to you, 'Take a loan never to be repaid me,' will you be mad if you accept? Or are you more out of your mind, if you reject the profit which propitious Mercury brings?

The use of conditionals features extensively in Stoic logic: a propositional logic, expressed in terms of 'assertibles' (*axiōmata*) and their relationship with each other,⁵³⁸ from which arguments and syllogisms also derive. Conditionals were essentially a particular kind of assertible, comprising other simple assertibles, e.g. 'if it is day, it is light,' actually consists of three assertibles (including the conditional proposition as a whole). Diogenes Laertius, on Stoic logic, defines conditionals as 'the assertible that is formed by means of the linking connective 'if'' (D.L. 7.71). Indeed, certain views were developed as to what constituted a true conditional (Chrysippus apparently modifying the definitions of Philo and Diodorus)⁵³⁹ and there are many examples of conditionals in works on Stoic logic – notably found in Diogenes Laertius (7.71, 73, 78, 79-82), Sextus Empiricus (*PH* 2. 131-160) and Aulus Gellius (*Noct. Att.* xvi. 8)⁵⁴⁰ – both in their own right, and as a part of syllogisms and arguments. Cicero also discusses conditionals in connection with Stoic logic at, for example, *Acad.* 2.98, *Topica* 53, 54, and *De fato* 12-14. Thus the use of conditionals would have been understood as a particularly Stoic feature to Horace and his readership, and in reproducing these recognisably Stoic stylistic points – at such insistent length – Horace is perhaps also ridiculing what he saw as a rather pedantic interest in a field which he may have felt had little relevance to the practicalities of life.

Other Stoic practices, which Horace reproduces, include pinpointing the subject (in this case madness) (2.3.41) and then defining exactly what madness is (43-5),⁵⁴¹ and, at the beginning and end of his speech (44, 287) Chrysippus' authority is directly referred to.⁵⁴² As to subject matter, as well as greed, 2.3 covers ambition (158-223), self-indulgence (*luxuria*) (224-246),

⁵³⁸ Bobzien, 1999, 92.

⁵³⁹ Bobzien, 1999, 107.

⁵⁴⁰ Brunschwig, 1994, 76.

⁵⁴¹ Lejay (1911, 356) cites Cicero *Off.*, 1.7; *Fin.* iv, 8; *Tusc.*, 3, 56 on the importance, for the Stoics, of defining the subject at issue.

⁵⁴² Muecke, 1993, 130.

persisting with childish pursuits and erotic love (247-280), and superstition (281-295).

Again, as Lejay points out,⁵⁴³ in 2.7 Horace employs rhetorical questions to lend a Stoic pomposity to Davus' argument and we are again given stock examples with which Davus supports his argument,⁵⁴⁴ as well as commonplaces one would expect in a Cynic/Stoic diatribe: slavery to the passions, i.e. sex (46-71) pursuit of trivial, aesthetic pleasure (90-101) gluttony (102-111) and anxiety (111b-115). Many of these examples and philosophical topics have already appeared in the 'diatribe' satires of book 1, and *Satire* 2.2. However, the method of presentation, indeed - by comparison with *Satires* 1.1-3 – the very consequentiality of the arguments and their adherence to an overall Stoic principle, make these satires more particularly Stoic. That said, in as much as they are diatribes, Cynic attributes are to be found. A striking example of this is the discussion of sex in 2.7, which comes across, essentially, as a résumé of what Horace has said in 1.2, where, as we saw in Chapter 2 (§2.3), he took examples from specific Cynic sources. The coarse, jocular depictions of sexual folly are repeated in similar terms:⁵⁴⁵ e.g. (2.7.47b-50)

..... *acris ubi me*
natura intendit, sub clara nuda lucerna
quaecumque excepit turgentis verbera caudae
clunibus aut agitavit equum lasciva supinum...

When irresistible nature sets me up for sex it doesn't matter who,
 naked in the bright lamplight, has received with her buttocks the blows

⁵⁴³ Lejay, 1911, 545.

⁵⁴⁴ Lejay, 1911, 546-547, notes certain illustrations which appear to be commonplaces from the Cynic/Stoic diatribe, or appear in other philosophical contexts. E.g.: the god who gives men a change of lot (2.7.24) cf. Teles, quoted by Maximus of Tyre *Disc.* 21, 1 & cf. *Sat.* 1.1.15; simile of the beast who has broken his chain (2.7.70-71) cf. Seneca 7.16.3; simile of the puppets (2.7.82), cf. Plato *Laws* 644E, Persius 5, 128-9; simile of the struggle to escape the mire of sin (2.7.27) Lactantius 7.7.20 = *SVF* 1.147 with reference to the teaching of the Stoic Zeno.

⁵⁴⁵ Although the general effect of this passage is obscene enough, Adams (1982, 221) notes that Horace only uses obscene words in the first book (in particular 1.2), but avoids them from then on.

of my swollen tail or, free of inhibitions, has ridden me as I lay on my back as her horse.

By contrast to 2.3 and 2.7, 1.3 is not a Stoic sermon – indeed its argument is clearly anti-Stoic and pro-Epicurean. The Stoic paradox that all sins are equal is introduced (*Sat.* 1.3.96) into the argument in order to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the Stoic position as regards justice and, by implication from the preceding discussion, friendship. As discussed in Chapter 4 (§4.3), from 25 to 95 Horace has for the most part been discussing tolerance of friends' faults, and, at 96, the Stoic paradox, referred to thus, *quis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant/ cum ventum ad verum est*, marks a new stage in the argument (96-124), where Horace discusses fairness and justice in society as a whole. *Satire* 1.3 then, does not primarily concern the Stoic paradox that all sins are equal, but its introduction at 1.3.96 marks an important, explicitly anti-Stoic development in the argument, which is continued into the concluding section of the satire. Indeed, as was seen in Chapter 4 (§4.5) at 1.3.124b-5 Horace further ridicules other Stoic paradoxes: that only the wise man is rich, king, handsome and a good cobbler (master of every art and craft):

..... *si dives, qui sapiens est,*
et sutor bonus et solus formosus et est rex,
cur optas quod habes?

If the wise man is rich and a good cobbler and if he alone is handsome and king, why do you long for what you already possess?

And he thus presents the Stoic position in general as extreme, intolerant, and finally absurd.⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴⁶ At *Epistles* 1.1.106-8 Horace endorses the general spirit behind these Stoic paradoxes, but, in the last line, with a pinch of salt: these attributes of the Stoic *sapiens* are still, practically, unattainable:

*Ad summam: sapiens uno minor est Iove, dives
liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum,
praecipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est.*

6.3 Cicero and *Satire 2.7*

Satire 2.7 is notable for its thematic similarity to Cicero's treatment of the same paradox (*Paradoxa 5*) 'that all fools are slaves',⁵⁴⁷ which suggests that Cicero was a source, though 2.7 avoids any obvious verbal repetition. Also, Horace's argument, portrayed as that of the slave Davus, is more dramatic, personal and amusing. Nevertheless, the parallels between the two treatments are striking and although there are points made in Cicero which are omitted in 2.7, these omissions can be explained, for the most part, as being quite deliberate, and as in a sense strengthening the correlation with Cicero rather than weakening it. Lejay⁵⁴⁸ regards the fact that Horace does not deal with certain topics discussed in *Paradoxa 5* as suggesting that Horace should not be seen as totally depending on it; but the fact that these omissions in 2.7 can be explained by their discussion in other satires in the second book, seems to indicate, if not total dependence, then a very deliberate use of *Paradoxa 5*. However, a difference between the two treatments which is immediately apparent, and so offsets any thoughts of such a correlation, is that Cicero's *Paradoxa 5* tackles the point at issue from the outset, whereas in 2.7, as with Horace's other 'diatribe' satires, there is an opening preamble which does not concern (at least not directly) the main subject of the satire. In fact the subject of 2.7, to begin with, appears to be inconsistency, and so is similar to the opening of 1.3, although the inconsistency in 2.7 is of a slightly different kind. In 1.3 inconsistency is seen to be at odds with moderation and *aequabilitas*, but in the opening of 2.7, Davus begins his remarks on inconsistency thus (2.7.6-7):

'To sum up: the wise man is less than Jove alone. He is rich, free, honoured, beautiful, in fact a king of kings; above all of sound mind, except when troubled by the flu.' (tr. Fairclough, 1926, adapted.)

⁵⁴⁷ Muecke, 1993, 214; Lejay, 1911, 541-2. Also, Palmer (1883, 356) comments: "For much of his treatment of the text (i.e. of 2.7) Horace is indebted to Cicero's Essay on the Stoic Paradox." (i.e. *Paradox 5*).

⁵⁴⁸ Lejay, 1911, 542.

*pars hominum vitiis gaudet constanter et urget
propositum; pars multa natat, modo recta capessens,
interdum pravis obnoxia.*

Some people are consistent in the enjoyment of vice and pursue their chosen course; the majority waver, at one moment making for the right, sometimes at the mercy of what is wrong.

This seems to suggest that immoderate living (a *vitium* more often than not constituting some kind of excess) if pursued consistently is preferable to the inconsistent pursuit of vice, on the one hand, and right behaviour on the other, as Davus later sums up (18-20):

*..... quanto constantior isdem
in vitiis, tanto levius miser ac prior illo
qui iam contento, iam laxo fune laborat.*

The more consistent a man is in one and the same vice, the less unhappy he is and the more he comes out ahead of him who slogs with the rope now taut, now slack.

Although consistency here is thus different from the consistency suggested by *aequabilitas*, which would also imply balance and moderation, it would seem that there is a deliberate intention to remind the reader of *Satire* 1.3. And bearing in mind the irony with which Horace presents his argument in 1.3, it is notable that Davus, who is about to defend the Stoic paradox that all fools are slaves, is himself promoting a paradoxical position with regard to consistency from the outset: that excess can be conducive to consistent living. The theme of consistency persists until Davus announces the beginning of his sermon proper, with the ominous words, bearing in mind what Horace has already said about Crispinus in book 1:

..... manum stomachumque teneto,

dum quae Crispini docuit me ianitor edo. ' (44-5)

and keep your hand and bile in check, while I pass on what Crispinus's doorkeeper taught me.

However, it is not immediately clear from what Davus goes on to say that he is dealing with the paradox that all fools are slaves, though the fact that Davus is giving this sermon on a day when, paradoxically, all slaves are free, makes discussion of this paradox particularly apt.⁵⁴⁹ From 46 to 72 Davus advises against certain dangerous sexual options (as Horace had done in 1.2), but it is not until 70 that this is all put into the context 'that all fools are slaves':

*quaeres quando iterum paveas iterumque perire
possis, o totiens servus!* (69-70).

You will seek to know when again you may be terrified, when again you may perish, O time and time again a slave.

Then, at 89-92, after some general, intervening remarks, Davus turns to slavery to women (though this is clearly connected to the passage [46-72] on slavery to sex with married women):

..... *quinque talenta*
poscit te mulier, vexat foribusque repulsum
perfundit gelida, rursus vocat: eripe turpi
colla iugo liber; "liber sum" dic, age: non quis.

A woman asks you for five talents, torments you, turns you away from her door and drenches you with cold water. Then she summons you

⁵⁴⁹ The scenario is the feast of Saturnalia when, traditionally, for one day (17th December), slaves enjoyed the advantages of freedom, and were thus equals with their masters (Muecke, 1993, 214).

back. Pull your neck from the degrading yoke and be free; “I am free”, go on, say it: you can’t.

Cicero does not include sex *per se*, though his first example, after having made some explicatory remarks about the paradox in question, is slavery to women:

An ille mihi liber cui mulier imperat? cui leges imponit, praescribit, iubet, vetat quod videtur? qui nihil imperanti negare potest, nihil recusare audet: poscit, dandum est; vocat, veniendum; eicit, abeundum. (Paradox 5.36).

Do I think a man is free whom a woman commands? who imposes on him rules and regulations, orders and prohibitions as she thinks fit? and the man cannot object to her commands, and dare refuse her nothing? She demands, he must give; she calls, he must come; she dismisses, he must leave.

There is no verbal similarity here but in both Cicero and Horace we are given similar accounts of the changeability of female demands, and that to put up with such fickleness is slavish. Between the examples of slavery to misguided sexual desire and slavery to women, Davus sums up the ideal that lies behind this Stoic dictum (83-88):

*Quisnam igitur liber? sapiens, sibi qui imperiosus,
quem neque **pauperies** neque mors neque vincula **terrent**,
respondere cupidinibus, **contemnere honores**
fortis et in se ipso totus, teres atque rotundus,
externi ne quid valeat per leve morari,
in quem manca ruit semper **Fortuna**.*

Who then is free? The wise man, who has command over himself, whom neither poverty nor death nor chains makes fearful, having the courage to stand up to his desires and to disdain honours. He is

complete in himself, a smooth rounded sphere. On his polished surface nothing from outside can get a hold. On him the attack of fortune always falls half-strength.

Again, a comparison can be made here with Cicero *Paradoxa* 5. 34-35, where the question, *quid est enim libertas?* ⁵⁵⁰ is answered, although after the initial question, there are again no real direct verbal similarities. However, Lejay⁵⁵¹ has drawn attention to another passage in Cicero which does use similar language, as highlighted above and below. This is in *Tusculan Disputations* 5.30 (and, as we will see, it seems very likely that Horace drew from *Tusculan Disputations* in forming the argument for *Sat.2.3*), where Cicero, speaking of the Peripatetics from a Stoic viewpoint says:

inducant animum illa, quorum splendore capiuntur, vires, valetudinem, pulchritudinem, divitias, honores, opes contemnere, eaque quae his contraria sunt, pro nihilo ducere: tum poterunt clarissima voce profiteri se neque fortunae impetu nec multitudinis opinione nec dolore nec paupertate terreri omniaque sibi in sese esse posita nec esse quidquam extra suam potestatem quod ducant in bonis.

Let them persuade themselves to despise those things by whose glamour they are seduced; strength, health, beauty, riches, offices of state, resources, and to treat their opposites as of no significance. Then they will be able to declare with a loud voice that they are frightened neither by the assault of Fortune nor the opinion of the masses, nor by pain nor poverty, that everything that concerns them is within their power, and that there is nothing outside their control which they regard as good. (Tr. Douglas, 1990)

As the above passages show, freedom, for the Stoics, was in the sphere of ethics and politics,⁵⁵² meaning freedom from constraints both internal (i.e.

⁵⁵⁰ Lejay, 1911, 241.

⁵⁵¹ Lejay, 1911, 242.

⁵⁵² Bobzien, 1998, 340: on Stoics and Freedom: *SVF* 3. 355-364.

psychological, the passions, *Fin.* 3.75, cf. *SVF* 3. 360) and external (circumstantial *Fin.* 3.75), which – according to Bobzien – amounts to the sage being impervious to bribery or blackmail because he has no desire for anything that another person might give or withhold.⁵⁵³ Freedom also meant power of independent action (*ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας* D.L. 7.121) in as much as the Stoic wise man is free because he never does anything, or is forced to do anything, that he does not want to do.⁵⁵⁴ And this is because he always behaves virtuously, so that if he incurs some failure or loss or pain, this is simply a ‘non-preferred indifferent’: it does not affect his virtue, so does not affect his happiness or freedom.⁵⁵⁵ Furthermore, he believes that everything is determined by providence and so regards whatever happens as being the best outcome at that time in accordance with nature and divine providence.⁵⁵⁶ In this passage (2.7.83-88) Horace is referring to internal freedom from the passions (cf. *Fin.* 3.75) and freedom from external forces (desire for money, honours), though clearly if one is free internally (i.e. from passions, desires) then one will be impervious to these external constraints.

The brief passage on slavery to trivial aesthetic pleasures (2.7.95-101), which also seems to imply an element of pomposity and pretentiousness is also found in *Paradoxa* 5. 37-8:

Aetionis tabula te stupidum detinet (37);

A painting by Aetion holds you spellbound.

cf. *Sat.* 2.7. 95:

vel cum Pausiaca torpes, insane, tabella...

Or when you swoon over a painting by Pausias, you lunatic...

⁵⁵³ Bobzien, 1998, 340.

⁵⁵⁴ Philo *quod omnis probus liber* 97, where Philo is quoting Zeno: Bobzien, 1998, 340.

⁵⁵⁵ *SVF* 3.565 = Seneca *Ben.* 4. 34: Sharples, 1986, 278.

⁵⁵⁶ *SVF* 3.4 = D.L. 7.87-89.

Indeed this sort of pretentiousness is reminiscent of Horace's discussions earlier in book 2 in relation to the Epicurean idea of *kenodoxia*. In fact, although *kenodoxia* is most identifiable with Epicureanism, it appears in other philosophical writing,⁵⁵⁷ for example in a passage in Philo (from *On Sobriety*), whose ethics are generally Stoic in nature (*SVF* 3. 603):⁵⁵⁸

μόνος ἐλεύθερος ἄφειμένος ἀργαλεωτάτης δεσποίνης, κενῆς δόξης.

He is alone free who has let go of that most troublesome mistress, empty opinion. (My translation)

Any direct verbal similarity between the Horace and Cicero passages above has again been avoided, though in sentiment they certainly correspond. In fact, the discussion in Cicero may also imply a tendency toward monetary greed and luxury (i.e. the wherewithal to buy and enjoy such *objets d'art*) and, following this, Cicero then briefly goes on to mention the slavery which results from *cupiditas...honoris imperii provinciarum*. But, if one bears in mind that Horace has already touched on ambition in *Sat.* 2.6, and devoted some 65 lines to the topic in the other Stoic sermon 2.3 (158-223), it is understandable that he omits the subject here. Also, 2.7 is more personal than 2.3 in that Davus' argument is more directly aimed at Horace, and it would seem, given what Horace has said in 1.6 and 2.6 (and, more incidentally, elsewhere in the *Satires*) he has already defended himself against the charge of *cupiditas honorum*. The same could also be said for *cupiditas argenti*, or *avaritia* - the main vice Horace attacked in *Sat.* 1.1 and which was also discussed at length by Damasippus at 2.3.82-157.

Instead Horace goes on to a subject more in keeping with the rest of book 2: food (102-111) - as in 2.2 in connection with pretentiousness - which is also briefly touched on by Cicero (38):

⁵⁵⁷ Cf. above Chapter 2, §2.2.

⁵⁵⁸ Also on right reason being essential to the Stoic concept of freedom, cf. *SVF* 3. 360; Bobzien, 1998, 340: "the wise are thus free, if they have the right beliefs... and in particular do not have any wrong or false beliefs of the kind that are passions or desires."

*...et videat aliquem summis populi beneficiis usum barbatulos mullos
exceptantem de piscine ut pertractantem et muraenarum copia
gloriantem - nonne hunc hominem ita servum iudicet ut ne in familia
quidem dignum maiore aliquo negotio putet?*

... and let him (e.g. someone like the aforementioned M. Curius, not given to flashiness) see the recipient of the people's highest favours taking mullet (with little beards) out of his fish-tank and studying them, or boasting of his supply of lamprey – wouldn't he suppose that here was a man so servile that he could not be made responsible even for a household task of any importance?

Cicero briefly mentions the slavishness of flattery, a subject which is also discussed in *De amicitia*,⁵⁵⁹ though again Horace has already dealt with flattery, both in terms of any personal involvement (in 1.6, 1.9 and 2.6 – in connection with friendship and ambition), and he has just devoted an entire satire – 2.5 – to the subject.

But Horace does not omit the slavishness of fear (*formido*) - in Cicero *timor* – as at 2.7.75-77:

*tune mihi dominus, rerum imperiis hominumque
tot tantisque minor, quem ter vindicta quaterque
imposita haud umquam misera formidine privet?*

Am I to call you my master, you who are subject to so many and so great constraints, both of circumstances and of people, you whom an act of manumission performed three, even four times, could never release from wretched fear?

Also at 111b-115 Davus criticises Horace for his tendency to anxiety:

..... *Adde quod idem*

⁵⁵⁹ See above, Chapter 5, §5.3.

*non horam tecum esse potes, non otia recte
ponere teque ipsum vitas fugitivus et erro,
iam vino quaerens, iam somno fallere curam:
frustra; nam comes atra premit sequiturque fugacem.*

Moreover, you can't endure your own company for an hour, you can't invest your free time properly and you try to get away from yourself like a runaway slave, attempting to cheat anxiety now with wine, now with sleep. In vain, for that black companion presses close, following you as you run away.

Here it is Horace's *curae* rather than *timor* that is attacked, but one kind of *timor* which Cicero has in mind seems to be very much in line with Horace's anxiety: fear through awareness of one's guilty deeds:

*Quid? cum cupiditatum dominatus excessit, et alius est dominus
exortus ex conscientia peccatorum - timor. quam est illa misera quam
dura servitus (40).*

What then? Once the tyranny wielded by desires has left, still another tyrant emerges from a guilty conscience – that of fear. How pitiable, how harsh is the servitude it imposes.

Davus' depiction of Horace's anxiety is also reminiscent of Lucretius' description of people's vain attempts to escape their problems, by changing their geographical situations (*DRN* 3. 1053-1075); an idea that is also found elsewhere in Horace (*Epistles* 1.11.27). Indeed, the emphatic note here – of erroneously running away from one's problems - is Lucretian, and Horace doubtless intends that it be recognised as such, but with regard to the satire as a whole, Cicero would seem to be the main point of reference. In fact, even in this more identifiably Lucretian passage, there may again be a link to Cicero in the use of *fugitivus* (runaway slave), at *Murena* 61:

qui sapientes non sumus, fugitivos, exsules, hostes, insanos esse ducunt

They say that we who are not wise, are runaway slaves, exiles, the enemy, and insane.

(And, as we will see, this sentence seems to dictate Cicero's discussion in *Paradoxa* 4.) Both in Horace and Cicero *fugitivus* is used because of its particular connotation of slavishness.⁵⁶⁰

Therefore, there certainly seem to be enough parallels between 2.7 and *Paradoxa* 5, to suggest that Horace was familiar with Cicero's treatment, and the nature of the Horatian omissions (if one accepts them as such) – political ambition, greed and flattery – actually supports this link, and suggests that Horace was using Cicero's work as a thematic model. Whether the majority of Horace's readers would have been familiar with the Ciceronian work is hard to say, although, as I said in Chapter 1, it would seem that readers who were as interested in philosophy as Horace, would have also been familiar with much of Cicero's philosophical works. Furthermore, the fact that Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum* can be seen more as a rhetorical work may suggest a wider potential readership - i.e. both those who were interested in his philosophical works, and those in his rhetoric.

Also, Cicero's *Paradoxa* are styled as a kind of personal diatribe (addressed to Brutus) and share some of the characteristics which one might attribute to Horace's *Satires*: e.g. the use of monologue and dialogue; an imaginary opponent (1.14, 2.17, 3.20, 3.25); analogies from drama and poetry (3.26), and rhetorical questions (1.11, 4.30).⁵⁶¹ Thus, in presenting the Stoic paradoxes in book 2 (2.3 and 2.7) as Stoic sermons, Horace, simply in that respect, is doing something similar to Cicero. However, Cicero's 'diatribe' is intended to persuade his audience of the wisdom of these paradoxes, whereas Horace's intention, as chronicler rather than speaker, is different. For Horace, the Stoic paradoxes have a more dramatic and humorous purpose - not least in relation to Horace's own dramatic presence in them. But it is also clear that Horace realises that there is some substance to the points made in both Damasippus' and Davus' arguments. These points – on greed, ambition, and

⁵⁶⁰ Muecke, 1993, 226; J. Adamietz, 1989, 207.

⁵⁶¹ Lee, 1953, xxvi-xxvii.

sex, for example - are in keeping with the sentiments Horace himself advocates in the diatribe satires of the first book. To an extent, by using the dialogue form and involving himself in that dialogue personally, Horace wishes to show his own imperfections and redeem himself from his own sermonising. It is the adherence to the perfection required by the paradoxes themselves which Horace sees as extreme. For Horace, at least, it would seem that the Epicurean tenet (clearly at odds with the idealistic quality of the Stoic paradoxes) that vices cannot be cut out completely (as at *Sat.1.3.76-7*) is an important qualification to his opinions on ethical subjects in general.

6.4 Cicero and *Satire* 1.3

The Stoic paradox that all sins are equal is introduced into the argument of *Sat.1.3*, at line 96, in antithesis to the argument that sins should be judged quantitatively, and that the penalties incurred should be proportionately grave, as Horace later states:

*nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet idemque
qui teneros caulis alieni fregerit horti
et qui nocturnus sacra divum legerit. adsit
regula, peccatis quae poenas irroget aequas,
ne scutica dignum horribili sectere flagello. (115-119)*

No more will reason prove the case, that someone who's broken off young vegetables in someone else's garden is guilty of one and the same offence as someone who's lifted the sacred emblems of the gods in the night. Let's apply a scale, to impose fair penalties for offences, so that you don't inflict the fearful scourge on someone deserving the strap.

Unlike in *Satires* 2.3 and 2.7 which, in a sense, argue for the relevant paradoxes in each case, in 1.3 the paradox unequivocally represents an

extreme, unbalanced, intolerant attitude – in opposition to the poem's primary themes of tolerance and *aequabilitas*.

Cicero's defence of the paradox is weak. Unlike in *Satires* 2.3 and 2.7 there are no other correlations between Cicero's and Horace's treatments other than discussion of the same paradox, but it is likely, bearing in mind Horace's probable familiarity with Cicero's *Paradoxa* as a whole, that he was aware of Cicero's argument, and how, in that regard, the paradox is found wanting when applied to practice. The difficulty for Cicero (and for the credibility of the paradox) is not in the premise that all sins are wrong, or even in the idea, as first presented, that all wrongs are equally not right: once the line has been transgressed, how far one has gone beyond that line is irrelevant (*Paradoxa* 3.20); the problem for the Stoics arises when this paradox is put into a practical context, and one looks at the moral consequences of the paradox, as Horace comments: *laborant/ cum ventum ad verum est* (*Sat.* 1.3.96-7). One could argue that the theoretical ideal behind the paradox is what is important: that human imperfection should always be striven against even though, in practice, perfection may be impossible.⁵⁶² However, Cicero does not argue on these grounds: he does not suggest that a literal practical application of the paradox is misguided, because it would be unworkable. Instead he argues the point as if it has a direct practical relevance and so attempts to answer the complaints of a realist on a realist's ground. Cicero's explanation is that even though all sins are equally wrong, they differ according to the reason behind the action:

causa igitur haec non natura distinguit.

It is therefore the reason, not the type of crime, which makes the difference.

Paradoxa 3. 24

⁵⁶² In fact, at *Epistles* 1.16.55-6 it seems that Horace has sympathy with the dictum 'all sins are equal': *nam de mille fabae modiis cum surripis unum/ damnum est non facinus, mihi pacto lenius isto*. 'For when from a thousand bushels of beans you steal one, my loss in that case is less, but not your sin.' (tr. Fairclough, 1926): Ronnick, 1991, 118.

Cicero goes on to state that motive is what is important in deciding whether or not a crime has been committed; and thus the parricide at Saguntum does not constitute murder – but rather, justifiable homicide (*Paradoxa* 3. 24ff). Thus, if the motive justifies the killing, it is not sinful, but if the motive is sinful, so is the killing, and, as with crimes themselves, there are no degrees of sinfulness as to motive. The motive, like the crime, is either sinful or not.

This seems logical enough, but then Cicero decides to tackle the problem of the relative seriousness of crimes - that some crimes warrant heavier penalties than others - by stating that parricide amounts to a number of sins (whereas the murder of a slave would only constitute one sin) in that one would be first killing a man, second killing one's father:

violatur is qui procreavit, is qui aluit, is qui erudit, is qui in sede ac domo atque in republica collocavit; multitudine peccatorum praestat, eoque poena maiora dignus est (25).

There is the violence to the man who gave us life, who brought us up and educated us, and secured us a place in home and family and state; the parricide is the most notable for the great number of his wrong actions, and so deserves the severer penalty.

Rist accepts this reasoning: that punishment is thus administered in proportion not to the level of guilt, but to the number of crimes;⁵⁶³ but this seems problematic, since it implies that in a sense the difference is one of type (*natura*) after all, and so runs contrary to the statement (above) at 3.24. Practically, (and here Cicero is trying to relate the paradox to practice) it would seem that if one were to kill an important person (or family member), one would be committing several crimes, and thus deserving of a greater punishment than if one were to kill someone whom one did not know and/or

⁵⁶³ Rist, 1969, 82. Brunschwig (1994) does not mention Cicero's treatment in his discussion of the paradox (towards the end of the article), and unlike Cicero and Rist he defends the paradox from a moral perspective in keeping with Stoic 'all-or-nothing' idealism, rather than on a logical basis.

who was not particularly important. This comes across, in all, as a poor defence of the paradox – and there is nothing to suggest that Cicero is being at all ironic in his presentation of it - chiefly because of Cicero's relating of the paradox to its moral consequences - to practice - which clouds the logical reasoning behind the paradox in the first place. It would be wrong to suggest that Horace's criticism of the paradox in 1.3 is indebted to Cicero's treatment: the anti-stoicism in Horace is essentially anti-extremist and he does not go into detail about the possible logical implications of the paradox. But it is not surprising, with Cicero's treatment in mind and Horace's probable familiarity with it, that Horace is quick to relate the paradox to judicial practice in 1.3, and to highlight its impracticability.

6.5 Cicero and *Satire* 2.3

The Stoic paradox 'that all fools are mad' (ὅτι πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται, *omnes stultos insanire*) can be traced back to Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (3.9.6) where Socrates is said to have contrasted madness with wisdom.⁵⁶⁴ However, this contrast was not as extreme and sweeping as that denoted by the Stoic paradox; Socrates did not argue that most people were mad (as, by implication, the Stoics did) – he regarded ignorance (*anepistēmosunē*) as *next* to madness, and a man was generally regarded as mad only when his mistakes were in matters of which ordinary people would be aware.⁵⁶⁵ Again, in pseudo-Plato, *Alcibiades* 2 (139C), madness is at first opposed to wisdom, but the argument is refined, according to proportion, degrees and types of unsoundness of mind, so that finally not all those who are unwise are considered mad (140C).⁵⁶⁶ It also appears that the Greeks often regarded madness and badness as one and the same,⁵⁶⁷ so that madness was seen as morally bad even though it was granted that one may have no control over becoming mad: in a sense its concomitant moral badness was part of the

⁵⁶⁴ Rudd, 1966, 187.

⁵⁶⁵ *ibid.*

⁵⁶⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁶⁷ see below, n. 576.

misfortune of becoming mad. With the exception of the latter, these views of madness would seem to be in keeping with what one might regard as the usual concept of madness. It is the disregard of proportion, that if one is not wise - is not, essentially, morally perfect - then one is mad, that marks the Stoic paradox.

This paradox, too, was dealt with by Cicero in his *Paradoxa Stoicorum* (no. 4), but part of this has been lost,⁵⁶⁸ and what remains essentially consists of a personal attack on Publius Clodius Pulcher,⁵⁶⁹ a personal and political enemy of Cicero's, and so bears little specific similarity to Horace's treatment of the paradox in *Sat.* 2.3. In spite of this Wickham remarked that there were signs in both *Satires* (i.e. 2.3 and 2.7) that Horace was familiar with Cicero's expositions of each (i.e. in his *Paradoxa Stoicorum*).⁵⁷⁰ But affinities between *Paradox* 4 and 2.3 are, in fact, slight, and either suggest that the part of Cicero's essay that is lost perhaps more closely pertains to Horace's treatment, or that Horace quite consciously chose to treat the subject differently from Cicero. Indeed, it appears that the paradoxes Cicero is really dealing with in *Paradox* 4 are 'that all fools are exiles' and 'that the wise man cannot be a victim of injury.'⁵⁷¹ However, Molager, in his introduction to the Budé edition of *Paradoxa Stoicorum*,⁵⁷² suggests that Cicero is using Clodius as a particular *exemplum* of madness. There are certainly references to his 'madness' throughout the invective; for instance, Cicero accuses Clodius thus (4.30):

⁵⁶⁸ There is a lacuna at the beginning of the essay, after the introductory words: *Ego vero te non stultum ut saepe, non improbum ut semper, sed dementem...*

⁵⁶⁹ Publius Clodius was killed in 52 B.C. on the Appian Way, where a fight took place between his gang and that of Milo (cf. *Pro Milone*): Lee, 1953, 59.

⁵⁷⁰ Wickham, 1891, 189; though Wickham gives no specific examples of similarities between *Paradox* 4 and *Sat.* 2.3.

⁵⁷¹ cf. Seneca *Ben.* 2.35: *negamus iniuriam accipere sapientem* (Lee, 1953, 59-60); and, more generally, the Stoic notion of Indifferents: e.g. *SVF* 3. 164-168; Ronnick (1991, 122): "Of the specific three paradoxes mentioned, all fools are mad, all fools are exiles and that the wise man cannot be injured, only the latter pair is given full treatment." (122). Certainly, there is much in the Ciceronian essay on the theme of Clodius as an exile (or an exile as far as Cicero is concerned) although he is still resident in Rome: (*Paradoxa* 4.31): *omnes scelerati atque impii, quorum tu te ducem esse profiteris, quos leges exilio adfici volunt, exules sunt. Etiam si solum non mutarunt.* And, by contrast, Cicero refers to himself as the (relatively) wise man, who is impervious to Clodius' attacks. E.g. at *Paradox* 4, 28-9.

⁵⁷² Molager, 1971, 31-37.

caedem in foro fecisti, armatis latronibus templa tenuisti, privatorum domos aedes sacras incedisti.... Numquamne homo amentissime te circumspicies, numquam nec quid facias considerabis nec quid loquare?

You carried out a massacre in the forum, you occupied the temples with armed thugs, you set fire to private houses and sacred buildings... will you never look around you, you lunatic? Will you never reflect on what you are doing, what you are saying?

These remarks on Clodius' behaviour would seem to fit the definition given by Damasippus at *Sat.* 2.3.43ff:

quem mala stultitia et quemcumque inscitia veri caecum agit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex autumat.

Whoever dangerous folly and ignorance of the truth drive blindly on, him the portico and flock of Chrysippus maintain to be mad.

Also, bearing in mind what Cicero says at *Pro Murena* 61: *nos autem qui sapientes non sumus fugitivos, exules, hostes, insanos, denique esse dicunt;* and at *De Oratore* 3.65: *servi, latrinos, hostes, insani*, it is possible that Cicero is treating the paradox that all fools are mad both together with, but also, as it were, in summary of these other accusations.⁵⁷³

In *Sat.* 2.3 Horace does not discuss the paradoxes 'that the wise man cannot be a victim of injury', or 'that all fools are exiles' but one could correlate the *exemplum* of Clodius' insanity (for the above reasons, the diatribe against Clodius *could* be regarded as such an *exemplum*) with Horace's references to the insanity brought on by excessive ambition, which, although not explicitly spelled out by Cicero, is surely the source of Clodius'

⁵⁷³ Molager, 1971, 34.

insanity. For example, at *Sat.* 2.3.212-13 Stertinius asks (Damasippus, for most of the satire, is quoting the Stoic Stertinius):

*cum prudens scelus ob titulos admittis inanis,
stas animo et purum est vitio tibi, cum tumidum est, cor?*

When you ‘reasonably’ commit a crime for the sake of empty distinctions, are you in your right mind, and is your heart, when swollen up, free of fault?

And at 222b-223:

..... *quem cepit vitrea fama,
hunc circumtonuit gaudens Bellona cruentis.*

He whom glassy fame has taken hold of, about him thunders Bellona who rejoices in deeds of blood.

But what is more pertinent to Horace’s treatment of the paradox in 2.3 is Cicero’s discussion in *Tusculan Disputations* 3.7ff.⁵⁷⁴ The paradox that all fools are mad is discussed here in relation to the statement that the wise man may suffer anxiety (*videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo*, 3.7), a proposition which Cicero argues against from a decidedly Stoic point of view; indeed both books 3 and 4 of *Tusculan Disputations* deal with the treatment of the passions as argued from a Stoic standpoint.⁵⁷⁵

Cicero makes the distinction at *Tusc.* 3.11ff between unsoundness of mind (*insania*) and frenzy (*furor*) - which could still be regarded as a particular kind of unsoundness of mind - where he cites the madness of Athamus, Alcmeon, Ajax and Orestes as *furor*, rather than *insania*. *Insania*

⁵⁷⁴ Rudd (1966, 187) draws attention to this treatment in Cicero.

⁵⁷⁵ This causes Douglas (1990, 77) to comment: “The uncharacteristically close adherence to a single viewpoint also contributes to make these books (3 and 4) less generally attractive.”

can include folly and does not suggest a total lack of control, whereas those who succumb to *furor* lose all control:

qui igitur exisse ex potestate dicuntur, idcirco dicuntur, quia non sunt in potestate mentis, cui regnum totius animi a natura tributum est (*Tusc.* 3.11).

Those then who are described as beside themselves are so described because they are not under the control of the mind, to which the empire of the whole soul has been assigned by nature. (tr. King, 1927)

But it is important to note that in the definition put forward in *Tusc.* 3.11, *furor* is not necessarily related to anger; *furor* is madness marked by hallucinations or delusions: a blindness to reality - *furorem autem esse rati sunt mentis ad omnia caecitatem*; ‘frenzy however they regarded as a blindness of the mind in all relations’ (*Tusc.* 3.11) - which may or may not be caused by anger. Nevertheless, it seems that such blindness and delusion, as in the example of Ajax, certainly can result from anger. In fact, Cicero associates *furor* with wrath and lust, in order to explain the notion of being out of control.

But because of the total irrationality of *furor*, the fact that it can come upon any individual, like any chance calamity, the Stoics said that the wise man *can* be prey to *furor* - but not to *insania* (which he would dispel by means of *ratio*):

quod cum maius esse videatur quam insania, tamen eius modi est, ut furor in sapientem cadere possit, non possit insania. (*Tusc.* 3.11)⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷⁶ This could pose the moral question of whether, under the influence of *furor*, an act of terrible violence, or rape, is really morally reprehensible, or less reprehensible than it would be if not under the influence of *furor*. For the Greeks it appears that if someone charged with a crime is mad, his punishment would be just as severe as if he was sane; in fact it seems that madness was assimilated to badness (Dem. Lv 30, Dem. xlviii 56): Dover, 1974, 148-9. However, it could be that the Romans were more lenient – in the 3rd century A.D. (*Pauli Sententiae* 5.23.10) lunacy was a valid defence for one charged with murder (Robinson, 1995, 44).

And though this seems to be worse than unsoundness of mind,
nevertheless there is this to be noted, that *furor* can come upon the
wise man, *insania* cannot. (tr. King, 1927, adapted)

Even so it would surely be the case that *while* the wise man is subject to *furor* he is not, in fact, wise.⁵⁷⁷ This distinction between *furor* and *insania* makes the maxim ‘that all fools are mad’ more palatable in practical terms. Indeed one could be tempted, following the discussion in *Tusculan Disputations* 10-11, to suggest its practical meaning to be ‘all fools are subject to unsoundness of mind’, which really seems tantamount to saying that all fools are fools. But then one has to be aware that the term ‘fool’ as used by the Stoics (*ἄφρων*) is applied to anyone who is not a Stoic sage (a paradox itself), anyone who has not achieved an extreme level of wisdom, which, in effect, means everyone. In this sense, put in terms suggested by Cicero’s discussion of the paradox and the definition of *insania* in *Tusc.* 3.7-11, one could understand the paradox as meaning that people who make wrong judgements (which, effectively, simply means people) are, *in so doing*, of unsound mind. The paradox thus serves to make this point in an arresting way.

In 2.3 Horace makes no distinction between different kinds of insanity - *insania* and *furor* are treated as belonging to the same mental disease - and this is likely to be deliberate on Horace’s part.⁵⁷⁸ As a result Stertinius’ argument is – initially at least - made all the more compelling, his examples more startling, in a way that would have been impossible if he had adhered to the distinctions of *insania* and *furor* made by Cicero in *Tusc.* 3, as, for example, in Stertinius’ reference to Orestes’ madness at 2.3.132ff. Here Stertinius’ argument is that if maniacal murder or (in the case of Orestes) matricide, is a sign of madness, then murder resulting from ambition is surely no less insane. From Cicero’s point of view – as expressed in *Tusc.* 3 – murder resulting from ambition would be classed as *insania* but not *furor*, whereas Orestes’ matricide would be seen as *furor* (as mentioned above, Cicero names

⁵⁷⁷ Chrysippus said that virtue could be lost due to depression or intoxication (which seems similar to *furor*, as if affected by something which reason cannot control) though Cleanthes said virtue was irremovable (LS 61I= D.L. 7.127).

⁵⁷⁸ So O’Brien-Moore, 1924, 44, n.4: “What Horace is doing - consciously in all likelihood - is confusing *insania* and *furor*.”

Orestes as an example of *furor*). Stertinius views both such behavioural faults as essentially due to the same mental condition. From 128b - 133 Stertinius relates the absurdity of the kind of attitude which could oppose this argument:

..... *populum si caedere saxis*
incipias servosve tuos, quos aere pararis,
insanum te omnes pueri clamentque puellae:
cum laqueo uxorem interimis matremque veneno,
incolumi capite es. quid enim? neque tu hoc facis Argis
nec ferro ut demens genetricem occidis Orestes...

If you were to begin stoning people or your slaves, whom you have paid cash for, the very boys and girls would call you mad: when you hang your wife and poison your mother, your head is untouched. After all, you're not doing this in Argos and you're not killing your mother with a sword, like mad Orestes...

Rudd brings out the humorous absurdity of the position Stertinius is mocking: 'Throwing stones at people is a recognised sign of madness – especially if you injure a slave who has cost you money. But my wife and mother didn't cost me anything, so there's nothing absurd about killing them. Moreover, Argos is the place where men butcher their mothers in a fit of madness. This is Rome; here we do it quite sensibly and unobtrusively with poison or a length of rope.'⁵⁷⁹ In fact, Stertinius makes a further point in drawing attention to the standard view of Orestes' madness (which he rejects, and expects his listeners to do the same)⁵⁸⁰ – that Orestes only went mad *after* he had killed his mother: i.e. when he was pursued by the Furies; and thus that he was perfectly sane when he murdered his mother, and when officially

⁵⁷⁹ Rudd, 1966, 179.

⁵⁸⁰ In this respect Stertinius sides with the orators against the mythological explanation of Orestes' madness (Muecke, 1993, 146); e.g. Aischines *Against Timarchos* 190.

insane (in the deluded *furor* sense) the worst he did was mistakenly say some insulting words to his sister Electra, and Pylades (134-141).⁵⁸¹

In deliberately equating these different kinds of unsoundness of mind, Stertinius shows up the absurdity of the idea that only crimes committed by ‘officially’ mad people are really mad, and that Orestes only went mad after he had killed his mother.⁵⁸² Stertinius is making the point that killing one’s mother out of vengeance would still mean that the act was motivated by emotion – it would still have resulted, therefore, from a wrong judgement, even if it was planned and deemed ‘rational’, on the grounds of justifiable revenge. Thus Stertinius aligns *insania* (the making of wrong judgements generally) with *furor* (delusional insanity) in order to show that both forms of mental unsoundness are very far from the mental condition of someone who is wise. Cicero, taking the Stoic view, would have agreed that *insania* and *furor* are equally non-wise, but does not regard them as essentially the same condition. Cicero’s aim in making a distinction between *furor* and *insania* was partly, it seems, to make the paradox ‘that all fools are mad’ understandable to those who may have *wrongly* confused *insania* with *furor*.

Again, the blurring of these distinctions is made to good effect in the passage 2.3.182-223, where reference is also made to insanity induced by ambition. Stertinius actually compares ‘reasonable (*prudens*, 212) insanity’ – insanity deriving from what could be considered ‘rational’ motives (though obviously erroneously so for a Stoic), such as the desire for position, with the blind, frenzied madness (*furor*) of Ajax (whom Cicero also mentioned as having been prey to *furor*), who mistakenly slaughters a thousand sheep, in

⁵⁸¹ Indeed Cicero (*Pis.* 46-47) says, *sua quemque fraus, suum facinus, suum scelus, sua audacia de sanitate ac mente deturbat*, and in the next sentence draws a comparison with Orestes, suggesting madness through guilt, after having committed the crime (thus he interprets the Furies as his insanely guilty conscience) as well as madness in committing the crime in the first place. Orestes is the subject of Varro’s Menippean satire, *Eumenides*, where he is depicted as the typical madman, and he is again treated in Varro’s *Orestes, vel De insania*; and there was the play *Eumenides*, by Ennius (Muecke, 1993, 146). Romans may also have been familiar with Orestes from paintings (Austin, 1955, 469ff). And his vision of the Furies was a common example in Hellenistic discussions of epistemology, e.g. as an example of seeing something that is not there (Sextus Empiricus *M.* 8. 63).

⁵⁸² On the other hand, the actual circumstances surrounding the matricide – following Orestes’ father’s murder at the hands of his mother, Clytemnestra, and Aegisthus – suggest that it was a planned, and even (as implied by Homer, *Od.* 1.29ff; 298ff.; 3.303ff; Rix, March, 2003, 1074) a justifiable act.

the belief that he is killing the Greek leaders (by whom he feels he has been dealt an injustice):

*mille ovium insanus morti dedit, inclutum Ulixen
et Menelaum una mecum se occidere clamans.* '...(197-8)

He was mad. He gave to death a thousand sheep, shouting that he was killing renowned Ulysses and Menalaus together with me.

The scenario here is that Agamemnon is being questioned by a Stoic common soldier (182-224) who asks him whether the sacrifice of his own daughter Iphigenia (as if she were a lamb: 219-220)⁵⁸³ is in any way less insane than Ajax's slaughter of lambs in the belief that they were men: surely the killing of one's own daughter, for the sake of power, (*ob titulos.. inanis* 212) is just as mad as killing sheep in the belief that they are men.

But while showing how such different kinds of behaviour - or behaviour as resulting from different causes - can all be labelled as madness is certainly arresting, this blurring of distinctions is finally shown as absurd at the end of the poem, where Damasippus compares Horace's 'insanity' with the kind of murderous *furor* just mentioned. Horace asks (300):

*'Stoice, post damnum sic vendas omnia pluris,
qua me stultitia, quoniam non est genus unum,
insanire putas? ego nam videor mihi sanus.'*

My Stoic friend, as you hope to sell everything at a profit after your loss, with what folly, since there is not only one sort, do you think I'm mad? For to myself I seem sane.

And Damasippus (who is no longer quoting Stertinius) replies:

⁵⁸³ The example of the sacrifice of Iphigenia is here used to illustrate the insanity of ambition, though the insanity of superstition is perhaps also implied through the use of the same example in Lucretius (1.80-101), which would have surely been noted by Horace's readers; in any case for Lucretius superstition and ambition are connected in that they both result from the fear of death. See below, Chapter 8, §8.3.

*'Quid? caput abscissum manibus cum portat Agave
gnati infelicis, sibi tunc furiosa videtur?'* (303-4)

What? When Agave is carrying in her hands the torn-off head of her ill-starred son, does she then think herself a maniac?

Damasippus thus compares Horace to Agave – like her, Horace is deluded as to his own mental health (302).⁵⁸⁴ Damasippus goes on to explain Horace's insanity: that it consists of his emulating his social superiors (307b-320), the fact that he is a poet (321-2), his temper (323), his living beyond his means (323-4), and his love life (325). To compare these faults with the kind of lack of judgement which results in a mother proudly carrying the severed head of her son in her hand, is clearly absurd. Thus although the blurring of distinctions earlier in the argument serves to make insightful points about human behaviour and to show up absurdities as to how such behaviour is perceived; in the end, the equation of *insania* with *furor* is shown to be too extreme and absurd in itself, thus warranting Horace's final retort:

'o maior, tandem parcas, insane, minori!' (326)

'O greater madman, *do* spare a lesser.'

⁵⁸⁴ Muecke, 1993, 164. This is also reminiscent of Agamemnon's 'madness', in that he recognises Ajax's madness, but, like a typical *stultus*, does not recognise his own (Muecke, 1993, 153).

6.6 Lucilius, Terence and Cicero

The major difference between Cicero's and Horace's expositions of the Stoic paradoxes is that Horace is ultimately holding up the paradoxes to ridicule, whereas Cicero is arguing in their favour.⁵⁸⁵ However, it is also highly likely that both Cicero and Horace drew (to an extent) from the same sources, such as the *Satires* of Lucilius and the *Menippean Satires* of Varro.⁵⁸⁶ Indeed there appears to be a correlation between some lines of Varro (*Menippean Satires* *περί ἐδεσμάτων* 404B) and Horace 2.7.42-3, in the idea of the worthlessness of a master who is not philosophically educated.⁵⁸⁷ There is also some evidence to suggest that Lucilius satirised the Stoic paradox 'that all fools are mad.'⁵⁸⁸ However, the evidence is not explicit. Aside from the fragments which may relate to Lucilius' satirising of this paradox there are references to Stoic paradoxes at 1189W: *nondum etiam <qui> haec omnia habebit,/ formosus dives liber rex solus feretur*; 'not even he who has all this will alone be called handsome, rich, free and king;' cf. Horace. *Sat.* 1.3.124-6, *Epistles* 1.1.106-8, Cicero *Pro Murena* 61. And at 805-11W Lucilius ridicules certain Stoic terms.⁵⁸⁹

Correlations between Horace's *Satire* 2.3 and the Lucilian fragments which possibly relate to a treatment of the same Stoic paradox (that all fools are mad) have been discussed in detail by Fiske, although some of these suggested correlations seem more tenuous than others. The fragments, cited

⁵⁸⁵ However, in *Pro Murena* (61ff) Cicero ridicules the Stoic Paradoxes generally. But then in *De finibus* 4.74 he explains that he was playing to the gallery a little: *apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt; aliquid etiam coronae datum* (Lee, 1953, xiii).

⁵⁸⁶ Mackendrick, 1989, in his chapter on 'Stoic Paradoxes' suggests that Lucilius and Varro may have been sources for Cicero's treatments (pp. 92-3). Cicero alludes to Lucilius at *Brutus* 131 and he was an acquaintance of Varro's; like Cicero, they attack luxury, profligacy and corruption.

⁵⁸⁷ Fiske, 1920, 406; Lejay, 1966, 540. Fiske also states that the master/slave confrontation can be traced back to Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, where it is said that if a master were worse than his own slaves, he would be ridiculous.

⁵⁸⁸ As Fiske (1920, 390-398) attempts to demonstrate.

⁵⁸⁹ Gratwick, 1982, 167.

by Fiske,⁵⁹⁰ which are the most convincing in terms of a connection to this paradox, and with Horace's treatment in 2.3, are: the ridiculing of the Stoic philosopher's beard: Horace, *Sat.* 2.3. 16-17:

..... *Di te, Damasippe, deaeque*
verum ob consilium donent – tonsore!..

May the gods and goddesses, Damasippus, for this true advice, bestow
on you – a barber.

Cf. Lucilius, 1007M = 1108W:

neque barbam inmiseris istam.

And do not let that beard grow long.

Damasippus (quoting Stertinius) begins his discourse with a definition of madness (2.3. 41) *primum nam inquiram quid sit furere*, 'first I'll look into what it is to be mad'; so too, according to Porphyrio, Lucilius: 1178M = after 1247W (Porphyrio's note: *ostendit quid sit furor, ut Lucilius*; 'like Lucilius, he shows what it is to be mad'). Fiske notes seven Lucilian fragments (729M = 737W, 730M = 738W, 737M = 740W, 734 = 741W, 731 = 778W, 732 = 744W, 735 = 742W) which show his referring to the madness of love – though these are regarded as belonging to a satire on the madness of love in particular,⁵⁹¹ rather than to the paradox that all fools are mad. Even so these fragments can nevertheless be compared with the section on love in 2.3, from 259-271. Fiske⁵⁹² suggests a correlation between a Lucilius fragment, four lines of *Satire* 2.3 and three lines from the first scene of Terence's *Eunuchus* – as being all on the *exclusus amator* theme:

⁵⁹⁰ Fiske (1920, 390-3) cites six fragments (1007, 1178, 1005, 1092, 755, 757M) as possibly being related to the poem in which Lucilius satirised this Stoic paradox; but only those two quoted above in the text (1007, 1178M) seem to relate directly to Stoicism.

⁵⁹¹ Warmington, 1938, in fact, puts 778W (=731M) in a different satire, i.e. *Satire* iii of Book 27; the satire on the folly of love is marked as *Satire* 1 of Book 27.

⁵⁹² Fiske, 1920, 394-5.

Terence, *Eunuchus* (53-55):

*infecta pace ultro ad eam venies, indicans
te amare et ferre non posse, actumst, ilicet,
peristi.*

You go to her of your own accord with no terms negotiated, making it quite clear that you love her and can't bear it – you've had it, it's all over, you're done for. (tr. Barsby, 2001)

Cf. Lucilius 729M (=737W), where Lucilius depicts the *exclusus amator* wanting to make peace with his girlfriend:

*pacem cum peto, cum placo, cum adeo et cum
appello 'meam'.*

When I ask to make it up, when I pacify her, when I go to her and call her 'my own'. (tr. Warmington, 1938)

cf. Horace 2.3.259-262:

..... *amator*
exclusus qui distat, agit ubi secum eat an non
quo rediturus erat non arcessitus, et haeret
invisis foribus?

How is the locked out lover different, when he argues with himself whether or not to go to the place where he was on the point of returning, even without a summons, and hangs about the doors he hates?

However, other than this similarity of theme – which was hardly peculiar to these poets alone – there is in fact little to suggest a strong connection between these passages.

But Fiske suggests another correlation between Lucilius, Terence and Horace⁵⁹³ where there is certainly similarity between Horace and the original Terence version; though again the Lucilian parallel seems to be rather tenuous - in Lucilius 734M (=741W), the lover wonders whether love can ever go smoothly for him:

ego enim an perficiam ut me amare expediat?

But shall I ever manage to make it worth her while to love me? (tr. Warmington 1938)

Fiske unconvincingly claims that the above fragment concerns the irrationality of love, (uncertainty of love would be more accurate) and links it to the words of Phaedria in Terence's *Eunuchus* 57-58 (which certainly does concern love's irrationality):

*ere, quae res in se neque consilium neque modum
habet ullum, eam consilio regere non potes.*

Master, when a thing has no logic to it and no means of control, you can't rule it by logic. (tr. Barsby, 2001, adapted)

cf. Horace 265-267:

..... *o ere, quae res
nec modum habet neque consilium, ratione modoque
tractari non vult.*⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹³ Fiske, 1920, 395.

⁵⁹⁴ Another parallel between Horace and Terence: *Eunuchus* 60-1 *suspiciones, inimicitiae, indutiae./ bellum, pax rursum*; Horace *Sat* 2.3. 267-8: *in amore haec sunt mala, bellum,/ pax rursum*. As Muecke, 1993, 160 says: "In this passage Horace

O master, a matter which has in it no control or logic, does not allow itself to be handled with reason or control.

These striking similarities between the opening of Act 1 of Terence's *Eunuchus* and Horace *Sat.* 2.3. 259-71 again point to the possible influence of Cicero.⁵⁹⁵ In *Tusc.* 4.76 Cicero directly quotes from the same Terence passage in discussing the folly of love within a Stoic context. This further suggests, together with Cicero's discussion of insanity at *Tusc.* 3.7-11, that Horace possibly had *Tusculan Disputations* in mind when he wrote 2.3. With regard to *Tusc.* 3.7-11 and *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, it seems likely, simply in the similarity of theme – i.e. the Stoic take on insanity – that some of his readership (at least) would have inferred a link with Cicero. And the specific use of the Terence passage (in Cicero and again in Horace) seems to add to the likelihood of a Ciceronian influence.

But it should also be noted that the depiction of the folly of love (2.3.259-271) shares similarities with the end of book 4 of Lucretius' *DRN* (particularly, in terms of madness, 1068-72), and doubtless such a similarity – bearing in mind Lucretius' influence on 1.2, and indeed on Horace generally – was intentional on Horace's part. It is clear that in satirising erotic love and its concomitant 'insanity', Stertinius' sentiments are essentially in keeping with those of Lucretius. Although Lucretius' treatment of sex and love in book 4 has much in common with Horace's attitude as to how one should conduct one's sex life in *Sat.* 1.2, in *Sat.* 2.3.259-271 the subject matter has turned rather towards erotic *love* (whereas 1.2 was more concerned with sex); that is to say that here Horace is dealing with the emotional pitfalls of falling in love, whereas in 1.2 he was concerned with the dangers of sex with the wrong kind of women (married women, on the whole); in 1.2 these dangers are not presented as directly emotional or psychological (although it is clear that those who err sexually will in due course be unhappy) but are financial, physical and affect reputation. However, it is clear that the satirical attitude

comes as close to a word for word citation [of Terence] as is possible given that they were writing in different metres."

⁵⁹⁵ Muecke, 1993, 160.

towards the dilemma of the *exclusus amator* taken by Stertinius – dealing with the emotional pain of being in love – would find support from Lucretius and, indeed, Horace. R.D. Brown⁵⁹⁶ also, in fact, considers the possibility of the influence of Terence on Lucretius’ misguided lover and of both Lucretius and Terence on Horace. But the strong verbal similarity with the Terence passage, which is actually quoted in Cicero, together with the other treatments of the Stoic paradox, both in *Tusculan Disputations* and *Paradoxa Stoicorum*, suggest a more consciously Ciceronian rather than Lucretian influence here.⁵⁹⁷

6.7 Conclusion

In repeating the main ethical topics of book 1 in book 2, Horace repeats, to some extent, the use of the same philosophical sources. However, Horace’s treatment of the Stoic paradoxes also draws from fresh material: the most likely being Cicero’s expositions of the paradoxes, both in *Paradoxa Stoicorum* and *Tusculan Disputations*. In comparing Horace’s expositions of these paradoxes in 1.3, 2.3 and 2.7, we are given some indication of Horace’s personal views of them. In 1.3.96 ff, Horace appears to have little time for the extreme, disproportionate paradox that all sins are equal, which he regards as impractical; and the impracticability of the paradox is reflected in Cicero’s *Paradoxa* 3, with which Horace was likely to have been familiar.

In 2.3 and 2.7, by presenting the diatribes as being delivered by a Stoic, Horace affects the stance of detached listener, by means of which he takes little responsibility for the views being aired, though we are given hints as to what his own views might be from the way in which he presents the argument. The similarity of topics between 2.7 and *Paradoxa* 5 certainly indicate that Horace has drawn from Cicero to put across Davus’ argument, although, deliberately no doubt, he has avoided any verbal repetition. And the nature of what Horace does not discuss in 2.7, by comparison with *Paradoxa*

⁵⁹⁶ R.D. Brown, 1987, 136 notes that the opening scene of Terence’s *Eunuch* conveys a similar interpretation of the psychological pain of love to Lucretius: “The Lucretian lover exhibits a similar mixture of desire, anger, irresolution, and self-reproach.”

⁵⁹⁷ So Muecke, 1993, 160.

5, also suggests a correlation between the two: it is partly because Horace has dealt with some of these topics in preceding satires – including 2.3 – that he does not include them in 2.7. In fact, Horace in a sense accepts the paradox ‘that all fools are slaves’; at the end of the satire he has no effective answer to Davus’ argument: he would admit, at least, that we are all slaves to something, to some extent, and thus foolish.

By grouping together widely diverging degrees of unsoundness of mind in *Sat.* 2.3, as if they all amount to the same malady, Horace both shows up the madness of a great deal of ‘sane’ behaviour (as motivated by ambition and the desire for wealth, for example) while at the same time showing the absurdity of comparing severe mental derangement (as suffered by Agave in her Bacchic frenzy – referred to at the end of the poem 2.3.303-4) with Horace’s own, relatively minor errors in his personal life. Thus although in 2.3 Stertinius’ argument is at first convincing, heightened by gory mythological examples, in the end Horace deflates the argument, and indeed the Stoic position. He does this by consciously blurring *insania* and *furor* - the distinction made by Cicero in *Tusc.* 3 - to both the benefit and detriment of Damasippus’/Stertinius’ argument. Although commentators had previously remarked on Stertinius’ long-windedness and sanctimoniousness as constituting Horace’s criticism of the Stoic position, Horace’s treatment is a little more subtle than that, not least because, in many respects, he would agree with the thrust of Stertinius’ ethical points.

Chapter 7

Literary Theory

7.1 Literary Theory and Philosophy

A fundamental reason for the connection between literary theory and philosophy in an ancient context is that the role of literature in society was considered to be an important moral issue. Plato dealt with the possible moral effects of literature on society. In the *Republic* (602c-607d) he analyses and defines poetry (as *mimesis*), concluding that it should be excluded from the ideal state because of the moral damage it might cause (if one takes these arguments as strictly indicating Plato's opinion). In book 10 Plato is in fact picking up on a subject already discussed in book 3, where the suggestion was that poetry could actually be morally beneficial to society, if censored (377b-392b).⁵⁹⁸ Although Plato was not the first to deal with this subject – Xenophanes and Heraclitus had touched on the possible moral effects of poetry,⁵⁹⁹ and Plato himself may also have been reflecting current interest in the subject generally – Plato's discussions are likely to have affirmed this interconnection between philosophy and literary theory, and to have acted as a benchmark for future discussions where this relationship would be assumed.

Later, with regard to the moral effect of literature, Epicurus asserted that words should be used in their most obvious, straightforward sense, (*ad Herodotum* 38), and had little time for poetry. Epicureans were wary of poetry because of its appeal to the emotions whereby it can distort one's

⁵⁹⁸ Plato was clearly himself an adept at appealing to the emotions, as can be seen from the dramatic and rhetorical technique of his dialogues. *Gorgias* – a dialogue which purports to be about rhetoric (and is anti-rhetoric) – shows considerable rhetorical skill. On Plato's position regarding poetry: e.g. Annas, 1981, 340-2; Halliwell, 1988, 3-6; Havelock, 1963, 3-19.

⁵⁹⁹ Xenophanes: frs. 1, 11-12; Heraclitus A22-3, frs. 42, 56-7, 104 DK: Halliwell, 1988, 152.

perception of the actual, rational truth;⁶⁰⁰ but, as I mentioned in Chapter 1, this position may have eased by Horace's time.⁶⁰¹ The Stoics held different views. Chrysippus wrote a treaty, *On the interpretation of poems*, which is categorised in Diogenes Laertius (7.200) as an ethical subject.⁶⁰² Indeed the Stoics regarded the myths of Homer and Hesiod as sometimes imparting pre-philosophical wisdom (e.g. Balbus' account in Cicero *De Natura Deorum* 2.63-72,⁶⁰³ Plutarch, *De Placitis Philosophorum* 879c-880d).⁶⁰⁴ While this may indeed indicate the Stoics' desire to be affiliated with traditional Greek culture, the Epicureans regarded this as a somewhat questionable attempt to appropriate Homer and Hesiod as Stoic precursors.⁶⁰⁵

Literary theory, in an admittedly basic and relatively unselfconscious sense, can in fact be traced back to Homer's and Hesiod's objective views of their art,⁶⁰⁶ but Plato's is the first surviving text to discuss systematically and at length both poetry and rhetoric in his dialogues (e.g., in books 3 and 10 of the *Republic*; *Ion*). However, it was perhaps Aristotle who first considered the subject in a way that would more recognisably be identified with literary theory as understood today. Aristotle's literary theory consisted of the objective studies of literary genres (in *Poetics*: tragedy, comedy [though this is largely lost], and epic); their various aspects and which of these were the most important - in tragedy he stressed the importance of plot over character and ideas; and how they should be employed. But also he put forward theories of poetry as *mimesis* (developed first by Plato) and the doctrine of *katharsis*, where the emotional engagement of the audience in the drama can be seen as beneficial, a way of experiencing and venting emotions by proxy (such as pity, fear), so as to regulate them;⁶⁰⁷ in this respect he differed from Plato,

⁶⁰⁰ De Lacy, 1939, 87, + n.10: Philodemus, (*On Music* ed. Kemke, 1884, p.97 = col. 28 ed. Neubecker, 1986) attacks the philosophical poetry of Cleanthes.

⁶⁰¹ Cf. also discussion of Philodemus on moral aspect of poetry below, §7.3

⁶⁰² Schenkeveld, 1999, 221.

⁶⁰³ However, in this particular extract, Balbus also states how absurd he finds these poets' superstitions regarding the divine: Boys-Stones, 2001, 34-5.

⁶⁰⁴ Schenkeveld, 1999, 222, n.270.

⁶⁰⁵ On the Epicurean view of the Stoics on this matter: Philodemus *On Piety*, col. 6; Cicero *De Natura Deorum* 1.41: Boys-Stones, 2001, 32 and n.11.

⁶⁰⁶ e.g. Homer *Il.* 2. 482-92; *Od.* 8.479ff.; Hesiod. *Theog.* 1-104: Russell, 2003, 869.

⁶⁰⁷ Aristotle briefly discusses *katharsis* in *Politics* 8 1339b42-1340a27; 1341b32-1342a18 with regard to the possible moral effects of music, and refers (1341b38) to a

who regarded the performance of unseemly emotion as encouraging such emotion in people's lives more generally (*Republic* 10 606d).

The characterisation of certain types in book 4 of *Nicomachean Ethics* is certainly philosophical from an ancient perspective - and in its moral implications could also be understood as such from a modern perspective, as well as being psychological and sociological. The question of how to be happy relates to the rational observation of types of behaviour and character, in this instance in the form of examples which one should either avoid or aspire to, which can also be seen as relating to the psychological. And connected to this is the question of how to be a successful member of (and happy in) a society, which essentially involves relating these psychological observations to their social context.

The relation between psychology and sociology and literature (including drama) is self-evident in the context of ancient approaches to literature. More specifically, one can see a similarity between the depictions of character types in *NE* 4 and the analysis of character in, for example, *Poetics* 1453a7-11: a description of the character best suited to the tragic hero; 1454a15ff: character in tragedy (not just the hero), i.e. they should be good, life-like, consistent etc.; 1454b8ff: how to represent particular character traits – both good and bad; and in *Rhetoric* 1388b31 – 1391b6: on character, differentiated by age, wealth and power, but also on specific emotions (clearly relevant to character and behaviour) from 1377b - 1388b30. Thus a link between ancient ethics and literary theory, both in the role of literature in society (that is, its impact on morality, as seen more explicitly in Plato, though also relevant to Aristotle's doctrine of *katharsis*) and in the discussion and definition of character types, is clear.

The character traits of an audience was also important to the poet and rhetorician, as seen in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*;⁶⁰⁸ and this can also be seen as a consideration of moral aspects in society. Thus characterisation as a particular

fuller discussion of *katharsis* in the *Poetics*, though this does not survive. He does briefly mention *katharsis* at 1449b 25ff – in the *Poetics* – as a function of tragedy.

⁶⁰⁸ Though this is less directly considered in the *Poetics*, except in that a dramatic work should have a particular effect on an audience (i.e. *katharsis*); and at 1453a33 Aristotle mentions which plots work best on audiences (because of the “weakness” of audiences).

area analysed within literary theory is demonstrably, from an ancient perspective, an ethical concern.⁶⁰⁹

As we will see, Horace himself discusses the moral role of literature together with other aspects of literary theory: style, content and humour (as part of content, and in a moral context). Indeed, besides character and plot (the latter being barely relevant to Horatian satire), humour, content and style are also seen to feature in Aristotelian theory and in the literary theory of Neoptolemus of Parium, and Philodemus, all of which exerted an influence on Horace.

7.2 Style and Content

In the first of the literary satires, 1.4, Horace commends Lucilius' humour, granting that he was witty and observant: *facetus, emunctae naris* 1.4.7-8, but criticises his literary style:

.....*in hora saepe ducentos,*
ut magnum, versus dictabat stans pede in uno;
cum flueret lutulentus, erat quod tollere velles. (9-11)

He would often, as a bravura display, dictate two hundred lines in an hour on one leg. As he flowed muddily on, you'd have wanted to remove some of the content.

In so doing he makes a distinction between style and content (humour here being a facet of content): a distinction that is also made, in terms of *verba* and *res*, with regard to the question of whether or not comedy should be considered as poetry, at 1.4.46-7:⁶¹⁰

.....*quod acer spiritus ac vis*

⁶⁰⁹ Ethics deriving from the Greek word for character: *ethos*. Cf. Chapter 5, §5.4, on the possible influence of Theophrastus' *Characters* on *Satire* 1.9, and below, §7.5.

⁶¹⁰ Brink, 1963, 160-62.

nec verbis nec rebus inest.

Because an impelling passion and energy isn't to be found in the language or the subject matter.

His criticisms of Lucilius in 1.4 may have met with some disapproval and thus, in 1.10.1-2, Horace further defends his position,⁶¹¹ though again, while he criticises Lucilius on stylistic grounds he praises his content – or, more particularly, his wit:

..... *at idem, quod sale multo*
urbem defricuit, charta laudatur eadem.

Yet he's also praised on the same page because he scoured the city with the abundant salt of his wit. (1.10.3-4)

Indeed, Horace couples style with content in his criticism of Lucilius at the beginning of both 1.4 and 1.10, though Armstrong and Oberhelman note that in discussing satire generally (and thus his own, as well as Lucilius') Horace concentrates on *res* (content) in 1.4, mainly in terms of its moral function

⁶¹¹ However, it has been argued that 1.4 is not a reaction to any actual criticism levelled at Horace. Hendrickson (1900, 121-142) and Williams (1972, 15ff) regard the apparent attack against Horace for malevolence as a fictitious device to facilitate Horace's argument. Rudd (1955 165-75) is of the view that 1.2 and many of the *Epodes*, which are likely to have predated 1.4, "could have given the impression that Horace possessed an aggressive and malicious temper" p.168, and thus that Horace was responding to actual criticism. More appealing is the stance of Brown, 1993, and Brink (1963, 157 n.1) who suggest that Horace may, in part, be reacting to actual criticism, but the poet's analysis and defence of his own work should nevertheless be considered in its own right, regardless of whether or not it is a response to criticism. Oberhelman and Armstrong (1995, 233-254) argue that the first book of *Satires* was published as a whole, not in instalments (and thus neither 1.4 nor 1.10 would have been responses to actual criticism, p.237). However, although in 1.4 the apparent defence against criticism could be regarded as fictitious, the repetition of this idea in 1.10, although modified, seems somewhat excessive, even if fictitiously pre-empting the criticism that would have been induced by his comments in 1.4, particularly with regard to Horace's criticisms of Lucilius, and therefore unlikely if Horace is not, in fact, being criticised for what he said in 1.4.

(which will be discussed in due course) and in 1.10 is more concerned with style (*verba*).⁶¹²

The overall impression of 1.10 is that it is less harshly critical of Lucilius than 1.4, and in 2.1 Lucilius is really only mentioned in terms of his being a praiseworthy example to Horace, and to add support to Horace's own defence of himself as a satirist. The criticism of Lucilius in terms of his style, as opposed to his content, and thus Horace's differentiation between the two, can be related to certain ideas expounded in earlier literary theory.

The distinction between style and content was made by Plato in terms of *ta epē* and *dianoia* in *Ion* 530b10-c4, and Aristotle in terms of *lexis* and *dianoia* (*Rhetoric* 1404a18-19);⁶¹³ it was also made by the Stoics, both with regard to rhetoric (D.L. 7.59)⁶¹⁴ and, it would seem, poetics (D.L. 7.60), where Posidonius differentiated between *poiema* and *poiesis* (the two constituent parts of the poetic art), defining *poiema* as "diction that is metrical or rhythmical with elaboration going beyond prose... *poiesis* significant poetic diction (i.e. *poiema*), containing an imitation of things divine and human."⁶¹⁵ From this distinction one can, I think, relate *poiema* to style (metrical form, the choice and order of words) and *poiesis* to content (i.e. the subject matter, although *poiema* is still a constituent part of *poiesis*). Philodemus too, in discussing the views of Neoptolemus of Parium,⁶¹⁶ makes a distinction between *poiema* and *poiesis*, but Philodemus differs from Posidonius, in that he regards *poiema* as a short poem, or part of a larger one, and *poiesis* a large poem, such as the *Iliad* (*On Poems* 5. col. xiv.26-xv 7 Mangoni, 1993)⁶¹⁷:

τον θανμα[στὸν] δ' αὖ- / τοῦ καὶ [τὸ] τῆ[ς] ποιήσεω[ς] / εἶναι τ[ῆ]ν ὑπόθεσιν
[μὲν- / νον, καὶ τοῦ ποιήματο[ς] καὶ / πάντων ὅλως τῆς ποιήσεω[ς] / ως ὄντων· ἡ
μὲν [γὰρ] πό/ησις καὶ π[ό]ημά γ' ἐστίν, / οἷον ἡ Ἰλι[ά]ς, οἱ δ' ἐπ[ὶ] πρῶτοι
στίχοι τρ[ι]άκ[οντα] τα[ύ]της / πόημα μ[έ]ν, οὐ μέντοι ποι- / ησις· καὶ τὸ

⁶¹² Oberhelman and Armstrong, 1995, 246-7.

⁶¹³ Porter, 1995, 99-100.

⁶¹⁴ There is a list of five virtues for good rhetoric: the first and last of these, *hellenismos* and *kataskewē* concerning style only, the second and third, *sapheneia* and *suntomia*, the link between style and content, and the fourth *prepon*, content.

⁶¹⁵ As translated by De Lacy, 1948a, 244.

⁶¹⁶ Brink, 1963, 45, puts Neoptolemus' date in the third Century B.C.

⁶¹⁷ This corresponds with Jensen 1923, col.xi 26-xii 7.

πόη[ματος μόνον τὴν [σύνθεσιν τῆς] λέξεως μ[ετέχειν...νὰς διανο[ίας.....]/
καὶ πράξεις καὶ π[ροσω-/ποποιί[ας].

‘It is amazing of (Neoptolemus) to claim that only the subject belongs to *poiesis*, when the *poiema* and everything else in general belong to it; for the (entire) *poiesis* is also “poetry”, for example the *Iliad*, but the first thirty lines of it are “poetry,” but not a *poiesis*: and that only the composition (σύνθεσις) of the diction belongs to “poetry,” [but not the?]. . . . thought . . . action and character-drawing. (tr. Armstrong, 1995, 219)

Neoptolemus’ definition is similar to Posidonius’, in that *poiema* constitutes form (i.e. verbal arrangement, which would thus correlate with style) and *poiesis* content/ subject-matter (ὑπόθεσις).⁶¹⁸ Neoptolemus in fact includes a third distinction, the poet himself, *poietes*. These are the three aspects of the *technē* of a poetic work.⁶¹⁹ Although Philodemus’ definition of *poiema* and *poiesis* is different from Neoptolemus’, being essentially quantitative whereas Neoptolemus’ definitions are aspectual, he nevertheless recognises style and content, as his criticisms of Neoptolemus above indicate, using similar terms to those used by Plato and Aristotle: poetry consists of a rational part that expresses meaning *dianoēma* (which could be aligned with content) and a part that appeals to an emotional, non-rational side through form (style: *synthesis tēs lexeōs*); and for Philodemus – unlike Neoptolemus – style and content are inseparable.⁶²⁰ *On Poems* 5 col. x. 32-11.2 (Jensen, 1923):

⁶¹⁸ Cf. Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1404b15, ὑπόθεσις = subject; Sextus Empiricus *M.* 3.3 *hypothesis* = subject (Brink, 1963, 92, n.3 and 4).

⁶¹⁹ Philodemus found the representation of the poet alongside these other distinctions as absurd (*On Poems* 5 col. xi. 5-11 Jensen). According to Porter (1995, 117), it appears that, in confrontational fashion, Philodemus was unwilling to accept these aspectual definitions with regard to the poetic *technē* as a whole; Neoptolemus means looking at the *technē* “with respect to” the style, or the content, or the poet; in the latter case this would mean that the poet makes a unique impression on the work. It seems to imply that one cannot look at a work, knowing the author, without this knowledge having some bearing on one’s impression of the work.

⁶²⁰ *On poems* 5.xii. 1-17 Jensen, 1923; Freudenburg, 1993, 141; *On Poems* 5 col xi [xiv] 26-xii [xv] 14, Jensen; Mangoni, 1993, in brackets; Armstrong, 1995, 218-9; Brink, 1963, 57-8.

.....Ἀλλὰ/ μὴν ὃ [γε Νεοπ]τόλεμος/ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔδοξε τὴν σύν-
θεσιν [τῆς λέξε]ως τῶν/ διανοημ[άτων χωρί-/ζε[ι]ν,

But Neoptolemus was wrongly of the opinion that style (*synthesis tēs lexeōs*) is separable from content (*dianoema*). (My translation)

The inseparability of style and content will be seen to be key to Philodemus' views on the effect of metathesis on poetry, which is relevant to Horace's position on poetry in *Satire* 1.4 (as discussed below, §7.6); but it is worth noting here that Horace certainly regards style and content as, in practice, very much entwined at *Ars Poetica* 38-47a.⁶²¹ Here he begins by talking about subject matter:

*sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, aequam
viribus.*

Take a subject, those of you who write, equal to your strength.⁶²²

And then, at 40:

..... *cui lecta potenter erit res,
nec facundia deseret hunc nec lucidus ordo.*

whoever will choose a theme within his range, neither speech will fail him, nor clearness of order.

Ordo here means aptness in the timing and arrangement of particular points, which relates to style; and then, at 46-47a Horace continues with style in terms of arrangement of individual words:

*in verbis etiam tenuis cautusque serendis
dixeris egregie, notum si callida verbum*

⁶²¹ Oberhelman and Armstrong, 1995, 250.

⁶²² Translations of *Ars Poetica*: Fairclough, 1926 (with adaptations).

reddiderit iunctura novum. (46-8)

Moreover with refined taste and care in weaving words together, you will express yourself excellently, if a skilful setting makes a familiar word new.

Thus, it appears that Horace too regards style and content as in practice inseparable.

However, although Horace apparently disagreed with Neoptolemus on the inseparability of style and content, it is likely that Horace drew from Neoptolemus' discussions of *poiema* and *poiesis* in the *Ars Poetica*.⁶²³ Brink divides the *Ars Poetica* into four sections: a brief introduction (1-40) followed by a section on order and style (40-118), a section on how to deal with subject-matter and the major genres of poetry that deal with those subjects (119-294) and the final part: concerning poetic criticism in general (295-476). Brink shows a correspondence between these sections and sections of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, and *ex hypothesi* (Neoptolemus drawing from Aristotle) Neoptolemus' fragments. He correlates 1-40 of *Ars Poetica* with *Poetics* chs 7-8; 40-118 with *Rhet.* 3 and *poiema* in Neoptolemus; 119-294 with *Poetics* (+ *Rhet.* 2, 12-14), and *poiesis* in Neoptolemus; and 295-476 with (possibly) *De poetis*, and *poietes* in Neoptolemus.⁶²⁴ On this basis there would seem to be – in a general sense at least – a division between style and content, in the second and third sections respectively: order, in the sense described by Horace, being essentially a presentational aspect of style.

Lucilius – perhaps not surprisingly, given Horace's criticism of him – does not appear to discuss style and content, although he does discuss *poiema* and *poiesis* (Warmington 10.403-7). Like Philodemus, he makes a quantitative distinction while also referring to a *poiesis* as a unified whole (as did Philodemus), so that his definitions are not, in fact, simply quantitative.⁶²⁵

pars est parva 'poema' < 'poesis.' >...

⁶²³ Brink, 1963, 43-78.

⁶²⁴ Brink, 1963, 138.

⁶²⁵ Brink, 1963, 64.

*epistula item quaevis non magna 'poema' est;
illa 'poesis' opus totum, ut tota Ilias una est,
una thesis sunt Annales Enni atque epos unum,
et maius multo est quam quod dixi ante 'poema.'*

A 'poema' is a small part of *poesis*. Again any epistle (in verse) which is not long is a *poema*, but the *poesis* above mentioned is a whole work just as the whole Iliad and the Annals of Ennius each make one theme and one epic; and it is a much bigger thing than that (namely, a *poema*) which I mentioned before. (tr. Warmington 1938)

Essentially, then, *poiema* and *poiesis* do not relate to style and content for Philodemus and Lucilius, but do for Neoptolemus and Posidonius; though Philodemus also recognises facets of the poetic art as pertaining to style and content, he sees *poiema* and *poiesis* more as quantitative distinctions in poetry (as does Lucilius). Neoptolemus regards *poiema* and *poiesis* aspectually as relating to style and content, and Posidonius makes a similar definition, though while Neoptolemus relates *poiema*, *poiesis* and *poietes* to the poetic art, Posidonius relates *poiema* simply to *poiesis* – as a constituent quantitative part of *poiesis* as well as an aspect of it (in terms of style or form rather than meaning, plot etc.); in a sense, Posidonius' definitions are a compromise between those of Neoptolemus and Philodemus. But, whatever the particular nuances in definition regarding *poiema* and *poiesis*, it is clear that ancient literary theorists, going back to Plato, made distinctions between style and content and these were seen as crucial to an understanding of what constitutes poetry, as will also be seen later in §7.6 with regard to Horace's discussion of what constitutes poetry in *Satire* 1.4.

7.3 Discussion of moral purpose in the *Ars Poetica*, and in Neoptolemus and Philodemus

A particular point in the *Ars Poetica* where Horace appears to disagree with Philodemus, and, one could say by extension, the Epicureans, and which is essential in assessing Horace's views on the writing of poetry, involves poetry's possible moral function. As has already been stated, Epicurus himself was disapproving of poetry because of its power to distort rational truth through the emotion rendered by its aesthetic. Although Philodemus was himself a poet as well as a philosopher, unlike Neoptolemus (*De Poem.* 5 col. 16, 10-14) and Horace (*Ars Poetica* 333-4), according to De Lacy⁶²⁶ he did not think that poetry should have the double function of creating a pleasing effect and of moral instruction. However, De Lacy's understanding of Philodemus' views on this issue should be measured against what is said at *On Poems* 5 col.i [iv] 1-21 (Jensen, Mangoni in brackets), where Philodemus says that poetry *can* be morally instructive, or not.⁶²⁷ And, furthermore, at col. xxiii [xxvi] 1-7 he says:

τῇ/ μὲν λέξει τὸ μ[εμ]ιμῆσθαι τὴν ὠφέλι[μα] πρὸς/ διδάσκουσιν,
τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ μεταξὺ μετ[εσχ]η/κέναι τῆς τῶν σοφῶν / καὶ τῆς
τῶν χυδαίων.

[the fixed goal of poetry is]... “in the words, to imitate perfectly that diction which contains useful teaching in addition (i.e. to being attractive) and to keep perfectly to a mean between the thoughts appropriate to the wise (or philosophical) and the thoughts appropriate to laymen.” (Tr. Armstrong, 1995, 217-8)

⁶²⁶ Philodemus *On Poems* 2 (Hausrath, 1889, p. 269): De Lacy, 1939, 89: Brink (1963, 54) points out the scantiness of evidence regarding the question, in Philodemus, of the relationship between philosophy and poetry, or the possible moral function of poetry.

⁶²⁷ Armstrong, 1995, 216.

This may seem somewhat at odds with the idea that poetry need not be instructive, but then it is only the *imitation* of useful teaching that is being suggested. It is not clear that Philodemus is talking specifically about moral instruction here either, though the reference to *sophōn* suggests a philosophical relevance. For example, he may mean that reading about courage in battle in Homer gives the impression to the reader that he is actually learning something about courage, but he is really only learning an imitation of what courage is; whereas philosophical prose would go into the matter more directly, with an eye for the exact truth.

In *On Music* 4 Philodemus regards song (and thus poems) as potentially having some morally beneficial value, but he also says that prose is a better medium for such thoughts (col. xx 11-17 Neubecker, 1986); the pleasurable aspects of song (as well as other circumstantial aspects) distract the listener from its moral content (col. xxviii 24-35).⁶²⁸ But unlike the anti-moralist critics, such as Crates, who regarded poetry as having no possible moral value,⁶²⁹ Philodemus held that poetry can certainly have a moral aspect and effect, even if it does not need any moral content to be good poetry *per se*. Also, because, for Philodemus, as will become clear, the content and style of a poem are inseparable and this content can contain a moral aspect, then such a moral aspect *can*, in fact, in so far as it is part of the content, have a bearing on the merit of the poetry.

Although one could still claim that Lucretius' poem is too technically philosophical to fall within this view of poetry and its moral purpose - described in the fragment above as aiming at thoughts intermediate between the philosopher and the layman (in spite of Lucretius' own desire for its general accessibility at 1.921) - the practical moral philosophy present in Horace's *Satires*, though recognisable to a reader with a philosophical education, is certainly accessible to the layman, or, at least, the moderately well-read. De Lacy,⁶³⁰ who understood Philodemus' position (and thus the contemporary Epicurean position) as being strongly opposed to such a double

⁶²⁸ Asmis, 1995, 155.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ De Lacy, 1939, 91.

function in poetry, explained Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* by suggesting (as others have)⁶³¹ that Lucretius was not affiliated with a contemporary Epicurean school. However, the fact that remains of *DRN* have been found in Philodemus' library at Herculaneum and that other poets in the circle around Philodemus, such as Virgil and, indeed, Horace,⁶³² wrote poetry that adhered to this double function, makes it likely that Philodemus was not, in fact, *opposed* to it. The difference between Philodemus and Horace (and Neoptolemus, whom Horace seems likely to have followed) on this issue is that Horace actually advocates the position that the function of poetry should be both moral and aesthetic (as he states on three occasions in *Ars Poetica*).⁶³³ In *Satires* 1.4 and 2.1 particularly, Horace actually defends his satire, primarily, on the basis of its moral purpose.

Thus, although Philodemus' views on the moral aspect of poetry are difficult to pin down definitively, it would appear that he thought that poetry could certainly have a moral aspect, which could be instructive, though that this was not a necessary function of poetry.

7.4 Lucilius, Old Comedy and Aristotle

Horace depicts the satirist (and thus himself) being criticised for going too far for the sake of a laugh at *Sat.* 1.4. 34-8. It is in response to such an accusation that Horace puts forward his views regarding the appropriate use of humour in an ethical, as well as a stylistic light. The depiction of the humorist at 34-6 (that Horace might be accused of being) seems likely, in fact, to represent what Horace would disapprove of - the implication being that Horace is certainly nothing like the *scurra* thus described (1.4.34-8):

..... dummodo risum

⁶³¹ Clay, 1983, 169ff.

⁶³² Kleve, 1997, 49-78; against this view: Sedley, 1998, 66. See also above, Chapter 4, §4.6.

⁶³³ *Ars Poetica* 99-100: *non satis est pulchra esse poemata: dulcia sunt/ et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunto*; 'It is not enough for poems to have beauty: they must have charm, and lead the hearer's soul where they will.' (tr. Fairclough, 1926, adapted) 333-4; 343-4.

*excutiat, sibi non, non cuiquam parcat amico;
et quodcumque semel chartis illeverit, omnis
gestiet a furno redeuntis scire lacuque,
et pueros et anus.*

As long as he extracts a laugh, he won't spare himself, he won't spare any friend; and whatever he's once scrawled on his pages he'll be itching for everyone to know as they return from the bakehouse and the water tank, both slave-boys and old women.

This appears to be an adoption of a view found in Aristotle's portrait of the *bomolochus*, as expressed at *NE* 4, 1128a4ff.⁶³⁴

*οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί,
γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα
ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον.*

Those then who go to excess in ridicule are thought to be buffoons and vulgar fellows, who itch to have their joke at all costs, and are more concerned to raise a laugh than to keep within the bounds of decorum and avoid giving pain to the object of their raillery.⁶³⁵

This characterisation of *bomolochia* or *scurrilitas* – of the man who has no sense of restraint in his desire for laughs – may well have passed from the Peripatetics to Panaetius,⁶³⁶ in that it appears in *De officiis* 1.134.⁶³⁷ In fact,

⁶³⁴ Hendrickson, 1900, 121-142; Fiske, 1920, 278. Muecke, 1979, 66.

⁶³⁵ Translation: Rackham, 1945.

⁶³⁶ Fiske, 1920, 278.

⁶³⁷ *De officiis* 1.134: *In primis provideat ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet esse in moribus: quod maxime tum solet evenire, cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi causa aut per ridiculum aut severe, maledice contumelioseque dicitur*; 'And above all he should be on the watch that his conversation shall not betray some defect in his character. This is most likely to occur when people jest or in earnest take delight in making malicious and slanderous statements about the absent, on purpose to injure their reputations.' (tr. Miller 1913) Again, in *De Oratore* (2.247) Cicero distinguishes between the *scurra* and the *orator*: Muecke, 1979, 63.

the depiction of someone laughing behind someone's back in *Off.* 1.134 is similar to Horace's depiction of the *scurra* at 1.4.87-9:

*.....e quibus unus amet quavis aspergere cunctos
praeter eum qui praebet aquam; post hunc quoque potus,
condita cum verax aperit praecordia Liber.*

One of these delights in casting all manner of aspersions on them all, except the one who's throwing the party; and later on him too, when he's tipsy enough and the truthful god of Freedom reveals the secrets of his heart.

It seems likely, then, bearing in mind the Ciceronian parallels, that these observations regarding appropriateness and limits in humour in Horace draw from a tradition traceable to Aristotle's criticisms of *bomolochia* in *NE* 4 1128aff. In this respect, the role of the satirist is shown to concern matters of conduct which relate to ethics. And this relationship is further enhanced by the fact that the satirist, and in particular Horace, regards moral instruction as part of the purpose of satire. If Horace (or any other satirist for that matter) takes it upon himself to lampoon others' behaviour on ethical grounds (e.g. in their propensity towards greed, ambition or adultery) then he should take particular care that in doing so he himself is not breaking the limits of reasonable conduct.

Horace, in fact, begins 1.4 with reference to the *libertas* – the outspoken censure - of his predecessors:

*Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae,
atque alii quorum comoedia prisca virorum est,
si quis erat dignus describi quod malus ac fur,
quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui
famosus, multa cum libertate notabant.
hinc omnis pendet Lucilius...*

The poets Eupolis, Cratinus and Aristophanes, and other exponents of Old Comedy, had this habit: if anyone deserved to be noted down for being a villain and a thief, for being an adulterer or an assassin or otherwise infamous, they would show great freedom of speech in branding him. On them Lucilius depends totally...

The claim that Lucilius was wholly dependent on Old Comedy is clearly a generalisation,⁶³⁸ but Horace's aim here still seems to be to put satire (including his own) in the context of a comic tradition that goes back to Eupolis, Cratinus and Aristophanes. However, Hendrickson,⁶³⁹ who was the first to note the Aristotelian influence of *NE* 1128a on 1.4, argued that Horace was actually distancing himself from this tradition, and the satire of Lucilius. Hendrickson regarded Horace's alignment of Lucilius with Old Comedy as suggesting that Lucilius' brand of humour was closer to that of the *scurra* or *bomolochus*, in line with Aristotle's criticism of Old Comedy as *bomolochia* at *NE* 1128a. And, as we have seen, Horace appears to be drawing from these Aristotelian views at 1.4.34-8, 83-5. On these grounds it seems inconsistent to claim that Horace is not criticising Lucilius. However, even if one grants the likelihood of an Aristotelian influence, it does not necessarily follow that Horace would adhere to Aristotelian theory quite that assiduously. Indeed, Freudenburg⁶⁴⁰ has accepted the interpretation that Horace adopts an Aristotelian view regarding the practice of comedy, but has also rightly maintained that Horace is not criticising Lucilian humour and Old Comedy.

Certainly, as Freudenburg points out,⁶⁴¹ Horace's position, taking on the opposed theories of Aristotle's moderate approach to comedy and the more extreme, outspoken, even malevolent tendency of Old Comedy, ought, logically, to be irreconcilable. Aristotle preferred the more subtle approach of New Comedy, the comedy of his own day, as he indicates at 1128a2-5. Indeed, as can also be inferred from Plutarch's *Comparatio Aristophanis et*

⁶³⁸ Rudd, 1966, 89; Shackleton Bailey, 1982, 27.

⁶³⁹ Hendrickson, 1900, 121-142; also: Fiske, 1920, 277-306; and Lejay, 1911, xlvii-l.

⁶⁴⁰ Freudenburg, 1993, 52-109; Hunter, 1985, 480-90.

⁶⁴¹ Freudenburg, 1993, 52-4.

Menandri, Aristotle's rejection of Old Comedy as *bomolochia*, and Horace's approval of Old Comedy do not, theoretically, sit well together.⁶⁴²

Freudenburg looks into these two opposing theories regarding comedy: the Peripatetic (represented by Menander) and - as Freudenburg puts it - the iambographic,⁶⁴³ (i.e. from *iambizo*, to lampoon, rather than necessarily denoting metrical form - represented by Aristophanes) and notes that the latter, through its continuation by the Cynics and the diatribe, would have been a recognised rival to Aristotelian theory in the Hellenistic period and up until Horace's time.⁶⁴⁴ Thus the idea that the allusion to Aristotelian theory on *bomolochia* shows an absolute adherence to it starts to become questionable: rather, Horace sees value in both these comedic approaches. An illustration of his disparate tastes is attested at *Sat.* 2.3.11-12:⁶⁴⁵

*quorsum pertinuit stipare Platona Menandro,
Eupolin Archilocho, comites educere tantos?*

What aim did it serve, then, to pack in Plato with Menander, Eupolis with Archilochus, to take such mighty companions away with you?

However, although Freudenburg maintains that Horace takes on both traditions and thus makes "a unique contribution to ancient theories of poetic *libertas*,"⁶⁴⁶ he regards Horace's position as, logically, impossible and absurd. Although he argues convincingly for the existence of this hybrid, Horatian

⁶⁴² Freudenburg, 1993, 91; Hunter, 1985, 488.

⁶⁴³ Freudenburg (1993, 78) notes that Horace's identification with the tradition of invective, rather than the Aristotelian, is further evidenced in his *Epodes* 6. 11-16; also *Epistles* 1.19.21-5. Hendrickson's (1900, 121-41) argument that 1.4 is programmatic in that, from then on, Horace abandons Lucilian invective and the tradition of Old Comedy for a gentler Aristotelian approach could, strictly speaking, still stand, bearing in mind the fact that the *Epodes* were likely to have been composed before 1.4. But to reject the tradition of Old Comedy totally, in favour of the Peripatetic theory and New Comedy, given the *Epodes* and *Sat.* 1.2, seems to be an unlikely (and very obliquely implied) u-turn. Also, at 1.10.16-17, he openly praises Old Comedy.

⁶⁴⁴ Freudenburg, 1993, 72-86.

⁶⁴⁵ As noted by Hunter, 1985, 490.

⁶⁴⁶ Freudenburg, 1993, 108.

theory, he does not really explain how this theory, in the context of satire, works.

Horace's theory works by his extolling the virtues of both these antithetical positions, and implicitly criticising their shortfalls. In the opening lines of 1.4 the important point to note is that those who are liable to outspoken criticism from the Old Comic poets are unquestionably wrongdoers: lampooning those who deserve such treatment is justified (a point that Horace discusses, with regard to himself and Lucilius, in 2.1). But to lampoon the undeserving, and to do so merely for the sake of a laugh (i.e. without any moral purpose) is clearly wrong, as exemplified in the two recognisably Aristotelian/Ciceronian depictions of *bomolochia* at 1.4.34-8 and 81-85. In fact, the tradition of invective practised in Old Comedy and continued through the Cynics would more clearly be suited to satire than the gentler, more impersonal approach propounded by Aristotle. Horace therefore uses Aristotelian theory to set ethical limits (which, ultimately, must be decided at the poet's discretion) to a form of comedy which, in its very essence, is opposed to such Aristotelian theory. This conflict is deliberate: on the one hand satire has to exercise *libertas* to be effective, but when the use of such *libertas* concerns moral advice and reproof, then it must itself be subjected to moral constraints, and this is indicated by Horace's application of Aristotelian theory. An exact exposition of Horatian theory regarding humour is not offered in the literary satires. Although a judgement can be made by measuring Horace's position against the tradition of Old Comedy and lampoon, and Peripatetic/Ciceronian theory, it is ultimately in keeping with the style of the *sermo* that these opposing theories need not, explicitly, be recognised. Horace is rather telling us that he is aware of both positions and thus implies that his aim is to steer a path adhering to both, but without being too extreme or partisan in either direction.

As to the question of his criticism of Lucilius in particular, 1.4, while certainly being a defence of Horace himself, is also a defence of the satirist in general, and thus of Lucilius.⁶⁴⁷ Horace criticises Lucilius for his style not his content and not, therefore, his humour. Furthermore, the fact that Horace

⁶⁴⁷ Brink, 1963, 157. Rudd, 1966, 89; Muecke, 1979, 57.

openly praises Lucilius for his wit both in 1.4, 1.10 and 2.1 surely does not square with his finding Lucilius' humour distasteful or particularly excessive. In addition, I do not agree with the view that Horace is criticising Lucilius for his propensity towards invective at 1.10.11-15:

*et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso,
defendente vicem modo rhetoris atque poetae,
interdum urbani, parcentis viribus atque
extenuantis eas consulto. ridiculum acri
fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res.*

And a style is needed that is sometimes stern, often playful, maintaining the part now of the orator and poet, sometimes of the civilised individual who reserves his strength and deliberately underplays it. Humour decides great issues more forcefully and more effectively than severity.

While Freudenburg rightly makes the point that this passage is dealing with poetic style rather than invective versus innuendo anyway,⁶⁴⁸ it also seems that at 1.10.11-15 Horace is making general points as to what he regards as good style in writing satire, and that these points are no longer, specifically, made with reference to Lucilius.

7.5 Ethics: the moral function of Horatian Satire

Although ethics has already been partly discussed in relation to Horace's theory of satire, ethics is clearly an important component of Horatian satire itself, in terms of its moral function. In *Sat.* 2.1 Horace's defence of his satire rests on the fact that it has such a function (and he points to the example of Lucilius in justifying his approach). However, ethical concerns themselves are dealt with more specifically in 1.4. At 1.4.105ff Horace compares himself

⁶⁴⁸ Freudenburg, 1993, 102. Unlike Rudd, 1966, 97-8, and Brown, 1993, 185.

with his father in order to explain the method by which the moral function of satire is put into practice. But the ethical content of satire is really introduced at 25, where he takes up moral themes from the first three satires:

..... *Quemvis media elige turba:*
aut ob avaritiam aut misera ambitione laborat;
hic nuptarum insanit amoribus, hic puerorum:
hunc capit argenti splendor... (25-28)

Choose anyone you like from the midst of a crowd: he's oppressed either with avarice or the wretchedness of ambition; this one's crazy with passion for married women, this one for boys: this one's a prisoner to the gleam of silver...

Omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas. (33)

All these are afraid of verses, and hate poets.

Later, at 1.4.105ff, Horace describes his satirical method and in so doing explains the practical link between satire and ethics. Two examples follow which show his father giving advice by way of observation of people's folly and their consequent undoing. The first involves the vice of prodigality, brought up in 1.2.7-11, and, in terms of the resultant Epicurean advice (as it is presented by Horace) of living within one's means, in *Satires* 1.1 and 2 more generally:

“nonne vides Albi ut male vivat filius, utque
Baius inops? magnum documentum ne patriam rem
perdere quis velit.”

“Don't you see how Albius' son leads a wretched existence, and how Baius is penniless? A fine lesson to anyone not to squander the family fortune!” (1.4.109-111).

The second example relates his father's advice against infatuation with a prostitute or pursuing a sexual relationship with a married woman (111f).⁶⁴⁹ Here Horace's own advice in 1.2 is obviously brought to mind. More importantly though, his father's explanation for his advisory observations at 115-120 is clearly a reflection of Horace's explanation for his satirical method: its underlying moral purpose. It is summed up at 115-116, (*sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu/ sit melius, causas reddet tibi*; 'a philosopher will give you theories as to what it's better to avoid and to pursue') in terms reminiscent of 1.2.74-6 and 1.3.114, where Horace advises, through observation, what should be sought and what avoided, within a noticeably Epicurean framework.⁶⁵⁰

Indeed, in quoting his father as referring to what a *sapiens* advises (and thus what Horace's father advises by example) Horace is deliberately indicating that his father's instruction, even if in an apparently incidental way, would be similar to that of a philosopher. The thought here is very similar, in fact, to one expressed in *Republic* (1.2) where Cicero maintains that one can come to the same ethical conclusions, through practical (non-theoretical) experience, as philosophers do by theoretical argument. Horace is also highlighting the notion of Roman wisdom passed down through the generations (116-17) – as he does in *Satire* 2.2, when relating Ofellus' precepts; but what is notable in both these examples is that the moral advice given essentially comprises sentiments recognisable from philosophical doctrine.⁶⁵¹ Indeed, although *sapiens* at 115 need not refer to a particular school or to systematic philosophy at all, Epicureanism is clearly implied in the preceding examples and their relationship with sentiments already expressed in the first three satires.

⁶⁴⁹ As Brown (1993, 137) rightly notes, his father does not disapprove of his son using a prostitute, but of his shameful passion *turpi... amore* (1.4.111). This distinction is further reinforced by the fact that in his warning against the pursuit of married women, he suggests seeking gratification that would be permissible, *concessa... Venere*, and which could reasonably include (as in 1.2) a *meretrix*.

⁶⁵⁰ See Chapter 2. Although the context here points to Epicureanism, the notion of choice and avoidance also appears in Aristotle (*Topics* 5.6. 135b15, *Motion of Animals* 8. 701b34, *NE* 3.12 1119a22, *Rhetoric* 1.5 1360b5) and Stoicism (*SVF* 3.24, 62, 88, 118, 262) – I owe these references to R.W. Sharples.

⁶⁵¹ On *Satire* 2.2, see Chapter 3.

Muecke⁶⁵² draws a comparison between Horace's description of his father's moral teaching (and thus his own method of satire) and *ethologia*: a method of teaching through the observation of examples, as mentioned by Seneca (*Ep.* 95. 65-6) in connection with the Stoic Posidonius:

Ait utilem futuram et descriptionem cuiusque virtutis; hanc Posidonius ethologian vocat, quidam characterismon appellant, signa cuiusque virtutis ac vitii et notas reddentem, quibus inter se similia discriminantur. Haec res eandem vim habet quam praecipere. nam qui praecipit dicit 'illa facies si voles temperans esse,' qui describit ait 'temperans est qui illa facit, qui illis abstinet'. quaeris quid interest? alter praecepta virtutis dat, alter exempla.'

He remarks that it will also be useful to illustrate each particular virtue; this science Posidonius calls *ethologia*, while others call it *characterismos*. It gives the signs and marks which belong to each virtue and vice, so that by them distinction may be drawn between like things. Its function is the same as that of a precept. For he who utters precepts says: "if you would have self-control, act that way!" He who illustrates says: "the man who acts that way, and refrains from certain other things, possesses self-control." What's the difference? you ask. The one gives precepts of virtue, the other examples. (tr. Gummere, 1925/1967 adapted)

The character-sketch of the pest in 1.9 and the immoderate, inconsistent singer Tigellius at 1.3.3-19, would also appear to be examples of *ethologia*. Indeed *ethologia* can be seen as very much in the tradition of the character-sketches of Aristotle and Theophrastus, (see §7.1, Chapter 5, §§5.3, 5.4) which, as we have seen, were clearly intended to be morally instructive. Seneca goes on to give examples of *ethologia* from poetry (Virgil, *Georgics* 11.77-81) and, historically, in the *exemplum* of Cato (*Ep.* 95.68-73), so relating *exempla* in literature generally to ethics, and implying that Posidonius' own historical

⁶⁵² Muecke, 1979, 66.

work was *ethologia*.⁶⁵³ Indeed the use of *exempla* for generally moral purposes featured widely in literature and historiography – for example, in the works of Horace’s near contemporary, Livy (e.g., in his preface Livy points to the early Romans as examples of good moral conduct). And it seems unlikely that Horace’s use of moral *exempla* is necessarily a reflection of a specifically Posidonian influence – rather, that Posidonius was particularly aware of the instructive potential of such characterisations. Seneca’s discussion of *ethologia* also shows that characterisation for moral purposes in literature generally would have been associated with ethics by Horace’s readership - as philosophical discussions of Homer demonstrate.⁶⁵⁴

7.6 Is Satire Poetry?

Horace’s position as to the moral purpose of satire is clear, but his position regarding its literary status is not so straightforward. At 1.4.39-62 Horace apparently claims that he does not regard himself as a poet. The passage begins (39-44):

*primum ego me illorum, dederim quibus esse poetis,
excerpam numero: neque enim concludere versum
dixeris esse satis; neque si qui scribat uti nos
sermoni propiora, putes hunc esse poetam.
ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinator atque os
magna sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem.*

First, I wouldn’t include myself amongst those I’d recognise as poets, because you wouldn’t say it’s enough to turn out a metrical line, nor, supposing someone wrote, like me, what’s pretty near conversational prose, would you think him a poet. Someone with genius, with

⁶⁵³ Edelstein and Kidd, 1988, 651.

⁶⁵⁴ See above, §7.1 on Stoics and Homer; Chapter 1, §1.2 (ii) on Philodemus and Homer.

inspiration, and a voice capable of mighty resonance, is the one you'd dignify with this title.

Most commentators have taken 1.4.39-62 more or less at face value:⁶⁵⁵ while Horace's claim not to be a poet (with regard to his *Satires*) is perhaps, in one way, ironically self-deprecating, in another it is nevertheless clear that he is not an epic poet or a tragedian and, indeed, he has not yet taken up the lyric form. But aside from the specific issue of the literary categorisation of Horatian satire, it seems that on the surface Horace is simply pointing out generic differences within poetry⁶⁵⁶ and, on this point at least, he can surely be taken at face value. However, there have recently been two studies⁶⁵⁷ which interpret the passage as being a strong indication that Horace does, in fact, regard his satire as poetry of a high kind, and both studies refer to earlier literary theory, in Aristotle and Philodemus, to support their arguments.

Perhaps not surprisingly the introduction to the discussion of the literary/poetic status of satire is illogical. Some commentators have remarked upon the conversational tone of the discussion,⁶⁵⁸ prompted by the statement 'all these fear verses and hate poets', *omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas* (33) i.e. all those fools and wrongdoers to whom Horace has been generally referring in the preceding lines 25-32. But little has been said about the illogicality of the consequent claim that Horace is exempt from such hatred because he is not a poet.⁶⁵⁹ It is illogical because all those who hate poets (33) do not, in fact, hate poets as Horace apparently understands the term - they hate satirists. And Horace certainly *is* a satirist.

This illogical basis to his line of defence should perhaps warn the reader of the doubtful seriousness and rationale behind Horace's apparent claims about the literary status of his own satire. Oberhelman and Armstrong,

⁶⁵⁵ e.g. Brink, 1963, 162-3, though he regards this passage as rather extreme; Grube, 1968, 232; Fraenkel, 1957, 126-7; Rudd, 1966, 92; Brown, 1993, 130-1.

⁶⁵⁶ So Brown, 1993, 131: "The real object of the passage is to distinguish between grand poetry, like epic, and less elevated poetry, like comedy and satire."

⁶⁵⁷ Freudenburg, 1993, 119-128; Oberhelman and Armstrong, 1995, 233-254.

⁶⁵⁸ e.g. Fraenkel, 1957, 127, who comments: "this whole section is clearly marked as a digression."

⁶⁵⁹ Brown simply draws attention to a "verbal quibble;" Rudd, 1966, 90, following the argument as presented: "In other words 'you may hate poets, but you shouldn't hate me, for I'm no poet.'"

and Freudenburg, have interpreted the passage 1.4.39-62 as in fact ironically indicating that Horace's satire is, indeed, poetry. The former two make the fair point, before explaining their reasoning, that one should be guarded in taking Horace at face value.⁶⁶⁰ Then, in their analysis of the poem, they draw attention to the fact that in the opening lines Horace labels Eupolis, Cratinus and Aristophanes as poets, in order to strengthen their argument that Horace would thus (in belonging to this comedy/satire tradition) see himself as a poet.⁶⁶¹ But why should one take Horace at face value in line 1, but not in the discussion at 39-62? If one follows the progression of 1.4 as a whole, it seems more likely that Horace refers to Aristophanes et al. as poets at the beginning, since that is how they would have been generally regarded, but then questions labelling them (and himself) as such later on, when he can address the question both in more detail and in a broader context. That is not to say, necessarily, that he does *not* regard himself as a poet, but merely that as a satirist he is not the kind of poet he describes at 43-4. In fact, it could be that Horace deliberately refers to the writers of Old Comedy as poets at the beginning almost to prompt the discussion of considering their status as such at 45ff.

At the end of the satire, however, Horace appears to refer to himself as a poet:

*multa poetarum veniat manus auxilio quae
sit mihi (nam multo plures sumus).*

A great band of poets would come to my assistance (because we're very much in the majority). (141-2)

Oberhelman and Armstrong regard this as Horace again claiming status as a poet – and that this should be taken *prima facie*; but again, why should this be taken as such and not 39-62? And it is also questionable whether Horace is attaching the same significance to the term *poeta* here as he does at 39-62. However, at this stage I am not claiming that Oberhelman's and Armstrong's

⁶⁶⁰ Oberhelman and Armstrong, 1995, 235.

⁶⁶¹ Oberhelman and Armstrong, 1995, 239.

analysis is necessarily at fault, but simply pointing out the difficulties in interpretation which arise with regard to the question of what should and should not be taken at face value.

In fact, Oberhelman's and Armstrong's argument relies, for the most part, on an application of Philodemean literary theory, which suggests that Horace, in his meticulous use of word order, is very much affirming his position as a poet - and this would have been recognised by his readers.⁶⁶² The hints that Horace gives that his claim that he is not a poet is disingenuous are, for example, the elision of *primum* into *ego* and *me* into *illorum* (line 39), thus suggesting that Horace *is* one of the poets he claims, on the surface, not to be;⁶⁶³ the alliteration at the end of line 46 (*acer spiritus ac vis*) - obviously dependent on word order and so showing that comedy *is* poetry; the subjunctives *dixeris*, *putes*, *des* and *excerpam*, which suggest that these statements be taken as theoretical, and thus not necessarily representing Horace's real view; and the very fact that Horace is discussing metathesis would alert readers to Horace's word order.⁶⁶⁴

This is all in spite of the fact that at face value Horace argues that adherence to metre (39-42) and use of word order (56b-62) are not enough for verses to qualify as real poetry:

.....his, ego quae nunc,
 olim quae scripsit Lucilius, eripias si
 tempora certa modosque et quod prius ordine verbum est
 posterius facias, praeponens ultima primis,
 non, ut si solvas 'postquam Discordia taetra

⁶⁶² Oberhelman and Armstrong, 1995, 240-44. (What follows is essentially a summary of Oberhelman's and Armstrong's argument.)

⁶⁶³ Oberhelman and Armstrong (1995, 240 n.40) refer to Anderson (1982, 24-5), who previously commented on these elisions, regarding them as showing the *difference* between Horace and the epic poets and tragedians to which he is referring. Oberhelman and Armstrong give as another example of elisions undercutting the surface meaning in Horace, *Epistles* 1.1.3 *me includere ludo* (*mincLUDere LUDO* – as Oberhelman and Armstrong illustrate): Horace does (in a sense) still include himself in the 'old school' (the gladiatorial/lyric school). However, the wordplay here may rather emphasise that it is Maecenas' *wish* that Horace remain shut in his old school. As Mayer (1994, 88) points out, "the invitation is unintentionally the reverse of kind, for the compassionate redeemed gladiators."

⁶⁶⁴ Oberhelman and Armstrong (1995, 243).

*Belli ferratos postis portasque refregit',
invenias etiam disiecti membra poetae.* (1.4.56 b-62)

with these verses which I'm writing now or which Lucilius wrote before me, if you stripped away the pattern of the quantities and rhythm and put the earlier words later, interchanging first and last, you wouldn't find – as you would if you broke up 'when once foul Discord broke open the iron posts and gates of War – the limbs of even a dismembered poet.

However, Oberhelman and Armstrong note that this argument is at odds with the views of Philodemus, who regards style and content as inseparable,⁶⁶⁵ and holds that any change in style – including a change in word order, as well as words - must result in a change in thought (and therefore content): *P. Herc.* 1676 fr. IX = Treatise C col. ix Sbordone (22-28):

[ἡμε[ί]ς δὲ τὸν [/ δ[ε]χό[μεν]ον ἀμετάθ[ε]τ[ο]ν [ἄλλ]ης συνθεία[ς
/ὕ]παρχ[ού]ς]ης τὸν νο[ῦ]ν τῶ[ν] π[ο]ητῶν, εἰκαίως/ ἐ]παινεῖν ἐροῦμεν ἢ
[περι/κόπτειν

But we will say that the man ... who accepts that the thought of the poet is unchanged, if another form of speech is used, is praising or blaming it to no purpose. (tr. Oberhelman and Armstrong, 1995, 245)

Indeed, according to Philodemus, the style should be exactly appropriate to the content - which, as we saw earlier in the discussion of style and content, is a view which Horace seems to imply at *Ars Poetica* 38-47: *P. Herc.* 1676 fr. Xii = col. I Sbordone (14-17):

διόπερ ὁ [ποητῆς μὴ/ τὰς λέξεις οἰκείας [λαβὼν/ ἐκτός ἐστι τῆς τέχνης...

⁶⁶⁵ See above, §7.2.

Therefore, the poet who does not use expressions suited to his subject (*lexeis oikeias*) is outside of the art. (tr. Oberhelman and Armstrong, 1995, 247)

The inseparability of style and content can be shown, according to Philodemus, by the fact that true poetry is destroyed when either the style or content is altered.

Metathesis, the rearrangement of words (in this instance not letters), should prove, if such rearrangement destroys the effect of the verse, whether or not the words as they originally stood constituted poetry. The point of metathesis as a method of poetic criticism was in fact to show that by a change in the arrangement of the words (i.e. the *sunthesis*, though not the choice, the *ekloge* of words) the new arrangement of words would be inferior to the original arrangement, if that original arrangement constituted good poetry.⁶⁶⁶ It was primarily used to analyse style. Philodemus regarded this method of poetic criticism as limited: technically it can be used to tell whether or not something is a poem, but it cannot be used as a judge of style alone, because style and content are inseparable: *any* change in style, must also, in some way cause a change in thought (and thus content).⁶⁶⁷ Thus metathesis as a method of criticising poetic *style* alone was impossible (hence the title of Oberhelman's and Armstrong's article). This means that, by Philodemus' reckoning, the poem *as a whole* (and thus its style and content) would also be affected by metathesis, and, if originally good poetry, made worse by it. From this the implication is that through metathesis it is clear that Horace's poetry, which in its deliberate word order suggests subtleties in meaning, and therefore content, would clearly be damaged, in terms of both style and content; and this is an indication that Horace's satire *is* poetry.

⁶⁶⁶ Greenberg (1958, 262-70) looks, at first, at Dionysius' discussion of metathesis, where a change in metre is specified, and then looks at the views on metathesis of Crates, Heraclodorus and the *kritikoi*, where the point of metathesis is to gauge the value of the synthesis (though not necessarily with a change in metre) apart from the choice of words (also relating to style) and the content.

⁶⁶⁷ Philodemus, cols. vii.25-viii.5 (*On Poems* 2, *P.Herc* 1676 Heidmann 1937) "They are accustomed to present innumerable verses, such as those of Homer and of the other epics, which differ according to the variations. However, we must assert that the thought becomes better or worse through the metatheses." (tr. Greenberg, 1958, 267)

Such theory is in total contrast to Horace's surface argument, where, in lines 60-62 he quotes Ennius to show that even if Ennius' words are rearranged, they still constitute true poetry – which, he claims, does not hold for his or Lucilian satire. But, according to Philodemean theory, it is the very claim that Ennius' words (in this instance, at least) would not be affected by metathesis that would prove that they are *less* poetic than the words of Horace, which, it appears, would be destroyed by metathesis.⁶⁶⁸

So, in a passage where Horace is discussing word order, his own use of word order, by comparison with a 'real' poet such as Ennius, shows that he (Horace) is a real poet. These observations are in themselves convincing, but taken in the context of the discussion from 33ff and the whole poem, it is difficult to attach to them quite the importance Oberhelman and Armstrong suggest. Horace may certainly be showing his verbal dexterity as well as indicating that, from a Philodemian perspective, he writes real poetry - and to those familiar with Philodemus' views on metathesis and poetry, a humorous irony could be detectable here; and anyway this does not necessarily negate the statements he makes earlier, of the reasonable distinction between satire (and comedy) and poetry written in the grand style. However, Horace clearly wants to indicate that his satire is technically poetic, and it appears that knowledge of Philodemian literary theory on the nature of language, and what constitutes poetry is relevant to a proper understanding 1.4.56-62.

Freudenburg's analysis, although independent, complements that of Oberhelman and Armstrong, though he bases his argument on Aristotelian literary theory: in particular that *mimesis* is the major defining aspect of poetry, as at *Poetics* 1451b27-29:

δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν μᾶλλον τῶν μύθων εἶναι δεῖ ποιητὴν ἢ τῶν μέτρων, ὅσῳ ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ἐστίν, μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις.

Thus, from this it is clear that the poet should be more a maker of stories than a maker of rhythms, insofar as he is a poet by virtue of

⁶⁶⁸ Philodemus' theory is connected to Epicurean atomistic theory and the theory of language as seen in Lucretius, where letters correlate with *elementa*, and words are seen to change their meaning by the alteration or removal of letters *DRN*: 1.196-8; 823-27; 907-914 (Armstrong, 1995, 210-232; Greenberg, 1958, 262-70).

imitation, and he is an imitator of actions. (tr. Freudenburg, 1993, 121)⁶⁶⁹

At 41-2 Horace appears to suggest that his satire does not deserve the title of poetry because it is almost conversational prose (*sermoni propiora*), and at 47b-8: *nisi quod pede certo/ differt sermoni, sermo merus*; ‘apart from the fact that it differs from prose by its set metre, it’s unadulterated prose.’

Freudenburg argues that, according to Aristotelian theory, such a claim would assert, rather than negate, the fact that comedy and satire is poetry.⁶⁷⁰ And, since Horace’s readers would be familiar with these Aristotelian views, his apparent disqualification of his own poetic status would be recognised as “overtly inept.”⁶⁷¹

However, the exact meaning of *sermo* in this context requires some consideration. On the one hand it could mean, as Freudenburg would have it, ‘conversation’ (so supporting his Aristotelian, *mimesis* argument) or, on the other, it could mean ‘prose’, which would be a very explicit way of saying *not* poetry. At face value the argument would seem to suggest the latter meaning, as being in deliberate antithesis to poetry,⁶⁷² and for this reason it may be doubtful that Horace’s readers saw this as ‘overtly inept’ but rather, in the context, simply understood Horace as meaning poetry as opposed to prose, or indeed conversational prose, rather than conversation in particular.

However, in lines 48-53, the example from New Comedy of the father being angry with his wayward son, although intended at first to show an *acer spiritus ac vis* (46) in comedy, then suggests, in fact, the likeness between comedy and everyday conversation, which could support the Aristotle/*mimesis* argument:⁶⁷³

⁶⁶⁹ Freudenburg (1993, 121) also refers to Aristotle to make a similar point to that of Oberhelman and Armstrong concerning metathesis: at *Poetics* 1451a30-35 Aristotle discusses the importance of the unity of all the parts (*ta mera*) and how rearrangement or removal of one part affects the whole.

⁶⁷⁰ Freudenburg, 1993, 124-5.

⁶⁷¹ Freudenburg, 1993, 128.

⁶⁷² Brown, 1993, 46, translates *sermo* in line 42 as ‘conversational prose’, so combining both meanings, at 49 simply ‘prose’ (as opposed to poetry).

⁶⁷³ Freudenburg, 1993, 124.

.....*numquid Pomponius istis*
audiret leviora, pater si viveret?

Would Pomponius get a lesser dressing down were his father still
alive? (52-3)

But even if one were to accept the application of Aristotelian theory in these lines (or indeed in the passage 39-62 as a whole), one could interpret Horace here as actually *criticising* the Aristotelian tenet that *mimesis* is the most important defining aspect of poetry. Indeed, presumably, by the application of this theory, the mime-artist Laberius referred to with apparent contempt, and as explicitly *not* a real poet at *Sat.* 1.10.5-6, would be considered a poet (...*nam sic/ et Laberi mimos ut pulchra poemata mirer*). Also, the surface argument in Horace that metre is not the defining characteristic of poetry (39-41) is also to be found in Aristotle (as Freudenburg notes, though only to show up that *mimesis* is the defining characteristic)⁶⁷⁴ and it seems that the view that comedy was not, strictly, poetry, because of its closeness to colloquial speech was not uncommon. Brink draws attention to a passage in Cicero (*Orator* 67) where it is noted that Plato and Democritus are regarded by some as more poetic, because of their style and inspiration, than the verse of comedy, which is so close to everyday speech.⁶⁷⁵ While Horace's apparent assertion that he is not himself a poet (at least not yet) can be interpreted as a little extreme and thus somewhat disingenuous, the distinction being made between comedy and satire, and poetry of the grand style, is surely real enough, and Horace may quite reasonably be hinting that Aristotle's stress on the importance of *mimesis* is as extreme (though that is not to say that it is entirely wrong) as his own claim that satire is not poetry.

Although the arguments of Freudenburg, and Oberhelman and Armstrong, supporting the presence of Aristotelian and Philodemean literary

⁶⁷⁴ Aristotle *Poet.* 1, 1447b15; 9,1451b27.

⁶⁷⁵ Cicero *Orator* 67: *Itaque video visum esse nonnullis Platonis et Democriti locutionem, etsi absit a versu, tamen, quod incitatius feratur et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius poema putandum quam comicorum poetarum, apud quos, nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est aliud cotidiani dissimile sermonis*: Brink, 1963, 162-3: also cited by Lejay, 1911, and Kiessling and Heinze (1957, first published 1886, 76-7).

theory to determine Horace's position regarding the literary categorisation of satire (particularly his own), are both enlightening and in some respects convincing, the resultant conclusions - that Horace is, in fact, wholly asserting that as a satirist he is indeed a poet - are too definitive. The fact that Horace can be taken in several ways, with regard to his possible irony or at face value, and with regard to Aristotelian and Philodemian literary theory, suggests that Horace would rather not categorise himself or his satires in the way in which Freudenburg and Oberhelman and Armstrong have attempted. Although, in 1.10.81-8, he associates himself with other contemporary poets, this is rather in their capacity as literary artists he admires, and whom others would regard as the major literary figures of the day - irrespective of particular distinctions between satire and poetry.

Furthermore, one should bear in mind that although 1.4 certainly deals with literary issues, it is also a satire. The interrelation of points is not systematic: it is not a treatise on literary theory. Indeed, perhaps for that reason more than any other, one should be guarded in taking Horace at face value. And when Horace sweepingly states that he is not a poet, and then indirectly shows, through the application of earlier literary theory, that he is, he is in fact deliberately leaving the question open to interpretation. Also, at face value, the point that 'real' poetry, by Horace's reckoning, should be in the grand style, is an understandable view, and suggests a reasonable antithesis to the possible arguments implied by Aristotelian and Philodemian literary theory. His irony seems to express, more than anything else, his ultimate independence.

7.7 Conclusion

For the ancients, there were points of contact between literary theory and philosophy which would perhaps seem less concrete today. The key interconnections which have underscored the philosophical relevance of literary theory in this discussion are the moral impact of literature on society – and thus its possible moral function – and the psychological nature of ancient ethics, of observance of character and human behaviour, which is clearly

pertinent to the representation of character and behaviour in literature, and indeed in Horace's *Satires*.

Although Horace was likely to have been influenced by Philodemus, it seems that in terms of the moral function of poetry, he sided with Neoptolemus. In *Satire* 1.4 Horace concentrates on the moral purpose of satire, with particular reference to the use of *exempla*, which also, as discussed partly here and in a different context in Chapter 5, was pertinent to Peripatetic ethics.

Philodemus and Neoptolemus also seem to have been influential in respect of Horace's views on what constitutes poetry in terms of style and content. The nature of language and its meaning was important to philosophers, and Philodemus' views on metathesis are key to a realisation that Horace's position on satire in 1.4 should not simply be taken at face value. And Horace's elusive position is further reinforced by references to satire's realism, which points to Aristotle's theory of *mimesis*. It seems that he is playing with certain prevalent ideas in literary theory, so as to ask the reader what *he* thinks constitutes real poetry.

The discussion of comedy in Aristotle relating to *bomolochia*, while being an observance of a certain type, also has a more directly moral pertinence in that Aristotle – and Horace – did not approve of this kind of over-the-top comedy, and this itself is clearly a moral position. The Aristotelian influence in 1.4 indicates Horace's moral stance with regard to satire: in its essential *libertas* (which serves a moral purpose) satire requires ethical constraints.

Chapter 8

Religion and Superstition

8.1 Introduction

In his myths and cosmology Plato⁶⁷⁶ put forward religious ideas, and religion was also considered by Aristotle⁶⁷⁷ (to a lesser extent), and by the Stoics and Epicureans. In addition to this, a theistic religion can be seen as an established part of Graeco-Roman cultural tradition, and as such – from Homer onwards – entwined with its literary tradition.

In Horace's time, religious practice in Rome - *religio* – was mainly a public activity, taking the form of the observance of rites and festivals in accordance with the ritual calendar.⁶⁷⁸ Although the cults which comprised Roman *religio* came from various sources, such as from Greece and the Etruscans, and other parts of Italy, *religio*, at Horace's time, could be described as consisting of those cults which over centuries of usage had become generally regarded as Roman, and upheld as such by the state.⁶⁷⁹

As well as the major Olympian gods there were also minor deities peculiar to particular practices, e.g. Imporcitor, the god of 'ploughing with furrows',⁶⁸⁰ and particular festivals, such as the Matronalia, Vinalia,

⁶⁷⁶ E.g. *Republic* bk 10 (614a5-616b1), *Gorgias* (523a-527e) *Phaedo*, *Timaeus*, *Phaedrus* (245c-249d3) *Meno* (81a-e3), *Laws* 10.

⁶⁷⁷ As in *De caelo* (269a31, 286a11, 292b32) *Metaphysics* A 7-8. However, Bodéüs, 2000, argues that the unmoved mover in *Metaphysics* A 7-8 does not represent Aristotle's true view of God: his theology being more in line with popular Greek religion than is generally accepted: e.g., on the beneficence of gods (*NE* 1179a22-32) p.123; Aristotle invokes traditional views on heaven and the gods to strengthen his argument (*De caelo* 284a11-13); according to Bodéüs (p.95), when Aristotle says that the mythological gods are fictitious (*Metaphysics* 1074b4-5), he is rejecting the mythology rather than the gods themselves.

⁶⁷⁸ Beard, North, Price, 1998, 215.

⁶⁷⁹ Beard, North, Price, 1998, 12.

⁶⁸⁰ Beard, North, Price, 1998, 11.

Robigalia, were concerned with particular gods. Worship of the household gods was a relatively private matter, though in its direction by the *paterfamilias*, it can be seen as reflecting the more all-inclusive state religious practices though on a smaller, familial scale.⁶⁸¹ More will be said about what *religio* comprised in the 1st Century B.C. in due course, particularly as distinct from *superstitio*, but at the outset it is important to note that religion was a part of everyday Roman life, and very much emblematic of Roman identity itself. And if one looks at Livy's history it is clear that the gods, and *religio*, were regarded as instrumental in Rome's illustrious history and military success.⁶⁸² It is not surprising then that religion features in the works of Horace, which naturally reflect this culture and identity.

However, religion and/or religious references feature less prevalently in the *Satires* and *Epistles* than in the *Odes*. This can partly be explained by the difference in genre,⁶⁸³ and by the fact in many instances the religious references in the *Odes* actually have little religious significance: they are essentially used figuratively, often as symbols of earthly realities (e.g. Mars as war, Venus as love, Bacchus as wine), or they are used as illustrative, mythological examples of human situations and events.⁶⁸⁴ Even so, some poems could be described as possessing an identifiably religious aspect, or indeed, as hymns or prayers, are intrinsically religious (e.g. 1.10, 1.34, 35, 2.19, 3.18, 22).

⁶⁸¹ Beard, North, Price, 1998, 49.

⁶⁸² E.g., Livy's list of prodigies, as at xxxi.12, xxxii.1, xxxii.9, xxxii.29; these lists were probably drawn from the *annales maximi*: Briscoe, 1973, 88.

⁶⁸³ See below, §8.4.

⁶⁸⁴ E.g. in *Ode* 3.4 Horace's reference to Jupiter's defeat of the giants is symbolic of Augustus' defeat of Antony and Cleopatra; or to illustrate a general point, e.g., (there are many such examples) on gold, the first two stanzas of *Odes* 3.16.1-8; the inevitability of death, *Odes* 4.7.25-8.

8.2 Distinctions between Religion and Superstition

What comes under more scrutiny in the *Satires*, and understandably so in a satirical context, is the perversion of religious belief, which could be regarded as constituting superstition. Before looking at superstition and religion in Horace's *Satires* in particular, some discussion of what *superstitio* and *religio* meant at that time is desirable, as well as what the distinction between these concepts might have been.

The term *superstitio* itself is used by Cicero in *De Natura Deorum* and *De Divinatione*, as distinguished from, and connected to, *religio* (ND 2.71-2; 1.45; 1.117; Div 2.148).⁶⁸⁵ Cicero gives a possible etymology of *superstitio* and *religio* at ND 2.72, and in so doing indicates differences between the two terms: that *superstitio* derives from *superstes* = survivor,⁶⁸⁶ and *religio* from *relegendo* = re-reading. With regard to the practical application of these terms, the most important distinction here (whether or not one agrees with Cicero's suggested etymology) is that *religio* is praiseworthy and *superstitio* incurs disapproval:

Ita factum est in superstitio et religioso alterum vitii nomen alterum laudis.

Hence 'superstitious' and 'religious' came to be terms of censure and praise respectively.⁶⁸⁷

Another possible etymology of *religio*, which may have also been regarded as likely at that time, is found in Lactantius (A.D. 245-c.325) (*Inst.* 4.28.3):⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁵ Pease, 1920, 580-1, and 1958, 738 (e.g. ND 2.71: *non enim philosophi solum verum etiam maiores nostri superstitionem a religione separaverunt*).

⁶⁸⁶ i.e. from *super-sto*, which can mean 'survive'.

⁶⁸⁷ Translations of *De Natura Deorum* in this chapter are by Rackham, 1933 (with adaptations).

⁶⁸⁸ Pease (1920) 582.

hoc vinculo pietatis obstricti deo et religati sumus; unde ipsa religio nomen accepit, non, ut Cicero interpretatus est, a relegendo.

We are bound and tied (*religati*) to god by this bond of piety; from where religion itself gets its name, not, as Cicero interpreted it, from *relegendo* (re-reading). (My translation)

This may indicate, in the sense of ‘being bound to something’, a sense of obligation, duty, which would again suggest, in its practical use, the respectability of *religio*. This etymological route is also suggested in Lucretius 1. 931-2⁶⁸⁹:

*primum quod magnis doceo de rebus et artis
religionum animum nodis exsolvere pergo...*

First, because my teaching is of high matters and I proceed to untie the mind from the close knots of religious practices.

Another suggested etymology of *superstitio* is that it derives from the meaning ‘being present at’, (*superstes* meaning “witness” cf. Cicero *Murena* 26) or ‘pondering over a thing (i.e. anxiously)’⁶⁹⁰ which, in the connotation of anxious reflection, may suggest the idea of fear of the gods or the supernatural. For the purposes of this discussion, however, the etymology is only important in so far as it may indicate what these concepts actually meant to people in the first century B.C. We can be sure, at least, that from Cicero onwards *superstitio* is used pejoratively, and *religio* usually denotes respectability.

Looking at the practical application of these terms in the first century B.C. there are several ways in which they can be usefully distinguished. What one perceives as false or misguided beliefs about the divine could be

⁶⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁶⁹⁰ Nettleship (1876, 98-99) compares the etymology through *superstes* = witness, with the Greek *ἐπίσταμαι* = know: Pease, 1920, 581.

described as superstitious or giving rise to *superstitio*, as when the Stoic Balbus comments:

Quae res genuit falsas opiniones erroresque turbulentos et superstitiones paene aniles (ND 2.70).

A thing which has engendered false beliefs, crazy errors and superstitions hardly above the level of old wives' tales.

Superstition is often thus associated with 'old women', whether it be for their excessive, or their erroneous, credulity: *ND 3.92, Div. 1.7, 2.19, 125*. Again, at *Div. 2.86* Marcus, arguing from a Sceptic viewpoint, criticises the Stoics for their worried credulity, describing it as *superstitiosa*.

It appears that in the first century B.C., a foreign religion would not necessarily be regarded as *superstitio* simply because it was foreign. At *De Legibus 1.32* Cicero says:

molestiae, laetitiae, cupiditates, timores similiter omnium mentes pervagantur, nec, si opiniones aliae sunt apud alios, idcirco, qui canem et faelem ut deos colunt, non eadem superstitione qua ceterae gentes conflictantur.

Troubles, joys, desires, and fears haunt the minds of all men without distinction, and even if different men have different beliefs, that does not prove, for example, that it is not the same quality of superstition that besets those races which worship dogs and cats as gods, as that which torments other races. (Tr. Keyes, 1928)

Here it would appear that the Egyptian practice of worshipping cats and dogs may *appear* 'superstitious' from a Roman point of view, but Cicero's point is that superstition besets everyone, irrespective of religion: strictly speaking it is

not the religion itself that is superstitious, even if it seems strange, and is thus *apparently* somewhat superstitious.⁶⁹¹

Another distinction can be seen in terms of excess (as *superstitio*) and moderation, or the right amount (as *religio*) – the other extreme being godlessness.⁶⁹² This can be measured with regard to demonstrable behaviour, i.e. in excessive adherence to religious practices, or to excessive fear of the gods (which would no doubt often amount to the same thing).⁶⁹³ Thus, excessive fear is seen as a possible component of *superstitio*, as against a more reasonable respect and sense of duty, *pietas*, which was the hallmark of *religio*. The notion of excessive or empty fear (if empty it is therefore excessive) is found at, for example, Quintilian 8. 3. 55, Cicero *ND* 1.117, Virgil *Aeneid* 12.816-7, and Varro (*Augustine Civ. Dei.* 6.9).⁶⁹⁴

Scheid draws attention to a distinction between *religio* and *superstitio* in terms of public and private.⁶⁹⁵ *Religio*, being officially upheld by the state, was often practised publicly, *superstitio*, being at odds with conventional practice, was clearly not endorsed by the state or approved of as a public activity. Although *religio*, as practised within the home, could also be a

⁶⁹¹ Grodzinsky (1974, 44) also notes that Livy does not use the term *superstitio* to describe foreign religions or religious practices, with the possible exception of a reference to the Samnites: *operati superstitionibus* (10. 39.2). However, by the early second century AD, some foreign religions (even old, well-established ones) were regarded as *superstitio* (Tacitus, *Histories* iv.54.4, iv.81.2, v.13.1) perhaps, according to Beard, North Price (1998, 222) because the Roman elite felt a need to distinguish themselves from the provinces. Pliny the younger, when governor of Bithynia in 111-113 A.D., refers to christianity as *superstitio*, though this seems to be more to do with its being new than foreign, at *Epistles* 10. 96. 8; cf. (a little later) Tacitus *Annales* xv, 44, 5, also on Christians (Grodzinsky, 1974, 47).

Suetonius (*Aug.* 93) reports that Augustus was respectful of some ancient foreign religions (though not of all).

⁶⁹² Plutarch, *peri deisidaimonias* (171f) later describes proper religious behaviour, piety, as a mean between the extremes of superstition and godlessness (Pease, 1955, 512).

⁶⁹³ Beard, North and Price (1998, 217) define *superstitio* in the 1st Century BC completely in terms of excess, equating perversion of religious practice, and erroneous belief with excess, as “excessive forms of behaviour, that is ‘irregular’ religious practices (‘not following the customs of the state’)” – as well as excess in terms of excessive adherence to conventional religious practice, and fear of the gods.

⁶⁹⁴ Grodzinsky, 1974, 40-42; also, where superstition is aligned with excessive fear: Cicero *Div.* 2.86; Seneca *Ep.* 123.16.

⁶⁹⁵ Scheid, 1985, 136ff.

private matter, the distinction here is between official, public approval and disapproval.⁶⁹⁶

The distinction between public and private thus seems rather obvious: if *superstitio* is condemned and *religio* respected, it is not surprising that one operates in the private sphere and the other in the public. Even so, Scheid importantly draws attention to a connection between this public/private distinction and the fact that *superstitio* is often associated with those who are to some extent sidelined in public life: women, slaves and foreigners.⁶⁹⁷

However, in as much as the dialogues in *De Divinatione* and *De Natura Deorum* involve the intellectual and social elite, it is clear that those more closely associated with the establishment, in their so-called erroneous beliefs, were also regarded (at least for argument's sake) as prone to *superstitio*. In addition there are examples of the prevalence of magic among the upper classes, e.g. the Pythagorean and *magus* Nigidius Figulus, (exiled by Caesar) and Appius Claudius Pulcher (Cicero *Tusc.* 1.37, *Div.* 1.132)⁶⁹⁸ – although, in fact, magic was not specifically referred to as *superstitio* until the 1st Century A.D, by which time it became regarded as “the ultimate *superstitio*.”⁶⁹⁹

Religion as an official part of public life is particularly relevant to Horace – as we will see – given his association with important political figures, most notably Augustus himself, who was keen to be seen as *pious*, as is shown in his pride in his restorations of temples.⁷⁰⁰ The fact that Augustus' *pietas* had a definite political purpose – to incur approval from his subjects – shows that *religio* was a matter of public importance. Also, officially Augustus himself was the son of a god, since his adoptive father (in fact, his great uncle) Julius Caesar, had been deified: there being cosmological proof of this in the appearance of a comet shortly after his death in 44 B.C. (as alluded

⁶⁹⁶ Indeed, one might wonder what the public reaction was to Augustus' superstition of begging once a year in the market place (*Aug.* 91), though it has been suggested that Suetonius may have confused Augustus with Caligula on this point (Rolfe, 1914, 260 note c.).

⁶⁹⁷ Scheid, 1985, 136.

⁶⁹⁸ Watson, 2003, 181.

⁶⁹⁹ As Beard, North, Price (1998, 218) put it.

⁷⁰⁰ *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 20: West, 2002, 9.

to in *Eclogue* 5, in the deification of Daphnis).⁷⁰¹ Indeed Horace himself implies Augustus' divinity at *Odes* 1.2.30-40, and *Epistles* 2.1.14-16.⁷⁰²

8.3 The *Satires*

Horace uses the term *superstitio* at *Sat.*2.3.79, in relation to its indicating insanity (2.3 dealing with the Stoic paradox 'that all fools are mad'). Later in *Sat.* 2.3 Horace refers to a particular kind of *superstitio* which seems to relate to the Ciceronian etymology of the word, as being concerned with survival:

“*Libertinus erat, qui circum compita siccus
lautis mane senex manibus currebat et 'unum'
(‘quid tam magnum?’ addens), ‘unum me surpite morti!
dis etenim facile est’ orabat....*(2.3.281-284)

“‘There was a freedman, who in his old age in the early morning before touching breakfast would run around the shrines at the street corners, with washed hands, and would pray ‘Me alone’ (adding ‘Is this such a big thing to ask?’) ‘Snatch me alone from death. Truly for the gods it’s easy.’

*‘Iuppiter, ingentis qui das adimisque dolores,’
mater ait pueri mensis iam quinque cubantis,
‘frigida si puerum quartana reliquerit, illo
mane die, quo tu indicis ieiunia, nudus
in Tiberi stabit.’* (288-292)

⁷⁰¹ Coleman, 1977 (1998 edition) 173.

⁷⁰² West, 2002, 10; cf. Virgil, *Eclogues* 1.6-7:
*O Meliboe, deus nobis haec otia fecit.
Namque erit ille mihi semper deus...*

‘Jupiter, you who send and take away great suffering’ says the mother of a boy lying ill for five months now, ‘if the shivering quartan leaves my boy, early in the morning on that day on which you proclaim fasting, he will stand in the Tiber naked.’

And then Horace concludes:

quone malo mentem concussa? timore deorum.” (295)

By what evil has her mind been shaken? By fear of the gods.

The notion of fear is in fact very much a part of the wish for survival (whether for oneself or someone else) in the shape of the fear of death; and clearly the fear of death and fear of the gods are connected. Indeed the most effective solution for the superstitious types described above by Stertinius (in the context of 2.3) would be to extirpate the fear of death – as vehemently argued by Lucretius (book 3 *passim*). Indeed at 2.3.199ff Horace refers to the sacrifice of Iphigenia (in the context of ambition) which Lucretius dealt with to show up the folly of *religio* (the term being used disparagingly, as superstition, excessive fear of the gods); and certainly the Epicurean position against such fear, and its detriment to peace of mind, was in this respect more vocal than the Stoics.

The two other main instances where Horace draws attention to religion and superstition in the *Satires* are both in the first book (at 1.5.97-103 and 1.8), as is the other more incidental reference at *Sat.* 1.9.69-71. 1.8 concerns magic. 1.5 would appear to be an example of a superstitious belief – in Horace’s opinion (what might be termed by Cicero as an ‘old wives’ tale’, *superstitio anilis*) - though a superstitious belief which is a perversion of mainstream religion (as in the above examples in *Sat.* 2.3). The reference at *Sat.* 1.9.69-71 also concerns religion, although again there are hints that the religion in question, Judaism, is somewhat superstitious, because of its perceived excessive mode of practice (and thus, not necessarily because it is foreign, though there is perhaps the suggestion that its being foreign and its excess are connected). Judaism is also mocked for the extreme forcefulness of

its followers at 1.4.143, and at *Sat.* 1.5.100⁷⁰³ the suggestion again is that it is superstitious, in its credulity:

.....*dein Gnatia Lymphis*
iratis exstructa dedit risusque iocosque,
dum flamma sine tura liquescere limine sacro
persuadere cupit. credat Iudaeus Apella,
non ego: namque deos didici securum agere aevum...(97-101)

Then Gnatia, which was built without the Water-Nymphs' blessing, provided laughter and merriment in its wish to persuade us that incense melts on the sacred threshold without fire. Apella the Jew might believe it, not me, because I've learnt that the gods lead a life free from care.

In line 101 Horace is referring to the Epicurean view that the gods do not intervene in human affairs - or indeed play an active role in the entire universe:⁷⁰⁴ cf. Lucretius *DRN* 6.58, 5.82:⁷⁰⁵

nam bene qui didicere deos securum agere aevum.

Lucretius puts forward this idea in more detail at 2.646-51:

omnis enim per se divum natura necessest
immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur
semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe;
nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,
ipsa suis pollens opibus, nil indiga nostri,
nec bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira.

⁷⁰³ Also, on the (later) Roman perception of the absurdities of the Jewish religion, cf. Juvenal 14.96-106: Brown, 1993, 149.

⁷⁰⁴ See above, Chapter 4, §4.6, where it was noted that this reference to Lucretius is likely to be somewhat ironic in its blatant self-advertisement, but does not suggest that Horace is in fact disavowing these Epicurean sentiments.

⁷⁰⁵ Brown, 1993, 150.

For the very nature of divinity must necessarily enjoy immortal life in the deepest peace, far removed and separated from our affairs; for without any pain, without danger, itself mighty by its own resources, needing us not at all, it is neither propitiated with services nor touched by anger.

Although, for the Epicureans, the gods certainly existed, they were, in their state of perfect *ataraxia*, uninvolved in human affairs – they were affected neither by human prayer, nor impiety. Indeed, in as much as the gods had any role in human life it was to exemplify the kind of trouble-free existence which was the ultimate goal for Epicureans. This is strongly indicated at *Men.* 135: “Meditate on these things day and night, both by yourself and with one like yourself, and you shall live like a god among men. For a man who lives amidst immortal blessings is not like a mortal man.” Given that Horace’s position on religion here is Epicurean, one could suppose that this would influence his views as to what is superstitious – what constituted erroneous belief - rather than what the state would regard as *superstitio*. For Horace, it would seem, belief in divine intervention, at least in the traditional, somewhat crude sense, is misguided although, as we will see, this is brought into question in the *Odes*.

The Jewish religion is again mentioned in *Satire* 1.9 in a passage where Horace hopes that his friend Fuscus Aristius will provide a means of escape from the ‘pest’ (67ff):

*‘certe nescio quid secreto velle loqui te
aiebas mecum.’ ‘memini bene, sed meliore
tempore dicam: hodie tricesima Sabbata: vin tu
curtis Iudaeis oppedere?’ ‘nulla mihi’ inquam
‘religio est.’ ‘at mi: sum paulo infirmior, unus
multorum: ignosces: alias loquar.’*

‘You definitely said there was something or other you wanted to discuss with me in private.’ ‘I well remember, but I’ll tell you on a

more suitable occasion: today's a thirtieth Sabbath – do you want to fart in the faces of the bob-tailed Jews?' 'I've no religious qualms' I said. 'But I have: I'm a bit too weak-minded, one of the many. You'll forgive me; I'll talk another time.'

Although what is most evident in this passage is its humour - where we are invited to laugh at the discomfort and hopelessness of Horace's situation, as well as perhaps laughing with Fuscus Aristius - we are also given a glimpse of Horace's attitude to religion. It has been suggested that *tricesima Sabbata* is simply made up by Aristius on the spot, and that no such religious date existed;⁷⁰⁶ because of the perceived frequency of such religious rites among Jews, the existence of such a date is almost believable (while at the same time appearing to be obviously excessive – so further adding to the humour). Indeed, *vin tu/ curtis Iudaeis oppedere* (70) shows that Aristius is not at all serious about this religious commitment. Horace's response (*nulla mihi... religio est*), although made in the context of Judaism in particular, seems all the more apt given the views he has just expressed in *Sat.* 1.5.97ff and 1.8 (as we will see). Furthermore, Aristius then confesses that his own supposed religious belief is a sign of weakness (which plainly suggests the disingenuousness of that belief): *at mi: sum paulo infirmior, unus/ multorum* Thus Horace is depicting over-zealous religious activity as somewhat absurd, a practice for the weak and unenlightened, (and thus as superstitious, cf. Cicero's 'old women'), and for foreigners. The religious theme, however, is again brought up in the last sentence of the poem. Having only moments before stated that he has 'no religious qualms' as regards the Sabbath, his reference to Apollo at the end of the poem: *sic me servavit Apollo* – as if, rather unwittingly, to betray his *own* religious inclinations – seems somewhat ironic. In fact, this statement is also alerting the reader to Lucilius' Homeric quote in a similar poem;⁷⁰⁷ and it is fitting that Apollo, protector of poets,

⁷⁰⁶ Brown, 1993, 181. Although there are other (less likely) explanations: that it could be either the feast of trumpets, the day of atonement or the feast of tabernacles. (Palmer, 1883, 227).

⁷⁰⁷ *Iliad* 20.443, where Apollo rescues Hector (Brown, 1993, 182). Notably, Horace reproduces the sentence in Latin, rather than keeping the Greek, as Lucilius had done (6.231M=267-8W): Horace being critical of Lucilius' tendency towards Greek

should be Horace's rescuer.⁷⁰⁸ Taken together with the appearance of this line in Lucilius and Homer, the intimation is almost that he is saved by poetry (and since he is recounting the anecdote, in a sense he is).⁷⁰⁹

Unlike all the other poems in the first book, *Satire* 1.8 is not presented as being narrated by Horace, but rather by a tree-trunk personified as the deity Priapus. Here Horace pours scorn on the absurdity of superstition, and, as Brown notes,⁷¹⁰ he does so without explicitly stating that it is absurd, but rather by presenting it as such. The personification of the fig-tree as Priapus is, in itself, an obviously comic touch, but even more absurdly so when the reason behind this piece of wood's divinity is simply the whim of a carpenter (1-3):

*Olim truncus eram ficulnus, inutile lignum,
cum faber, incertus scamnum faceretne Priapum,
maluit esse deum. deus inde ego...*

Once I was the trunk of a fig-tree, a useless piece of timber, when a carpenter, uncertain whether to make a pedestal or a Priapus, preferred that I should be a god. So god I am...

The antics of the witches are also portrayed as extreme and ridiculous at 23-28 (from the readers' point of view at least – to Priapus their behaviour is terrifying). And then there is the farcical ending (46-50), where Priapus inadvertently saves himself by breaking wind.

More precisely, 1.8 concerns magic. There has been considerable debate over the definition of magic⁷¹¹ though, going back to ancient opinion, the Elder Pliny described it as a mix of religion, astrology and medicine, as

interpolations (*Sat.* 1.10.20-30). Warmington (1938, 83) puts this fragment at the end of those of the Lucilian Satire which recounts Scipio's encounter with a pest (or 'bore'), see above Chapter 5, § 5.4.

⁷⁰⁸ Brown, 1993, 182.

⁷⁰⁹ There is also a parallel of sorts to be drawn here with the end of *Satire* 1.8 – also a first person anecdote – where the deity Priapus inadvertently saves himself: Anderson, 1972, 12.

⁷¹⁰ Brown, 1993, 169-70.

⁷¹¹ Beard, North, Price, 1998, 219.

aiming at health, prescience and manipulation of the gods, and as fraudulent,⁷¹² which would appear to more than cover its representation in 1.8.⁷¹³ Magic met with the disapproval of the establishment: its rituals (as those described here in 1.8, and in *Epode* 5) clearly being a gross perversion of conventional religion, and deemed a subversive element in society. Sorcery is outlawed in the 12 tables (viii 1a, viii 8a and b),⁷¹⁴ and mentioned as unlawful in Cicero *De legibus* 2.21; and, in 81 B.C., the *Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis* was introduced against black magic.⁷¹⁵ In 33 B.C., at about the time Horace wrote the first book of *Satires*, Agrippa expelled all magicians and astrologers from Rome (Dio 49. 43.5), and Tacitus reports a repeat expulsion in 16 A.D. (*Annals* ii.32).⁷¹⁶ I have already mentioned that magic was also practised by members of the social and intellectual elite, such as Nigidius Figulus⁷¹⁷ (who pre-dates Horace, dying in 45 B.C.), and it may be that Horace's depiction of magic rites as being practised by the dregs of

⁷¹² Pliny, *Natural History* xxx.1-18: Beard, North, Price, 1998, 219.

⁷¹³ Cf. *Epode* 5, which also concerns magic and the witch Canidia. Canidia also comes under attack in *Epode* 17, and, briefly at *Epode* 3.8 and *Satires*. 2.1.48 and 2.8.85. Whether she was based on an actual individual or not is not known. The scholiasts suggest that she may be based on Gratidia, a former lover of Horace's, but this is impossible to substantiate (Brown, 1993, 172; Rudd, 1966, 148-9). Cf. also, Juvenal satirising the antics of women participating in love magic at 6.314ff:

*Nota Bonae secreta Deae, cum tibia lumbos
incitat et cornu pariter vinoque feruntur
attonitae crinemque rotant ululantque Priapi
maenades.*

Women, as witches, were often associated with magic (cf. Beard, North, Price 1998, 220) – just as they have continued to be in Western culture until comparatively recently.

⁷¹⁴ Bruns/Gradenwitz, 1909 (reprinted 1969), 28-31: Watson, 2003, 178.

⁷¹⁵ Watson, 2003, 178.

⁷¹⁶ Brown, 1993, 169.

⁷¹⁷ Cicero said that Nigidius was responsible for the revival of Pythagoreanism in Rome in the 1st century B.C. (see Chapter 1, §1.4 [v]), and it is notable that magic and necromancy were often associated with Pythagoreanism at this time. Horace mocks Pythagoreanism at *Sat.* 2.6.63 although he alludes to what *may* be Pythagorean doctrine with regard to the constitution of the soul at *Sat.* 2.2.77-9 (see Chapter 3). However, against the association between Pythagoreanism and magic, and thus the expulsion of Nigidius (Dio 45.1.4) and Anaxilaus of Larissa, another Pythagorean (Dio 52.36.2-3: Watson, 2003, 179) there needs to be set the fact that some (e.g. Castor of Rhodes 1st century B.C.) considered there to be a strong link between Pythagoreanism and early Roman institutions, (cf. Ovid *Metamorphoses* 15, 60-478, Cicero *Tusc.* 4.2-4); and that Pythagoreanism was also regarded, because there had been a Pythagorean school on Italian soil in 5th century B.C., as being, in a sense, a Roman philosophy; Aristoxenus said that Pythagoras had had Roman pupils, Wehrli *Aristoxenos* (1945) Frs. 17 and 124 (Rawson, 1985, 292-293).

society acts as a more cutting criticism against practitioners among the upper classes,⁷¹⁸ being thus degraded by their behaviour. It is also notable that Antony was regarded (by Octavian) as being under Cleopatra's spell (*Plut. Ant.* 60.1), and that the Caesarians accused their political opponents of practising magic.⁷¹⁹ Thus Horace's attack on magic would have been understandable for political reasons. As to Horace's attitudes to religion, the deification of the fig-tree as Priapus, the presentation of the poem by means of Priapus' narration, and the absurdity of Priapus' involvement in the scene at the end of the satire again indicate a more general disbelief in divine intervention, following what was said at *Sat.* 1.5.101ff.

From what we see in the *Satires*, it is therefore reasonable to suggest that Horace's views on religion were largely in keeping with Epicureanism, even though this is only made explicit in *Sat.* 1.5.

8.4 The *Odes*

(i) Horace's Personal Beliefs

If one looks at the *Odes*, this Epicurean view of theology could be regarded as having been abandoned. Looking at one of the *Odes* in particular (1.34) may shed some more light on what Horace's views really were concerning religion, not just at the time of his writing *Odes* 1, but also when he wrote the *Satires*.

On the face of it, in *Odes* 1.34 Horace apparently renounces Epicurean physics and theology (these being inextricably linked in Epicureanism)⁷²⁰ and professes not simply a belief in the divine (which would be perfectly in keeping with Epicureanism) but a belief in divine intervention (which would not) – a belief that the only explanation behind certain physical occurrences

⁷¹⁸ Watson, 2003, 181.

⁷¹⁹ Watson, 2003, 179.

⁷²⁰ The structure and movements of the cosmos can be explained scientifically, according to the Epicureans, and thus there is no reason to believe that there is some divine element influencing events either in the cosmos or on earth – as explained in Epicurus' letter to Pythocles.

on earth is that some divine element is, indeed, responsible. The apparent renunciation of Epicureanism in the first stanza is striking:

*Parcus deorum cultor et infrequens,
insanientis dum sapientiae
consultus erro, nunc retrorsum
vela dare atque iterare cursus*

cogor relictos...

I was a stingy and infrequent worshipper of the gods all the time that I went astray, expert that I was in a mad philosophy. Now I am forced to sail back and repeat my course in the reverse direction. (tr. Rudd, 2004)

One could infer from this that Horace was under the influence of such a ‘mad philosophy’ when he wrote the *Satires*, given his professed adherence to Epicurean theology at *Sat.*1.5.101. The reference to Epicureanism is further hinted at in the words *sapientia* and *erro*.⁷²¹ At *DRN* 5. 9-10 Lucretius refers to Epicureanism as *sapientia*.⁷²²

*qui princeps vitae rationem invenit eam quae
nunc appellatur sapientia...*

Who first discovered that reasoned plan of life which is now called wisdom.

Also, Lucretius often uses *erro* in order to describe the misguided lives of those who have not been enlightened by this *sapientia* (e.g. *DRN* 2.10, 2.82,

⁷²¹ West, 1995, 162.

⁷²² West, 1995, 162, points out that Lucretius never refers to Epicureanism as *philosophia*, though this can be explained by the fact that (i) *philosophia* does not scan in hexameters (ii) Lucretius generally uses Greek terms only to refer to what he is critical of (e.g. on the folly of erotic love 4.1160-1170); though Horace’s use of *sapientia* here nevertheless brings Lucretius to mind.

3.1052).⁷²³ It is the specific use of *sapientia* and *erro* together which suggests a link with Lucretius here. But it would be a mistake to take *Odes* 1.34 – as with much of Horace’s work – entirely at face value. Horace’s claim that the only explanation for thunder and lightning in a cloudless sky is divine intervention, depends on the assumption that this never in fact occurs. Apparently, then, Horace has witnessed a miracle, but, bearing in mind the implication that, in truth, he has not witnessed any such thing, it would clearly be rash to take this, and his renunciation of Epicureanism, as genuine. Also, this phenomenon is mentioned in other literary works (Cicero *Poemata* 2.23ff., Virgil *Georgics* 1.487f), and most importantly Lucretius wonders why thunder and lightning never occurs in a clear sky at 6.400.⁷²⁴ This suggests that Horace’s intention is surely that his readers recognise this as a literary reference, and thus regard his apparent testimony to the phenomenon as tongue-in-cheek. It could appear then that this renunciation of Epicurean physics and theology is, in the argument he presents, *deliberately* flawed: the poem is apparently inadvertently (though in fact deliberately) an argument *in favour* of Epicurean physics and theology. But again, looking at the poem as a whole, and the role of theology in the *Odes* generally, this may also be too simplistic, too definitive an interpretation.

Although in *Odes* 1.34 there is the apparent claim that the explanation for certain occurrences is the gods’ intervention, Horace’s representation of the Olympian gods, as West points out, is surely too crude to take *prima facie*.⁷²⁵ And yet to interpret the poem as suggesting some kind of belief in divine intervention on an emotional level (and thus not rationally) is perhaps also reasonable. A comparison could be made with the end of *Sat.* 1.9 where the timely coincidence – because it is so timely, is, indeed, a ‘godsend’ – can only be explained by divine intervention, though again we are clearly not to take this literally.

⁷²³ *ibid.*

⁷²⁴ Nisbet and Hubbard, 1970, 376-7; and later: Lucan 1.530ff, Pliny *Nat.* 2.137; Suet. *Aug.* 95.

⁷²⁵ West, 1995, 166.

Nisbet and Hubbard⁷²⁶ have interpreted *Ode* 1.34 as self-mocking and non-serious until the end, where the serious point of the ode comes - “the inexplicability, the violence and the suddenness of Fortune’s action on human life” - as summed up in the last stanza (12-16):

... *Valet ima summis*

*mutare et insignem attenuat deus,
obscura promens; hinc apicem rapax
Fortuna cum stridore acuto
sustulit, hic posuisse gaudet.*

God has the power to cause the highest and the lowest to change places; he makes the illustrious dim and brings the obscure to light. With a piercing scream rapacious Fortune snatches the crown from one head and likes to place it on another. (tr. Rudd 2004)

To an extent this interpretation seems right, and though the religious imagery seems a little too grandiose at the end of the poem (bearing in mind its non-seriousness up to that point where the imagery is thus more understandable), the seriousness comes through, nevertheless: “though the thought is blurred by the conventionalism of his [Horace’s] imagery.”⁷²⁷ However, it seems that the purpose of this conventional imagery, in this context, could be further explained. Horace does seem to be making a serious point about the uncertainty of future events, though the manner in which he does this, particularly in the last two lines, is almost as if he is putting the last verse in inverted commas: he deliberately overdoes it so as to dissociate himself from what these lines connote, literally, in terms of divine intervention, while not detracting from the serious point of the randomness of life’s vicissitudes. Indeed the effect is not dissimilar to the last two lines of *Satire* 2.2, where he is quoting Ofellus, again on the uncertainty of *Fortuna*; as Rudd notes, Horace

⁷²⁶ Nisbet and Hubbard, 1970, 376-7.

⁷²⁷ Nisbet and Hubbard, 1970, 378.

actually exaggerates the tone in order to diminish its seriousness.⁷²⁸ *Fortuna* can thus be seen as essentially symbolic, not one of the conventional gods, and who as such exists – as Armstrong puts it – in “Epicurus’ pantheon of the world”⁷²⁹ as one can see by the fact that much of the wise man’s actions are determined with *tuchē* in mind.⁷³⁰ In fact, Armstrong’s “pantheon of the world”, would, strictly speaking, be oxymoronic to an Epicurean, (the gods having nothing to do with human affairs), and, in fact, fortune is explicitly described as not being a god;⁷³¹ but the thrust of Armstrong’s point is clear enough: for the Epicureans fortune certainly does exist. For Horace, to personify it as a god is in keeping with the lyric genre; and yet there is still a sense that he does not want to completely dismiss the possibility of divine presence, even if this is perhaps an emotional, irrational indulgence.

Syndikus regards *Ode* 1.34 as programmatic: an allegory of Horace’s literary intentions; his apparent rejection of Epicureanism in favour of a belief in divine intervention should be viewed as reflecting his abandonment of satirical, in favour of lyrical verse, and, on a more practical level: “Horace never wavers in his agnostic, sceptical philosophy, but no ancient literary form allows its rules to be broken and lyric poetry demands gods.”⁷³² This interpretation, relating to generic differences in poetry already mentioned in §8.1, is also convincing to a point, but the deliberate inconsistencies in *Ode* 1.34 could also surely represent Horace’s religious views too. It seems rather that Horace does wish to suggest some sense of divine presence in the *Odes*, albeit on a purely emotional level – as could still be suggested in *Ode* 1.34 – and thus that his religious references are not merely “literary furniture.”⁷³³

Ode 1.11 also concerns the randomness of fate, but is less concerned with the divine element, in spite of the formulaic reference to Jupiter (as controller of fate) at 4-6. In this poem Horace is rationalistic and Epicurean, being openly dismissive of Babylonian horoscopes (*nec Babylonios/ temptaris*

⁷²⁸ Rudd, 1966, 173.

⁷²⁹ Armstrong, 2004, 273.

⁷³⁰ *Men.* 133-135, *KD* 16.

⁷³¹ *Men.* 134: “And he [the wise man] believes that fortune (*tuchē*) is not a god, as the many think...”

⁷³² Syndikus, 1972, 307 (tr. West, 1995, 165).

⁷³³ West, 1995, 91, in reference to *Ode* 1.18.

numeros 2-3).⁷³⁴ Even if *scire nefas* in line 1 does refer to the divine, this would not be entirely at odds with Epicurean theology, since it seems to express the sort of reciprocal detachment that, as far as Epicureans are concerned, human beings ought to affect with regard to the divine. Nor is a perception of some divine element as reflected in human existence entirely at odds with Epicureanism. Although, for the Epicureans, the gods do not intervene in human affairs, the gods certainly do exist (though there were those who criticised the Epicureans as really being atheists)⁷³⁵ and simply in as much as one has an awareness of this existence, then one has some kind of relationship with the divine.⁷³⁶ Sometimes, in alluding to the divine in his *Odes*, as, for example, in *Ode* 1.18, where he addresses Bacchus and Venus, Horace, as well as personifying wine and love to suit the lyric genre, is perhaps also suggesting this relationship between the human and divine. For the Epicureans, the gods were models of perfection to humans, in their state of absolute blessedness and *ataraxia*, and the image of god is implanted in the human mind.⁷³⁷ Thus, when attempting to communicate what seems, in human terms, to touch some quality of perfection, some quality that, perhaps for a brief moment, seems to transcend everyday human existence, whether it be in love, wine, or friendship, a reference to the divine seems perfectly apt. Indeed friendship is itself assimilated with the divine by the Epicureans: ‘the noble nature dedicates itself to wisdom and friendship, of which the first is a mortal good, the second immortal’ (*VS* 78).⁷³⁸

Furthermore, although the Epicureans did not support the conventional idea of divine intervention, it was regarded as acceptable by Epicureans to

⁷³⁴ cf. Usener 395; Nisbet and Hubbard, 1970, 135-6.

⁷³⁵ Cicero: Cotta’s attack on Epicurean theology: *ND* 1.123, 1.85; Plutarch, *non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*, 1102c-d.

⁷³⁶ Epicurus himself, in fact, complied with religious activities (in accordance with the law), took part in religious festivals, and was initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries (fr. 169 Usener). Brunt, 1989, 186.

⁷³⁷ *ND* 1.43: *Solus (Epicurus) enim vidit primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura*. *Men.* 123: “First, believe that god is an indestructible and blessed animal, in accordance with the general conception of god commonly held.” (Farrington, 1967, 117.)

⁷³⁸ So Farrington, 1967, 26: “Here friendship is called immortal because it is the way of life of the gods, while wisdom is only the path by which mortals may discover the blessedness of friendship.”

worship the gods, if they did so with the correct notion of the gods in mind.⁷³⁹ On this basis it is possible to regard two other religious *Odes* as, in fact, Epicurean. *Odes* 1.10 and 2.19 are both hymns (to Mercury and to Bacchus respectively) and are not petitionary: Horace does not ask for, or expect divine intervention. Because they are not petitionary West calls them examples of ‘pure Epicurean prayer’⁷⁴⁰ (though, being hymns they need not be petitionary anyway). In these hymnic *Odes* Horace is addressing divinities in an untroubled, non-expectant frame of mind, which would indeed be in line with Epicurean prayer: to address the gods or pray in an expectant – to some degree anxious – frame of mind is, according to Lucretius, one way of incurring harm from deities: the harm not coming in any literal sense by means of divine intervention, but inadvertently from one’s own misplaced anxiety and expectation because of a belief in divine intervention, and thus of the gods’ favour or disfavour: as at Lucretius 6.68ff.⁷⁴¹

*quae nisi respuis ex animo longeque remittis
dis indigna putare alienaque pacis eorum,
delibata deum per te tibi numina sancta
saepe oberunt.*

Unless you spew all these errors out of your mind, and put far from you thoughts unworthy of the gods and alien to their peace, their holy divinity, impaired by you, will often do you harm.

Satire 2.6 also begins with a prayer, or rather a reflection upon a prayer, and, although in this instance the prayer appears to be petitionary, one could in fact regard this as an Epicurean prayer, albeit of a different kind:

*Hoc erat in votis: modus agri non ita magnus,
hortus ubi et tecto vicinus iugis aquae fons*

⁷³⁹ Lucretius 2.655-60, D.L. 10.120, and *POxy.* 215 (early Epicurean text ed. Obbink 1992); Mansfeld, 1999, 464 n.64.

⁷⁴⁰ West, 1998, 142.

⁷⁴¹ West, 1998, 142-3.

*et paulum silvae super his foret. auctius atque
di melius fecere. bene est. (1-4)*

It was this I used to pray for: a parcel of land (not too big), where there would be a kitchen garden and a spring of ever-flowing water close to the house and, above them, a little bit of forest. The gods have provided better and more generously. I am content.

It is clear that in giving votive thanks for his good fortune Horace is himself touched by a sense of *ataraxia*; indeed *ataraxia* is the overriding theme of the poem. The prayer to which Horace is here referring was not excessively demanding – unlike the kind that Lucretius criticises at 6.68ff and which Horace himself criticises in lines 6-12 of this satire; indeed what he was praying for was really to achieve *ataraxia*, a state of mind which comes from within.⁷⁴² the prayer itself being an expression of that wish, rather than being expectant of divine intervention. Indeed the prayers in 2.6 can be viewed, in their petitionary style, as conventionally formulaic – asking, in the customary way (and the Epicureans, following religious customs, could *ostensibly* ask, so long as they had the correct notion of the gods in mind), but not anxiously expecting. Also, the prayer for further good fortune at 2.6.5ff need not be regarded as being over-demanding: this was simply the customary response to good fortune: that it may continue.⁷⁴³ Thus, although his prayers have been and, in the narrative of the satire, are petitionary, this can be explained by adherence to custom, and indeed as such this votive beginning may read like a fairly common turn of phrase. But even if taken as a serious address to a deity, the fact that he is praying for something which, for an Epicurean, is to be found within oneself, is not in fact contradictory because for Epicureans the

⁷⁴² *Ataraxia* is a state of mind that comes from a true understanding and acceptance of life as it is. Just as changing one's geographical circumstances (*Epistles* 1.11.27, cf. *Sat.* 2.7.111-115; Lucretius 3.1053-1075) does not ensure *ataraxia*, nor can *ataraxia* be gained through any other external means, such as greater wealth, fame, etc.: i.e. those things that Horace, in keeping with Epicurean principles, did *not* pray for.

⁷⁴³ cf. Terence *Eunuchus* 1048ff, Suet. *Aug.* 58.2: Fraenkel 1957, 138 n.4.

divine – in as much as humans can relate to it – is also to be found within oneself, as a representation of perfect *ataraxia*.⁷⁴⁴

In addition, the prayer to Faunus in *Ode* 3.18, for example, and his avowed observance of religious festivals in *Odes* 3.13 and 3.22 need not imply that Horace had deserted the rational principles he advocates through Epicureanism at *Sat.* 1.5.101. These *Odes* (and this can, I think, apply generally to those in which deities are addressed and/or praised) suggest an adherence to cultural tradition, rather than a whole-hearted belief in conventional religion.

(ii) Politics

Some aspects of conventional religion were clearly at odds with Epicureanism, such as following the priests' interpretations of omens (Cicero, *De legibus* 2.21); again, the fact that various meteorological occurrences were considered as portentous would clash with Epicurean views, such as the deification of Caesar, and, indeed, Horace's own (bogus) lightning in a clear sky in *Ode* 1.34. But Horace was also proud of his native culture and respected its customs, and this was something which he also wished to communicate in the *Odes*.

Lucretius was perfectly clear in his condemnation of aspects of 'religious' activity, as expressed at 1.80-101 in the example of the sacrifice of Iphigenia (*tantum religio potuit suadere malorum* 1.101) and Horace would have surely agreed with Lucretius' sentiments here (and this is perhaps suggested by his use of the same example, Iphigenia's sacrifice, in *Sat.* 2.3.212ff). But it seems likely that Horace, as a loyal subject and friend of Augustus, and wishing to uphold the traditions of Rome for its overall moral good, takes a more sympathetic position, and thus abides by religious custom.⁷⁴⁵ In this respect Horace can be compared with Livy. It seems that

⁷⁴⁴ See above, note 737.

⁷⁴⁵ Fowler (1995, 248-266) regards Horace's panegyrics to Augustus and his apparent support of the regime as incompatible with his Epicurean political position and Callimachean poetics – and thus, in a sense, as disingenuous – and suggests

although Livy upholds traditional Roman religion in his history (as noted above, §8.1), he was himself a rationalist, or at the very least was unlikely to have believed in the Olympian gods as they were traditionally perceived; indeed by this time (Livy being a contemporary of Horace) it seems unlikely that an educated Roman would have believed in the Olympian gods as anthropomorphic deities that in a sense physically interact with and shape worldly events.⁷⁴⁶ But Livy saw the importance of upholding traditional religion for the moral good of the state,⁷⁴⁷ like Horace (and Cicero)⁷⁴⁸ and, indeed, Augustus. This political motivation must go some way to explain the religious content of *Odes* 3.5 and 3.6.

In *Ode* 3.6, Horace explicitly sees religion in a political context, correlating the decline in morality in Roman society with the decline in its religious activity. The first two stanzas speak of the divine as responsible for human outcomes on earth, but Horace is not professing a personal belief in divine intervention here, rather he is implying that when Romans knew their place, so to speak, their moral behaviour and achievements were more laudable. The statement, in line 6, that one should attribute life's outcomes to the gods (*hinc omne principium, huc refer exitum*) seems to sit uncomfortably with the views he expresses at *Sat.* 1.5.101, but again this must be seen in its political context. Horace thinks that it was better when people erred in the direction of being mindful of the gods' possible intervention (and thus respecting the gods and being mindful of their own moral behaviour) rather than now, when they appear to have little or no respect, and have thus morally deteriorated (cf. *Ode* 1.35.33-40). But it does not follow that the civilised,

subversive elements in, for example, stanzas 3-4 of *Ode* 3.1. But this is perhaps to overstate Horace's Epicureanism (especially with regard to politics where the Epicureans seem to have become less exclusionary anyway) and, indeed, to understate Horace's own involvement with the regime (so Nisbet and Rudd, 2004, xxi). Lyne (1995, 171) comments on the '*dispositio*' of *Ode* 3.7, wittily deflating the seriousness of the preceding *Odes* (particularly 3.6, concerning to an extent the same subject: chastity/ unchastity in women); though this does not seem subversive, but rather an assertion of his independence and his proclivity, in the *Odes*, to less weighty matters. The fact that Augustus asked Horace to be his secretary (Suetonius *Vita* 18), and commissioned him to write the *Carmen Seculare* (see below) also argues against his actually being subversive in the *Odes*.

⁷⁴⁶ Walsh, 1961, 47; Brunt, 1989, 193ff.

⁷⁴⁷ Walsh, 1961, 48.

⁷⁴⁸ *Republic* 2.26ff, *ND* 1.4, *Leg.* 2.15f: Brunt, 1989 179.

enlightened and morally respectable Epicurean (or even agnostic or atheist) or, indeed, one of his readers, need convert to a literal belief in the Olympian gods. And again, Horace's loyalty to Augustus, clearly suggested in the reference to Augustus' rebuilding of temples (lines 2-3) must also be considered: along with the rest of the Roman Odes, 3.6 should be seen as political support for Augustus' attempts to improve the morality of the nation (cf. *Odes* 1.2.29-30, 4.5.20-24, 4.15.10-16).

Indeed, six years after *Odes* i-iii was published, in 17 BC, Augustus commissioned Horace to write a poem for the *ludi seculares* – a religious festival which Augustus revived.⁷⁴⁹ Not surprisingly then, the *carmen seculare* has a strong religious and moral aspect. The fact that Horace was commissioned in this way may suggest that the religious sentiments of the poem are not really his own, even if he might regard religious adherence as morally and socially beneficial. Indeed, Fraenkel is keen to point out that this poem is essentially an Horatian Ode, and not, as traditional in these ceremonies, a poem designed to tie in with the procession.⁷⁵⁰ Horace's poem was recited at the end of the celebration, and was thus "not meant to be a part of the religious ceremonies but an ideal image of them."⁷⁵¹ So even here, while supporting a religious festival, it seems that Horace was still exercising a certain detachment when it came to religious practice.

8.5 Astrology and Divination

If one accepts, then, that Horace does have some conception of divine existence, but not in the form of the Olympian gods and divine intervention, it seems unlikely that he would have accepted astral divinity as advocated by the Stoics and previously by Plato. Although there is certainly an allusion to the

⁷⁴⁹ The *ludi seculares* had been celebrated before in 249 and 146. The Augustan version lasted for three days and nights, including processions, and prayer and sacrifices to Moerae (in charge of men's fate and prosperity) Ilythiae, goddess of childbirth, Mother Earth, and to Jupiter, Juno, Apollo and Diana (Fraenkel, 1957, 368).

⁷⁵⁰ As with the *carmen* of Livius Andronicus for a procession in 207: Livy 27.37.7, 11-15 (Fraenkel, 1957, 380).

⁷⁵¹ Fraenkel, 1957, 382.

Stoic belief in the relationship between the soul and the aether at *Sat.*

2.2.79,⁷⁵² it would be rash to assume from this that Horace believed in astral divinity (and here he is relating the views of Ofellus) particularly bearing in mind the Epicurean view expressed at *Sat.* 1.5.101. Indeed, if his religious views at the time of the *Satires* are in keeping with 1.5.101, i.e. Epicurean, then he would certainly not have believed in astral divinity.⁷⁵³

Conversely, astrology found some backing in Stoicism, based on the idea of cosmic sympathy and divinity. The Stoics interpreted the regular movements of the celestial bodies as proof of the order of the universe,⁷⁵⁴ and so believed that the stars influenced events on earth (Sextus Empiricus *M.* 9.79).⁷⁵⁵ In fact, there is some debate as to when astrology became a part of Stoicism: Neugebauer and Long put the date in the middle of the 2nd Century B.C.⁷⁵⁶ It is certain at least that by Horace's time the Stoics accepted and approved of astrology, and no doubt this would have been well known. The link between Stoic cosmology and astrology logically follows from such observations as the connection between the moon and the tides (Sextus Empiricus *M.* 9.79; Cicero, *ND* 2.19, *Div* 2.34).⁷⁵⁷ In the second century B.C.

⁷⁵² See above, Chapter 3, §3.6.

⁷⁵³ Epicurus *Hdt* 76-7: "Moreover, when it comes to meteorological phenomena, one must believe that movements, turnings, eclipses, risings, settings and related phenomena occur without any [god] helping out and ordaining or being about to ordain [things] and at the same time having complete blessedness and indestructibility; *Pyth* 97, 113, 115; Lucretius 5.146-55: the gods' dwelling-places are not inside the cosmos; *ND* 19ff.

⁷⁵⁴ Cambiano, 1999, 596. The Stoics believed that earth was stationary, at the centre of the universe, and the heavenly bodies moved, in circles, around it, being naturally drawn to the centre. (Arius Didymus fr. 23 ap. Stob. 1.166.4-27.) But they also believed that the heavenly bodies were living beings who *chose* to move in circles: as Cleomedes states in *Caelestia* (formerly called *de motu circulari*) 1.2.1-9 (Bowen and Todd, 2004).

⁷⁵⁵ Sambursky, 1959, 41.

⁷⁵⁶ Neugebauer, 1975, 607-13; Long, 1982, 165-92; Ioppolo (1985, 73-92) has argued for its being at the time of Chrysippus: Cambiano, 1999, 598, n.18. In *De Divinatio*, divination with reference to Chrysippus consists of dreams and oracles. But in *De fato* 12-16 where Cicero presents Chrysippus and Diodorus opposing each other on the subject of free will and determinism, Chrysippus appears to be an adherent of astrology (*si quis [verbi causa] oriente Canicula natus est, is in mari non morietur*), though the source here may well be Carneades (2nd century): Sharples, 1991, 22; and the conditional examples could have been made as any kind of prediction – not just relating to astrology. Or rather, according to Sedley (1982, 253-5), any kind of prediction where the connection between the sign and what it portends does not derive from the nature of the thing involved.

⁷⁵⁷ Sambursky, 1959, 41-42.

Hipparchus of Nicea gathered data from astronomical observations, and it seems that these, as well as the observations made by Hypsicles in *On Ascension*, may have introduced the Stoics to astrology.⁷⁵⁸ According to Cicero, (*Div.*1.6; 2.88) Panaetius was the exception among Stoics in his rejection of astrology, and his doubt about divination in general.

In fact, astrology does not come under specific scrutiny in the *Satires*, but one can infer from Horace's description of an amble around Rome at *Sat.* 1.6.111ff that in his quiet detachment from the hustle and bustle of city life, he is also glad that he feels no compulsion to consult fortune-tellers (of whom some would be astrologers) himself. Instead he is a bemused, and relatively wise, observer:

*fallacem Circum vespertinumque pererro
saepe Forum; adsisto divinis; inde domum me
ad porri et ciceris refero laganique catinum.* (113-15)

I often wonder through the trickster-thronged Circus and the Forum as evening descends; I stand next to the fortune-tellers; then I go back home to a dish of leek and pea soup.

In the context of the Epicurean flavour of 1.6 - its advice (albeit gentle and qualified by Horace's own social ambitions) against *prava ambitio*, and its advocacy of *ataraxia*, which in itself implies an antithesis to the Stoic position of active political involvement and social responsibility - this reference to *fallacem Circum* may also suggest a criticism of Stoicism, implied by the Stoic link with astrology. Unlike the Stoics, the Epicureans thought astrology and divination in general to be nonsense. Indeed this standpoint was considered necessary in order to achieve *ataraxia*, as suggested at *Pyth* 93 ('not fearing the slavish technicalities of the astrologers') - just as Horace's ironic interest in the fortune-tellers at the Circus is set against his own sense of *ataraxia*. And thus it seems likely that Horace's

⁷⁵⁸ Cambiano, 1999, 597.

dismissal of astrology in *Ode* 1.11.2-3, taken together with its Epicureanism, is also anti-Stoic.

8.6 Conclusion

Horace's professed Epicurean position at *Sat.* 1.5.101 indicates a disbelief in the idea that the divine has any active involvement in human affairs (or indeed in the entire universe), and it is clear, from this Lucretius quote, that his readership would have recognised his position as Epicurean. At *Sat.* 1.9.69-72 his position is evasive, sceptical, and somewhat mocking of religious zeal – religious excess often being regarded, in fact, as a form of *superstitio*. His feelings about such overt superstition as practised in magic-rites by witches is quite plain from *Sat.* 1.8, not only because of its excess, secrecy and, indeed, absurdity, but because of its perversion of conventional religion. In *Sat.* 2.3, it is specifically *superstitio* rather than *religio* which the Stoic Stertinius attacks, although it seems that the most effective way of avoiding this form of *superstitio* would be to dispel the fear of death, as the Epicureans strongly advise.

However, in the *Odes* Horace does seem to be more sympathetic to conventional religious belief than he appears to be at *Sat.* 1.5.101. This is partly because he is more politically motivated, his stance more socially constructive rather than satirical, and thus, as a more public-spirited poet and supporter of Augustus, he upholds conventional religion in the *Odes*, realising its practical benefits on society. In addition, religious allusions and references are a traditional part of the poetic tradition, and of the lyric genre. But, even so, it appears that in the *Odes* Horace may be touched by some genuine sense of divine presence, though certainly not of divine intervention in crude terms.

Indeed the ambivalent position he takes in *Ode* 1.34, where the possibility of divine intervention is suggested, while at the same time being shown to be irrational, as well as his apparent renunciation of Epicureanism at the beginning of the ode, would have been grasped by his readers, many of whom, being philosophically literate, would have been likely to have had similarly ambivalent views on religion. Furthermore, although the

intellectually enlightened were unlikely to have accepted the traditional perception of the Olympian gods as constituting the divine in actuality, these gods could still be worshipped in the context of the cultural tradition as representations of the divine.

Chapter 9

Horace's Use of his Philosophical Sources

9.1

The purpose of this chapter is to look, summarily, at the main philosophical influences at work in the *Satires* from the perspective of individual sources. In drawing together much of what has already been discussed, one will see that the points made concern the importance of an awareness of the ancient philosophical sources for our appreciation of Horace; that some points concern the importance of modern discussion of these sources, and how this relates to Horace, and others concern the demonstration of parallels between Horace and ancient philosophical sources.

9.2 The Diatribe and Cynicism

As we have seen, Horace's *Satires* owe much to the tradition of the so-called 'diatribe'. Whether one accepts that the diatribe can be described as properly philosophical or not⁷⁵⁹ one must at least accept that the 'diatribe satires' are a vehicle for certain recognisably philosophical viewpoints.

Just as the philosophical status of the diatribe could be questioned, the same is true - for similar reasons - for Cynicism as a whole. In Chapter 1 I argued that Cynicism can be regarded as a credible philosophy, but it is notable that, as a philosophical force, Cynicism had been somewhat overlooked until about thirty years ago⁷⁶⁰ thus postdating Rudd's and Fraenkel's works on Horatian satire. More recent studies in Cynicism, in

⁷⁵⁹ See Chapter §1.2 (ii) and (iii).

⁷⁶⁰ Branham and Goulet-Cazé, 1996, 1; with the exception of Dudley, 1937.

particular the collection of articles edited by Branham and Goulet-Cazé (postdating the most recent commentaries on Horace's *Satires*)⁷⁶¹ and, in specific relation to Horace, Gigante's study of the relationship between Cynicism and Epicureanism, and Kindstrand's *Bion of Borysthenes*,⁷⁶² have further established Cynicism as an important and influential philosophical sect. These studies are relevant to Horace's *Satires*: Bion being Horace's avowed precursor (*Ep.* 2.2.60), and Cynicism and Epicureanism being seen as co-existent influences in several satires, particularly 1.2.⁷⁶³

Also, the fact that other philosophical material which exerts an influence on the *Satires* was itself influenced by the so called 'diatribe' is important. Notably, the influence of the diatribe can be found in Cicero and Lucretius in areas which have a striking influence on the *Satires*: in Cicero the *Paradoxa Stoicorum*⁷⁶⁴ and in Lucretius, the finales of books 3 and 4 of *De Rerum Natura*.⁷⁶⁵ The connection with diatribe and philosophical discourse - that is, discourse that one would describe as consisting to a great extent in systematic philosophical argument - was thus very much a part of philosophy as recently represented in Latin; indeed, with reference to Lucretius Classen (1968) has highlighted the issue of how far this work (with reference to particular passages) is rhetoric and how far systematic argument; but the important point here is that such rhetoric was by no means out of place in all philosophical works; rather, in the case of the diatribe, it was an important feature.

Satirical humour - the piercing of pretentiousness, the mockery of human folly in whatever form (in many ways similar to satirical humour as we understand it today) - was also an ingredient of the diatribe and could be described as Cynic, given the witty, deflationary rhetoric of the Cynics (as Diogenes Laertius' life of Diogenes would suggest). The use of what is often called the 'Cynic-Stoic diatribe' (Cynicism often being regarded as to some extent a practical application of Stoicism)⁷⁶⁶ in order to attack Stoicism and

⁷⁶¹ i.e. Brown, 1993; Muecke, 1993.

⁷⁶² Gigante, 1992; Kindstrand, 1976.

⁷⁶³ See also Chapter 1, §1.2 (iii) and Chapter 2, §2.3.

⁷⁶⁴ See Chapter 6, §6.3

⁷⁶⁵ See Chapter 1, §1.2 (v).

⁷⁶⁶ See Chapter 1, §1.2 (iii).

champion Epicureanism (particularly in *Satires* 1.1-3) seems to be a strikingly Horatian feature.

9.3 Aristotle and the Peripatetics

In Chapter 2 I argued that it was highly probable that Horace was familiar, to some extent, with Aristotle's *Ethics*, including, whether directly or indirectly, what is now called the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The references to the doctrine of the mean at *Sat.* 1.2.24 and *Epistles* 1.18.9 (which bear strong terminological similarities with Aristotle's doctrine) seem to bear this out. The probability of Cicero's familiarity with Aristotle's esoteric works, and the fact that Horace was a student of philosophy in Athens in 44 where he may well have become acquainted with these works through the lectures of the Peripatetic Cratippus, also point to Horace's being familiar with Aristotle's ethics.⁷⁶⁷ Although the mean was, indeed, a commonplace and can also be seen as part of the poetic tradition, Horace's wording - *vitia*, vices as extremes to be avoided on either side of the ideal mean - suggests a wish to draw attention to its Aristotelian association. Indeed, as well as the strong Epicurean stance of the opening satires, one should not underestimate this Aristotelian influence, and in many ways the doctrine of the mean can be seen to underpin much of Horace's philosophical reasoning. In *Satires* 1.1, 2 and 2.2 Horace combines the doctrine of the mean with the Epicurean view of moderation as living within the limits of nature. In 1.1 this is only made explicit at 106-7, but in 1.2 and 2.2 the doctrine of the mean plays an important role in the development of the argument. Horace proposes ideal means, and the corresponding deficiencies and excesses to be avoided: in 1.2 with regard to sexual activity (at 24ff),⁷⁶⁸ in 2.2 diet (at 53-69).⁷⁶⁹

Indeed fairly recent discussions of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean - concerning whether it can be regarded as an exclusively quantitative measurement or also as denoting excess, deficiency and the mean in

⁷⁶⁷ See Chapter 2, §2.5 (ii).

⁷⁶⁸ See Chapter 2, §2.5.

⁷⁶⁹ See Chapter 3, §3.2-4.

qualitative terms - sparked off by Urmson, and then taken up by Hursthouse and Curzer,⁷⁷⁰ prove to be illuminating when looking at Horace's application of the doctrine in 1.2. It seems that Horace initially applies the doctrine firstly in qualitative terms, then in qualitative/quantitative terms, through the Epicurean depiction of moderation as that which is within the limits of nature, and as avoiding what is unnecessary, unnatural and empty, as a way of merging these two criteria (quantitative and qualitative) for excess, deficiency and the mean. The discussions on the doctrine of the mean by Hursthouse and Curzer draw attention to the different ways in which excess can be measured, and help us understand the interconnection of these two approaches - quantitative and qualitative - in Horace's argument.

Moderation and, more specifically, the mean is also applicable to other ethical topics such as literary theory, conduct, and even to some extent religion and superstition. The Golden Mean is also evident in the *Odes* and the *Epistles*,⁷⁷¹ and is applied by Horace to most areas of ethics - just as it was by Aristotle. And although the mean had become a commonplace by Horace's time, there is little doubt that Aristotle would have been regarded as its most prominent and systematic champion. Indeed the mean with respect to conduct was a crucial part of Panaetian ethics as disseminated by Cicero, and Cicero is keen to stress the Aristotelian affiliations on this point.⁷⁷² But in the *Satires* at least, it seems that Horace made an exception in the application of this principle with regard to ambition. As discussed in Chapter 4, although Horace's advice to friends (in particular in the *Epistles*) and his personal approach to his career would seem, in part, to support a kind of moderate ambition, he would not have regarded a total lack of ambition as a deficiency, but rather as in keeping with the Epicurean tenet of *lathe biōsas*.⁷⁷³

Aristotelian literary theory can also be seen to inform Horace's views on the purpose of satire and the way in which one should write comedy. Although I am not in complete agreeance with the respective conclusions of

⁷⁷⁰ Urmson, 1973, 223-230; Hursthouse, 1981, 57-72; Curzer, 1996, 129-138. See Chapter 2, §2.5 (iii).

⁷⁷¹ E.g. *Odes* 2.10; *Epistles* 1.18.9.

⁷⁷² See Chapter 5, §5.1.

⁷⁷³ Usener 551. Armstrong, 275, 2004, argues that Epicureanism in the *Epistles* is the mean between Stoicism and Cyrenaicism, but with regard to conduct/ambition surely Cyrenaicism is a less extreme position than Epicureanism (see Chapter 5, §5.2).

those who have interpreted Horace's position in 1.4,⁷⁷⁴ partly through its being influenced by Aristotelian literary theory, nevertheless, the observations of Aristotelian influence are themselves significant. Also, Aristotle's influence on Horace in terms of the way in which he writes satire are wider reaching than his discussions on comedy and *mimesis*. In satirising certain kinds of people, for comic effect, it seems very likely that Horace, like the writers of New Comedy (notably Menander), was influenced by depictions of character types such as those found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Such observations of character types were continued by Theophrastus - under whom Menander studied - and, as noted in Chapter 5, Theophrastus' *Characters* are regarded as a kind of blue-print for certain stock characters in New Comedy. It is clear from Horace's discussions of literary theory (particularly in *Sat.* 1.4) and his use of the character sketch as moral *exemplum*, that literary theory and ethics, in an ancient context, were inter-connected.

9.4 Philodemus

The recognition of Philodemus as an influence on Horace represents an area of recent development in ancient philosophical discussion itself, since Philodemus' writings are still being deciphered. His influence on Horace is difficult to gauge owing to the incomplete and disparate nature of Philodemus' extant writings, though there have recently been studies which point to his influence on Augustan literature.⁷⁷⁵ The main areas where I have suggested Philodemus' influence - as pertaining directly to Philodemus' works - are in literary theory and good conduct. With regard to the subject of conduct and, more specifically, flattery - Philodemus having written a *peri kolakeias* - it would seem that much of what Horace says in *Satires* 1.9 and 2.5 is certainly in keeping with Philodemus. Again, what Horace has to say about satire and, by extension, poetry in *Sat.* 1.4 and 1.10 relates to discussions in Philodemus - mainly in connection with the views of Neoptolemus of Parium - concerning the definition of poetry and the relationship between *poiema* and *poiesis*, and

⁷⁷⁴ Namely Hendrickson, 1900, and Freudenberg, 1993: see Chapter 7, §7.4.

⁷⁷⁵ e.g.: Obbink, 1995; Armstrong, 2004.

style and content. Philodemus' theory of metathesis is also seen to have implications for our interpretation of 1.4, and the question of whether Horace is really denying his status as a poet here.⁷⁷⁶

But perhaps the most relevant question in Philodemean literary theory which relates to Horace is what Philodemus' views were as regards the relationship between poetry and philosophy, and whether or not he thought that poetry could have a genuine moral purpose. It seems that Philodemus did not think that moral content was necessary for good poetry, but he was not, at the same time, actually averse to poetry having moral content (which was Epicurus' view): although he attacks Cleanthes' philosophical poetry,⁷⁷⁷ one suspects he may have seen the philosophical merit in Lucretius' poem. It is evident that Epicureans certainly recognised that rhetorical devices and attractive presentation of philosophical ideas helped them to communicate their arguments more successfully - and Philodemus' own essays are a case in point (as discussed in Chapter 1); this indicates possible Epicurean flexibility in this area: Epicurus having been suspicious of rhetoric and poetry. Indeed, Philodemus' essay *On the Good King in Homer* shows that he did regard some poetry as morally useful, and worthy of discussion on that basis.⁷⁷⁸

Horace directly refers to and quotes Philodemus at *Sat.* 1.2. 120-2 ff and parodies one of his epigrams at 1.2.92-3. In these instances Horace is not referring to Philodemus as a philosopher, but the references are suggestive of his familiarity with Philodemus and, one could suppose, the Neapolitan circle. *Satire* 1.5 also suggests this familiarity. This satire is particularly striking for its strong Epicurean overtones in the praise of friendship, and the Epicurean sympathies of the travelling party. Two of them, Virgil and Varius, were contemporary poets, and Plotius was also a literary acquaintance; it seems more likely than not that they were all (Maecenas and, indeed, Horace too) inclined to Epicureanism.⁷⁷⁹ Thus there would certainly seem to be a connection with the Neapolitan circle here even if Horace himself was not a fully fledged member.

⁷⁷⁶ cf. Chapter 7, §7.6.

⁷⁷⁷ See Chapter 7, §7.1.

⁷⁷⁸ Armstrong, 2004, 277-279.

⁷⁷⁹ See Chapter 4, §4.6.

Epicurus' position on friendship and its compatibility with the goal of pleasure was questioned, and criticised by Cicero (*fin.* 1.66-70, 2.80). Recently scholars have re-appraised Epicurus' sayings on the matter: Annas (1993) and Mitsis (1988) finding the Epicurean pursuit of pleasure at odds with the altruism inherent in genuine friendship (as they see it), while Rist (1980), and O' Connor (1989) take the opposite view.⁷⁸⁰ It is clear from Horace's sentiments at 1.5.44 (*nil ego contulerim iucundo sanus amico*)⁷⁸¹ that he, at least, sees no such incompatibility, and this is implied in the rest of the poem, in his views on the importance of tolerance and loyalty in *Sat.* 1.3, as well as, in general, in the *Odes* and *Epistles*.

9.5 Lucretius

In as much as Horace is communicating philosophical ideas through the medium of poetry - and many of these ideas have an Epicurean basis - it is not surprising that a major influence and source in the *Satires* is Lucretius.

Horace ends *Sat.* 1.1 with a Lucretian metaphor - of life being a banquet which one should leave, uncomplainingly, as a satisfied guest (*DRN* 3.938, 959-60) - having argued for moderation in terms most identifiable with Epicureanism regarding the acquisition of material wealth. Indeed, although the doctrine of the mean is implied at 106-7, Horace's main argument in 1.1 appears to rely on the Epicurean link (which was specifically emphasised by Lucretius in Book 3. 59-97 (cf. *KD* 7, 14) between desire for security, and greed, which is borne out of the fear of death.⁷⁸²

Lucretius' influence is also felt particularly strongly in Horace's views on sex in *Satire* 1.2 which, as previously mentioned, is notable for its convergence of Cynicism and Epicureanism. Aside from the doctrine of the mean, the intermingling of Epicurean and Cynic sentiments in 1.2 is striking and one could again look to Lucretius' argument against the folly of erotic

⁷⁸⁰ As discussed in Chapter 4, §4.3.

⁷⁸¹ cf. Lucretius on pleasure: 2.3: *iucunda voluptas*; 2.19: *iucundo sensu*; 2.31: *iucunde*.

⁷⁸² See Chapter 2, §2.4.

love at the end of Book 4 by way of comparison. It is likely that both Horace and Lucretius (and, in fact, Lucilius) were familiar with a fragment of the Cynic Cercidas of Megalopolis,⁷⁸³ and indeed Lucretius also appears to have been influenced by the diatribe in books 3 and 4: as discussed, a form most identifiable with Cynicism.

Lucretian didacticism is felt most strongly in *Sat.* 1.3 from 96, where Horace is attacking the Stoic position on justice, and the paradox that all sins are equal. There are many instances where Horace employs Lucretian phraseology, and the sentiment of the passage is essentially Epicurean. In *Satire* 2.4 Horace again uses a somewhat didactic style in places, which could be seen as a nod to Lucretius,⁷⁸⁴ though the Epicurean overtones result in an ironic, mock Epicurean impression. Indeed this is borne out by Catius' misapplication of Epicurean principles and his own hypocritical inclination to *kenodoxia*.

Again, the ethical position put forward in *Sat.* 2.2 and 2.6 is for the most part Epicurean, and the sentiments found in both are also found in Lucretius, such as, in 2.2, the advisability of the simple life, the folly of empty opinion, and in 2.6 the Epicurean view (again) of moderation, of the simple country life and its conduciveness to *ataraxia* (cf. Lucretius 2.20ff). Here, however, although the sentiments are Epicurean, there are fewer instances which suggest a specifically Lucretian influence.

Bearing in mind the prevalent theme of food and *kenodoxia* (and the relationship between the two) in *Satires* 2.2 and 2.4, it is notable that Lucretius did not discuss unnecessary desires in terms of exotic foods, but in terms of various other luxuries (at *DRN* 2.20ff). Nevertheless, Lucretius' analogy of life being a dinner party at which we are guests may have some relevance here. Indeed the dinner party scene - whether concentrating on the *kenodoxia* and gluttony of those present, or on other aspects, such as (in the *Odes*) the fleeting nature of life, the appeal to enjoy good company - is certainly used by Horace to convey particular philosophical messages, just as Lucretius had done with regard to the fear of death at 3.938-9.

⁷⁸³ See Chapter 2, §2.3.

⁷⁸⁴ See Chapter 3, §3.5.

Surely the most all-encompassing aspect of Lucretius' influence, aside from his being an effective communicator of Epicurean ethics, is that his means of communication was verse. One should not assume, however, that all the Epicurean material in Horace is traceable to Lucretius and Philodemus. He had studied philosophy in Athens, and was thus no doubt well acquainted with Epicurus' original writings, as well as those of later Epicureans.⁷⁸⁵ While there are instances in the *Satires* where a specific Lucretian or Philodemian influence is extremely likely, Epicurean tenets regarding moderation, of living within the limits of nature, and of the folly of empty opinion would have been known to Horace from Epicurus' original writings.

9.6 Cicero

Cicero's philosophical influence on Horace's *Satires* is most striking in the so-called Stoic sermons of the second book, *Satires* 2.3 and 2.7. Both these poems deal with Stoic paradoxes: 2.3, that all fools are mad, and 2.7, that all fools are slaves. Cicero had also dealt with these paradoxes in his rhetorical/philosophical work *Paradoxa Stoicorum* and there is much in *Satire* 2.7 which suggests that Horace was acquainted with Cicero's *Paradoxa* 5: that all fools are slaves. Cicero's discussion of the Stoic view of madness in *Tusculan Disputations*, the distinction between *furor* and *insania*, also, in my view, exerted an influence on 2.3, as did his discussion of the madness of love in *Tusc.* 4 - all of which are discussed from a Stoic point of view. Indeed, an awareness of Horace's deliberate lack of distinction between *insania* and *furor*, which both enhances the rhetorical colour of the sermon, and then finally renders the argument absurd and impracticable, gives us an insight into the way in which Horace uses material for his own satirical, and philosophical ends.⁷⁸⁶

In *De officiis*, Cicero put forward the ethical views of the Stoic Panaetius. From what Horace says on matters concerning appropriate conduct in the *Satires* and *Epistles*, there are general similarities with *De officiis* (1.93-

⁷⁸⁵ De Witt, 1939, 127-134.

⁷⁸⁶ See Chapter 6, §6.4.

141) in terms of the overall guiding principle of moderation. Notably Panaetius was concerned with the practical application of Stoicism,⁷⁸⁷ and is also regarded as quite deliberately Romanising Stoicism, and in turn making traditional Roman ideas acceptable to Stoic principles. Moderation and temperance are qualities applied to the well-practised Stoic, and it is clear that Panaetius (assuming that Cicero's discussion of *decorum* was essentially in line with Panaetius' *on to prepon*) was influenced by Peripateticism in the importance he attaches to the idea of the mean in respect of behaviour.⁷⁸⁸ Although it is thus very likely that Horace was familiar with *De officiis* - indeed it is probable that he would have looked to Cicero's works in terms of its conversion of Greek philosophical material into Latin, and its practical application of that philosophy into a Roman context⁷⁸⁹ - he was also likely to be familiar with Panaetius' works at first hand (*Odes* 1.29.13ff).

If we accept the influence of Cicero and Philodemus regarding good conduct, flattery and friendship (where Cicero's *De amicitia* is relevant), and also, to some extent (perhaps via Cicero) the influence of Aristotle and Theophrastus - as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 - then Horace's observations of inappropriate behaviour themselves act as a practical reflection of these philosophical theories (even if these theories were to a great extent already presented in a practical context). At the very least, in the character of the pest in 1.9 (perhaps drawn from two of Theophrastus' *Characters*)⁷⁹⁰ and the would-be inheritance hunter of 2.5, Horace can be regarded as putting ethical tenets on behaviour, derived from philosophical sources, in a contemporary Roman context - or, in 2.5, in a mythical context based on a current phenomenon in Roman society. Indeed, although 1.9 and 2.5 are perhaps the most comic of the satires, the ethical material from which Horace has drawn adds a serious dimension to the humour, which would be clearly noticeable to his readers: a good example of what Horace means when he says, at *Sat.* 1.24-5: *quamquam ridentem dicere verum/ quid vetat*.

⁷⁸⁷ See Chapter 4, §4.4.

⁷⁸⁸ At 1.89, 93, 130, 140: Dyck, 1996: See Chapter 5, §5.1.

⁷⁸⁹ See Chapter 1, §1.4 (iv).

⁷⁹⁰ See Chapter 5, §5.4.

9.7 Plato and Pythagoreanism

Horace mentions Plato at *Satire* 2.3.11 in the prelude to Damasippus' lengthy sermon on the Stoic paradox, that all fools are mad, where it is clearly intended that his readers should be aware that Plato is favoured reading material. The beginning of 2.4 (*unde et quo Catius..*) is practically a translation of the opening of Plato's *Phaedrus*, and the purpose of this Platonic reference - and the other philosophical motifs in the *Satire* (notably Lucretian) - is to demonstrate the absurdity of discoursing on the subject of food and gourmandising as if it were a worthy philosophical topic.⁷⁹¹ The setting of 2.8 - the dinner party, or *convivium* - can also be regarded as part of the philosophical/literary tradition of the *symposium*, as first begun by Plato. Although Plato was responsible for using this scene as a literary tool to communicate philosophical argument, the dinner party was also used in Lucilian satire (book 20, Granius' dinner party) in Varro's *Menippean Satires* - and in the later *Satire* of Juvenal (5) and Petronius.⁷⁹² The *convivium* was also later a common setting in Horace's *Odes* - as discussed in Chapter 4. Thus, the influences for the satirical dinner party scene in 2.8 are likely to be more recent and Roman, but its philosophical origin is important, and Horace emphasises this.

In the *Satires*, Horace's pro-Epicurean position on religion (as put at 1.5.101) is certainly at odds with the Stoics but also with Plato and Pythagoreanism. The Stoics and the Pythagoreans (in Horace's time the Neopythagoreans) believed in the survival of the soul after death, which the Epicureans rejected. In addition, most Stoics believed in divination (the notable exceptions being Panaetius and Diogenes of Babylon) but the Pythagoreans, in particular, were associated with magic,⁷⁹³ and Horace's views on magic - very much connected with superstition (as a perversion of mainstream religion) in *Satire* 1.8 and *Epodes* 5 and 17 - are scathing.

⁷⁹¹ See Chapter 3, §3.5.

⁷⁹² Muecke, 1993, 227.

⁷⁹³ see Chapter 8, §8.3.

In fact, there is no explicit reference to Pythagoreanism in either *Sat.* 1.8 or *Epode* 5 or 17, but Horace certainly does ridicule the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis and Pythagorean stipulations as to what one should eat (*Sat.* 2.6.53, *Epode* 15.21, *Epist.* 2.1.52). And although Horace's mention of Pythagoras at 2.4.4 along with Plato and Socrates places him in the context of eminent philosophers of the past, his inclusion here may owe something to his particular views on diet, (the satire being about food as a philosophical topic) rather than simply reflecting his position as a great philosopher; and, in any case, these are presented as Catius' words.

Horace's favourable reference to what may have been regarded as Pythagorean doctrine on the nature of the soul in *Sat.* 2.2.79 (*atque affigit humo divinae particulam aurae*) in the context shows the importance Horace (as relating the views of Ofellus) attaches to moderation – rather than saying anything about his religious beliefs. The connection to Plato, and by the associative context Pythagoreanism, is very likely, in that part of the lines in question appear to refer to a part of the *Phaedo* (83d) on the corporeality of the soul, which is presented as part of a dialogue between Socrates and the Pythagoreans Simmias and Cebes (even though in these lines Socrates is speaking).

9.8 Lucilius and Roman Traditional Wisdom

The popular flavour of the moralising in the *Satires*, its Roman context, and its relationship with the *Satires* of Lucilius suggest that the moral content was not only borne out of Greek philosophical precedent, but also from established views in the Roman tradition as to what was the proper way to behave and think.

I have just mentioned that Horace's characterisations may have been influenced, in part, by Peripatetic ethics, but *exempla*, in general, were also a feature of Roman historiography (e.g. Livy, see Chapter 7, §7.4) and are indicative of the traditionally Roman emphasis on the practical rather than the theoretical. On the other hand, as has already been mentioned, *exempla* were also employed in the diatribe.

The description of Horace's father in *Sat.* 1.4 illustrates this teaching through *exempla*, but is itself a portrayal of the traditional wisdom at work: the father handing down wisdom to his son, as it had been handed down from generation to generation before. Again, in 2.2, Ofellus is described as *rusticus* and *abnormis* (3): a man whose wisdom comes from his own and his predecessors' experience of life, rather than philosophy. But it is notable both in the portrayal of his father in 1.4, and Ofellus in 2.2, that Horace alludes to Hellenistic philosophical doctrine, particularly Epicureanism. Indeed, in 2.2 Ofellus' pronouncements – for most of the satire related through Horace, Ofellus himself does not speak until 116 – draw on Stoicism, Pythagoreanism and Epicureanism. Mayer notes that Ofellus is informed by a variety of philosophical material, but is also described as *abnormis*, suggesting that he is of no philosophical school: “once again, a marriage of the pragmatic Roman and the imported Greek.”⁷⁹⁴ But this marriage does not dilute the philosophical nature of Ofellus' precepts: the philosophical material is still, essentially, philosophical, whether it is coming from someone ironically described as *abnormis sapiens*, or simply as *sapiens*.

Also, as has been mentioned, the distinction between this traditional wisdom and the ethics of Greek philosophy has, it would seem, been deliberately blurred by Panaetius (and later Cicero). This blurring can also be seen in Lucilius, where his eulogy on *virtus* could be viewed as chiefly Stoic (Fiske, Marx) or Roman (Earl, Mayer).⁷⁹⁵ Clearly if these lines (1196-1208W) came across to his audience as *non*-Roman, they would not have been well received: they must therefore represent ideas which are very much in line with Roman values; at the same time, the fact that Lucilius was a contemporary of Panaetius (both being associated with Scipio), famed for putting Stoicism in a practical, Roman context, suggests that these apparently Roman values would still have been recognised as Stoic. In short, this conflation of Roman traditional wisdom and Greek philosophy is intentionally inseparable.

⁷⁹⁴ Mayer, 2005, 154.

⁷⁹⁵ Fiske, 1920, Marx, 1902-1905; Earl, 1961, Mayer, 2005, 152.

Conclusion

Quintilian claimed that satire was an exclusively Roman literary genre⁷⁹⁶ and Horace himself regarded Lucilius as satire's real *inventor*, but as we have seen satire also drew considerably from other sources, and Greek philosophy played a key role in satire, particularly in the satires of Horace.

Indeed, in Chapter 1 it was seen how Greek philosophy – the Hellenistic schools in particular – had been Romanised by Lucretius and Cicero (among others) in the first century B.C., and that Rome itself had become as important a philosophical centre as Athens. This appropriation of Hellenistic philosophy by the Roman intellectual elite was reflected in the literature of the time, and Roman satire, which dealt with ethical themes in its engagement with the folly of human behaviour, naturally drew from these philosophical texts.

In Horace's *Satires*, this is most obviously evidenced in the so-called 'diatribe' satires, in which the arguments – inconsequential as they may sometimes appear – are nevertheless concerned with particular philosophical themes. What lies at the heart of these satires, and what, for Horace, answers the ultimate question in ancient ethics of how can we be happy, is the philosophical theme of moderation. Horace's advocacy of moderation is well-known, but the extent to which he makes his case, with reference to Epicurean and Aristotelian doctrine, is striking, and certainly suggests much more than a general appreciation of what was, indeed, a commonplace. In fact, it is through an understanding of Epicurean and Aristotelian doctrine that his arguments, in 1.1 and 1.2, can be best interpreted; and in 1.2 the concept of the mean and moderation in Aristotle as being either a quantitative or qualitative measurement (or both) – as discussed in modern scholarship – illuminates the inter-relation of points in Horace's argument: points which on

⁷⁹⁶ Quintilian, *Institutes* 10.1.93-5.

the surface are presented so casually, and apparently inconsequentially.⁷⁹⁷ And moderation is again put forward by means of an Aristotelian-Epicurean fusion in *Satires* 2.2, where Horace deals with the quantitative excess of gluttony and the qualitative excess of pretentiousness through *kenodoxia*.⁷⁹⁸

It is notable that friendship is raised in *Satire* 1.3 in a generally anti-Stoic context, and indeed from Horace's thoughts on this theme in other satires (1.5 and 1.6) and in the *Odes*, an Epicurean view of friendship can be deduced. In his discussion of (essentially Epicurean) tolerance in friendship and justice in *Satire* 1.3, Horace attacks Stoic inflexibility partly by upholding Stoic *aequabilitas* (balance), while at the same time his position is ironically undercut by his apparent inconsistency (*aequabilitas* also means consistency), and this is enhanced by his skilful (in a sense inconsistent) use of philosophical material.⁷⁹⁹ For Horace friendship is connected with, and complicated by, ambition. In spite of his personal acquaintance with important political figures and his literary aspirations, in the *Satires* Horace still advocates Epicurean exclusion and quietism against Stoic public involvement. Friendship and ambition were important topics in ancient ethics, and in the *Satires* Horace is both drawing from, and adding to, these discussions. Unlike Cicero – and, to an extent, some recent scholars – Horace saw no friction between the pleasure principle and the gamble of human relationships.⁸⁰⁰ With regard to ambition, he was, by his own admission (as in *Epistles* 1.1), somewhat inconsistent, though even in those epistles (1.17, 18) where he advises on how to get on in the world, his own poetically idealised Epicurean quietism, in his semi-retirement on his Sabine farm, has the last word. Just as with friendship and ambition, so with matters of appropriate conduct Horace can be said to be putting ancient ethics in a contemporary, practical context.⁸⁰¹ The relationship between behaviour and morality is further explored, and in a sense taken to its limit, where conduct is seen to have definite moral implications: this was true for Horace, as it was for Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Philodemus.

⁷⁹⁷ See Chapter 2.

⁷⁹⁸ See Chapter 3, §§2-4.

⁷⁹⁹ See Chapter 4, §4.3.

⁸⁰⁰ See Chapter 4, §4.3.

⁸⁰¹ See Chapter 5.

Horace criticises Stoic paradoxes at the end of *Satire* 1.3 in connection with Stoic extremism in general. In 2.3 and 2.7 the sense of Stoic priggery is maintained, though we are also invited to agree with much of what the Stoic spokesmen in these satires say. Horace's wilful blurring of the Ciceronian distinction between *insania* and *furor* (in 2.3) serves at first to enrich Damasippus' argument, but finally to render the Stoic position absurd and impractical. The modelling of 2.7 on Cicero's *paradoxa* 5 shows a remarkable application of another rhetorical/philosophical text to satire; one feels that Horace is, in a sense, defeated by Davus' argument that all fools are slaves.⁸⁰²

Ancient literary theory and ethics were connected, and this is illustrated in Horace's discussion of his own, and Lucilian satire in *Satire* 1.4. Horace's views here are greatly influenced by Philodemean and Aristotelian literary theory and scholars have recently made significant claims in respect of these influences; but in spite of this these interpretations need re-consideration: in using these sources Horace adopts an individual, elusive position which marries the satiric tradition with the constraints of what is morally appropriate and constructive.⁸⁰³

Religion was addressed by the Hellenistic schools and Horace's references to religion in the *Satires*, and, in particular, *Ode* 1.34, are clearly made in the context of these philosophical discussions. The apparent renunciation of the Lucretian view he expresses at *Satire* 1.5.101 in *Ode* 1.34 has sparked much debate as to Horace's views on the gods; but the strongest case is for an essentially Epicurean position, in spite of there being some emotional attachment to a more traditional notion of religion in the *Odes*, though even this is not in fact entirely at odds with Epicureanism.⁸⁰⁴

Philosophy plays an important part in Horace's *Satires*, and the fact that it does so also has a bearing on the tastes and philosophical awareness of Horace's contemporary readership. Like Horace, they were also well versed in Hellenistic ethics, and the prevalence of the philosophical element in the *Satires* shows this, as well as the extent to which Hellenistic ethics were seen

⁸⁰² See Chapter 6, §§2-4.

⁸⁰³ See Chapter 7, §§7.4-6.

⁸⁰⁴ See Chapter 8.

to encroach on matters of everyday life, and were thus entwined with contemporary intellectual discourse even in the most general way. Horace demonstrates human folly, vice and excess, and in so doing suggests tenets (many of which are identifiable with Epicureanism) as a sensible guide to life; but on a more particular level, Horace utilises principles drawn from ancient philosophical sources to shape and inform his arguments, as well as to formulate his literary theory. His representations of human behaviour themselves owe as much to philosophical sources as to the comic/satiric tradition. The *Satires* are not philosophical treatises and Horace is not a philosopher in any technical sense, but a truly rounded appreciation of these poems can only be achieved through a proper awareness and consideration of their philosophical content.

Abbreviations

<i>CErc</i>	<i>Cronache Ercolenesi</i>
DK	Diels and Kranz, 1951-2, see bibliography
D.L.	Diogenes Laertius, <i>Lives of Eminent Philosophers</i>
<i>FHG</i>	C. Müller, <i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i> (Paris 1841-1870)
FHS&G	Fortenbaugh, Huby, Sharples and Gutas, 1992, see bibliography
<i>Hdt.</i>	Epicurus, <i>Letter to Herodotus</i>
Hense	Hense 1909, see bibliography
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graeci</i> (1873-)
<i>KD</i>	Epicurus, <i>Kuriai Doxai</i>
KRS	Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 1983, see bibliography
LS	Long and Sedley, 1987, see bibliography
<i>M</i>	Sextus Empiricus, <i>Against the Professors</i> (<i>Adversus Mathematicos</i>)
M	Marx, 1904, see bibliography
<i>Men.</i>	Epicurus, <i>Letter to Menoeceus</i>
<i>OCD</i>	<i>Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> , third edition revised, eds. A. Spawforth, S. Hornblower (Oxford 2003)
Peek	Peek, 1955, see bibliography
<i>PH</i>	Sextus Empiricus, <i>Outlines of Pyrrhonism</i> (<i>Pyrrhoneiai hypotyposeis</i>)
<i>P.Herc</i>	<i>Papyri Herculanenses</i>

<i>PHP</i>	Galen, <i>On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis)</i> : De Lacy, 1978-1984, see bibliography
<i>Pyth.</i>	Epicurus, <i>Letter to Pythocles</i>
<i>SVF</i>	H. Von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i> , (Leipzig 1903-5)
Usener	Usener, 1887, see bibliography
<i>VS</i>	Epicurus, <i>Vatican Sayings</i>
W	Warmington, 1938, see bibliography

Bibliography

(a) Editions of Horace's *Satires*

P.M. Brown, *Horace, Satires I* (Warminster 1993, reprinted 1995)

H. R. Fairclough, *Horace: Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica* (Cambridge, Mass.; London 1926, reprinted 1970)

A. Kiessling and R. Heinze, *Quintus Horatius Flaccus, Satiren* (Berlin 1886, reprinted 1957)

P. Lejay, *Horace, Oeuvres d'Horace* (Paris 1911, reprinted Hildesheim 1966)

F. Muecke, *Horace, Satires II* (Warminster 1993, reprinted 1997)

A. Palmer, *The Satires of Horace* (London 1883, reprinted 1904)

E.C. Wickham, *Q. Horatii Flacci Opera Omnia, vol. I & II* (Oxford 1877 & 1891)

(b) Other Works

J. Adamietz, *Cicero: Pro Murena* (Darmstadt 1989)

J.N. Adams, *The Latin Sexual Vocabulary* (London 1982)

A. Angeli and M. Colaizzo, 'I Frammenti di Zenone Sidonio', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 9 (1978) 47-133

W.S. Anderson, 'The Form, Purpose, and Position of Horace's *Satire* 1.8', *AJP* (1972) 4-13

W. S. Anderson, *Essays on Roman Satire* (Princeton 1982)

J.-M. André, *Mécène: essai de biographie spirituelle* (Paris 1967)

J. Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* (Oxford 1981)

J. Annas, *The Morality of Happiness* (Oxford 1993)

- D. Armstrong, 'Horace, Satires 1.1-3: A Structural Study', *Arion* 3.2 (1964) 86-96
- D. Armstrong, *Horace* (New Haven 1989)
- D. Armstrong, 'The Impossibility of Metathesis: Philodemus and Lucretius on Form and Content in Poetry', *Philodemus and Poetry*, ed. D. Obbink (Oxford 1995) 210-232
- D. Armstrong, 'Horace *Epistles* 1', *Vergil, Philodemus and the Augustans* (Austin, Texas 2004) 267-298
- E.V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (Cambridge 1911)
- E. Asmis, 'Philodemus on Censorship, Moral Utility and Formalism in Poetry,' *Philodemus and Poetry*, ed. D. Obbink (Oxford 1995) 148-177
- A.E. Astin, *Scipio Aemilianus* (Oxford 1967)
- R.G. Austin, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos, liber quartus* (Oxford 1955)
- R.G. Austin, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos, liber sextus* (Oxford 1977)
- F.C. Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia* (Cambridge Mass.; London 1927, reprinted 2004)
- B. Baldwin, 'Horace on Sex', *AJP* 91 (1970) 460-5
- M. Balme and P. Brown, *Menander, the Plays and Fragments* (Oxford 2001)
- J. Barnes, 'Roman Aristotle', *Philosophia Togata II*, eds. M. Griffin and J. Barnes (Oxford 1997) 1-69
- J. Barsby, *Terence: The woman of Andros, The self-tormentor, The Eunuch* (Cambridge, Mass.; London 2001)
- J. Basore, *Seneca: Moral essays* (London; New York 1928-35)
- M. Beard, J. North, S. Price, *Religions of Rome: Volume 1: A History* (Cambridge 1998)
- C. E. Bennet, *Horace: Odes and Epodes* (Cambridge Mass; London 1914)
- G. Bernhardt, *Grundriß Der Römischen Litteratur* (Braunschweig 1872)
- S. Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford 1998)
- S. Bobzien, 'Logic', *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. K. Algra et. al. (Cambridge 1999) 83-157

- R. Bodéüs, *Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals* (tr. Jan Garret) (New York 2000)
- R.P. Bond, 'The Characterisation of Ofellus in Horace *Satires* 2.2 and a Note of v.123', *Anticthron* 14 (1980) 112-126
- A.C. Bowen and R.B. Todd, *Cleomedes' Lectures on Astronomy* (Berkeley 2004)
- C.M. Bowra, 'Aeneas and the Stoic Ideal', *Greece and Rome* 3 (1933-4) 8-21; reprinted in *Oxford Readings in Virgil's Aeneid* ed. S.J. Harrison (Oxford 1990) 363-377
- G. Boys-Stones, *Post-Hellenistic Philosophy* (Oxford 2001)
- R. B. Branham and M-O. Coulet-Cazé eds., *The Cynics: the Cynic movement in antiquity and its legacy* (Berkeley 1996)
- S.H. Braund, *Roman Verse Satire* (Oxford 1992)
- S.M. Braund, *Juvenal and Persius: Works* (Cambridge Mass.; London 2004)
- C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles* (Cambridge 1963)
- C.O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry: Epistles Book II* (Cambridge 1982)
- J. Briscoe, *Livy XXXI-XXXIII* (Oxford 1973)
- P.M. Brown, *Horace, Satires I* (Warminster 1993)
- R.D. Brown, *Lucretius on Love and Sex: DRN IV. 1030-1247* (Leiden 1987)
- R.M. Brown, *A Study of the Scipionic Circle* (Iowa 1934)
- I. Bruns, *Supplementum Aristotelicum* 2.1 (Berlin 1887)
- K. G. Bruns, *Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui* (7th edition revised, O. Gradenwitz, Tübingen 1909)
- J. Brunschwig, *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy* (tr. J. Lloyd) (Cambridge 1994)
- P.A. Brunt, "'Amicitia" in the late Roman Republic,' *PCPhS* N.S. 11 (1965) 1-20 = *The Crisis of the Roman Republic*, ed. R. Seager (Cambridge 1969) 199-218 = *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* (Oxford 1988) 351-381

- P.A. Brunt, 'Philosophy and Roman Religion', *Philosophia Togata*, eds. M. Griffin and J. Barnes (Oxford 1989) 174-198
- W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, translated by E.L. Minar (Cambridge, Mass. 1972)
- J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (London 1892, reprinted 1957)
- R.G. Bury, *Plato: Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles* (Cambridge Mass.; London 1929)
- E.W. Bushala 'The Motif of Sexual Choice in Horace, *Satires* 1.2', *CJ* 66 (1971) 312-315
- G. Cambiano, 'Philosophy, Astronomy and Astrology,' *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. K. Algra et. al. (Cambridge 1999) 595-599
- A.Y. Campbell, *Horace, A New Interpretation* (London 1924)
- F. Cairns, *Virgil's Augustan Epic* (Cambridge 1989)
- B. Cardauns, *M. Terentius Varro: Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum* (Mainz 1976)
- C.J. Castner, *A Prosopography of Roman Epicureans from the Second Century B.C. to the Second Century A.D.* (Frankfurt; New York 1988)
- A. Chiappelli, 'Zu Pythagoras und Anaximenes', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 1 (1888) 582-94
- C. Cichorius, *Untersuchungen zu Lucilius* (Berlin 1908)
- C.J. Classen, 'Poetry and Rhetoric in Lucretius', *TAPA* 99 (1968) 77-118
- C.J. Classen, 'Eine unsatirische Satire des Horaz? Zu Hor. Sat. 1.5', *Gymnasium* 80, (1973) 235-250
- C. J. Classen, 'Horace – a Cook?' *CQ* 28 (1978) 333-48
- D. Clay, *Lucretius and Epicurus* (Ithaca 1983)
- M. Coffey, *Roman Satire* (Bristol 1989)
- R. Coleman, *Virgil: Eclogues* (Cambridge 1977, reprinted 1998)
- R. Coleman, 'The Artful Moralist: A Study of Seneca's Epistolary Style', *CQ* 24 (1974) 276-289
- F.H. Colson, *Philo* (London; New York 1929)

- G.S. Conway and R. Stoneman *Pindar: The Odes and Selected Fragments* (London 1997)
- J. A. Coulter, 'An Unnoted Allusion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in Horace's *Sermones* 2.2.' *CP* 62 (1967) 39-41
- L. Curran, 'Nature, Convention and Obscenity in Horace, Satires 1.2', *Arion* 9 (1970) 220-245
- H. Curzer, 'A defence of Aristotle's Doctrine that Virtue is a Mean', *Ancient Philosophy* 16 (1996) 129-138
- P.H. De Lacy, 'The Epicurean Analysis of Language', *AJP* 60 (1939) 85-92
- P.H. De Lacy, (1948a) 'Stoic Views of Poetry', *AJP* 69 (1948) 241-271
- P.H. De Lacy, (1948b) 'Lucretius and the History of Epicureanism' *TAPA* LXXIX (1948) 12-23
- P.H. De Lacy, *Galen: On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (Berlin 1978-1984)
- N.W. De Witt, 'Parresiastic Poems of Horace', *CP* 30 (1935) 312-319
- N.W. De Witt, 'Epicurean Doctrine in Horace', *CP* 34 (1939) 127-134
- C. Dessen, 'The Sexual and Financial Mean in Horace's *Serm.* 1.2', *AJP* 89 (1968) 200-8
- H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1879)
- H. Diels, *Philodemos Über die Gotter* (Berlin 1916-1917)
- H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Dublin; Zürich, 1951-2)
- J. M. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: a study of Platonism, 80B.C. to A.D. 220* (London 1977)
- J. M. Dillon, *The Heirs of Plato: a study of the Old Academy (347-274 B.C.)* (Oxford 2003)
- E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951)
- P. Donini, 'The History of the Concept of Eclecticism', *The Question of "Eclecticism"*, eds. J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long (Berkeley; London 1988)
- P. Donini, 'Stoic Ethics', *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. K. Algra et al. (Cambridge 1999) 705-738

- T. Dorandi, *Philodemo: Il buon re secondo Omero* (Naples 1982)
- A.E. Douglas, *Cicero: Tusculan Disputations II and V: with a summary of III and IV* (Warminster 1990)
- K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974)
- D.R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* (London 1937)
- D.R. Dudley, 'The Satiric Element in Lucretius', *Lucretius: Chapters by D.R. Dudley (and others)*, ed. D.R. Dudley (London 1965)
- I.M. Le M. Du Quesnay, 'Horace and Meacenas: the Propaganda Value of *Sermones* I', *Poetry and Politics in the Age of Augustus*, eds. T. Woodman and D. West (Cambridge 1984)
- I. Düring, 'Notes on the History of the transmission of the transmission of Aristotle's writings', *Göteborgs Högskolas arskrift* 56 (Göteborg 1950)
- A.R. Dyck, *Cicero: De Officiis* (Ann Arbor 1996)
- D.C. Earl, *The Political Thought of Sallust* (Cambridge 1961)
- H. J. Easterling, 'Quinta Natura', *Museum Helveticum* 21 (1964) 73-85
- L. Edelstein, *Ancient Medicine*, translated by C.L. Temkin (Baltimore 1967)
- L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd (eds.) *Posidonius. Vol. 2, Commentary* (Cambridge; New York 1989-)
- M. Erler (et al.), *Die Philosophie Der Antike 4: Die Hellenistische Philosophie – Epikur- Die Schule Epikurs- Lukrez* (Basle 1994)
- H.R. Fairclough, *Horace: Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica* (Cambridge, Mass.; London 1926, reprinted 1970)
- W.A. Falconer, *Cicero: De senectute, De amicitia, De divinatione* (London; New York 1923)
- B. Farrington, *The Faith of Epicurus* (London 1967)
- G.C. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace* (Madison 1920)
- W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, R.W. Sharples and D. Gutas (eds.) *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, II* (Leiden 1992)

- D.P. Fowler, 'Lucretius and Politics', *Philosophia Togata*, eds. M. Griffin and J. Barnes (Oxford 1989) 120-150
- D. P. Fowler, 'Horace and the Aesthetics of Politics', *Homage to Horace: A Bimillenary Celebration*, ed. S.J. Harrison (Oxford 1995) 248-266
- D.P. Fowler and P.G. Fowler, 'Lucretius', *The Oxford Classical Dictionary: Third Edition Revised*, eds. A. Spawforth and S. Hornblower (Oxford 2003) 888-890
- E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957)
- M. Frede, (1999a) 'Stoic Epistemology' *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. K. Algra et al. (Cambridge 1999) 295-322
- M. Frede, (1999b) Epilogue to *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. K. Algra et al. (Cambridge 1999) 771-797
- K. Freudenburg, *The Walking Muse: Horace on the Theory of Satire* (Princeton 1993)
- K. Gantar, 'Horaz zwischen Akademie und Epikur', *Živa Antika* (1972) 5-24
- T. Gargiulo, 'P. Herc 222: Filodemo Sull'adulazione', *CErc* 11 (1981) 103-27
- G. A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon* (Leipzig; Berlin 1909)
- M. Gigante, *Cinicismo e Epicureanismo*, (Naples 1992)
- M. Gigante, *Philodemus in Italy*, tr. D. Obbink (Ann Arbor 1995)
- C.E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Christian Psychagogy* (Leiden; New York 1995)
- J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (1978)
- J. Glucker, 'Cicero's Philosophical Affiliations', *The Question of "Eclecticism"*, eds. J.M. Dillon and A.A. Long (Berkeley; London 1988)
- J. Godwin, *Lucretius: De Rerum Natura IV* (Warminster 1986)
- A.W. Gomme and F.H. Sandbach, *Menander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1973)
- T. Göransson, 'Albinos, Alcinous, Arius Didymus', *Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia* 61 (Göteborg 1995)
- W. Görler, 'Silencing the Troublemaker: *De legibus* 1.39 and the Continuity of Cicero's Scepticism', *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. J.G.F. Powell (Oxford 1995)

H.B. Gottschalk, 'Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the time of Cicero to the end of the Second Century A.D.', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*, II.36.2 (1987) 1079-1174

E. Gowers, *The Loaded Table* (Oxford 1993)

E. Gowers, 'The Restless Companion: Horace, *Satires* 1 and 2', *The Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire*, ed. K. Freudenburg (Cambridge 2005)

A.S. Gratwick, 'The Satires of Ennius and Lucilius', *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, eds. E.J. Kenney and W.V. Clausen (Cambridge 1982) 156-171

N. Greenberg, 'Metathesis as an Instrument in the Criticism of Poetry', *TAPA* 89 (1958) 262-270

M. Griffin and E. Atkins, *Cicero: On Duties* (Cambridge 1991)

M. Griffin, 'Cynicism and the Romans: Attraction and Repulsion', *The Cynics: the Cynic movement in antiquity and its legacy*, eds. R.B. Branham and M.-O. Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley 1996) 190-204

M. Griffin, 'Cicero and Matius on Friendship', *Philosophia Togata II*, eds. M. Griffin and J. Barnes (Oxford 1997) 86-109

D. Grodzinsky, 'Superstitio', *Revue Des Études Anciennes* (1974) 36-60

G.M.A. Grube, *Greek and Roman Critics* (Toronto 1968)

R.M. Gummere, *Seneca: Ad Lucilium epistulae morales* (London; New York 1925, reprinted Cambridge, mass. 1967)

D. Hahm, 'The ethical doxography of Arius Didymus', *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt* II.36.6 (1992) 2935-3055

F.S. Halliwell, *Plato: Republic 10* (Warminster 1988)

P. Hardie, *Virgil's Aeneid* (Oxford 1986)

A. Hausrath, *Philodemi peri poiēmatōn libri secundi quae videntur frangmenta* (Leipzig 1889)

E.A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge 1963)

J. Heidmann, *Der Papyrus 1676 der Herculischen Bibliothek; Philodemos über die Gedichte* (Bonn dissertation 1937) = *CErc* (1971) 90-111 = F. Sbordone, *Ricerche sui Papiri Ercolanesi* (Naples 1976) 189-301

- G. L. Hendrickson, 'Horace, Serm. 1.4: a Protest and a Programme', *AJP* 21 (1900) 121-124
- O. Hense, *Teletis Reliquiae* (Tübingen 1909)
- W.S. Hett, *Aristotle: On the soul: Parva naturalia; On breath* (London 1935)
- R.D. Hicks, *Aristotle: De Anima* (Cambridge 1907)
- R. L. Hunter, 'Horace on Friendship and Free Speech', *Hermes* 113 (1985) 480-490
- R.L. Hunter, 'Menippus', *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, eds. A. Spawforth and S. Hornblower (Oxford 2003) 959-960
- R. Hursthouse, 'A false doctrine of the mean', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1980-81, vol. 81 (1981) 57-72
- R. Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics* (Oxford 1999)
- C. Ingreteau, *Lactantius: De Ira Dei* (Paris 1982)
- B. Inwood and L.P. Gerson (eds.), *The Epicurus Reader* (Indianapolis 1994)
- M. Ioppolo 'L'astrologia nello stoicismo antico', *La Scienza ellenistica: atti delle tre giornate di studio tenutesi a Pavia dal 14 al 16 aprile 1982*, eds. G. Giannantoni and M. Vegetti (Naples 1985) 73-92
- R. Janko, *Philodemus: On Poems* (Oxford 2000)
- C. Jensen, *Philodemus: Epigrammata, Liber 5* (Berlin 1923)
- W.R. Johnson, *Horace and the Dialectic of Freedom* (Ithaca; London 1993)
- C.H Kahn, *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans: A Brief History* (Cambridge 2001)
- J.J. Keaney 'The early text tradition of Theophrastus' *Historia plantarum*' *Hermes* 96 (1968)
- J. Kemke, *Philodemus: De musica* (Leipzig 1884)
- E.J. Kenney, 'Doctus Lucretius', *Mnemosyne* 4.23 (1970) 366-392
- E.J. Kenney, *Lucretius: De Rerum Natura, Book III* (Cambridge 1971)
- A. Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics* (Oxford 1978)
- C.W. Keyes, *Cicero: De Re Publica, De Legibus* (Cambridge Mass.; London 1928, reprinted 1943)

- A. Kiessling and R. Heinze, *Quintus Horatius Flaccus, Satiren* (Berlin 1886, reprinted 1957)
- R. Kilpatrick, *The Poetry of Friendship: Horace, Epistles 1* (Edmonton, Alta 1986)
- J.F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes* (Uppsala 1976)
- J. E. King, *Cicero: Tusculan Disputations* (London; New York 1927, reprinted 1950)
- G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1983)
- K. Kleve, 'Lucretius and Philodemus', *Lucretius and his Intellectual Background*, eds. K.A. Algra, M.H. Koenen and P.H. Schrijvers (Amsterdam; Oxford 1997) 49-66
- A.D. Knox, *Herodes, Cercidas and the Greek Choliambic Poets* (London; Cambridge Mass. 1953)
- D. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge 1997)
- D. Konstan et al. (introduction, translation and notes), *Philodemus: On Frank Criticism* (Atlanta 1998)
- D. Kovacks, *Euripides: Cyclops, Alcestis, Medea* (London; Cambridge Mass. 2001)
- D. Krueger, 'The Bawdy and Society', *The Cynics*, eds. R. Branham and M-O Goulet-Cazé (California 1996) 222-239
- C.G. Kühn, *Galen: Opera Omnia* (Leipzig 1821-1833; reprinted Hildesheim 1964-5)
- A.G. Lee, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Paradoxa Stoicorum* (London 1953)
- Y. Lehman, *Varron theologien et philosophe romain* (Brussels 1997)
- P. Lejay, *Oeuvres d'Horace* (Paris 1911, reprinted Hildesheim 1966)
- A.A. Long, 'Astrology: arguments pro and contra,' *Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice*, eds. J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M. Burnyeat, M. Schofield (Cambridge; Paris 1982) 165-192
- A.A. Long, 'Pleasure and Social Utility – the virtues of being an Epicurean', *Aspects de la philosophie hellénistique*, eds. H Flashar, O. Gigon (Geneva 1986) 283-325

A.A. Long, 'Cicero's Politics in *De officiis*', *Justice and Generosity: studies in Hellenistic social and political philosophy: proceedings of the sixth Symposium Hellenisticum*, eds. A. Laks, M. Schofield (Cambridge 1995) 213-240

A.A. Long, 'Aristippus and Cyrenaic Hedonism', *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1999) 632-639

A.A. Long, *Epictetus* (Oxford 2002)

A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1987)

J.P. Lynch, *Aristotle's School* (Berkeley 1972)

R.O.A.M. Lyne, *The Latin Love Poets (from Catullus to Horace)* (Oxford 1980)

R.O.A.M. Lyne, *Horace: Behind the Public Poetry* (New Haven; London 1995)

P. MacKendrick, *The Philosophical Books of Cicero* (London 1989)

C.W. Macleod, 'The Poetry of Ethics: Horace Epistles 1', *Collected Essays*, (Oxford 1983)

C.W. Macleod, *Horace, the Epistles: Translated into English Verse with Brief Comment* (Rome 1986)

W.S. Maguinness, 'The Eclecticism of Horace', *Hermathena* 52 (1938) 27-46

C. Mangoni, *Philodemus: De poematis, liber 5* (Naples 1993)

J. Mansfeld, 'Theology', *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. K. Algra et. al. (Cambridge 1999) 452-478

F. Marx, *C. Lucilii Carminum Reliquiae I, II* (Leipzig 1904)

T. Maslowski, 'Cicero, Philodemus, Lucretius', *Eos* 66 (1978) 215-226

R.G. Mayer, 'Horace's Epistles I and Philosophy', *AJP* (1986) 55-73

R.G. Mayer, *Horace: Epistles I* (Cambridge 1994)

R.G. Mayer, 'Horace's *Moyen de Parvenir*', *Homage to Horace: A Bimillenary Celebration*, ed. S.J. Harrison (Oxford 1995) 279-295

R.G. Mayer 'Sleeping with the enemy: Philosophy and Satire', *The Cambridge Companion to Roman Satire*, ed. K. Freudenburg (Cambridge 2005) 146-159

- A.K. Michels, 'Parresia and the Satire of Horace,' *CP* 39 (1944) 173-177
- W. Miller, *Cicero: De officiis* (London 1913)
- P. Mitsis, *Epicurus' Ethical Theory* (Ithaca 1988)
- J. Molager, *Cicéron: Les Paradoxes des Stoïciens* (Paris 1971)
- J. Moles, 'Cynicism in Horace *Epistles* 1', *PLLS* (1985) 33-60
- J. Moles, 'Poetry, philosophy, politics and play. *Epistles* 1', *Traditions and Contexts in the Poetry of Horace*, eds. A. Woodman and D. Feeney (Cambridge 2002) 141-57
- J. Moles, 'Diatribē', *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford 2003) 46-4
- A. Momigliano, Review of *Science and Politics in the Ancient World* by B. Farrington', *JRS* XXXI (1941) 149-157
- P. Moraux, *Aristotelismus bei den Griechen vol. I & II* (Berlin 1984)
- A.L. Motto and J. R. Clark, 'Paradoxum Senecae: The Epicurean Stoic', *CW* 62.2 (1968) 38-42
- F. Muecke, 'Horace the Satirist: form and method in *Satires* 1.4', *Prudentia* 11 (1979) 55-68
- F. Muecke, *Horace, Satires II* (Warminster 1993)
- H. Nettleship, 'Superstes, Superstitio, Superstitiosus', *Journal of Philology* 6 (1876) 98-99
- J. Neubecker, *Philodemus: De musica, liber 4* (Naples 1986)
- O. Neugebauer, *A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy* vol. ii (Berlin 1975)
- R.G.M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace, Odes Book I* (Oxford 1970)
- R.G.M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace, Odes Book II* (Oxford 1978)
- R.G.M. Nisbet and N. Rudd, *A Commentary on Horace, Odes Book III* (Oxford 2004)
- D. Obbink (ed.), *Philodemus and Poetry* (Oxford 1995)

- S. Oberhelman and D. Armstrong, 'Satire as Poetry and the Impossibility of Metathesis in Horace's Satires', *Philodemus and Poetry*, Ed. D. Obbink (Oxford 1995) 233-254
- A. O'Brien-Moore, *Madness in Ancient Literature* (Weimar 1924)
- D. O'Connor, 'The invulnerable pleasures of Epicurean friendship', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 30 (1989) 165-186
- A. Oltramare, *Les Origines de la Diatribe Romaine* (Geneva 1926)
- T.E Page, *The Aeneid of Virgil, Books I-VI* (London 1894, reprinted 1964)
- T.E. Page, *Q. Horatii Flacci Carminum Libri IV, Epodon Liber* (London 1883, reprinted 1920)
- A. Palmer, *The Satires of Horace* (London 1883, reprinted 1905)
- A.S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De divinatione* (Illinois 1920/1923, reprinted Darmstadt 1963)
- A.S. Pease, *Cicero: De Natura Deorum* (Cambridge 1958)
- W. Peek, *Greek Verse Inscriptions* (1955, reprinted Chicago 1988)
- R. Phillispon, 'Das Sittlichschöne bei Panaitios', *Philologus* 85 (1930) 357-413
- J. Porter, 'Content and Form in Philodemus', *Philodemus and Poetry*, ed. D. Obbink (Oxford 1995) 97-147
- J.G.F. Powell, *Cicero: Laelius de amicitia* (Warminster 1990)
- K. Praechter, 'Krantor and Ps. Archytas', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 10 (1897) 186-190, reprinted in *Kleine Schriften* (New York 1973) 33-37
- G. Pugliese Carratelli, 'Testi e monumenti (alla memoria di Raffaele Mattioli)', *Parola del Passato* 29 (1974) 108-126
- G. Pugliese Carratelli, 'Ancora Sulla Lamina Orfica di Hipponion', *Parola del Passato* 31 (1976) 458-466
- K. Quinn, *Virgil's 'Aeneid'* (London 1969)
- K. Quinn, *Horace: The Odes* (London 1980)
- H. Rackham, *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics* (London; New York 1926, reprinted 1962)

- H. Rackham, *Cicero De natura deorum, Academica* (London; New York 1933)
- E. Rawson, *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic* (London 1985)
- E. Rawson, 'Roman Rulers and the Philosophic Adviser', *Philosophia Togata*, eds. M. Griffin and J. Barnes (Oxford 1989) 233-257
- J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (London 1969)
- J.M Rist, *Epicurus: An Introduction* (Cambridge 1972)
- J.M. Rist, 'Epicurus on Friendship', *Classical Philology* 75 (1980) 121-129
- J.M. Rist, *The Mind of Aristotle* (Toronto 1989)
- F. Ritter, vol. ii, *Satirae et Epistulae* (1856-1857)
- H.J Rix, J.R. March, 'Orestes', *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, eds. A. Spawforth and S. Hornblower (Oxford 2003) 1074
- O.F. Robinson, *The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome* (London 1995)
- J.C. Rolfe, *Suetonius: De vita Caesarum* (Cambridge, Mass.; London 1914; revised, D.W. Hurley, G.P. Goold 1997-1998)
- J.C. Rolfe, *Sallust* (London; New York 1921)
- M.V. Ronnick, *Cicero's "Paradoxa Stoicorum"* (Frankfurt; New York 1991)
- W.D. Ross, *Aristotle: Ethica Nicomachea* (Oxford 1925)
- W.H.D. Rouse, *Lucretius: De rerum natura* (London; New York 1924; revised, M.F. Smith, Cambridge Mass. 1992)
- M. Ruch, 'Horace, Satires 1.3', *Études Classiques* 38 (1970) 517-527
- N. Rudd, 'Had Horace been criticised?' *AJP* (1955) 165-175
- N. Rudd, *The Satires of Horace* (Cambridge 1966)
- N. Rudd, 'Horace as Moralist', *Horace 2000: A Celebration: Essays for the Bimillennium*, ed. N. Rudd (London 1993) 64-88
- N. Rudd, *Horace, Epodes and Odes* (Cambridge Mass.; London 2004)
- D. A. Russell, 'Literary Criticism', *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, eds. A. Spawforth and S. Hornblower (Oxford 2003) 869

- J. Rusten and I.C. Cunningham, *Theophrastus: Characters, Herodas: Mimes, Sophron and Other Mime Fragments* (Cambridge Mass. and London 2002)
- R.B. Rutherford, *The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: A Study* (Oxford 1989)
- S. Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics* (London 1959, reprinted 1987)
- F.H. Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London 1975)
- L. Scarpa, 'Adfigit humo divinae particulam auras', *Dignam dis, a G. Vallot: Silloge di studi suoi e dei suoi amici* (Venice 1972) 229-237
- J. Scheid, *Religion et Piété à Rome* (Paris 1985)
- D. M. Schenkeveld, 'Language', *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. K. Algra et al. (Cambridge 1999) 177-225
- J. Schmidt, *Physiognomik RE* 20.1 (1941) 1064-1074
- M. Schofield, 'Social and Political Thought', *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, eds. K. Algra et al. (Cambridge 1999) 760-768
- D.N. Sedley, 'Epicurus and his Professional Rivals', *Études sur L'Epicurisme Antique: Cahiers de Philologie* 1 (1976) 119-159
- D.N. Sedley, 'On Signs', *Science and Speculation*, eds. J. Barnes et al. (Cambridge; Paris 1982) 239-272
- D.N. Sedley, *Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom* (Cambridge 1998)
- W.Y. Sellar, *Horace and the Elegiac Poets* (Oxford 1924)
- D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *A Profile of Horace* (London 1982)
- R.W. Sharples, Review of *Bion of Borysthenes*, by J.F. Kindstrand, *JHS* (1978) 179
- R.W. Sharples, 'Soft Determinism and Freedom in Early Stoicism', *Phronesis* 31 (1986) 266-279
- R.W. Sharples, *Cicero: On Fate (De fato), and, Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy IV, 5-7, V* (Warminster 1991, revised 1996)
- R.W. Sharples, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics* (London 1996)
- N. Sherman, 'The Look and Feel of Virtue', *Virtue, Norms and Objectivity*, ed. C. Gill (Oxford 2005) 59-82
- E.T. Silk, 'Notes on Cicero and the Odes of Horace', *YCS* 13 (1952)

- W.D. Smith, *Hippocrates, Pseudo-epigraphic Writings* (Leiden 1990)
- R. Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind* (Oxford 2000)
- F-A. Steinmetz, *Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaitios nach einer Analyse von Ciceros "Laelius de amicitia"* (Wiesbaden 1967)
- B. Stenuit, 'Le Séjour d'Horace à Athènes', *Études Classiques* 47 (1979) 249-253
- S. Sudhaus, *Philodemus: Philodemi volumina rhetorica* (Teubner 1892-1896)
- H.P. Syndikus, *Die Lyrik des Horaz, I*, (Darmstadt 1972)
- H. Tarrant, *Scepticism or Platonism* (Cambridge 1985)
- G. Terzis, 'Homeostasis and the Mean in Aristotle's Ethics', *Apeiron* (1995) 175-189
- H. Thesleff, *An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period* (Åbo 1961)
- T. Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul: Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis Books ii-iii* (New York 1996)
- R. Todd, *Cleomedes Caelestia* (Leipzig 1990)
- S. Treggiari, 'Cicero, Horace and mutual friends: Lamiae and Varrones Murenarum', *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 245-261
- S. Treggiari, *Roman Social History* (London; New York 2002)
- J. O. Urmson, 'Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean', *American Philosophical Quarterly* (1973) 223-230
- H. Usener, *Epicurea* (1887, reprinted Rome 1963)
- R.G. Ussher, *The Characters of Theophrastus* (London; New York 1960, reprinted: 1993)
- C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense, *Stobaeus Johannes: Anthologium* (Berlin 1884)
- P.G. Walsh, *Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods* (Cambridge 1961)
- J.M. Walton and P.H. Arnott, *Menander and the Making of Comedy* (Westport, Conn.; London 1996)
- E.H. Warmington, *Remains of Old Latin* (London; Cambridge, Mass. 1938)

- L.C. Watson, *Horace: Epodes* (Oxford 2001)
- F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles, Texte und Kommentar: Aristoxenos* (Basle 1945)
- F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles, Texte und Kommentar: Clearchus* (Basle 1948)
- D.A. West, *Horace Odes I: Carpe Diem* (Oxford 1995)
- D.A. West, *Horace Odes ii: Vatis Amici* (Oxford 1998)
- D.A. West, *Horace Odes III: Dulce Periculum* (Oxford 2002)
- E.C. Wickham, *Q. Horatii Flacci Opera Omnia, vol. I & II* (Oxford 1877 & 1891)
- W. Wili, *Horaz und die Augusteiche Kultur* (Basle 1948, reprinted 1965)
- G. Williams, *Horace: Greece and Rome, New Surveys in the Classics No 6* (Oxford 1972)
- M.R. Wright, *On Stoic Good and Evil* (Warminster 1990)
- G. Zuntz, *Persephone* (Oxford 1971)